| 1. | The aggression of belligerent Eritrea on peace loving Ethiopia is a continuation of the aggressive policy of the Government of Eritrea on its neighbors. The Hanish Crisis involving Eritrea and Yemen and border incident with the Republic of Djibouti, and now the aggression against Ethiopia, etc. are the result of the provocative and aggressive policies of the Eritrean Government . It is to be noted that in order to advance their aggressive and expansionist policies against their neighbours, the Eritrean authorities have been transforming their country into a virtual military camp by training and arming the overwhelming majority of their able bodied citizens and inculcating in them racist and jingoist ideologies. |
| 2. | The Ethiopian territories such as Badme and its environs, Seboa-Una Shahak, Aiga-Alitena and Bada areas, etc. claimed by the expansionists in Asmara have perpetually been under the jurisdiction of Ethiopia. This holds true to the periods when Eritrea was under the colonial boots of the Italians, under the protectorate of British Administration, during the period of struggle for independence and right up to the Eritrean referendum and Eritrean statehood. The Eritreans have no basis in fact or history to lay claim on these territories, except their sick expansionist ambitions. |
| 3. | Prior to the incident of May 6 and the Eritrean aggression of May 12, 1998, both the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides had complaints concerning some incidents along the border. In fact, it was the Ethiopian side which had raised more of the complaints regarding the issue. Since the Eritreans had made encroachments on Ethiopian territory starting from the time of the downfall of the Dergue regime, Ethiopia had continuously complained to the Eritrean authorities about their encroachments on the Badme, Bada and areas on the Assab road. Regarding Bada and areas on the Assab road, the Eritrean authorities were telling the Ethiopian side that they were there to fill the vacuum and provide some social services to the people. In any case they were not forthcoming and clear about their intentions. But they never ever frankly told the Ethiopian side about their claims on these territories. Prior to sending military units to Bada, the Ethiopian side had informed the Eritreans of its plan two weeks earlier and they had accepted it for they had no legitimate reason, territorial claim or otherwise, to oppose it. Whatever complaints the Eritrean side had made after the event, it can only be an after-thought in order to placate some of their chauvinist cadres and army commanders who were thinking and working on the basis that Bada was Eritrean territory. As far as Badme was concerned the Ethiopian side was complaining to the Eritrean side of encroachments perpetrated by the adjacent Eritrean district authorities. It was at latter stages that the Eritrean side began to raise complaints regarding some incidents around the Badme area. Taking into consideration the above facts one wonders whether the whole issue is a border issue or whether there is an ulterior motive and a hidden agenda under the disguise of a border issue. |
| 4. | Since the issues around the border areas and to a large extent the policy differences on economic issues between the two governments were making the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea relatively more tense, the Ethiopian side proposed that a mechanism be initiated to permanently settle whatever border issues there might be. And as a consequence a Joint Commission was created to look into the modalities of settling the issue . The first meeting of the joint body took place in Asmara on 14 November 1997. And after discussing the issue, the Joint Commission agreed as follows :
b. until the border issue is permanently resolved, the status quo on the ground should be maintained. c. that the two sides should cooperate to reduce tensions in the border areas. |
| 5. | Sometime in March 1998, the two sides communicated and scheduled a meeting of the Joint Commission for 8 May 1998. Meanwhile on 6 May 1998 an armed confrontation was provoked when armed Eritrean troops in violation of earlier understanding crossed into Ethiopian territory in the Badme area. The Ethiopian police on the spot reminded the Eritrean troops of the existing agreement that crossing to either side of the border with arms in possession is prohibited and that they should leave their arms on their side of the border if they wished to enter Ethiopian territory. The Eritrean troops not only refused to comply with the Ethiopian Police's request but also opened fire and so there ensued an exchange of fire causing some causalities on both sides. It should be underscored here that this exchange was between Eritrean regular troops and local police and militia since there were no Ethiopian regular troops along the border where the incident took place or anywhere along the entire Ethiopia-Eritrea border for that matter. This was so because Ethiopia never expected that such a trusted and close neighbour as Eritrea would entertain any aggressive designs against Ethiopia. |
| 6. | Just two days after the Badme incident, on 8 May 1998, the Joint Commission met in Addis Ababa and discussed the border issue and also the Badme incident. The meeting was cordial and the following agreement was reached:
b. The Eritrean armed units which had made an incursion into Ethiopian territory since May 6 would evacuate and return to Eritrean territory. c. Crossings of armed personnel from one to the other's territory should be prohibited in line with past agreements. d. The status quo and the stability of the border should be maintained pending a final agreement. e. Efforts to reduce tension should be undertaken and as a means of reducing tension the incident of May 6 should be investigated jointly. |
| 7. | It was also agreed on 8 May 1998 that the Eritrean delegates would spend the following day (May 9) in Addis Ababa in order to consolidate the May 8 agreement through informal talks. But the Eritrean delegation left Addis Ababa on the morning of May 9 without even notifying its host, the Ethiopian side. |
| 8. | On 10 and 11 May 1998, several efforts were made by high officials of the Ethiopian government to seek clarification of what was occurring when the movement of armed units and tanks were observed taking positions near Badme town, contrary to the agreement. On 10 May 1998 when the Ethiopian Chief of Staff spoke by telephone to the Eritrean Minister of Defense on the matter in detail the reply was that the Eritrean authorities were discussing the matter and that any situation contrary to what had been agreed to on 8 May 1998, would be rectified. Also, on 11 May 1998 , Prime Minister Meles Zenawi sent a message to President Isayas via the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa, demanding that the massing of troops in the Badme area should be halted and that Eritrean armed forces should vacate Ethiopian territory on the basis of the agreement of 8 May 1998. |
| 9. | 12 May 1998: Early in the morning, columns of the Eritrean army, backed by tanks, moved into Badme town and its environs and overwhelmed the local police posts and the militia and invaded Ethiopian territory. There were no Ethiopian army units in the area, when the armed force of the Asmara Government invaded this area which had never been administrated by any colonial or present Eritrean government. |
| 10. | On 12 and 13 May 1998, Prime Minister Meles by contacting President Isayas Afewerki tried to work out a peaceful solution, but did not succeed. |
| 11. | On 13 May 1998, the Council of Ministers and House of Peoples' Representatives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia passed a resolution condemning the aggression, demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean invading forces and warning that Ethiopia reserved the right to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Eritrean military action is a violation of international law and many joint agreements between the two countries. |
| 12. | In response to the Eritrean military action, the Government of Ethiopia mobilized its armed forces to protect the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This involved stationing troops along many parts of the common frontier between Ethiopia and Eritrea. |
| 13. | On 17 May 1998, Vice President Paul Kagame of Rwanda came to Ethiopia at the start of an effort to defuse the crisis. His delegation was joined by a delegation of the Government of the United States. The two delegations conducted joint facilitation meetings with the governments of the two countries in a shuttle between Addis Ababa and Asmara which continued until 29 May 1998. |
| 14. | On 30 May 1998, President Isayas of Eritrea said that withdrawal of his invading forces from Ethiopian territory was "morally unthinkable and physically impossible", publicly rejecting the peaceful avenue as a means of resolving the crisis. |
| 15. | From 31st May - 6 June 1998, Eritrean forces launched repeated invasion attempts in the Zalambassa, Alitena and Aiga areas in the hope of creating new facts on the ground. |
| 16. | On 4 June 1998, Ethiopia accepted the peace proposals submitted to both sides by the US/Rwanda Facilitators. The key elements of the package are:-
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| 17. | On 5 June 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in a Special Session in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, urgently appealed to the two parties ' to put an end, concurrently and simultaneously, to all hostilities, accept and implement the recommendation of the [US/Rwanda] facilitators.' |
| 18. | On 5 June 1998, the Eritrean air force bombed Mekele, the capital of Tigray, deliberately targeting civilian neighborhoods and hitting an elementary school in session. 51 civilians including children and parents were killed and 136 wounded in the air raid of two sorties. Early in the afternoon, they bombed the Mekele civilian airport runway and its vicinity. In the second raid a couple of hours later, the Eritrean planes bombed an elementary school where parents had arrived to fetch their children and other civilians were in the area to help. It is therefore clear that the strikes were deliberately directed at the civilian population. |
| 19. | On 5 and 6 June 1998, in self-defense to the bombing of Mekele, the Ethiopian Air Force made two air raids on Eritrean military installations specifically the air force base outside Asmara destroying military planes and other airforce installations. |
| 20. | On 8 June 1998, in his message to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, meeting in the capital of Burkina Faso, the President of Eritrea proposed direct talks with Ethiopia, arguing that "this we believe will ensure a speedy resolution, as the facilitation process that has been underway has been a time-consuming process." Then on 9 June 1998, he was quoted by Reuters News Agency as saying:"...the problem with the peace process is the hasty way it was managed by the Americans... they believe in quick fixes and bulldozing and that does not work. It is not our culture." |
| 21. | Starting on 9 June 1998, Eritrea expelled over 4,000 Ethiopian peaceful civilians and detained about 600 others, confiscating their property including personal belongings and inflicting inhuman sufferings. Those imprisoned are still held incommunicado without access to their families and the ICRC. |
| 22. | The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its 34th Session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, held 8 to 10 June 1998, decided to launch an initiative to defuse the crisis based on the United States/Rwanda Facilitation Plan. The Assembly appealed to 'the two parties to put an end, concurrently and simultaneously, to all hostilities, accept and implement the recommendations of the facilitators' and decided to send a delegation of Heads of State and Government to Addis Ababa and Asmara to help resolve the crisis. |
| 23. | On 9 June 1998, Ethiopian positions at Zalambessa were attacked. This involved Eritrean troops crossing into parts of Ethiopian territory that the Government of Eritrea has never even claimed. |
| 24. | On 10 June 1998, at 6 a.m. Eritrean forces attacked an Ethiopian post on the Badme /Sheraro front at Erde Mattios near the Takeze River and the attackers were repulsed sustaining heavy causalities. |
| 25. | On 11 June 1998, Eritrea attacked on the Assab road around Bure but its forces were repulsed once again sustaining heavy casualties. |
| 26. | In the afternoon of 11 June 1998, after being categorically defeated on these two fronts and out of desperation Eritrea bombed civilian targets with cluster bombs in Adi-Grat, killing 4, wounding 30 civilians including an 18 month-old baby and a pregnant woman and destroying a grain store of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission in which large quantities of grain and edible oil were destroyed. |
| 27. | In an interview published in the June 12 issue of the Times (London) President Isayas Afewerki of Eritrea threatened to strike at the heart of Ethiopia. "There are a number of ways," he said. "It is not difficult to create a sense of insecurity anywhere in Ethiopia." he added. |
| 28. | On 12 June 1998, Ethiopia announced some precautionary measures with respect to Eritreans that were considered a threat to national security, while at the same time stressing that peaceful Eritreans should feel safe because there would be no change to the policy on Eriteans living and working peacefully in Ethiopia. The precautionary measures concerned the following three categories:
b. Functionaries and officials of the EPLF office and other party interests in Addis Ababa were expelled. c. Individual Eritreans who were found engaged in spying activities and mobilizing financial and other resources to support the Eritrean aggression were also expelled. Those in categories b and c number about 1045 and have been taken by transport to the border with Eritrea, accompanied by representatives of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society. |
| 29. | On 15 June, Ethiopia accepted a proposal by President Clinton of the United States to suspend the use of air strikes while efforts were underway to seek a peaceful end to the crisis, once more giving peace a chance. However, Ethiopia served notice that it reserved the right to end the moratorium if and when it is convinced that the peace process has come to an end. |
| 30. | The OAU Mission, under the chairmanship of President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and including the Presidents of Zimbabwe and Djibouti as well as the Secretary General of the OAU discussed on June 18 the implementation of the United States/Rwandan Facilitation Plan, which had become a plan adopted by the OAU, with the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. Meles Zenawi. The Mission left for Asmara the same day and was told that Badme and its environs were Eritrean territory. The OAU Delegation briefed the Ethiopian Prime Minister on 19 June 1998 on the conclusion of its mission characterized as unsuccessful by Secretary General Salim A. Salim of the OAU because, he said, Eritrea rejected the plan proposed by the United States/Rwanda facilitators, accepted by Ethiopia and adopted by the OAU. |
| 31. | Nevertheless the OAU Mission of Heads of State decided on a mechanism to continue with efforts to resolve the crisis by peaceful means. |
| 32. | It was clear by then that the Eritrean regime had derailed the OAU facilitation efforts by presenting it with a dilemma in the form of a lie that Badme and its environs were Eritrean territory in the first place. The OAU Delegation decided on a mechanism to verify who was administering Badme before 12 May 1998 as well as how the crisis evolved. Therefore, the Mission instructed the ambassadors of Burkina Faso, Djibouti and Zimbabwe to Ethiopia to constitute with the OAU Secretary General a fact finding Committee of Ambassadors. |
| 33. | A mission was assigned to the Committee of Ambassadors to:-
2. collect from the two parties or any other appropriate international organization and agency information which would make it possible to determine the authority which was administering Badme before 12 May 1998; 3. reiterate the appeal made to the two parties by the OAU Delegation of Heads of State during its visit so that they: |
| 34. | On 26 June 1998, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1177 which, inter alia: À expresses its strong support for the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 10 June 1998 (during its annual session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso); À calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the OAU. |
| 35. | On 30 June 1998, the Committee of Ambassadors, began its mission with a visit to Asmara.
In Addis Ababa, the Committee was received by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on 8 July 1998. He briefed it on the background and the evolution of the crisis, with emphasis that aggression by the Eritrean regime was at the centre of the problem and that aggression should be condemned as intolerable to principles that govern interstate relations. On 8 and 9 July, the Committee received evidence on the fact that Ethiopia was administering Badme before 12 May 1998. The evidence included:
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| 36. | On 11 July 1998, the Ethiopian Government released a document on the organization of the EPLF network under zone 7 with four branches throughout much of Ethiopia. Discovery of the network's documentary evidence became a basis of further investigation and expulsion of those considered a threat to the security and well being of the Ethiopian peoples. |
| 37. | On 1 - 2 August 1998, the OAU Mission at Ministerial level met the foreign ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, separately and discussed with them the report drawn up by the Committee of Ambassadors on the crisis. The summary of the report concludes, inter alia: " With regard to the authority which was administering Badme before 12 May 1998 and on the basis of the information at our disposal, we have reached the conclusion that Badme town and its environs were administered by the Ethiopian authorities before 12 May 1998. "Our Committee understands the viewpoint of Eritrea on the origin of the conflict and notes, in this connection, its concerns about the incidents which would have taken place at other places on the common border in July 1997. It, further, takes note of the evolution of the conflict due to the escalation which occurred after 12 May 1998. It is, nevertheless, of the view that what happened in Badme between 6 and 12 May constitutes a fundamental element of the crisis. Consequently, the challenge to be taken up is to find a solution to that particular problem and that within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in all its dimensions."(emphasis added). On another point, the report says; "The Ethiopian side considers that there are two distinct issues involved in the present conflict. First, there is what it considers as the act of aggression perpetrated by Eritrea which, according to Ethiopia, must be undone and not rewarded. Then there is the problem of the border dispute which must be considered once Eritrea will have withdrawn its forces from Badme and its environs. Ethiopia continues to accept the recommendations of the Facilitators and to consider the role of the OAU High Level Delegation to be the implementation of the decision adopted by the Summit of the Organization in Quagadougou and which it accepted." |
| 38. | On 5 August, Eritrea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on the fact finding Committee's report. In the first place, the Eritrean regime re-iterated its position that the crisis could be resolved by legal and technical means in effect considering its aggression as trivial, as if the aggression did not violate international law and the foundation of interstate relations. While not contesting the OAU finding on which authority was administering Badme before the Eritrean aggression of 12 May 1998, the Asmara regime said that "administration in itself was not valid if the process by which the administration had been established was illegal." However, there is evidence that Eritrean authorities had been communicating in writing, and officially, with the Badme Administration as a legal Ethiopian Administration. The Eritrean regime has also deliberately misread an important paragraph of the document changing it to say that the "Ministerial Committee... underlined its concerns about the incidents which would have taken place at other places on the common border to July 1997." The correct expression, as shown in paragraph 37, is that the Ministerial Committee notes its (Eritrea's) concerns about the incidents,..." |
| 39. | The Union of African Parliamentarians at its 21st conference held in Niamey, Niger 18-20 August 1998 adopted a resolution which:-
· calls upon Eritrea to respect the findings of the OAU Ministerial Committee dealing with the crisis, which has conclusively affirmed that Ethiopian administered territories have been occupied by Eritrean armed forces;
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| 40. | Throughout August 1998, the Eritrean authorities mounted a propaganda campaign concentrated on the human right issue related to the decision to expel Eritrean nationals found to be a threat to national security and public safety of Ethiopia. By the end of the month, Asmara had claimed that 20,000 had been expelled by Ethiopia while the actual figure was only 6,300. The propaganda was maximized to a degree that would divert international attention away from the core issue of Eritrea's aggression which was factually proved to be the only cause of the crisis. |