THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE BALKANS COUNTRIES

In all ten Balkan countries that are analyzed in this article, there is a democratic system in power. Greece has the longest tradition in this respect, since it renewed democracy in 1974; eight years later (1982) and identical orientation prevailed in Turkey. In the remaining eight countries the ruling system was the regime of “real socialism” (or, in SFRY, “self-management socialism”) up to 1989/1990, when the democratic system was established. Dilemmas with regard to the real nature of the new system in ex-communist countries was emphasized because this system differs in many respects from the one in stable democracies in Western Europe and the USA: an absence of a strong middle stratum (which is the “natural basis of democracy”), the domination of a parochial culture and one of subordination over the civic culture in the population, a low level of respect for human rights and the absence of democratic tradition. In these circumstance there is reason to ask whether in the case of the post-communist countries it is it all a democratic system, or maybe just a variant of an authoritarian system with certain democratic features. Most authors think that the newly emerged system can be conditionally characterized as a democratic one. Emil Mitev, for instance, calls this system a “proto-democratic” one and describes it as". an extremely unique combination of residual restrictions, freedom and anarchy... Proto-democracy is characterized by a contradiction between the legislative sphere and the social reality, as well as the contradiction within the legislative branch itself”

Guillermo O’Donnell uses “delegate democracy” to mark the new type of democracy that emerged in Latin America and the post-communist countries after the breakdown of the old regime. Delegate democracy (DD) is, in O’Donnell’s view, based upon the premise that the winner in presidential elections is empowered to rule in the way he or she likes, limited only by the existing power relations and constitutional limits with regard to the duration of the mandate .  In view of this author, there are some similarities and differences between the DD and the representative democracy that exists in Western European countries and the USA. The first similarity is that the most important political organ (in the case of Latin America the president of the republic) is elected in a democratic way; the second one is that during his mandate he is exposed to constant criticism from the opposition parties. These features make the DD substantially different from the previous authoritarian system. However, DD is also different from representative democracy, primarily because in the DD responsibility of the president is exclusively a vertical one, to the voters, but there is no so-called horizontal responsibility, to other institutions, first of all the parliament. Explanations rest upon the low level of institutionalization of the parliament and the political system in general.

The second specific feature of the DD is that the decision making process is a quick one, whilst in countries with representative democracy, in which there are autonomous institutions, this process is mainly a slow one. The advantage of the DD with regard to the pace with which decisions are arrived at is carrying also some immanent deficiencies: an increased probability of making wrong decisions, outstanding obstacles in implementation of decisions and the individualization of guilt in case of failure exclusively in the person of the president. We think that the reservations emphasized by some authors with regard to the character of the democratic system in post-communist countries are fully justified, and their assessment that this is a system that belongs to the genus of democratic, and not of authoritarian systems, is also a correct one. Decisive arguments in favor of such an assessment come from the fact that in the post-communist countries the free activity of political parties is guaranteed and that exercise of power is based upon the will of the citizens as expressed in free elections.

Of course, the democratic political systems established in the eight ex-communist countries are not identical. In some of these countries, as in Slovenia, the political process is developing without harsh conflicts, similar to the countries with stabile democracies, whilst in other countries the political life is burdened with conflicts over basic principles and institutions. In these countries the citizens have little confidence in political institutions, which indicates the possibility to “transfer” the political life into the non-institutional sphere. As an illustration of the small confidence of citizens in political institutions, let us say that, for instance, 25% of citizens in Romania, 26% in Bulgaria, 27% in Slovenia, 28% in Serbia, 30% in Croatia and 53% in Montenegro, do not have confidence in the parliament

Exactly because these are newly established democratic systems, the level of their institutionalization is a low one and therefore their ability to solve difficult economic and social problems is a limited one. In all eight of the mentioned ex-communist countries, except FR Yugoslavia, there did occur first peaceful changes of governments, which is seen as the “critical” point of democracy. In FR Yugoslavia winners in all the republican and federal elections that were held up to now (1990; 1992; 1993; 1996) were the reformed communist parties, the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party of Socialists. In the elections held in 1996 (for the Federal parliament, for the parliament of Montenegro and for local organs in both republics) a far-reaching political conflict emerged, because the SPS refused to recognize the victory of the coalition Zajedno (Serbian Renewal Movement, Democratic Party, Civic Alliance of Serbia) in some municipalities and cities. Unsatisfied with such an outcome, the SPS used the regular courts and electoral commissions in an attempt to annul the election results, and the opposition reacted by mass demonstrations in all bigger towns in Serbia. Faced with the resolve of the opposition to resist electoral machinations, in February 1997 the SPS unwillingly recognized the results of local elections. Anyhow, this conflict revealed the deep polarization in the political life of Serbia among the forces that want to keep the status quo and the forces that stand for democratic changes.

Like the big differences among the ex-communist countries, there also exist significant differences between Turkey and Greece, because by their prevailing political culture and the dominant models of political life the latter country is closer to the countries of stabile democracy.

Regardless of the fact that the societies in the majority of the analyzed Balkan countries are multi-ethnic and multi-confessional, a low level of decentralization characterizes their political systems. This assessment is valid also for FR Yugoslavia, although this is the only one among the ten countries with a federal system. However, the federal units in FR Yugoslavia are highly centralized. This is true not only of Montenegro, but also of Serbia within which there are two provinces (Kosovo and Metohija; Vojvodina). However, the level of autonomy of these provinces, the normative and the real one, is extremely low. Only Bosnia-Herzegovina is deviating from this assessment of low level of decentralization of political systems of the Balkan countries, but this political system does not yet function in practice.

State System

With regard to the form of the state system, the majority of Balkan countries opted for parliamentary systems. This is the case with Slovenia, FR Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece. Macedonia introduced a specific parliamentary system in which the government is formed from the parliamentary majority. In this country, however, part of the executive power – apart from the government – rests with the president of the republic who is elected directly and who has a right of veto in respect of laws. Anyhow, the president is responsible to the parliament for disregard of the constitution and he also does not have the right to dismiss the parliament, which is the reason why in this case we cannot speak about a presidential system.

Turkey has a variant of state system that in essence is a mixed one, in which the president of the republic plays a significant role. The president is empowered, inter alia, to declare referendums on proposals for amending the constitution, to ask the constitutional court to cancel laws passed in the parliament, to declare the rules of procedures for the parliament, to dismiss the parliament and call new elections. However, this is not a presidential system, because in Turkey the president is not elected directly by the citizens, but by the parliament.

In Croatia and Serbia  there is a “semi-presidential” system. In both of these countries the president of the republic has a key role, whilst the role of the parliament is of a secondary nature. In Serbia and Croatia the president of the republic is elected by direct votes of the citizens (article 86 of the 1990 Constitution of Serbia, article 95 of the 1990 constitution of Croatia), and the revocation procedure is extremely complicated. In Serbia this procedure is initiated by the parliament (two-third majority), and in Croatia by the constitutional court (two-third majority). The presidents of both republics have broad authorization, especially in Serbia in which the president of the republic has the right of suspense veto with regard to laws (article 84), he declares by his own decision the “danger of war”, he declares “the state of emergency” (article 83) and decides on the dismissal of the parliament (article 89). In Croatia the president of the republic appoints and dismisses the prime minister (article 98) and is authorized to “introduce decrees with a legislative effect and undertake extraordinary measures in case of war or immediate threat to independence and unity of the Republic (article 101). Having in mind the scope of the presidential powers, in both republics there is a “semi-presidential system”  ( However, the “semi-presidential” system – as exists, for instance, in France – is not a specific institutional arrangement because, depending on the power relations in the parliament it functions as a presidential or "semi-presidential" system. As long as the party (or the parties) which supports the president has majority in the parliament, the “semi-presidential” system functions as a presidential one, and when this is not the case it functions as a parliamentary system . In this latter case, which is named cohabitation, the president’s rights are essentially limited by the prerogatives of the parliament. In Serbia and Croatia, however, due to victories of the “president’s party” in all parliamentary elections held till today, the “semi-presidential system” was functioning as a presidential one.

In the other republic in FR Yugoslavia, Montenegro, the President of the Republic is elected by direct vote, but his powers are limited and under certain circumstances the parliament has the right to recall him (article 87 of the Constitution adopted on October 12, 1992), so that with regard to Montenegro we can speak of a parliamentary system.

The state system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sui generis one for two reasons. First of all because the implementation of the system established by the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution (in the Dayton Agreement) begun only in mid-1996, and the situation “in the field” is substantially differing from constitutional proclamations. Second, even when looked upon in a purely normative way, the system in Bosnia-Herzegovina is specific because it is designed for an ethnically and religiously completely divided society in which the civil war has just stopped. The peculiarities of the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina are manifold. First of all, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was introduced by an international agreement and the “international factor” has a strong role in its implementation, which makes the international position of Bosnia-Herzegovina nearing the status of a protectorate. Second, the President (namely, the Presidency) of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a collective organ, whilst in all other Balkan countries this is an individual organ. Members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina are elected directly in both entities (article V, par. (a) of the 1995 Constitution). The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of the People’s Council and the Presidential Council. The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina can dismiss the first of these councils under the condition that such a decision was adopted by the majority of the delegates, which implies the majority constituted by at least two of the three people (article IV, par. (g) of the 1995 Constitution).
 
The Constitutional Status of the Minorities
 
The majority of the Balkan states has a mixed ethnic structure, and in five of them (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) the dominant national group constitutes less than 80% of the population, and therefore these countries are marked as “heterogeneous societies”. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the national question represented a chronic cause of instability both in the individual countries, and in the Balkan region in general. The civil (and ethnic) war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, which was brought to an end only upon intervention of the international community, is an illustration. Although the signing of the Dayton/ Paris Agreement at the end of 1995 stopped the hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the danger of new conflicts has not been removed. The relations between the Republic Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are still tense, and the big number of refugees cannot return to their homes that are under control of the “other side”. Having this in mind it could be said that the civil (and ethnic) war that began in SFRY in 1991 and which stopped at the end of 1995 with the Erdut Agreement and Paris Agreement, actually in practice is not yet brought to an end.

The outbreak of  war in SFR Yugoslavia was not accidental, because within the “second Yugoslavia” there existed ethnic antagonisms that have a long history and deep roots. In the period between the two world wars in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), like in the whole of Eastern Europe, conflicts between ethnic groups constituted a center of political struggles. Ethnic antagonisms in this part of Europe did not vanish when the communist parties overtook power after World War II, but were only “hibernated” and came to the surface in full strength in 1989/1990. The example of Bulgaria is a good illustration: in the times of “real socialism” the ethnic minorities, particularly the Turkish minority, were under brutal repression and therefore, in 1988, 300.000 Turks fled the country. Here it is necessary to say that this was not only repression by the regime, because it enjoyed significant support from the majority nation. An illustration to this point are the mass demonstrations at the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990, when the State Council and the Council of Ministers annulled the legal discrimination of the Turkish minority. Members of national minorities in Romania and Albania were also having an outstandingly unfavorable treatment in the period of “real socialism”.  In this regard, in SFR Yugoslavia the situation was considerably better, because the minorities enjoyed special rights in the fields of culture and education.

Convincing evidence with regard to the situation in inter-ethnic relations not only in the Balkans, but also in a broader sense in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the “ancien regime” is given by the following statement of a group of authors, which is based upon the findings of a comparative empirical research conducted in 1991: “We have already found that the peoples in Eastern Europe, simply speaking, do not like their neighbors. Their ethnic divisions are so sharp, and national intolerance so deep that a radical improvement of relations must wait for new generations to come”  Although gloomy, this assessment still does contain a ray of hope in “new generations”, which, unfortunately, is not based upon a reliable empirical foundation. Namely, in comparison to the period between the two world wars, which was marked by clear ethnic conflicts, “the new generations” are exactly those living in the contemporary period, but which – like the previous ones, “do not like their neighbors”. To what extend is this optimism in regard to the attitudes of the “new generations” an unfounded one is illustrated by the findings of the same research according to which the population in this region is exercising national intolerance even when the nation that is subject to intolerance has disappeared. This is illustrated by a strongly expressed anti-Semitism of the Poles and Slovaks in the contemporary period , although in these areas the Jews, with few exceptions, were terminated in the German concentration camps during World War II.

When after World War II the communist came to power, national conflicts in the Balkan countries (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania) were suppressed by force, but not annulled. From the beginnings of the sixties the conflicts emerge first in Yugoslavia (because the ruling regime was a more liberal one than in Bulgaria and Romania) in the form of seemingly benign conflicts in the field of culture, only to erupt in the beginning of the seventies in the “mass movement” in Croatia that made the national questions once again a key political issue. The ruling communist regime of the “second Yugoslavia” reacted with a mixture of repression and giving in; repression eliminated the leaders of the “mass movement”, and giving in pertained to the essence of the demands expressed by the “mass movement”.

The series of amendments (from 1971 to 1972) to the Yugoslav 1963 Constitution, followed by the new constitution of SFR Yugoslavia in 1974, integrated the demands of the “mass movement” for greater respect of the nation in the spheres of politics and economy into the ruling political system. However, this only temporarily suppressed the national issue only to erupt in the second half of the eighties when the independent political elites in the federal units began to act as self-declared representatives of “their nations”. In the atmosphere of social hopelessness caused by deep economic crisis – which in the “second Yugoslavia was manifest from the end of the eighties – the calls of political elites for national unity and resistance to other nations were falling upon fertile ground. In such social-economic circumstances in the Yugoslav republics in 1989/1990 democratic institutions were established but, unfortunately, they did not take enough care about the ethnic (and religious) heterogeneity of the republic’s societies. A pronounced “dependence” of countries with heterogeneous ethnic structure upon good institutions was stressed by Samuel Huntington: “However, the more complex and more homogenous the society is, the more dependent is the preservation of the society upon the functioning of political institutions”(1973). Establishment of political institutions of the “majority democracy”, which do not correspond with the heterogeneous “ethnic soil” in five of the former SFRY republics emphasized ethnic antagonisms and accelerated the outbreak of  war in 1991.

Starting form the supposition that inadequate political institutions in ethnically heterogeneous countries increase the probability of conflict, it is necessary to see what kind of political institutions the Balkan countries established with the purpose of regulating the status of ethnic minorities. Although the constitutions of all ten Balkan countries are based upon principles of equality and non-discrimination of citizens, they approached in different ways problems pertaining to national minorities. The Constitution of Bulgaria (June 13, 1991) speaks only about individual rights, without any mention of collective minority rights. Equal approach was adopted in the Constitution of Turkey (November 7, 1982). The Constitution of Bulgaria explicitly forbids formation of parties “... based on ethnic, race and religious principles...” (article 11, par. 4). Although the possibility cannot be excluded that the framer of the constitution in this case was lead with noble motives, particularly the endeavor not to complicate further the already complex ethnic relations in Bulgaria by a “meddling” of political parties, such a solution objectively does carry a non-democratic charge. The experience of democratic countries in Western Europe, namely, shows that the party engagement runs “along” ethnic lines, so that prevention of such engagement can induce minority ethnic groups to opt for non-parliamentary struggle. Actually, the role of political institutions in democratic countries is not to suppress the ethnic (and generally social) heterogeneity, but rather to enable it to express itself and to find peaceful solutions.

The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) and the accompanying documents, as well as the constitutions of Bulgaria and Turkey, speak only of individual human rights and they establish a network of institutions and procedures for implementation of human rights (ombudsman, council for human rights). The Constitution of Croatia (December 22, 1990) also guarantees collective rights of national minorities, but it does guarantee the citizens all the rights regardless of race, religion, color, sex, language, nationality and political convictions (article 14). In this regard a significant change occurred, because the Croatian parliament – under influence of the “European conference on Yugoslavia” - passed on December 2, 1991, a constitutional law (modified on May 8, 1992) by which it guarantees collective rights to national minorities, especially the Serbs.

The Romanian Constitution (October 8, 1991) does not guarantee directly the collective rights to national minorities, but it does do so in an indirect way. Article 6 of the Constitution says: “The state recognizes and guarantees the individuals belonging to national minorities the right to preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural and religious identity.” Constitutions of other Balkan countries – such as the “Chart of rights” (1993) which functions ad the constitution of Albania – guarantees collective rights to national minorities. Here belongs also the Constitution of Slovenia (December 23, 1991), which speaks about collective rights of national minorities, but these are (articles 5 and 64) limited to “autochthonous minorities “ (the Italian and Austrian ones.)

Some constitutions of the Balkan countries establish specific organs to monitor the implementation of minority rights. This is, for instance, the case with the Macedonian Constitution, which established the Council for inter-national relations. This Council is composed of the president of the parliament and of two representatives of the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vallakhs and Romans each, as well as of two more members from other nations which live in this republic. A similar solution was implemented in the Constitution of Montenegro. This constitution established a Republican council for protection of rights for members of national and ethnic groups, under the presidency of the president of the republic (article 76). In Romania, too, the minority problem was institutionalized; the decree of the government (April 6, 1993) established a Council for national minorities, which has similar powers as similar organs in Macedonia and Montenegro.

Important institutional protection of minorities is guaranteed by the Romanian Constitution, which provides for proportional participation of minorities in public affairs. In the electoral law (1992) this provision was made more concrete; this law is based upon the proportional principle and thus secured representation of minority groups in the parliament in accordance with their numerical strength. Right of proportionate representation is provided also by the constitutional law of Croatia (1991) for Serbs in part of the Croatian territory. When it comes to political representation of minorities, the Romanian law contains an important provision that enables representation also of minorities that cannot reach the “electoral threshold” (“positive discrimination”). Slovenian electoral law (1993) has a similar principle, but it relates only to “autochthonous minorities” (the Italian and Austrian one).

However, regardless of the endeavors of the legislature in the majority of the Balkan countries to guarantee the national (and other) minorities and their members all the rights according to the highest standards – in some cases this was accomplished only under direct pressure of the international community (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria) – in practice the minorities are facing many forms of discrimination. This was particularly evident in the former republics of SFR Yugoslavia that became independent states during 1991 and 1992. Pluralistic transformation in these states was accomplished in a period of manifest national polarization, so it is no accident that their constitutions (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, in a certain way Serbia) stress that these are the states of the majority (“constitutive”) nations, and not civil states. Thus the constitutions introduce division along ethnic criteria upon first and second class citizens. However, more important than this constitutional discrimination in principle is that in practice some of these states in the period from 1990 to 1996 acted as instruments of the majority nation, and not as organizations belonging to all citizens.

Faced with the state that identified itself with the “constituent nation”, ethnic minorities in “the second Yugoslavia” manifested resistance in many ways in the period from 1990 to mid 1991.

First, they refused to recognize the new state and tried by arms to create their own state; examples in this regard are Serbs in Croatia. Indications of a conflict in this republic were evident immediately after the election victory of the Croat Democratic Community, which in its program (1990) proclaimed “...the right of the Croat people to self-determination and state sovereignty”.  Fearing from the establishment of an independent Croat state, the Serbian Democratic Party has resolutely declared its demand for autonomy, which the newly established regime in Croatia rejected. Hopes for the possibility of autonomy were definitely lost after the adoption of the new Croatian Constitution (December 22, 1990), which opted for a completely centralized state system.

Second, ethnic minorities refused to recognize the new states and opted for a tactic of mass protests. The Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija implemented such tactic, and the immediate excuse for protests (the causes are deeper) was the substantial limitation of this province’s autonomy after changes in the constitution in Serbia in 1989. Expressing dissatisfaction with the new constitutional position of the province, Albanians organized mass demonstrations after which a state of emergency was declared. In January 1990 new revolt of Albanians erupted in Kosovo and Metohija; they demanded the abolition of the state of emergency, free elections and the liberation of political prisoners. The revolt was suppressed upon intervention of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the government introduced a number of administrative measures. Among those were, inter alia, the dismissal of the province’s parliament, executive council (1990) and the presidency (1991), the annulment of old and introduction of new school programs, closing of many Albanian schools, dismissing of teachers who did not accept the new educational program of the Council for Education of Serbia. Protesting against these measures, Albanians have answered to the call of their political parties united in the “Albanian alternative” and boycotted the first free elections for the parliament in Serbia in 1990 and refused participation in the March 1991 census. From September 26 to 30, 1991, the “Albanian Alternative” organized an illegal referendum for a “sovereign and independent state of Kosovo”. 89,3% of the citizens participated in the referendum, and 87% gave a positive answer to the question of the referendum. The Albanians have also refused to go to all the succeeding elections in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The third way in which the ethnic minorities reacted was a more moderate one, because it implied a recognition of the new state in principle and participating in the elections, but also some methods of non-parliamentary struggle. The Moslem national minority in Sanjak opted for such a method; its most influential party, Democratic Action Party, participated in the 1990 elections (it won 1,7% of votes and 3 seats in the parliament), but it boycotted all further elections for the republican parliament. This minority refused to participate in the federal elections in May 1992 and December 1992, but it did go to the federal elections in November 1996.

Finally, the fourth type of reaction of minorities is the most moderate one and it is reduced to using parliamentary struggle for achievements of minority rights. This strategy was adopted by the Albanian minority in Montenegro, the Albanian minority in Macedonia, as well as by the Hungarian minority in Serbia. Implementing such strategy, the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Macedonia – which mainly includes Albanians (23% of Macedonian population) – participated from 1990 to 1996 as a coalition partner in all four governments.

Here it is necessary to stress that the refusal of national minorities to participate in the political life, or their only conditional acceptance of this participation, was induced (and not caused) by inappropriate political institutions established in 1989/90 and the discriminatory practice of the ruling parties in the pluralistic period. The reasons for revolt of minorities, however, are much deeper and are pertaining to ancient inter-ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Let us add that the deepest roots of conflict are not always and only the attempt of ethnic majorities to assimilate (or in another way eliminate) the minorities, but also persistent attempts of the minorities (frequently stimulated by neighboring states) for secession. In such circumstances a negative stance of the political elites of the former Yugoslav republics in regard to decentralization (particularly in the case of Kosovo and Metohija) should be understood also as a reaction against attempts of national minorities for secession.

CSS Survey, No.18, June-July 1997

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