OSCE IN POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE

Today’s talks about the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) imply, more or less spontaneously, that this is actually a modified CSCE, i.e. a modified Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, that was held in Helsinki in 1975 and later on continued to act under this name as a specific form of a continuing international multilateral action (CSCE process) up to the summit in Budapest in 1994, when it was renamed by substituting the word “Conference” by “Organization”. However, the change of the name was the least important, since there were introduced fundamental,  changes of substance which started not at the Budapest Summit meeting, but at the CSCE Paris Summit which adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. We are actually facing a completely new institution, so that one could rather speak about discontinuity and not continuity of OSCE with regard to CSCE - which again, in itself, is by no means a negation of either the achievements from the previous phase, or the existence of their common grounds and linkages
 
The transformed CSCE, i.e. the OSCE, is in all aspects different from the previous CSCE - different are its place and role in European relations, its character, its constitutive structure and methods of work. Actually, everything is different - which is natural and understandable. First of all, its essential function is different - it is not the promotion of détente, but rather steering and managing the process of democratic transformation of the former socialist societies of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and that of regional stabilization. Its aims, as defined in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the subsequent basic documents, are now: democracy based upon human rights, economic freedoms and equal security for all member states.  The focal points of this all-European endeavor have also not remained the same: in the Helsinki CSCE these were, first of all, the inviolability of frontiers and free movement of people and ideas (the so-called Third basket), and in the Charter of Paris the emphasis is upon democracy, human rights, the rule of law and economic freedom, whilst the free movement of people is not even mentioned. On the general level, apart from reaffirming the ten principles from the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other basic document were not expanded with new principles, but therefore the concepts of democracy, of the rule of law, of economic freedoms and social justice were established de facto not only as the purposes of the CSCE/OSCE, but also as general value categories.
 
In the post-Cold War Europe the CSCE/OSCE was in its activities basically preoccupied with the democratic transformation of the countries of the former socialist camp, the resolution of crisis and conflicts in this area, and more recently, particularly after the Forum for Security Cooperation was established (1992), with the developing of a concept and model of common and cooperative security. Simultaneously, the OSCE/CSCE has also intensively dealt with itself alone, its institutional and programmatic development.

The Yugoslav crisis and the war in this region represented not only a major challenge for the post-Cold War CSCE (and not only for it), but also the first opportunity to test its potentials for conflict prevention and crisis management. This was at the same time, however, at first its major failure (and not only of the CSCE) and later, in a renewed engagement, its major success in the domain of crisis management up to now. Namely, the CSCE intervened in the Yugoslav crisis twice: first, during the first two years of crisis, when simultaneously with the European Community it was trying in many ways, but unsuccessfully, to contribute to the resolution of the crisis as well as to prevent, and then stop the war in the territory of the former Yugoslavia , and second, since November 1995, when it was included into the mechanisms of the implementation of the Dayton Agreements. In the first case the OSCE acted as an autonomous international political factor, dealing with the essence of the crisis; in the second one it acted in fact by fulfilling a task given to it by the international community, on behalf of which the Contact Group (the five big powers), headed by the USA, overtook handling of the Yugoslav crisis. Namely, the Dayton Agreement gave two basic tasks to the OSCE: to organize and carry out negotiations on confidence-building measures and arms control (i.e. balanced reduction of armaments) in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia as well as the whole activity concerning the organization of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mentioned negotiations on those military questions were completed successfully and in time, agreements were concluded, and the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (except for local elections) were also successfully carried out.

With regard to the new identity of the OSCE there are three points that should, first of all, be stressed: first, as a post-Cold War regional organization in Europe the OSCE is in fact a completely new body, both in substance and form, and hence different from the previous, Helsinki CSCE, within the framework of which and under the name of which it emerged at the Paris summit in 1990; second, the OSCE is still in a stage of searching for its own identity, its role and its place in contemporary international relations; and, third, the OSCE is basically the product of the (victorious) West - it reflects its views and secures its interests, and in accordance with this also the security interests and interests for cooperation of other of its members. All the three points are relevant the evaluation of both the evolution and the so far activity of the OSCE, as well as for the projection of its further development and role in European relations in the years to come. Without taking into account all these realities, it  is difficult to make either a valid evaluation of the road that was passed, or a projection of the forthcoming development of the OSCE.
 
At the Prague ministerial meeting of the CSCE Council in January 1992, State Secretary John Baker pointed that “the CSCE has become a central forum for solving problems and managing crisis”, and that this role of the CSCE should continue to strengthen, including its abilities for conflict prevention.  Shortly after this, at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in March 1992 Lawrence Eagleburger, US Deputy State Secretary, elaborated in a more detailed way the role and tasks of the CSCE in the new circumstances and sorted out four of its basic functions: first, to serve as a standard for judging democratic and human rights performance; second, to serve as a forum for political consultations and joint action in the field of managing transition (in Eastern Europe); third, to serve as the main forum for dealing with control of conventional armaments in Europe; and fourth, to assist in establishing democratic institutions and reforms of the market economy.  At the Budapest Summit of the OSCE in 1994 President Clinton expressed, however, his expectation that this organization will contribute to the establishment of a new united continent and will be the first flexible line of defense against ethnic and regional conflicts.
 
Richard Holbrooke points out in a characteristic sense that not only has the OSCE its place in the new European security architecture, but that its role is also indispensable because neither NATO nor the European Union can provide everything to each of the states in the region. Therefore, in his view, this new European architectural concept needs a larger and looser region-wide organization that can deal with a variety of challenges which neither NATO nor the European Union is suited for addressing. By saying so, Holbrooke actually is pointing to the OSCE as having an undoubtedly its proper place and role in the system of European regional organization, but by doing so he also implies that the division of competence (or labor) between the NATO and the European Union is a priority, while the OSCE is mainly in charge of what they do not cover.
 
The Lisbon Summit Declaration says that “the OSCE has a key role to fostering security and stability in all their dimensions” and that it represents “a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities”.  All these are elements that with minor variations are mainly used in official statements, especially in NATO documents and in statements and speeches of US diplomats and statesmen. Besides, present are also the elements of conflict management, conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy.
 
However, all this does not give a complete and sufficiently concrete answer to the question of the position and role of the OSCE in contemporary international relations. In this regard more specific - and, hence, a useful supplement to the mentioned general answers - are the positions expressed by S. Brown, that the OSCE can effectively act only in situations in which non-coercive solutions are possible ; and by F. Bozo, who thinks that up to a certain degree the OSCE can take over from the United Nations the main peace maintaining functions in Europe although the restoration of peace remains the prerogative of the World organization. Besides, Bozo is supporting a redefinition of strategic roles between organizations for collective security, organizations for common defense and the member-states.
 
Alan Dowd has a more far-reaching and more radical concept of a security system in Europe, including the OSCE, for which he says - after his above mentioned view on the futility of the rhetorical counter-action of the CSCE/OSCE with regard to war in Bosnia-Herzegovina - that it was only NATO that enabled it to cease to be “toothless”; still, the OSCE proved unable even to reach consensus with regard to the use of force in the interest of peace and security on this continent. Therefore, Dowd stands up for a re-evaluation of the nature and role of the OSCE, with the possibility to keep it as a purely diplomatic, deliberative body that would articulate standards of national behavior and long-term security objectives in Europe. In developing his concept of a security system in the region he puts an emphasis on the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (which, as a result of a recent NATO’s initiative is going to be transformed into the Atlantic Partnership Council), that could and should have primary responsibility for maintaining security in the continent. Furthermore, he suggests to modify this body so as to make it up into a forum for defining the aims of countries in the region, as well as providing them with means for their implementation, i.e. with a credible enforcement mechanism. In his conclusions Dowd speaks in favor of establishing a Euro-Atlantic security system that would be capable of ensuring the implementation of its decisions by force, and “the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a framework for existing and prospective regional security organizations could institutionalize such a system”
 
Flavio Cotti, the Swiss Minister for foreign affairs and the OSCE Chairman-in-office during 1996 is pointing at the multi-focal approach of the OSCE, citing its four basic functions: first, the OSCE constitutes a community of values, in the first place democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms; second, the OSCE is a permanent forum for dialogue on questions that concern security in Europe; third, the OSCE is a forum for arms control and disarmament, as well as for confidence - and security - building measures; fourth, the OSCE is equipped with means for intervention in regions of conflict (High Commissioner for national minorities; missions of preventive diplomacy, etc.), as well as for post-conflict rehabilitation activities, and it has at its disposal also the possibility to undertake peace-keeping operations. This is elaborated as a view of the contemporary state of affairs, but actually it implies also the further role and direction of activity of the OSCE.
 
Everything said above implies first of all the following conclusions.
 
The institutionalized multilateralism on the general level of security and cooperation in Europe represents a complex system which consists of a few regional organizations - by area and membership as well as by subject and character they are more or less different or identical, and by jurisdiction and tasks they are mutually complementary, but partly also competitive; they are independent in exercising their functions one from another, but also inter-related. For all these reasons the role of each of these regional organizations has to be viewed as part of the entirety of this system - a system that is actually in a process of searching for optimal solutions and an adequate institutional and conceptual build-up. This is the case exactly with the OSCE, its place and role in international relations in Europe. Whether or not, in the long run, NATO and the European Union are going to outgrow it and make it relatively less important or superfluous, or whether or not it will endure the competition and in the future become an even dominant all-European institution - it is hard to predict for the time being.
 
However, what can be said with certainty is that for the foreseeable time the OSCE will continue to hold its specific place in the system of regional security and cooperation in Europe, but essentially it will not be completely autonomous in the way that was the case with the Helsinki CSCE; functionally, for a longer period to come East Europe, namely the former socialist countries, will mainly be in the focus of the OSCE’s activity in the geo-political sense, whilst again, in the decision making process the Western countries will prevail. To put it even shorter: center of decision making is in the West, center of activity is in the East. This is so for quite objective reasons because the centers of both economic and military power are in the West; while in the East there is going on a process of transition, of building democratic institutions and of democratization that is going on, and at the same time this part of Europe is burdened by many sources of actual instability, crisis and conflict, more acute problems of respect for  human rights and fundamental freedoms. Anyhow, this cannot be generalized and judged in an over simplified way. Namely, it is a fact that in the West, too, there exist some of these problems, although of a relatively smaller scope and intensity, and what is even more important, they are solved within the narrower regional organizations (the European Union and NATO, first of all). Furthermore, an even more significant correction to this picture, is that the military aspects of security (confidence- and security-building measures, arms control and disarmament) constitute a field of the OSCE that is evenly encompassing the entire geo-political area of the OSCE, all armed forces in this territory of all its members; in this field there is no East-West asymmetry, because this as a comprehensive and balanced system of the mentioned military measures, a system that has been already established and functioning, and that is being further developed. Here the OSCE is functioning as a negotiating forum, as well as a mechanism for controlling the implementation of undertaken obligations, but, to be honest, in this process the epicenter of decision-making and agreement is no doubt beyond it. Moreover, the asymmetry within the OSCE, that is the mentioned imbalance of its decision-making process, is being to some extent also modified by recent endeavor of Russia to take a more active stance and to alleviate to a certain extent this Western preponderance. However, Russia cannot go too far in this and its reactions do not change substantially the image of a mainly Western-colored OSCE.
 
Generally speaking, the OSCE will in the future be primarily engaged in two aspects: peace and security, and human rights and fundamental freedoms (which includes also the question of creating and strengthening democratic institutions). With regard to the first aspect, peace and security, the OSCE will continue to act on two tracks - the one are the military aspects of security (arms control and others), and the other is the whole variety of already mentioned tasks with regard to diplomatic and political engagement aimed at early warning of danger of conflict, crisis management, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, as well as of post-conflict rehabilitation. On the first track (military-security measures) the OSCE/CSCE has up to now acted successfully and this is expected to be so also in the future; on the other one (political-security measures), in its initially independent attempts (for example the Yugoslav crisis and conflict) it was mainly unsuccessful, but afterwards, when it was accompanying and supporting actions of other international factors (the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and the newly established ad hoc Concert of big powers - the Contact-group), the OSCE did achieve certain success and it is this role of a more or less secondary, though not negligible nature that is to be expected in the future. With regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms the OSCE will, as it did up to now, have a useful and broadly applicable role, but also by support of international factors which have at their direct disposal means of enforcement (economic and military, and thus also political).  With regard to economy, neither CSCE in its time, nor OSCE later have had in fact almost any role and this is no doubt going to be the case in the
future.

As it was already said at the beginning, the OSCE, contrary to the CSCE, is not a completely autochthonous and autonomous regional organization, but rather just one of the factors of the regional organizing enterprise in the field of security and cooperation, one that acts in parallel with other collective actors in this region and has with them a relationship of cooperation but also of certain dependence, of complementarity but also of competition and collision, because their functions and prerogatives are not only mutually related and complementary, but to a great extent also identical.
 
Having this in mind, the role of the OSCE in European relations today and in the foreseeable future depends on the development of the entire complex of regional organizing, of the international relations and de facto,  and also de iure, of the mutual division of roles and activities. In fact, the development of the OSCE has a certain internal logic, but it also depends very much upon the development of other regional organizations in Europe, first of all NATO and the European Union. And the development of these organizations, in turn, is conditioned, by many of their internal factors and relations, as well as by their mutual relations. Therefore, it is only in this context that it is possible to perceive to some extent also the prospects of the OSCE.
 
Contrary to the autochthonous and, within its domain, a primary role of the Helsinki CSCE, the role of the today’s OSCE is - no matter how important and useful - in essence still a secondary one, because the essential decisions are made beyond its framework, in other regional bodies, so that its function is less of an essential, and more of an instrumental nature (the example of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton Agreement and its implementation). In this context the already quoted H. Meesman concludes that the CSCE (i.e. now OSCE) “from being a major catalyst of liberalization and democratization has become a modest accessory”.
 
However, in contemporary conditions when it is the only organization for security and cooperation that includes all European countries, the OSCE, with all its limitations, represents an undoubtedly necessary, functionally purposeful instrument for regulating and promoting relations in the region. Pointing out its limitations is not minimizing its role, but serves to remind upon the need to perceive it realistically and to make realistic expectations. Its acts are not decisive, its scopes are not far-reaching, but in leaning upon other international actors and with their support, it still can make a useful contribution to stability and improving things in Europe. In any case, in what it has done in the post-Cold War era the OSCE has best demonstrated its both abilities and disabilities - particularly in the case of the Yugoslav crisis.
 
The OSCE is significant as a factor of all-European gathering and dialogue, as a spot of articulation of an (conditionally understood and expressed) all-European interest and endeavor, and as a negotiating forum, first of all in the field of military aspects of security (confidence- and security-building measures, and arms control).
 
In its instrumental and operational functions the OSCE will certainly continue with its useful mediatory, conciliatory, fact-finding, and other similar missions, as well as with fulfilling special tasks, such as the implementation of certain aspects of the Dayton agreement, or assistance in solving problems of national minorities (particularly by engaging the High Commissioner for national minorities and the special missions). These activities are mainly concerning the field of building democratic institutions and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
 
Maybe the OSCE will take under its auspices also some initiatives for sub-regional cooperation (as is the one for South-Eastern Europe), which would certainly be useful for a quicker and more efficient stabilization of situation in certain parts of the region, as is exactly the South-Eastern one.
 
All this illustrates the undoubtedly positive potentials of the OSCE in the present phase of the post-Cold War era in international relations, but what was achieved till today and the current trends constitute a basis only for projections which will cover a relatively shorter, at most middle-term period and which will take into account all other essential factors of the European scene. In this regard the OSCE appears as one of the factors that  one should seriously count with, but not expect more than it can realistically offer.
 

CSS Survey, No.14, February 1997