HTML pages
designed &
maintained by
Alifuru67
Copyright ©
1999/2000 -
1364283024 &
1367286044
Revised paper for the Proceedings of the Conference on "Conflicts and Violence in
Indonesia," organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Department of African
and Asian Studies, Humboldt-University in Berlin, July 3-5, 2000.
GUNS, PAMPHLETS AND HANDIE-TALKIES (1 2 3 4 5):
How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in
Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges
George Junus Aditjondro
(Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Newcastle, Australia)
In this city of Ambon with its nearly 350,000 inhabitants (LSEM, 1998: 32), the underworld was dominated by two top figures, Berty Loupatty and Agus Wattimena, who vied for the leadership of the largest gang, called Coker. This gang was set up the early 1980s in the Kudamati neighbourhood, near the Dr. Haulussy public hospital by Berty Loupatty, after returning from Makassar. As the amalgamation of smaller gangs in Ambon with exotic names, such as Van Boomen, Papi Coret, Sex Pistol, Coker had about one hundred members, including Muslims and women. Literally meaning 'Handsome Boys' (Cowok Keren) some people also called provided another meaning for Coker, namely Cowok Kerempeng ('Skinny Boys'), since most of its male members were actually rather skinny young men. Later, after its Christian members got involved in defending Christian neighbourhoods from invaders, Coker obtained another meaning, namely Cowok Keristen , or 'Christian Boys' (Tajuk, April 1999).
The intertwining problems of overpopulation, land shortages and immigration are compounded the erosion of the traditional Ambonese inter-village alliance system, called pela. According to Bartels, pela alliances, which originated long before Europeans invaded Maluku in search of spices, are concluded between two or more villages and in a few rare cases, between clans from different villages. It is conceived as an enduring and inviolable brotherhood between all peoples of the partner villages or clans, who have to assist each other in times of crisis caused by war or natural disasters. "If Ambonese customs and beliefs would not have been subjected to the systematic destruction discussed earlier and people on both sides would still have considered themselves as Ambonese first and Moslem or Christian second," says Bartels, "I believe the pela concept could have had some soothing influence on the conflict."
Tanja Hohe and Albert Remijsen suggested an opposite view about this traditional custom. By analysing the myths and ceremonies in upholding this tradition, which balances the two contrasting values of fertility and violence, they argue that "pela is the instrument through which existing tensions may be amplified" (Hohe and Remijsen 2000). The unity between two parties bound by this pact is based on opposition towards a third party. Pela thus intensifies divisions by strengthening existing conflict potential. One source of tension is the relation between the indigenous Ambonese and the Buginese and Butonese migrants from South and Southeast Sulawesi. Only by establishing a relation of violence towards an 'outsider' the indigenous Ambonese establish the value of solidarity between themselves. Hence, the foundations for an ethnic conflict are created.
If this analysis is correct, than the campaign to popularise pela and even to uplift it to provincial level, as proposed by law scholar M.G. Ohorella (cited in Bartels 2000), may have also contributed to escalating the inter-ethnic violence in Maluku.
Northern Maluku:
The new province of North Maluku was officially split of from Maluku on September 16, 1999, after sectarian violence had erupted on the island of Halmahera less than a month earlier. Here the violence began when the district administration of North Maluku was planning to inaugurate the establishment of a new subdistrict, Malifut, on August 18, 1999, as stipulated by the Central Government Regulation (PP, Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 42/1999.
This new subdistrict was supposed to consist of sixteen villages of migrants from Makian, a volcanic island west of Halmahera, five villages of Kao people who are indigenous to this geographic area, and six villages of Jailolo people. The Makianese are predominantly Muslim, and so are the Jailolo people, while the Kao people are divided between Christians and believers of their native religion. The Kao and Jailolo villagers refused to be included in the new subdistrict of Malifut, since they would clearly become a minority on their own ancestral land. On the other hand, the Makianese settlers insisted that PP No. 42/1999 should be implemented without further delay. Communal violence then erupted between the Makian settlers and Kao villagers, with casualties from both sides (Jong Ambon 2000; Tomagola 2000a, 2000b).
Hence, one of the root causes of the sectarian violence in North Maluku was the decision in 1975 of the Moluccan provincial government, to evacuate the Makianese to the transmigration area of Malifut at the Kao Bay, on Halmahera's northeastern peninsula. By 1980, about 6,000 Makianese had been relocated to Malifut, far away from their traditional circulatory migration villages on the western coast of Halmahera (Lucardie 1985: 70).
Long before the social conflict erupted, criticism of this program had already been expressed by Ronald Lucardie (1985). His 1979-1981 field work on Makian and Malifut identified two trends that were endangering the success of the resettlement scheme: first, the Makianese settlers in Malifut increasingly resented the entire project; and second, many settlers were secretly returning to their home lands, leaving their plots at Malifut in the hands of relatives or friends. One of the reasons why the settlers disliked the scheme was the poor reception from the local, mainly Christian population. The local villagers disliked the settlers, since Malifut was planned predominantly for Makian settlers, with only two settlements on the periphery established for the local population (Lucardie 1985: 70). Lucardie advised the government to abandon the entire project, "for the great discrepancy between Makianese traditions of mobility and the resettlement project at Malifut can only widen." He suggested instead that "it would be far better to identify another area for transmigration, such as the south-west coast of Halmahera, that meshes with long-standing destinations favoured by the people" (1985: 78).
The fact that 15 years later, the Makianese settlers in Malifut strongly defended the establishment of the new subdistrict, is certainly related to the fact that gold mining had began in this area. This Gosowong gold mine is operated by PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals, a joint venture of the Australian company Newcrest Mining Limited with the state-owned PT Aneka Tambang. It began to produce its first ore in July 1999. After suspending mining in early 2000 because of the violence, in mid 2000 it was producing at a rate of 20,000 troy ounces of gold a month, with long-term production forecasted at 154,000 ounces a year (Dow Jones Newswires, June 20, 2000).
Hence, Tamrin Amal Tomagola rightfully states that competition over control of the gold mine and its revenues is one of the local factors underlying the inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in North Maluku. Two other factors according to Tomagola are competition between the elites of the two most powerful sultanates - Ternate versus Tidore - for the seats of governor of the new province, and competition for areas for religious expansion (2000a, 2000b). The first factor, I believe, carries more water than the second one, and has also been raised by other North Maluku analysts (Raimadoya 2000; Arianto Sangaji, pers. com., January 4, 2000). In fact, power struggles for governorial seats will become more prevalent in Indonesia in general in the coming years, since two new laws, Law No. 22/1999 which grants more autonomy to local administration and Law No. 25/1999 which provides a larger proportion of revenue for the provinces, districts and municipalities, will provide more real power to the governor than it has been for three decades during the Suharto era.
The other factor, territorial competition for religious expansion is more doubtful, especially since Tomagola bases his argument on opposition of a Pattimura University soil scientist against the Malifut resettlement scheme for the Makianese who had to be evacuated from the volcanic eruption in their home island. Tomagola explicitly states that the soil scientist was a Christian who hails from Kao (2000a). As I have discussed earlier, opposition against the Malifut resettlement scheme has been raised not only from an agronomical, but also from an applied anthropological angle by Lucardie. In addition, further investigations have shown that the soil scientist in question was indeed a Christian, but did not hail from Kao.
One fact that has not been raised by Tomagola, Raimadoya and Sangaji is that opposition against Muslim domination in North Maluku has not only come from Christians, but also from Halmahera's indigenous people, the Togutil, who have mostly retained their traditional, non-Semitic belief. They also fought against Muslim militants, motivated firstly by solidarity with Christian relatives who were killed by Makianese, and secondly to reject domination by non-Halmaheran migrants from Tidore or Makian (Jong Ambon 2000; Jubilee Campaign 2000). This Togutil opposition against outside control should also be seen in the light of other forms of indigenous Halmahera peoples' resistance against successive waves of outside domination by the Tidore sultanate, North Sulawesi-based Permesta rebels, Javanese transmigrants and lately, timber concessions (Leith 1998; Bubandt 1998).
Jakarta:
In the 1980s, a Christian Ambonese gangster in Jakarta, Onki Pieters, commanded respect and fear among the Ambonese youth, regardless of their religion. Despite eking a living from their brawns rather than brains, Ambonese gangsters in Jakarta still respected the pela tradition and often wore red bandanas, which was more as a symbol of their Ambonness - rooted in the Alifuru culture -- rather than of their religion. This differs radically with the current meaning given to 'red' to symbolise being a Christian and 'white' to symbolise being a Muslim (Tanja Hohe, pers. com., July 2000; Marthin Nanere, pers. com, July 2000).
After while, another hristian Ambonese youth, Milton Matuanakotta, appeared on the scene.He was claimed to have many younger supporters among both Christian and Muslim Ambonese, and was rapidly becoming more popular among Ambonese in Jakarta than his predecessor.
At hat time, the Muslim Ambonese reckoned that they also need to have their own 'hero', so they chose Dedy Hamdun, an Ambonese of Arabic descent, as their leader. Dedy was a contradictory character: on one hand he actively campaigned for the only Muslim political party permitted during the Suharto era, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United evelopment Party), but on the other hand he used his fighting skills to clear land for the real estate business of Ibnu Hartomo, a brother-in-law of then President Suharto(D&R, Aug. 9, 1997 : 96 - 99).
Whether it was because of his political or business activities, in early1998 Dedy Hamdun's name also on the list of 'disappeared persons, 'together with a group of student activists and leaders of Megawati Sukarno putri's party, in a clandestine operation involving the Indonesian Army's Special Forces, Kopassus. Dedy Hamdun's disappearance caused a major shift in the politicall nd scape of Ambonese gangsters in Jakarta. he leadership of the Moluccan Muslim outh was taken over by Ongen Sangaji, a Muslim Moluccan gangster who is also a member of Pemuda Pancasila (Jubilee Campaign, 1999 : 4).
Ironically, competing for loyalty among Moluccan youngsters in Jakarta drove the two gangster leaders also to compete for access to the Suharto children's private security business opportunities. Milton obtained access to the Suharto children through Yorris Raweyai, the Pemuda Pancasila deputy leader who hails from West Papua and is close to Bambang Trihatmodjo, Suharto's middle son. While Ongen was closer to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Suharto's eldest daughter, through Abdul Gafur, whom we...
From: aditjond@psychology.newcastle.edu.au (George J. Aditjondro)
Subject: GJA: Guns, pamphlets & handie-talkies (2)
Received via e-mail from : GJA
Copyright © 1999-2000 - Ambon Berdarah On-Line * http://www.go.to/ambon
HTML pages designed and maintained by Alifuru67 * http://www.oocities.org/alifuru67
Send your comments to alifuru67@egroups.com