An identification with a particular territory seems to be a natural part of human social organization. Thus, it is not surprising that national consciousness has occurred most frequently in people inhabiting a common piece of territory, sometimes overcoming cultural and even linguistic differences. Developing this consciousness is more difficult in diaspora populations which have no common land from which to raise their struggle or no vision of a homeland to use as a rallying symbol. The interesting question that arises, then, is how certain diaspora populations have formed a sense of national consciousness without either a real or imagined homeland.

This paper considers the existing paradigm of the nation, as presented by Smith, which only differentiates the state from the nation in that states hold sovereign power while contingent upon territory as the basis for nationhood. The paper suggests an alternative paradigm for understanding nationhood in an era in which non-state actors who are not necessarily linked to territory are growing in importance. Through this new paradigm, one can conceive of the nation in a manner that corresponds with existing mechanisms and structures of the international system, such as the human rights regime. This shift requires a reconsideration of the nation's purpose. This purpose no longer need be survival through sovereign territory, but instead can be survival through integration (not assimilation) into existing international structures.1

The paper then examines how national consciousness is formed in the absence of a common territory or homeland by considering the case of the Roma, a widely dispersed group with no vision of a historic homeland (northern India is considered the land of their origin, but the Roma do not consider it a homeland). Roma are stereotypically known as nomadic by choice; however, discrimination often has forced them to keep migrating. Many Roma have settled in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, with the largest group residing in Romania, but they are also scattered throughout many countries of Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and America.

Romani national identity is a relatively new phenomenon.2This paper considers the formation of Romani identity examining the specific mechanisms and processes, such as interaction between Romani and international organizations, that have been successful in creating and consolidating national identity. The paper also considers the factors which have impeded the formation of a common identity, such as geographic and linguistic diversity, and the problems of consolidating and maintaining a national identity in a diaspora situation. The central question in the case of the Roma is how far the "imagined community" (Anderson 1983) can be stretched and how the successful mechanisms of creating national consciousness have contributed to the ability to imagine the national community.

In order to outline the inherent difficulty of forming a national consciousness in the absence of a homeland, the second section briefly considers literature on political geography that describes how territories shape political spaces. Relating the importance of territory to nation-building, this section also considers the question of what a nation is and what role territory plays in forming a national identity, primarily using the works of Smith and Armstrong. The paper then offers a different perspective on the formation of a nation explaining how a new definition of the nation is more appropriate given the current international system. The case of the Roma serves as a basis to re-evaluate the concept of the nation and the historical background of their national development is a basis to analyze how the Roma illustrate this new paradigm. The final section considers how a national identity can be maintained if a nation does not inhabit a common territory by exploring the specific mechanisms Romani national organizers have used, and how other groups can use these mechanisms successfully.

The Relationship Between Territory and Nation

Contemporary scholars' definitions of the nation are based on the assumption that a nation must inhabit a common territory with the understanding that territory helps shape political spaces. However, in describing the importance of political space for the purpose of the nation, many scholars ascribe characteristics to the nation that more accurately belong to the state (Smith 1981; Gellner 1983, 30­38; Kedourie 1960, 7). In determining the differences between national and state characteristics, one must first consider the role of territory in developing a national consciousness and whether the characteristics that follow from territorial consolidation of political consciousness and power are necessary for the nation's existence.

The field of political geography contributes to an understanding of how territory shapes political space and how people develop an identification with a territory. As Agnew claims,
 

. . . place is more than an 'object' . . . Concrete, everyday practices give rise to a 'structure of feeling,' . . . or 'felt sense of the quality of life at a particular place and time' . . . This sense of place reinforces the social-spatial definition of place from inside, so to speak. The identification with place that can follow contributes yet another aspect to the meaning of place: one place or 'territory' in its differentiation from other places can become an 'object' of identity for a "subject" (Agnew 1987, 27­8).

Rather than power emerging solely from social relations, which can change, power is identified with place and thus becomes institutionalized more easily. Johnston, Knight, and Kofman argue that territory reifies power and that "territory can be used ideologically, to promote certain interests which require social control by associating them with a place within which that control is exercised (and recognized under the doctrine of sovereignty), thereby legitimating the control by obscuring its real nature" (Johnston, Knight, and Kofman 1988, 5). Noting the effect of territory on power when considering the processes of nation- and state-building is insightful. By reifying power, a territory can transform a land of various peoples into a land of one people, an ethnic group,3so to speak.

Smith views territory as all-important to the existence of an ethnic community or ethnie and the subsequent development of the nation. The ethnie, which, according to Smith, is a group with a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific piece of territory, and a sense of solidarity (Smith 1987, 22­30), requires territory for its continued existence because the symbolism associated with territory creates ethnic and, subsequently, national ties. The sense of nationhood thus cannot exist in a non-territorially consolidated group. However, in the case of the ethnie, the possession of the homeland is not as important as the symbolism it provides as the "symbolic geographic centre" of the group existence (Smith 1987, 28). This symbol of a homeland is an essential factor in group consciousness.

Armstrong articulates a different view on the role of territory in forming an ethnic community. He claims that the "primary characteristic of ethnic boundaries is attitudinal. In their origins and in their most fundamental effects, ethnic boundary mechanisms exist in the minds of their subjects rather than as lines on a map or norms in a rule book" (Armstrong 1982, 7­8). He adopts the ideas of the Norwegian anthropologist Barth who writes that ethnic identity is developed by social boundaries as opposed to territorial ones. Ethnic identity has an unfixed character which changes through social interaction. Nevertheless, perceptions of difference exist between group members and non-members. The processes of inclusion and exclusion among ethnic groups exhibit such boundaries, which can partly be defined by language. This theory holds that the members, as well as the culture, of the ethnic group can change and the sense of belonging to the group is defined by sociological factors such as myth, symbol, and communication, as well as attitudinal factors (Armstrong 1982, 7­9). The ethnic group, therefore, need not be defined by the territory it inhabits.

Scholars, however, generally conceive of nations as inextricable from territory primarily because nationhood implies political consciousness and activity, which in the modern era have always been linked to a particular space. Smith and other scholars such as Gellner, Anderson, and Kedourie all either argue or imply that a national identity must be formed in relation to a specific territory. As Smith theorizes, the historic community upon which the nation is based must always be associated with a distinct homeland since territory is the "material for a political construct . . . one that can preferably furnish the basis for a successful 'nation-state' " (Smith 1981, 187­203). Yet this view of political constructs is too limiting and does not consider new constructs which do not require an exclusive territory.

Smith defines a nation as a "named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991, 40). However, some of these other characteristics of a nation are more accurately classified as characteristics of a state. A mass, public culture usually has been the creation of a state through processes of industrialization and state education. Common legal rights and duties are also defined by an autonomous political structure such as the state. A nation may have a common economy if the entire nation exists within one state; however, if a nation is divided among several states, a common national economy is by no means a given.

One must consider what the goal of nationhood is today in order to determine whether all of Smith's characteristics of a nation are necessary to label a group a nation. Smith contends that "nationalism always involves a struggle for land, or an assertion about rights to land" (Smith 1981, 187). Yet more specifically, he means that this struggle for land is about the right to form a nation-state on that land. He differentiates between two aims of nationalism: one which links culture and politics, and thus claims that only distinctive cultural groupings can be the foundation of a state; and the other which links culture and geography or geopolitics, and claims that nations and territories belong together with every nation having its "rightful place on earth, which belongs to it and it alone" (Smith 1981, 191). Both types of nationalism aspire to statehood. The only difference is whether any territory could be the basis of a nation, or whether a specific territory must provide that basis.

If an ethnic identity or community can form without territorial attachment which the Roma clearly exhibit following the same logic, a nation can form without a common territory as well, at least in this era of increasing international interdependence. Thus, Smith's definition of the nation based on territory is inadequate. An ethnic community already has two of the characteristics of a nation: common myths and historical memories. According to Smith's definition, the nation is only one step away from being a state. His definition implies that a nation already has most of the requisites of self-determination and the next logical step is to gain international recognition. Yet this definition prevents many groups such as the Roma from legitimately claiming rights to the protection of their culture and gaining recognition of their common goals. Other definitions of the nation may not be as specific as Smith's, but nationhood, in the commonly accepted sense of the term, is usually synonymous with a common territory. This conception again is inadequate because it favors groups which have a territory often by the arbitrary good fortune of history over those which are dispersed among many states and sovereign territories controlled by others. Thus, the definition of a nation should include diaspora groups which do not have a homeland.

A New Definition of the Nation

A more useful definition of a nation for the purposes of the contemporary international system is a politicized ethnic group acting with or without attachment to a territory. This definition more adequately captures the goals of a nation without undermining the territorial integrity of existing structures. The territorial and sovereign state is not the only level on which politics can be practiced. Today political organization takes place more and more frequently on the international or suprastate level. Avenues of political mobilization are provided by the United Nations (UN) as well as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), various human rights groups, and other inter-national organizations. In addition, unrepresented nations and peoples now have an official forum in which to express their concerns the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples' Organization (UNPO) at The Hague as well as their own national, non-state organizations such as the International Romani Union (IRU). By defining the nation through its involvement with these organizations and structures, one can more clearly understand the nature of political activity in an increasingly integrated system.

The acceptance of a group as a nation is contingent today upon in-formal UN and state recognition. In the UN, nations can be legitimized through organs such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), where organizations representing nations hold consultative or observer status. States can informally recognize the existence of a nation by sanctioning the right of groups to agitate for their human rights. While human rights, by definition, pertain to individuals and not to groups, states do acknowledge that certain groups are targeted and collectively experience violations of their human rights. Recognizing the violations that pertain to a group and condemning these violations legitimizes the right of this group to act collectively for its protection (e.g., to act as a nation). Before the emergence of the current international climate, a nation could exist, but if it were not legitimized by even informal state recognition, it would have no recourse in protecting itself short of forming an army and fighting for statehood. Today, however, the recognition of a nation by the UN or by a number of strong states through publicly acknowledging its existence and the violations of its members' rights automatically legitimizes that nation and gives it the ability to seek recourse when members of the nation are threatened by the state(s) in which they live.

With this in mind, one can credibly ask whether statehood is necessarily the goal of a nation. With several different structures and arenas in which political mobilization can occur, the political purpose of the nation can be achieved without statehood. The primary goal of the nation is the protection of its people. One way a nation can achieve this is through the international arena involving a suprastate (or non-state) organization of the national group. This group, through the support of the UN as well as various human rights groups, can act as a watchdog for the protection of its people dispersed among various states. In a changing international system, where non-state actors are gaining a larger role and the notion of group rights is gaining legitimacy (Hannum 1993; Barsh 1994; Grossman 1993), this national organization could work supranationally for the protection of cultural, linguistic, and educational rights of its nation within all the various states its members inhabit.

A nation can also be organized within a pre-existing state, becoming involved in the state structures to ensure the cultural preservation of the nation. Such activities are possibly as effective in preserving the nation as attempts to create a national state, if not more so, considering the threat to the nation that arises from fighting for sovereignty. Due to the growing degree of international recourse available to nations protecting the rights of their people, territorial sovereignty (an impossible idea if applied universally to nations4) ceases to be as important in this day and age. Survival is often less a matter of withstanding military campaigns than resisting attempts at assimilation. The existence of a security threat is the most compelling reason for desiring territorial sovereignty, but nations can resist assimilation as well as certain military threats in ways other than creating a sovereign national state, namely by involvement in existing state structures as well as international organizations that can protect cultural rights.

Since the universal principle of a state for every nation is an impossibility and alternative methods exist for the protection of the nation, a new paradigm of the nation is necessary. This thesis requires a conscious shift in the purpose of a nation from survival through sovereign power to survival through integrative processes. Clearly if a nation does not possess a sovereign territory, there are limits to the political rights it can have. Such a nation has to accept that it will need to cooperate with other nations in a common political structure. This need not mean the neglect of national rights, however. The shift in the purpose of the nation would be from a more politicized existence which aims to exercise control over every aspect of that nation to the goal of cultural and social preservation. This would include the ability to exercise political authority over the group only to the degree necessary to defend group cultural and social interests.

In addition to fighting for sovereignty out of national hubris, many of the recent nationalist uprisings have occurred in response to the fear of genocide,5or, more benignly, in response to conditions which do not allow the group to fulfill its moral purpose.6Yet if mechanisms in international politics exist that allow external intervention when a nation faces genocide or simply cannot fulfill its moral purpose, then territorial conflict can be mitigated. This obviously would not be a perfect process and may not work well when strong national attachments exist to particular land (such as the Serbian romantic attachment to Kosovo, although 90 percent of its inhabitants are Albanians and the Serbs have not constituted a majority in this region since the end of the Ottoman Empire). Even defining a nation's rights as acceptable if they do not infringe upon the rights of other nations leaves many questions unanswered. The international community would clearly have to deal with such issues on an ad hoc basis, although it can accept certain rights such as the practice of one's culture, the use of one's national language, and no discrimination due to one's national background as universal principles.

The international community must accept the reality that nations and states are not and will never be congruent. Current theory on nationalism has not been significantly altered by the realization of this fact. The belief that the ideal goal of every nation is the creation of a nation-state is still prevalent. A new paradigm which recognizes that national interests can be protected outside of a sovereign national state would help delegitimize conflict that violates the territorial integrity of a state. This new paradigm would recognize that states and nations do not ideally have to be congruent and should not be so without a compelling reason (such as the complete incorrigibility of a state in respecting the rights of a nation). However, the increasing number of nations that have gained recognition attempting secession effectively undermines a more pragmatic non-territorial concept of the nation. The international community has largely accepted the right of nations within the former communist bloc to break away from existing state structure and form supposedly homogeneous nation-states.

It appears that the rise in nationalist claims for statehood in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has spurred nations in other parts of the world to make similar attempts, or at times has led the international community to accept the right of nations elsewhere to make these claims. This policy, if adopted by the international community, will inevitably lead to a dual standard. Clearly, the number of claims to self-determination in the form of full sovereignty and independence must be limited at some point. But what will be the criteria to determine the right of some nations to statehood or secession and the limiting of the rights of other nations? In determining these criteria, the concept of nationhood becomes politicized not only within the nation, but within the interstate community. Although this may be acceptable from a realistic perspective, supporting some nations for economic or political purposes and rejecting others for the same reasons is less than ideal. The purpose of an international regime is to regulate relations among states and provide certain norms according to which these relations are conducted. The world is becoming too interdependent for this former perspective to hold merit any longer. States are no longer completely sovereign as solitary political units because the growing interaction between states and non-state actors requires greater cooperation and compromise in order to address problems. Such interdependence necessitates a set of international rules that governs relations among all actors and that establishes a standard of human and civil rights to which states must adhere.

Acceptance of the territorial integrity of states in conjunction with their declining sovereignty requires a new paradigm for understanding the nation. In the current international system, it is no longer necessarily a goal of the nation to strive for a state. The goals of nationhood can be limited to the preservation of the nation culturally, economically, and politically within existing states. The example of the Roma is useful in developing this new paradigm. The Roma consider themselves a nation and they should be accepted as such according to the definition of a nation as a politicized cultural group which seeks the preservation of the group within the existing interstate structure. The goals of the nation may be fulfilled by the organization of the nation on a suprastate level. The Roma's sovereignty does not need to be absolute since, as a non-state actor, the Romani nation has become increasingly legitimized. As a non-state actor within the international regime, the Romani nation, according to this new paradigm, can strive for self-preservation without requiring absolute self-determination.

The Origins of and Current Developments in Romani Nationalism

Romani identity is not a recent construction. The Roma have had a sense of difference ever since the time of their earliest migrations into Europe, which they reached by a.d. 1250. This sense of difference is due to non-Western cultural characteristics, but is also reinforced by the discrimination they have faced since their arrival in Europe. In addition to the extensive discrimination the Roma faced in the past and continue to face today,7the Roma living in Romania were held in slavery for 500 years from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century. They obtained freedom only in the early to mid-nineteenth century, a little known fact in the history of Europe (Hancock 1987, 11­36). Some of the discrimination the Roma face today occurs in the form of laws in the United States and Europe against the settlement of migratory groups on any piece of land without a special permit. In the United Kingdom, Roma sometimes cannot even camp on pieces of land that they own (Coverley 1995, 22­24).

Part of the Romani reaction to discrimination was the maintenance of their separateness from the societies in which they lived. There was, and still is, a clear distinction between Roma and non-Roma (gadjé) and, because their differences are not respected, many Roma have little interaction with the gadjé (Hancock 1991, 136). They fear that if outsiders learn too much about them, they will face even more discrimination and hatred (Hancock 1991, 136­7). For these various reasons, Roma have a strong sense of difference vis-à-vis the populations of the countries in which they live. This separateness is reinforced by cultural traditions such as that of ritual purity (Hancock 1987, 115) which are difficult to reconcile with Western cultural characteristics. Another factor that has reinforced divisions between the Roma and gadjé has been the mistrust that former feel toward the latter. Thus, Romani identity has formed both from external factors, discrimination against them, and internal factors, their cultural traditions (Hancock 1987, 115). Gonzales claims that "conflict of one sort or another seems often to be a trigger in ethnogenesis or ethnoregenesis" (Gonzales 1989, 6). Smith and Mann also both recognize the role of conflict or adversity in crystallizing an ethnic or even national identification. For Mann, this occurs through warfare; however, the discrimination that Roma have faced can almost be compared to warfare because it has involved random as well as organized violent attacks against their people.

Thus, the Roma have at least a vague sense of group identity, although they are, in fact, a very diverse group. Barany asks "is there a distinctive Romani identity and, if so, what determines it?" (Barany 1994, 321­344). Acton asserts that the Roma are a "most disunited and ill-defined people, possessing a continuity, rather than a community, of culture. Individuals sharing the ancestry and reputation of 'the Gypsy' may have almost nothing in common in their way of life and visible or linguistic culture" (Acton 1974, 54). Yet both suprastate and state Romani national organizations are addressing this disunity. These organizations have succeeded in creating a growing sense of unity among different groups of Roma which understand the benefit of organizing across state boundaries in order to advocate for their individual human rights and their collective rights as a people. Their cultural and even linguistic differences do not preclude a common Romani identity because the purpose of this identity is not to develop uniformity.8

According to Acton, Romani nationalism is an ideal that fuels the political drive to obtain practical benefits rather than a state. Romani nationalism is an inspiration to a small group of intellectuals rather than a mass ideology. Elite groups have fostered the broad underlying identity of the Roma and they have banded together and formed international unions of Roma from all backgrounds. These Romani nationalists commonly voiced the sentiment that the Roma were one people when they came to Europe and that they must bind together as one people again. The belief is that fragmentation was not the result of voluntary internal factors, but of hostile external ones (Hancock 1991, 139). Thus, Romani nationalists seek to bring the Roma together as a cohesive group through international political action.

Any serious talk of a Romani national homeland, a "Romanestan," has been quite limited. The first World Romani Congress rejected the idea of attempting to create a national state in 1971. The movement adopted the idea that "We must create Romanestan in our hearts!" (Acton 1974, 234240). "Romanestan" serves as a symbol for the Romani nation, however there is no desire for an actual state. Kenrick and Puxon underline this fact quoting the Romani activist, Ronald Lee, who asks "What is Romanestan? I will tell you my brothers. Romanestan is our freedom, freedom to live as Gypsies under our laws and our way of life" (Kenrick and Puxon 1972, 206). An additional, and important, aspect of Romani national organization and political rights is the right of the Roma to define themselves. Romani activists contend that if outsiders continue to define the Roma, they do not have control over their nation. The notion of self-definition is the prerogative of any nation; however, achieving this has not been easy for the Roma who are so often judged by stereotypes.

Political activity among the Roma is not solely a modern phenomenon. However, it has grown significantly since World War II with Romani organizations forming in almost every country of Europe including many of Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, the former Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. In 1959, Ionel Rotaru, a Rom who had immigrated to France from Romania, founded the Communauté mondiale gitane (World Gypsy Community) which brought different groups of Roma together and in 1965 a splinter group of this organization formed the Comité international tsigane (International Gypsy Committee). This committee acted as an umbrella for Romani organizations of different states with 23 member organizations from 22 countries in 1972 (Liegeois 1994, 250, 257).

The committee worked to achieve recognition from the Council of Europe and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 1968, it petitioned the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) for recognition of the Roma as a nation which has been persecuted since the fifteenth century. In 1971, the committee organized the first World Romani Congress, the purpose of which was to bring together Roma from different countries and encourage collaboration in fighting discrimination according to their own ideals. At this congress with delegates from 14 countries, the International Gypsy Committee was renamed the International Rom Committee, following the rejection of the term "Gypsy" as a non-Romani definition of the group with derogatory connotations. The second World Romani Congress was held in 1978 which 60 delegates and additional observers attended representing 26 countries. The third and fourth World Romani Congresses were held in 1981 and 1990 with 300 and 250 delegates attending the respective congresses. In 1990 the congress was held in Eastern Europe for the first time, with the first ever participation of Roma from Albania, Bulgaria, and many Soviet republics (Liegeois 1994, 252­259; Tipler 1968, 61­70).

Romani activists formed a new organization, the International Romani Union, during the second World Romani Congress. The IRU is an umbrella organization which represents 10­12 million Roma and coordinates over 70 regional and state Romani organizations from approximately 30 states throughout the world. The IRU achieved recognition from ECOSOC and in 1979 was granted observer status in the "Roster" category as a non-governmental organization. By 1993 it obtained consultative status in ECOSOC. With observer status the organization was able to contribute their expertise on a periodic basis and with consultative status it was recognized as an expert on Romani issues with the task of contributing to ECOSOC on a continual basis. However, since the IRU was rarely approached for consultation, it returned to observer status with which it has a seat in the chamber, can participate in all meetings, and has voting rights. The role of the Romani representative to the UN is that of a conduit for any issues raised by Romani organizations (Hancock 1996; Liegeois 1994, 258­9). The IRU has a growing role as a pressure group involved with the Human Dimension of the OSCE and working with state governments. It also has had an ad hoc involvement with the EU and with the Council of Europe (Liegeois 1994, 258­9).

Since the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the number of Romani organizations in the former Eastern bloc has grown rapidly. These organizations, along with their international partners such as the IRU, have worked to coordinate efforts at the European and international level in the fields of politics, culture, and education. One such endeavor resulted in EUROM, the European Rom Parliament, a concept that emerged from the realization of opportunities for European representation through the Council of Europe and the EU. This parliament aims to gain democratic representation of the Roma at the European level through contacts with European institutions (Liegeois 1994, 255­260) and in recent years has been defining regulations for proposed European-wide elections (Liegeois and Gheorghe 1995, 26­27).

There are still numerous obstacles for the Roma to overcome in their efforts to unify and organize more effectively. However, their cause has gained much recognition since the fall of the communist bloc. The end of communism in Europe has had a dual impact on the effectiveness of Romani advocacy groups. The ability of Eastern European Roma to organize formally has led to a greater diversity among Romani advocacy organizations which may raise problems in creating a cohesive national unit. At the same time, the upsurge in the number of Romani political and civic organizations and the attention that the situation of Roma in Europe has garnered since 1989 has certainly helped the national cause by increasing visibility of and interest in their efforts. Thus, the political activity of the Roma which resulted from a loose sense of group identity indicates that the Roma are a nation in the process of developing further unity. While developing this unity, they are working toward the goal of national self-preservation without pursuing territorial interests.

The Roma: A New Paradigm for the Nation?

The common identity shared by the Roma (albeit on a very broad level) along with Romani political mobilization have made the Roma a nation according to a loose definition of the term as defined earlier by Smith. Certainly, only part of the nation's traditional definition holds true for the Roma. They do not share a historic territory nor a common economy and one could only make a tenuous claim to a mass, public Romani culture. While the Roma do have their own legal system, the lack of formal jurisdiction within state boundaries limits the degree to which they can use this system.

Working for national self-preservation is the goal of a nation under this new paradigm (as it is under the traditional paradigm of the nation), but because of the changing nature of state relations and the growing role for non-state actors, national self-preservation need not depend upon territorial sovereignty. The Roma are fulfilling a national purpose through their activism in securing their human rights. While many Romani organizations are addressing the most basic needs and problems in the fight against discrimination and the fight for survival, both individually and as a group, they have been fulfilling a new paradigm of the nation as presented in the third section. The involvement of the IRU in ECOSOC, the convening of several world Romani congresses, and the attention generated by various Romani organizations to the violation of Romani rights (particularly in Eastern Europe) have all served to bring the Roma together to preserve their nation.

The Roma illustrate the ability of a nation to preserve itself without a sovereign territory and, indeed, even without a nationally consolidated territory. While they have a long way to go until their rights are universally recognized and respected, they have been able to gain a certain degree of awareness and respect for their national and human rights which would have been difficult to achieve in earlier years. Pinpointing when states developed a greater tolerance for intervention in traditionally internal affairs is not possible, but since the end of the cold war non-state actors, such as nations, have gained acceptance even when the possibility for statehood was lacking. States realized that the state system alone does not provide protection for all state inhabitants. Thus, a nation like the Roma has been able to use the existing human rights norms that allow (limited) encroachment upon state sovereignty to work for national self-preservation.

Conclusion

The Romani nation serves as an example for other nations which do not have their own state such as the Kurds, the Mari, or the Maasai. Romani identity is maintained through the activism of its national organizations such as the IRU. This and other Romani organizations strive for the protection of Romani cultural, economic, linguistic, and educational rights within the states that the Roma inhabit. They lobby against assimilation policies that would absorb the Roma into the national culture of the state and, in this manner, they fulfill the goals of the Romani nation. However, the success of these organizations' endeavors depends upon the recognition of their goals as legitimate by other international organizations such as the UN or the EU. Success also depends on the influence international organizations have on the internal politics of states. The UN is becoming increasingly effective in this manner, but changing norms is still a slow process.

Nations can use certain policies to achieve their goal of self-preservation. Pressure on states to alter discriminatory policies against nations within the state is one route to preserving the cultural integrity of nations. Lobbying efforts, letter writing campaigns, and informing the press of human rights violations or discrimination have been effective strategies national organizations have employed. The nation can also operate on the suprastate level to influence both international organizations and states to recognize their legitimacy as a nation and respect the rights of nationhood. Some international organizations have recognized the arbitrary nature of statehood and the need for disenfranchised groups to have a political outlet. While stateless nations are not participating members in the UN and other international organizations, a growing number do have consultancy or observer status within some of these organizations; this can be another venue for nations to influence policy. International organizations representing the nation not only function as advocacy groups in this manner, but can also preserve a sense of unity in the nation by bringing the many elements of the nation together to work for a common cause.

Self-determination can occur on a more limited level than statehood allows. The international organizations and processes described above can provide the protection of a people who do not have an attachment to one homeland. This should not be viewed as a second-rate solution, but as a result of the growing interdependency of the international system. States are no longer completely sovereign as a result of the acceptance of certain principles deemed more important than the ultimate right of states to control what occurs inside their territory. This process of integration necessitates a new paradigm for the nation.

Since the concept of nationhood emerged, territory has been central to maintaining the nation. Even today, the necessity of territory remains central to the ideal of national self-determination. The need for a change in this ideal seems clear, however. The congruence of states and nations is not often feasible and the growth of non-state actors' influence in the international arena makes attaining the goals of a nation without complete sovereignty possible. The recognition of the rights of stateless nations leads to a new paradigm of the nation which is not based on the control of a certain territory. The Roma are a prime example of how a nation can organize itself in the face of adversity through the development of interstate representative associations; their efforts can serve as a model for other nations. Other nations can organize themselves in a similar manner and seek their national self-preservation through the structure of the international system (and, in turn, influence this structure), rather than fighting the system violently and unsuccessfully. A nation can be represented through its involvement with the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and other regional and international organizations. Through the recognition of basic collective and human rights, a nation can preserve its culture, unity, language, and political rights effectively in a changing international system.

1This thesis differs from Gottlieb's (Gottlieb 1993) in that Gottlieb views the existing human rights and minority rights regimes as inadequate to address national claims for self-determination. He appreciates the usefulness of international organizations, but argues that further mechanisms must be developed to grant nations formal legal status. This paper contends that nations can fulfill their purpose through protection of their cultural, political, and economic rights through existing mechanisms if enforcement of these rights can be guaranteed.

2Romani national identity is not to be confused with Romanian identity. The Roma are a separate nation with origins unrelated to the Romanians.

3Defining what constitutes ethnicity is problematic since different groups defining themselves ethnically have different conceptions of what ethnicity is. Armstrong asserts that "one must recognize that the phenomenon of ethnicity is part of a continuum of social collectivities, including, notably, classes and religious bodies" (Armstrong 1982, 6). Perhaps the most important characteristic of ethnic identity is a perception or myth of common ancestry. This paper will use this broad definition throughout the analysis considering, also, that a group defining itself ethnically often shares a common language, culture, and religion. Of note for this analysis is that the primary differentiation between an ethnic group and a nation is the common political consciousness and activity of a nation.

4Since national claims overlap in many areas of the world, creating agreements that satisfy the contesting parties is impossible.

5The term "genocide" is defined by the UN in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as any act aiming to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group by killing or causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UN Treaty Series 78: 277). Numerous instances of violence against Roma and inactivity on the part of state authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of this violence indicate the lack of interest these states have in protecting the Romani nation, thus allowing the Romani nation in these states to be destroyed.

6Here I draw on the work of Guyora Binder. Binder writes that "Cultures are not reducible to shared backgrounds or experience of individuals; cultures also commit individuals to shared conceptions of the good" (Binder 1993). Therefore, national identity is not based merely on a connection to the past, but has as a goal the pursuit of a common moral purpose that is embodied in that nation and only through the fulfillment of the national moral purpose can an individual member of that nation be fulfilled. Binder states that "Morality is inherently a collective enterprise . . ." and each nation has its unique conception of morality that must be fulfilled. Of course, the fulfillment of this morality is only acceptable as far as it does not infringe on other nations' sense of morality.

7Laws against the Roma often demanding deportation of Roma from many European states were already in effect in many places by the fifteenth century. In some places just being a Roma was a hanging offense (Hancock 1991, 136). Violence, hatred, and discrimination towards the Roma are widely prevalent today. For a synopsis, see Liegeios, Jean-Pierre and Nicolae Gheorghe. 1995. Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority. Minority Rights Group International Report. Minority Rights Group.

8There is, however, a drive to standardize the Romani language in order to facilitate communication between different groups as well provide a reference point for the various dialects which are rarely recorded (Simons 1990).

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