THE YUGOSLAV PUBLIC OPINION AND CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
 

The Yugoslav public is persuaded - primarily through the most influential media - to accept a very specific image of the contemporary international relations, one that is very similar to the way in which the Soviet propaganda was presenting the international situation during the 60-ies and 70-ies. Namely, the audience is given a gloomy picture of the world burdened with huge problems and unsolvable contradictions. There is talk about serious confrontation between the West and Russia, disagreements among countries of Western Europe that can lead to a breakdown of the European Union, on insurmountable difficulties concerning transition in Eastern Europe, etc. Many events are either not mentioned, or are interpreted always as a sign of a deterioration of the situation, and in almost all moves of the influential countries there are identified elements of confrontation, hegemonism or hidden bad intentions. Obviously, behind such “schools” of presenting the international situations there are factors pertaining to the internal policy and internal needs. Namely, if the situation in the world is really like the one presented, and if we are constantly finding ourselves on the verge of confrontation and a serious conflict, and with independence of many countries endangered, it is much easier to explain the circumstances with regard to the break-up of Yugoslavia and all that followed – the war, sanctions, big number of refugees, etc. In such circumstances the responsibility of the domestic, i.e. internal roots of the disintegration and the war is getting lost or subdued, and the biggest – or event the entire – responsibility is placed with the international situation and factors. If the world really is in such a crisis and difficulties, than it is no surprise that such a small country, as is ours, got stuck with problems - actually because of a “higher force”. In this manner the interpretation of international events acquires a very clear internal political and propagandistic function.
 
Of course, there is no doubt that the situation in Europe and in the world is sufficiently complicated. However, changes that occurred in the last ten years contain two key positive elements: first, the Cold War is over; second, the military-political bloc in which the countries of Eastern Europe were kept by force was dissolved, and all these states gained the opportunity for free development; Europe was liberated from the “iron curtain” as the decisive line of divisions and confrontation. In this country all this is most often interpreted as a result of some clandestine agreements, hidden acts of statesmen and “power centers”, as a result of conspiracy and the activity of intelligence and other services. Such “conspiracy” interpretations are completely loosing from sight one key moment: that these are profound social changes that are not depending from any service or statesmen agreements. Such radical events, as is the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty or the unification of Germany, are no result of some political game, of intelligence outwitting or failures of this or that politician – they are in the first place a result of the historical defeat of a social system that had reached its objective limits. The Eastern bloc disintegrated because the regimes in these countries disqualified themselves, and Germany united because the regime in the former GDR fell, after which the unification was impossible to prevent, except by use of force with catastrophic consequences. The political and economic system that has been developed in the West, with all its deficiencies, has proved to be more vital and more efficient than the one developed in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. This, and not clandestine agreements or the faults of politicians, is the essence of changes in Europe. East European countries nowadays want to join NATO not in order to “surround” and threaten Russia, but because they want guarantees for their stability and their further development. The problem of NATO’s expansion to the East is a complex one, but it still will not be the cause of a new confrontation, and it is in the interest of both the West and Russia to find a compromise. However, a significant portion of our public opinion – under the influence of the strongest media – is almost constantly expecting some more serious dispute and the conflict between Russia and the West; to our spectators and readers it is often suggested that the conflict is just about to begin. It seems that there are expectations that in this context there might occur certain changes in the relations of powers and the general constellation of forces in the world and that this – as it is expected – could change in the positive way the position of the FR Yugoslavia without its own special efforts. This was the context in which during the last years there was often given a more or less explicit support to those forces in Russia that were in favor of confrontation with the West; anyhow, the events themselves have gradually persuaded Belgrade to turn to more realistic and moderate circles in Russian politics.

Directing our public opinion towards such expectations of confrontation in relations between the West and Russia is harmful in many ways. First, this is unrealistic. Russia is facing huge internal problems and it cannot solve them without cooperation with the West. Expansion of NATO is more an issue of internal political outwitting in Russia, than a real problem of the citizens of this country. Although there certainly do exist also reasons for Russia’s legitimate concern, the room for maneuvers with regard to agreement and compromise is sufficiently big. Second, a possible tension in relations between the West and Russia would cause great harm, and not benefits, for Yugoslavia. Namely, conflicts between the West and Moscow have always been led in “third countries”, which is best known to the population of East Europe, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, etc. In contemporary circumstances the former Yugoslavia would be an almost ideal terrain for such a “crossing of swords”, namely for the erection of some new “iron curtain” or Berlin Wall. In such a context the situation is the worst for those on whose territory this divisions emerge. Besides, if in a possible confrontation Yugoslavia would side with Moscow, this would mean that, objectively speaking, it would side with the weaker one – especially in economic terms – and the one in which there are prevailing forces of greater-state and neo-imperialist orientation. Thus, both Russia and Yugoslavia would be cut off from contemporary economic, technological, integrative and other civilization trends. Such a development would harm mostly Russia itself and Yugoslavia.

One should hope that, regardless of the serious internal problems, Russia would keep a rational and realistic orientation in foreign policy and avoid conflicts that cannot bring any benefit. Although the situation in Russia is a very complex one, there is sufficient ground for such belief. However, Yugoslavia will not be of help to Russia by waiting and hoping for its conflict with the West. What many in Yugoslavia would consider as “support” to Russia (by offering themselves as allies and providing “argumentation” proving a “campaign against Russia from the West”), in the end would cause greatest harm exactly for the population of Russia which is nowadays the least in the need for isolation, closing and conflict with the world. It is superfluous even to speak of what would be the perspectives with regard to overcoming the crisis, for social and economic reforms and democratization, both in Russia and in Yugoslavia.

Hence, it is necessary to present to the Yugoslav public, and particularly to decision-makers in politics, a realistic picture of the changes in contemporary international relations, changes that are result of profound internal processes and transformation in some of the countries, and not of secret and clandestine calculations and conspiracy. This will enable us to understand the international realities without idealization (it is, anyhow, only rarely present in regard to these questions), but also without “satanizing” the processes in the world and the role of certain countries (which is very much present in Yugoslavia). It is not possible to have democratic changes in the country if the population is exposed to a psychology of a besieged fortress, and the relations in the world and with the world are understood as alleged inevitable conflicts and divisions, alliances of one against the other, etc. A realistic and rational approach and interpretation of contemporary international relations, without creating an atmosphere of threat and siege, should be the framework within which shall be implemented the necessary political and economic changes in Yugoslavia.
 

CSS Survey, No.16, April 1997