----- Original Message ----- 
From: George Aditjondro 
To: 
Cc: 
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2000 2:16 PM
Subject: Notes on Lasykar Jihad


Dear Joyo;

The following are my unfinished research notes on the Jihad Forces (Lasykar 
Jihad) currently still operating in Maluku, which I wrote a couple of months 
ago. I stress, they are unfinished notes, yet I still hope you can
circulate them (a) to provide a background to interested parties, and (b) to 
elicit feedback and additional information from those who are more knowledgable.

Thanks for your assistance.

George

-----------------------------------
NOTES ON THE JIHAD FORCES IN MALUKU
-----------------------------------
President Abdurrahman Wahid has currently declared martial law in Maluku, and 
also a prohibition for anybody to enter the Spice Islands. In the meantime, 
however, about 10,000 jihad forces are already stationed there and continue 
their campaign to rid the islands from its Christian population. Hence, it is 
important to expose the anatomy of these forces.

Sociological origin:
--------------------
A new stream of Muslim militants is now sweeping Indonesia, which has its roots 
in the 'neo-Wahhabi' movement, a movement to 'purify' Islamic practices all over 
the world to conform with the religions's 
interpretation and practices in Saudi Arabia, where it is the official sect 
(mazhab). It is called 'neo-Wahhabi', after its founder, Mohammad bin Abdul 
Wahab. In Indonesia, neo-Wahhabians have found a strong support 
among a rapidly growing group of Muslims, outside the two largest Muslim 
organizations (NU and Muhammadiyah), which is called the Tarbiyah Movement, 
which formed their conggregations, called jamaah 
salaf, among students in many prominent state universities in the country. Among 
others, they are actively reviving the goal of establishing an Islamic state 
(NII=Negara Islam Indonesia), which had been an underground stream among the 
Tarbiyahists during the Suharto period.

One of their central figures who has publicly supported attempts to establish an 
Islamic state in Indonesia is Al-Chaidar, an Achehnese, who organised the large 
Muslim gathering at the National Monument (Monas) park in Jakarta which called 
for the holy war to Ambon in January 2000, and was in the same month also 
implicated with the anti-Christian riots in Mataram, Lombok, on January 17,2000.

In addition, the 'supreme commander' of the jihad forces in Maluku, Ustadz 
(Teacher) Ja'far Umar Thalib, who earlier on founded the Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah 
Forum in Yogyakarta, comes from this neo-Wahabian movement, having studied the 
sect's teachings in Saudi Arabia and joined the Taliban armed forces in 
Afghanistan (SiaR, January 28, 2000; zulfan@iname.com, April 15, 2000; personal 
communication with sources in Jakarta, April -June 2000).

Financial backing:
-----------------
This neo-Wahhabi movement in Indonesia has been sponsored by Indonesians of 
Arabic origin by setting up the Al-Irsyad Foundation, a foundation which 
sponsors Al-Irsyad boarding schools (pesantren) all over the country. These 
Arabic-Indonesians are not descendents of the Prophet Muhammad, who are usually 
more involved in the Syi'ah sect associated with Iran. This Al-Irsyad foundation 
also owns the seven hectares of land near Bogor, West Java, where about 3,000 
vigilantes carried out their military training in early April 2000 to prepare 
themselves for their mission to Maluku (Jakarta Post, April 10, 2000; AFP, April 
9-10, 2000).

One of the main sponsors of the Al-Irsyad Foundation is Dr. Fuad Bawazier, an 
Indonesian economist of Arabic origin, who had served as Finance Minister in one 
of Suharto's last cabinets. Fuad Bawazier is also considered as a crony of the 
Suharto family, since he also sits on the board of PT Satelindo, the 
communication satellite company of Bambang Trihatmodjo, Suharto's middle son.

Serving his role as a Suharto crony, Fuad Bawazier was also a financial backer 
of Abdurrahman Wahid's political party, PKB, and power broker who persuaded 
Amien Rais, the current MPR speaker, to nominate Wahid as presidential 
candidate. This tactic was probably driven by the fact that Wahid -- before and 
after becoming president -- called for an amnesty for Suharto, as long as he 
returns his illgotten wealth to the Indonesian people. This position is also 
shared by Amien Rais.

Currently, Fuad Bawazier is allegedly also supporting Amien Rais' calls for 
Wahid's impeachment, having shifted his bet from Wahid to Amien Rais to save 
Suharto and his own's neck from a major anti-corruption trial (indemo@asia.com, 
May 30, 2000).

Political party links:
----------------------
Usually, people tend to link this jihad movement with the Moon-and-Crescent 
Party (PBB = Partai Bulan Bintang), due to the public statements from 
individuals such as Achmad Sumargono from KISDI and Eggi Sudjana from PPMI who 
called for crusades against Christians in Maluku and other places (Mataram and 
Madura).

However, my sources indicate a stronger link between this movement and the 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan). This is because the main ideologue of this 
party is Abu Rido, whose real name is Abdi Sumaiti, a former Islamic religion 
lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) who went to pursue his 
education at the Madinah University in Saudi Arabia, and joined the neo-Wahabi 
Tarbiyah movement. Abu Rido has a very strong anti-Semitic and anti-Christian 
stance, and also strongly opposes other Islamic sects which he feels are not 
teaching the right doctrine.

The media (organ) of Abu Rido's Tarbiyah sect is Sabili, which began as an 
underground magazine since 1989. While the financial backing for Abu Rido's 
group comes from Saudi Arabia via Dr. Tontonji.

Ideologue: Rustam Kastor:
-------------------------
Retired Brigadier General Rustam Kastor, born in Ambon on July 9, 1939, can 
rightly be called the 'ideological father' of the violence in Maluku, since he 
has given a pseudo-scientific justidication to send 'holy war' (jihad) troops to 
Maluku to save Muslims from annihilation by Christians Moluccans, who allegedly 
want to revive the 'South Moluccan Republic' -- a 1950 rebellion during the 
early years of the Indonesian Republic -- which mainly consisted of Christian 
Ambonese.

Kastor had been the former Chief of Staff of the 8-th army command, Trikora in 
Port Numbay (formerly, Jayapura) in West Papua and had also been stationed at 
the TNI headquarters in Jakarta.

According to Kastor, the Protestant Church of Maluku, or Gereja Protestan Maluku  
(GPM) and the Moluccan chapter of Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic 
Party for Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) do support this separatist ambition of the 
RMS.

This theory was actually first raised on January 28, 1999, in a press 
conference organized by two militant Muslim organisations, KISDI (Komite 
Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam) and PPMI (Persatuan Pekerja Muslim 
Indonesia). The first organisation is led by Achmad Sumargono and 
the second one by Eggi Sudjana (SiaR,  January 29, 1999).

These organisations and their leaders came into the national spotlight during 
the last years of Suharto's rule, due to their closeness to the president's son-
in-law, then Mayor General Prabowo Subianto. They all share a common tendency of 
blaming all Indonesiaís political and economic problems to Indonesians of ethnic 
Chinese origin and of Christian belief (Eklof, 1999: 134-143).

Sociologically, these Muslim militants belong to what William Liddle call 
'scripturalists,' associated with DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia), or 
Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council, set up by the late Islamic politician 
Mohammad Natsir after his Muslim party, Masyumi, was banned by Sukarno after the 
1957 regionalist rebellion in Sumatra and Sulawesi. These Islamic stream differ 
substantially from the two major Muslim organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, who Liddle calls 'substantialists,' in that they 
still advocate the establishment of an Islamic state (1996: 266-289).

The 'RMS-GPM-PDI-P' conspiracy theory acquired some sense of credibility when it 
was reiterated by Ret. Mayor General A.M. Hendropriyono, then Minister for 
Transmigration and the Resettlement of Forest Encroachers, in a public meeting 
with the Maluku governor, religious and other informal leaders, students 
and youth in Ambon on Tuesday, March 9, 1999 (Kompas, March 10, 1999).  Another 
retired general, Feisal Tanjung, instantly underlined Hendropriyono's accusation 
(SiaR, March 11, 1999).

The theory then spread like bushfire as it was disseminated by the Muslim 
controlled media in Indonesia, where the abbreviation 'RMS' became distorted to 
mean 'Republik Maluku Serani', or the 'Christian Moluccan Republic', thereby 
distorting the historical fact that Ambonese Muslims had taken part in setting 
this liberation movement up as well as disregarding the totally different 
tradition of separating 'church' and 'state' in the Christian tradition in 
contrast to the integration of 'religious' and 'political' communitie in the 
Islamic tradition.

After nearly a year of being propagated by certain Muslim and pro-New Order 
media, this theory was formalised by Rustam Kastor into his book (2000), which 
has become a bestseller not only among Muslims in Maluku but also in Java and 
Sulawesi. In fact, in the wake of the inter-religious riots in Poso, Kastor's 
book has also been widely disseminated in Central Sulawesi.

Apart from the totally disrespectful language about Christians and their 
religion, the book  is overtly tainted with numerous nationalistic accusations 
bordering to facist claims which shows the book's strong militeristic 
agenda couched in religious rhetoric. In this best-seller, for instance,  Kastor  
blames the Moluccan student movement for preparing the ground for the so-called 
'RMS-led Muslim-cleansing operation.' The massive demonstrations in Ambon on 18 
November 1998, in which up to 5,000 students took part -- and where the 
local army commander (Col. Hikayat) was eventually removed from Ambon -- was 
according to Kastor, a conscious attempt to weaken the military so that they 
would not be able to crush the subsequent 'RMS-led rebellion' which aimed at 
cleansing Maluku from its Muslim population (2000: 33-34, 185, 197-207).

This is not where Kastor's accusations ends. He also accuses Christians of 
manipulating the student-led Reformasi  movement to destroy the Indonesian 
economy and thereby promote the Republic's disintegration by separating the 
Christian-dominated provinces in Eastern Indonesia -- including East Timor -- 
which would then form a new Christian-dominated country with fantastic natural 
resources, since it will include West Papua and the current province of Maluku. 
The first step in this grand scheme is, according to the author, the 'breakaway' 
of East Timor from Indonesia (Kastor 2000:108).

What Kastor does not mention in his book is that the Timorese and Papuan freedom 
fighters have Muslims in their leadership ranks, who are certainly not fighting   
to create a greater Christian Melanesian alliance. Mar'i Alkatiri in Fretilin 
and Thaha Mohamad Alhamid in the Presidium of the Papuan Council, a Timorese   
Besides,the wish to   separate   from Indonesia   is  certainly not a Christian 
monopoly, as proven by the Achehnese people.

Apart from the more ideological inspiration through his book, Kastor has also 
been personally involved in sending the Islamic vigilantes from Java to Maluku. 
He was one among the six representatives of the jihad forces who went to see 
President Abdurrahman Wahid in the Merdeka Palace in Jakarta on Thursday, April 
6, 2000 (Kompas, April 7, 2000).

He also spoken at several public meetings in Java and in Ambon itself, where he 
kept emphasizing the need to carry out a holy war to liberate Muslim Moluccans 
from their Christian oppressors (zulfan@iname.com, April 9, 2000; 
AgungPrimamorista@tpj.co.id, May 30, 2000).

Military & police backing:
--------------------------
Considering the sociological and theological parallels between the jihad forces 
in Maluku and the FPI (Front Pembela Islam) vigilantes in Jakarta (Tempo, Jan. 
23, 2000: 40-46), it is most likely that the jihad forces are also politically 
backed by Wiranto and Djadja Suparman, two top army generals 
who have currently been sacked by President Wahid.

In East Java, military backing for these Muslim militias comes from Mayor 
General Sudi Silalahi, chief of the Brawijaya army command. I base this on the 
fact that Sudi Silalahi strongly denied the existence of military 
links with a bomb blast in Nganjuk, East Java, on May 30, 2000 (Jakarta Post, 
June 5, 2000). This denial comes after it had been found out that the bomb that 
exploded in the Suzuki Carry AB 7244 van and killed the driver and a passenger 
had all the indications that it was owned or connected to the jihad forces 
leader in Yogyakarta, which had been confirmed by the Indonesian Police 
Commader, General Rusdihardjo (SiaR, May 31, 2000; Jakarta Post, June 1, 2000; 
Detikcom, June 2, 2000).

It has also been established that the only casualty in this accident, Rifzikka 
Helta (32), a Yogyakarta resident, had previously spent two weeks in Ambon and 
that one of the survivors, Azmi Ishaq (32) is a student at the Al Ikhlas 
boarding school in Jember, East Java (Jakarta Post, June 3, 2000).

Apart from General Sudi Silalahi, the Police commander of East Java, Mayor 
General Da'i Bachtiar also allowed the thousands of jihad troops to board the 
ships from Surabaya to Ambon, shipping their weapons separately in soap boxes 
and containers which reached Ambon after the arrival of the troops. This was 
arranged by a courier company in Surabaya owned by a certain Haji Doellah 
(personal communication with a source in Surabaya, June 18, 2000). In an 
interview with the pro-jihad daily newspaper, Republika (April 20, 2000), the 
police commander also denied that tens of East Java police agents had 
returned their badges to join the jihad forces to Maluku. This probably means 
the opposite, namely that many police agents had indeed swelled the ranks of the 
jihad forces on their mission to Maluku.

The jihad forces must also have widespread support from police commanders in 
West Java, Jakarta, and Ambon, since they could freely carry out their military 
training near Bogor, brandish their swords publicly 
when they demonstrated at the parliament. And, in Ambon, enable their containers 
full of weapons to be disembarked at the harbour, which lies in Muslim-
controlled Waihoang, instead of in the Navy harbour of Halong or to be moved 
immediately to the Pattimura army headquarters in Ambon.

Finally, the jihad forces must also have support within the top ranks of the 
Indonesian Navy, since no efforts were made to prohibit the state-owned ships, 
such as KM Rinjani, from boarding the Muslim vigilantes whose mission was 
clearly to fight Christian Moluccans whom their leader accuse 
of planning to set up a separate, Christian state (see interview with Ja'far 
Umar Thalib in Panji Masyarakat, April 26, 2000, on zulfan@iname.com, April 28, 
2000).

In that interview, the jihad forces commander admits having a hotline to Armed 
Forces Commander Admiral Widodo A.S., through a 60-year old man called Bambang, 
who had donated 1,050 m2 land to the Muslim boarding school of Ja'far.

This probably means that as a Navy admiral, the armed forces commander may still 
be able to persuade his Navy subordinates to turn a blind eye on the exodus of 
jihad troops to Maluku.

-------------
July 2000

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