Few moral issues in modern society have evoked the intense, confrontational emotional responses that are associated with the abortion issue. It strikes at the very heart of our ideals, presenting difficult questions, where before there existed simplistic certainty. As our society evolves towards what is believed to be the epitome of civilization, the demand for the settlement of issues such as abortion is steadily increasing. This overwhelming desire for completion is what often drives individuals to cling to supposedly deciding factors, clouding the true issue in the vehemence of their protests.

In this paper, I first examine the concept of personhood, discussing a variety of arguments in order to come to some consensus. Next, I examine the role of this concept in the abortion debate, questioning the significant responsibility that is placed upon it by both sides in this debate. This progresses into a refutation of both the conservative argument and the liberal argument that use the concept of personhood as their basis. I conclude with a discussion of alternative areas that may be justified in carrying decisive weight that many individuals feel should belong to the concept of personhood alone.

One of the greatest tragedies associated with the english language is the abundance of misnomers. The true meaning of words is lost in their repetition, the multitude of contexts making any precise definition an insurmountable task. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the case of the word person. This noun encompasses such a wide range of attributes, depending on the individual using it, that its true meaning is obscured. G. E. Scott¹ feels that the concept of higher order intentional systems is an integral part of the person. Not only must a person possess the capacity to believe and desire, they must also possess the capacity to believe that others have beliefs and desires about their beliefs and desires, and vice versa. The concept of second order volitions is a similar necessity, according to Harry Frankfurt.² This concept centres around the ability to desire to have a specific desire, which Frankfurt believes is part of the intentional nature of the person. William Wordsworth³ includes criteria for personhood which many members of society today would be unable to account for. He believes that self interpretation and self recognition are essential aspects of a person. Being able to decipher the lessons learned in our past, and using them to sustain us in the future, is an inherent part of this self interpretation. Delving into the issues that such a rigorous definition of personhood raises is not an activity for the faint of heart. Eliot Deutsch⁴ introduces the intriguing concept of viewing personhood as an achievement, not something that is simple given to us in the virtue of our being human. Clearly, the foetus has no hope of achieving the status of personhood if such exacting definitions are applied. However, the question may be asked, "Is this status, or lack thereof, relevant to the issue at hand?"

According to the conservative view of abortion, the status of the foetus in this respect is of the utmost importance. This view stresses the necessary conditions for personhood, which the foetus lacks. The argument follows, that if the foetus cannot be considered a person, then abortion is perfectly justified. The liberal view places no less emphasis on the question of the personhood of the foetus when considering their argument. This view stresses the sufficient conditions for personhood, which the foetus possesses. Using a similarly direct approach, the argument follows, that if the foetus can be considered a person, then abortion is never justified. The fulcrum upon which these arguments are based is the moment the foetus attains the status of personhood. The conservative view places this attainment at the moment of birth, while the liberal view places it at the moment of conception. The heated opposition in this area has risen to such a level, that the majority of participants on either side now fail to see anything beyond the horizon of its conclusion. However, for individuals who are not participating in this area of the debate, questions abound as to its true significance when considering a conclusion to the abortion debate.

The concerns being raised with respect to the relevance of personhood centres around the gap that exists between the premises and conclusions of both the conservative and liberal views.⁵ The conservative view would have us believe that in proving the foetus is, in fact, not a person, we have provided sufficient justification for abortion. This implicitly states that the killing of non persons is acceptable under any circumstances. While this may seem reasonable under casual scrutiny, thoughtful examination reveals some serious fallacies in this statement. Society as a whole takes a very poor view of the wanton killing of animals. However, few would argue that animals could reasonably be afforded the status of personhood. Thus, the sympathetic nature of humanity dictates that unwarranted killing of non persons cannot, in good conscience, be justified. It is possible that qualities similar to those possessed by persons may be found in non-persons, and that ignoring these reflections of ourselves could cause serious harm to come to our very natures. Clearly, these problems in justification can be carried over into the conservative argument for abortion.

A comparable oversight can be identified in the liberal argument against abortion. The liberal view would have us believe that by proving the foetus is in fact a person, any justification for abortion is completely quashed. The implications in this statement suggest that the killing of an innocent person (for, who could be called such, if not an unborn child?) is never justified, under any circumstances. This is most notably not the case in the area of self defence. An individual is justified in acting in any manner believed necessary to counter a threat to their person, whether that threat is real or imagined. Such a situation, in the tragic case, could certainly result in the death of an innocent person, and still be justified. By this token, it is not unreasonable to imagine situations in which abortion would be justified, in spite of the status of personhood the foetus may have attained. With the decided lack of finality brought to the abortion debate by the concept of personhood, the focus of the debate is free to shift in other directions.

When considering the alternatives to the concept of personhood as the main issue of the abortion debate, few possibilities can be excluded. Any conclusions reached are bound to be somewhat subjective. With this in mind, it is essential that we include all aspects of human nature in this search for the truth. Our moral intuition will undoubtedly play an important role in reaching this goal, so long as the view presented is relatively unbiased. The psychological factors involved should not be ignored. I think it is very significant that the brutal clubbing of seals and the struggles of oil soaked sea gulls evoke powerful feelings of horror, rage and guilt in human beings. Our unconscious association of person-like qualities with non-persons can be applied to the abortion debate in a similar fashion. While a foetus around the time of conception bears little resemblance to a human being, there is very little distinction between a foetus at 24 weeks of age and an infant. As a result, the emotional responses that are evoked by each of these human beings (for that is what they are) are similarly diverse. Could this not, in some small way, dictate a possible course of action? It would seem to suggest a constriction of the abortion policy as the foetus matures, advancing towards its development into a human infant. This stance is supported by the supposition that the majority of reasons for considering an abortion, be they psychological, physical, financial or any other, do not change drastically over the course of the pregnancy. The woman could weigh these reasons in the early stages of the pregnancy, and make the appropriate decision, in the majority of cases. The smaller number of cases that could not be handled in this manner would be reflected in the constraints existing for abortions in the later stages of the pregnancy. This dynamic view of foetus development provides the facility by which the woman involved can exercise her own personal freedom and judgement, allowing her a measure of dignity for which few allowances are made in many of the other views on this subject.

I believe that a large portion of the abortion debate is misguided. Many of the individuals involved, in my opinion, have been arguing their platform for so long, that they no longer even consider questioning any part of it. There is a horrible danger in accepting without questioning. Often, the most fundamental fallacies exist in the knowledge we view as facts. I think that some serious reevaluation is needed in this debate. The problem begs to be viewed with fresh eyes. I do not claim to have the complete solution, but I think that considerable progress could be made in the abortion debate if the individuals involved stopped looking for the weak points in proposals, and started taking away any positive aspects that could be garnered from them.

1. G. E. Scott, "Moral Personhood: An Essay in the Philosophy of Moral Psychology," (State of New York Press, Albany, 1990), p. 76.
2. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person," Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, (1971), pp. 5-20.
3. Richard Elridge, "On Moral Personhood," (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989), p. 111.
4. Eliot Deutsch, "Personhood, Creativity and Freedom," (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1982), p. 17.
5. Jane English, "Abortion and The Concept of a Person," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2, (1975), pp. 233-43.

Last modified: April 1, 1998

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