Although government regulations prohibit employers from discriminating or harassing employees because of union membership, there are credible reports from union officials of employer retribution against union organizers, including firing, which is not effectively prevented or remedied in practice.

Some employers reportedly have warned their employees against contact with union organizers from the unrecognized SBSI organization.

Charges of antiunion discrimination are adjudicated by administrative tribunals. However, because many union members believe the tribunals generally side with employers, many workers reject or avoid the procedure and present their grievances directly to Parliament and other agencies.

Administrative decisions in favor of dismissed workers tend to be monetary awards; workers are rarely reinstated. The provisions of the law make it difficult to fire workers, but the law is often ignored in practice.

Commenting on antiunion discrimination and restrictions on collective bargaining in the context of ILO Convention 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively, the ILO's Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations' June report expressed deep concern that "in spite of the direct contacts mission that went to Indonesia in November 1993, the discussion within the present committee last year, and the technical advisory mission that went to Indonesia in January 1995, much progress was yet to be achieved to ensure in law and in practice the full application of the convention."

The armed forces, which include the police, continues to involve itself in labor issues, despite new regulations promulgated in 1994 to prohibit military interference when there is no threat to security.

There is some evidence that the incidence of such military involvement has decreased since 1994, but not all observers share this perception.

Workers charge that members of the security forces attempt to intimidate union organizers and strike leaders and have been present in significant numbers during some strikes, even when there has been no destruction of property or other violence.

Members of military intelligence attended and monitored trade union education seminars run by the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) and an AAFLI-SPSI sponsored seminar on democratization, even though these programs were approved by the Department of Manpower.

An AAFLI-SPSI program on legal aid for industrial disputes approved by the Department of Manpower, which the military command in Surabaya halted in 1993, was never allowed to resume despite government assurances to the contrary.

Military officials occasionally have been reported present during negotiations between workers and management.

Their presence has been described as intimidating by plant-level union officials. A military officer was among those convicted in connection with the Marsinah murder case.

Child labor exists in both industrial and rural areas, and in both the formal and informal sectors. There are an estimated 2.7 million working children between the ages of 10 and 14, according to a 1994 report of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

The number of out-of-school children age 7 to 15 who are economically active may be as high as 6.5 million, according to a 1989 study, and the number would be even greater if those who have not left school are included.

Indonesia was one of the first countries to be selected for participation in the ILO's international Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC), and it signed a memorandum of understanding with the ILO on May 29, 1992 to guide collaboration under this program. Recommendations for an action plan were developed at a national conference in Bogor in July 1993.

During 1995, 30 government labor inspectors received ILO-sponsored training on child labor matters under the IPEC program. However, enforcement remains lax.

The Government acknowledges that there is a class of children who must work for socioeconomic reasons, and in 1987 the Minister of Manpower issued regulation per-ol/men/1987, "Protection of Children Forced to Work," to regulate this situation. This regulation legalizes the employment of children under the age of 14 who must work to contribute to the income of their families. It requires parental consent, prohibits dangerous or difficult work, limits work to 4 hours daily, and requires employers to report the number of children working under its provisions. It does not set a minimum age for children in this category, effectively superseding the colonial-era government ordinance of December 17, 1925, on "Measures Limiting Child Labor and Nightwork of Women," which is still the current law governing child labor and sets a minimum age of 12 for employment.

The 1987 regulation is not enforced. No employers have been taken to court for violating its restrictions on the nature of employment for children, and no reports are collected from establishments employing children.

Act No. 1 of 1951 was intended to bring into force certain labor measures, including provisions on child labor which would replace those of the 1925 legislation. However, implementing regulations for the child labor provisions have never been issued. Thus the child labor provisions in the 1951 Act have no validity.

In the absence of a national minimum wage, area wage councils working under the supervision of the national wage council establish minimum wages for regions and basic needs figures for each province--a monetary amount considered sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs of nutrition, clothing, and shelter.

While Indonesia has succeeded in dramatically lowering the level of poverty throughout the country, the minimum wage rates until recently have usually lagged behind inflation and even the basic needs figures. The Government raised minimum wage rates in 1994 and again on April 1.

There is no national minimum wage. The minimum wage varies from province to province. In Jakarta it is about $2 (RP 4600) per day. While in certain provinces the new rates are still below the provincial basic needs figures, the Department of Manpower estimates that, on the average, minimum wage rates equal 108 percent of the basic needs figures, up from 97 percent as of August 1, 1994.

The Government announced in November that further increases would take effect April 1, 1996. There are no reliable statistics on the number of employers paying at least the minimum wage. Independent observers' estimates range between 30 and 60 percent.

The Department of Manpower increased the number of labor inspectors and announced a scheme of "blacklisting" offending companies, but enforcement of minimum wage and other labor regulations remains inadequate, and sanctions too light. The Department of Manpower has drafted a revision of a basic labor law that would raise statutory fines, which have been devalued by inflation, to more appropriate levels.

Some observers believe increased government pressures on employers and memories of the 1994 Medan riots have improved minimum wage compliance somewhat.

Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more modern facilities often receive health benefits and free meals. The law establishes 7-hour workdays and 40-hour workweeks, with one 30-minute rest period for each 4 hours of work. The law also requires 1 day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate is 1 1/2 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour, and twice the hourly rate for additional overtime. Regulations allow employers to deviate from the normal work hours upon request to the Minister of Manpower and with the agreement of the employee.

Observance of laws regulating benefits and labor standards varies from sector to sector and by region. Employer violations of legal requirements are fairly common and often result in strikes and employee protests. The Ministry of Manpower continues publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However, in general, government enforcement and supervision of labor standards are weak.

Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of industrial health and safety. In the largely Western-operated oil sector, safety and health programs function reasonably well. However, in the country's 100,000 larger registered companies in the non oil sector, the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies greatly.

The enforcement of health and safety standards is severely hampered by the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower inspectors as well as by the low level of employee appreciation for sound health and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the part of inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from retaliating against those who do, but the law is not effectively enforced.