Vladimir Veres
THE BALKANS AND THE POST-DAYTON ENVIRONMENT:
RESTRUCTURING OR INSTABILITY
The Dayton Accords for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina mark a turning point in the Yugoslav crisis and the war in this region. They have essentially defined and set the course for normalising the situation in the entire area of the former Yugoslavia, as well as for the development of international relations in this region, primarily among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia. These three main contracting parties have undertaken obligations to end the war and establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its legal institutions; to arrange their mutual relations, respect international law embedded in the United Nations as well as human rights, to eliminate grave consequences of war and, finally, to establish a military balance at a lower level both bilaterally and sub-regionally. The system of Dayton obligations, in effect, incorporates the crux of important conditions for international political rehabilitation of the FRY. Therefore, Yugoslavia's strategy to get incorporated into the world, must derive from the obligations under the Dayton Accords and their full and consistent fulfilment.
Present political situation in the Balkans is conditioned by several simultaneous processes: On the global level, disintegration of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON; which meant a breakdown of bipolarism that was characteristic of the international relations in the last few decades. On the regional level, disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and war on the part of her territory. Finally, on the national level, radical internal changes in the countries that used to belong to the so-called socialist bloc. The Balkans, that always have had - often due to outside forces and great powers - a reputation of a “Powder keg” - has again become a zone of instability, of real or potential conflicts. One could argue that, after a few decades of stability, we are again witnessing, at least partially, the continuation of the process of “Balkanization”, that could by defined as a “constant conflict among the Balkan nations over territories and a chain-line atomisation of the Balkan region.” .
Liquidation of the bloc-restrictions and of the one-party monopoly created
a vacuum that was primarily filled by nationalism, by territorial and national
claims and pretensions. Nationalism was understood and used as the most
efficient instrument for both preservation of or gaining power, for preserving
the old and forming new states. This was primarily felt in the case of
former Yugoslavia. History of the Balkans is a history of nationalism;
it already was a source of conflicts in the past; but never nationalism
had been in such a contrast with democratic and integrative processes in
Europe, as well as with a true interests of the Balkan peoples as it is
the case now. Historically speaking, as Serguey Russev argues, “this new
militant nationalism is fundamentally different from the historically rooted
concept of national identity as a precondition for the establishment of
civil society” . Recent events especially in the former Yugoslavia, threatened
to significantly discredit the key positive elements of processes in Eastern
Europe at the end of the eighties, such as breakdown of the structure of
bloc confrontation, drastic reduction of the nuclear-war danger, gaining
a real independence by the former Soviet allies, internal democratization
and affirmation of market economy based on dismantling the historically
obsolete model of “real socialism”. "But while we greeted the appearance
of the old flags and symbols as signs of liberation after decades of oppression
in Riga, Moscow or Bucharest, we more often than not failed to see the
magnitude of the dangers this represented in the ethnic mosaic of South-Eastern
Europe." Objective problems of transition - common for all of Eastern
Europe - were supplemented in the Balkans by renovation and reemerging
of the conflicts from the past. Since “for historical reasons, the Balkan
societies lack a democratic legacy and a tradition of civil society” they
are now facing a task of “the emergence of civil society and containing
of ethnic
nationalism. ”Along with escalation of nationalism on the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, national tension rose in other Balkan countries
as well, aggravating some border or minority issues. Fortunately, if one
could speak about any positive effect of Yugoslav experience, it may considered
to be influencing the others in the Balkans to behave with more restraint
and rationality in solving international problems.
We are now clearly witnessing the process of “restructuring” of the
Balkans in sense of international security. The most important issue here
is balancing two parallel currents: first, disintegration of the Eastern
bloc and liquidation of the bipolar confrontation in the region where three
Warsaw pact countries used to face two members of NATO, with one non-aligned
and one neutral country also present. Second, emergence of the newly independent
countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Both processes are
conditioned by internal transformation of the former communist countries
and acceptance and realization of the main principles of parliamentary
democracy, multi-party political system, market economy and observance
of human rights. So the internal changes are a priority. Foreign policy
of such countries is influenced by internal processes - social, political
and economical - maybe to a higher degree than ever in the past. It is
especially visible in the case of former Yugoslavia. Breakdown of this
country and the war that followed - and that has the most tragic consequences
in Bosnia and Herzegovina - was primarily of internal political origin.
As for the outside factor - international community and influential countries
- their biggest failure is that they did not react in time and did not
try more efficiently to prevent the “slipping” into military conflict.
The thesis about the primary responsibility of the international community
and the great powers mostly serves as a way of avoiding a discussion about
responsibility of internal political factors in former Yugoslavia. In Belgrade
one can often hear accusations that the outside world was a source of breakdown
of the country, being biased against Serbia and Montenegro; in Zagreb the
opinion is that international factors were basically against independence
of Croatia, while in Sarajevo an opinion prevails that international community
did not do enough to preserve the independence and unity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. All that contributed to the feeling of distrust toward the
outside world that is hard to surmount and that hinders participating of
all these countries in international security structures. Besides, it is
clear that these states could not pretend to participate seriously in the
processes of European integration without solving basic problems between
themselves, such as definite recognition, establishing of diplomatic relations,
renewal of transport links, dismantling trade barriers, return of the refugees
etc. Although it is clear enough that antagonism and hatred cannot be easily
overcome, it should also be clear that these countries and peoples could
not simply leave the region - they are bound to live, coexist and cooperate
with each other. So far, all important issues are being solved with permanent
participation of international factor, primarily of the USA. There is no
short-term military exit strategy possible without a substantial political
collapse as a result. At this moment, pressure is indispensable element
of settling the existing problems. In the long run, however, such pressure
will not be efficient enough if a climate of at least minimal mutual confidence
is not created, stressing the common interests of all these countries first
on the economic, and finally on the security plan.
New Yugoslavia and new environment
Disintegration of the USSR and of the Warsaw Pact fundamentally
changed the international position of Yugoslavia. The country lost its
place as a "buffer zone " between two military and political alliances.
During the Cold War both sides - East and West - were primarily concerned
that former Yugoslavia remains neutral - or non-aligned - and that Belgrade
denies access to Yugoslavia's territory or military facilities to the other
side. This was a source of an important room for maneuver for Belgrade,
and it was skillfully used by Yugoslav government at that time. Consequently,
former Yugoslavia appeared to have more political weight and used to play
a more important role in international relations than it could be judged
by its size or population. That's why the disappearance of the Cold War
division was an important factor of Yugoslavia's disintegration, since
in the "old" constellation the dissolution of the country probably would
have been prevented by the super-powers in order to avoid damage to the
established relationship. However, this is not to say that the break-up
of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact dissolved Yugoslavia. The changes in international
constellation made the disintegration possible only under condition that
there already existed internal forces and circumstances that led to the
crisis and, finally, dissolution. So the international changes rather served
as a necessary, but not sufficient source of Yugoslavia's fall. Actually,
Yugoslavia disintegrated before the Soviet Union did.
As was already mentioned, the main fault with international community
was an initial underestimating and than under-reacting to the Yugoslav
crisis, which led to the absence of the preventive measures. It is a common
opinion among the analysts that in the 1989 - 91 former Yugoslavia had
a better starting position for economic and political reforms than other
East or South - East European countries, since the political and economic
system of the SFRY, with all its faults, was more democratic, flexible
and adaptable in comparison with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact.
Since that time, however, the situation dramatically changed in favor of
such countries as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. That means
that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has to adapt not only to the new neighborhood,
but also to a profoundly different role and influence in the international
community, in comparison with the former Yugoslavia. Such adaptation requires
not only political and economic measures and reforms, but also a sort of
psychological identification with a smaller size of the country and the
more modest international role. Yugoslavia is now before the task of coping
with problems that most Eastern-European countries started to solve-although
not with equal success-back in the 1989. Unfortunately, the starting position
now is much weaker and the circumstances more unfavorable. The foreign
policy or Belgrade, thus, will have to adopt not only to a new international
role and a new neighborhood, but also to limited political and economic
capabilities of the country. There is also one additional change in comparison
with the former Yugoslavia: the Yugoslav crisis became an important international
issue and the settlement of the crisis is an international responsibility.
It appeared that a seemingly internal or local conflict, (particularly
in such a delicate place as the Balkans) could have far worse repercussions
for international community than it was understood at the very beginning.
The problems of former Yugoslavia will certainly continue to be the burden
on international community`s shoulders. As a consequence, the political
choices for former Yugoslav republics, including FRY, will be limited and
marked by international demands and requests. The Dayton Agreement itself
is a form of such combination of obligations, demands and pressure. The
Belgrade government, besides, faces certain conditions for reestablishing
ties with Organization of the United Nations, Organization of the European
Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and with international monetary and financial
organizations. These conditions are connected with, a) regulation of remaining
sensitive issues with former Yugoslav republics; b) certain internal issues
in Yugoslavia, including minority issues and Kosovo. According to Willy
de Clercq, Chairman of the Committee on External Economic Relations of
the European Parliament, "the EU considers that the development of a good
relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of its position
within the international community depends on a constructive approach by
the FR of Yugoslavia to the following points:
The second "circle of priorities" for Yugoslavia consists of the EU countries and such CIS countries as Russia and Ukraine. The EU is the most important source of economic and financial support. The absence of cooperation with EU has drastically affected the overall political and economic position of Yugoslavia. So the cooperation with the EU remains vital target and only way to prevent further lagging behind and to secure access to capital, technology, know-how and a developed market. The crisis has driven Yugoslavia away from integration courses and left it in a position sui generis towards the EU and European organizations, with the EU prescribing concrete conditions for cooperation: democratic parliamentary order, market economy and a legal state. Secondly, in order to gain access to the internal market of the European Union this country must observe the conditions stipulated in the so-called White Paper. Thirdly, its ability for integration must be proved. The first condition is checked by the Council of Europe, the remaining two by the European Union.
This practically means that Yugoslavia must: first, build all institutions of a democratic system, market economy and legal state; second, carry out all adjustments from the level of state to local self-government and enterprises in line with the White Paper and establish a long-term strategy of its society; third, work on the internal regional links and development; forth, achieve foreign-trade and foreign-policy opening; fifth, become integrated into regional forms of co-operation which are the future of the region.
Finally, relations and co-operation with the European Union can no longer be reduced to the economic sphere, despite its doubtless primary importance, but full account must be taken of the role of the EU as one of the key factors of the European policy and, in perspective, also its increasing role in the military-security sphere. Therefore, the approach to the normalisation and promotion of relations and co-operation with the European Union must start from its role in all aspects of intra-European relations as a whole.
Although Russia has a largely changed global geo-strategic role with problems of internal transformation making a decisive influence on its international engagement, it is still one of the key factors in international politics that plays important role in the Balkans. In view of the numerous historical, traditional and cultural ties, Yugoslavia could develop its relations with Moscow, as well as with other former Soviet republics, without the political burden characteristic for the period when the USSR existed. Particularly important for Belgrade are economic links with Russia and CIS countries. Their development, however, requires adaptation to the entirely new circumstances of free market and competition.
Relations with the USA require the largest attention. In addition to the undoubtedly decisive influence it has on Yugoslavia’s access to international political and economic institutions, the USA is increasingly reinforcing its position in Europe. Over the past few years, the USA has exercised a growing influence in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc and, more importantly for Yugoslavia, in South-East Europe by using both its diplomatic leverage and military presence independently or within NATO. The Dayton Accords and the American engagement in Eastern Slavonia ensure the USA a long-term role in the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and the most recent initiative for co-operation among countries of south-eastern Europe (SECI) makes this engagement still broader and more ambitious. Therefore, Yugoslavia's relations with the USA should be given special attention in the foreign policy engagement of Yugoslavia, since the degree of trust and the nature of contacts and co-operation with the USA will determine numerous other interests of vital importance for Yugoslavia.
Normalisation of Yugoslavia’s relations with the USA is a difficult, delicate and an exceptionally important issue, but also indispensable for its future.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is, at this moment, the only state in the Balkans without any kind of arrangement with NATO. The official position of Belgrade towards Partnership for Peace and enlargement of NATO and alliance’s further role in the Balkans has not been defined yet, which is, at least partly, understandable. Political forces in Yugoslavia express different, and often indefinite attitudes and public opinion could be rather divided in if this issue emerges in the concrete. Besides, Yugoslavia now faces more urgent and immediate tasks: implementation of Dayton agreements and definite and full return into international community, organizations and institutions - OUN, OSCE, IMF, regional organizations such as Central European initiative, joining Council of Europe etc. Since Yugoslavia is gradually emerging from isolation, the country is more in a situation to solve these immediate problems, than to define its long-term foreign policy. However, for Yugoslavia to strengthen her international position - in addition to full implementation of Dayton - the Belgrade government should take into account at least two important facts: first, all Yugoslavia’s neighbors and all the Balkan countries have certain arrangements and links with NATO in various forms. It will be political and geo-strategic risk for Yugoslavia to be the only country to stay outside these arrangements. Today Belgrade could hardly exercise the policy of non-alignment, that was characteristic of the former Yugoslavia. Second, building of a civil society, economic reforms and fulfillment of the international financial organizations’ criteria is hardly possible without association with European integration, including military and security aspects. All this is a condition for economic reconstruction and progress. These issues were discussed in Belgrade on the conference “Partnership for Peace and FR of Yugoslavia”, in February 1996. Clearly, strategic decision - making concerning possible arrangements with NATO depends primarily on internal situation and correlation of political forces in Yugoslavia. However, any realistic and rational policy will have to consider very seriously the issue of joining the European security structures - whose core, evidently, will be NATO, and finally to take long term decision in this regard. Although it is too early to predict all possible forms of such relationship, it would clearly require serious internal changes and adaptation to European criteria and standards.
CSS Survey, No.20, October 1997