Vladimir Veres

          THE BALKANS AND THE POST-DAYTON ENVIRONMENT: RESTRUCTURING OR INSTABILITY
           

          The Dayton Accords for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina mark a turning point in the Yugoslav crisis and the war in this region. They have essentially defined and set the course for normalising the situation in the entire area of the former Yugoslavia, as well as for the development of international relations in this region, primarily among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia. These three main contracting parties have undertaken obligations to end the war and establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its legal institutions; to arrange their mutual relations, respect international law embedded in the United Nations as well as human rights, to eliminate grave consequences of war and, finally, to establish a military balance at a lower level both bilaterally and sub-regionally. The system of Dayton obligations, in effect, incorporates the crux of important conditions for international political rehabilitation of the FRY.  Therefore, Yugoslavia's strategy to get incorporated into the world, must derive from the obligations under the Dayton Accords and their full and consistent fulfilment.

          Present political situation in the Balkans is conditioned by several simultaneous processes: On the global level, disintegration of the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON; which meant a breakdown of bipolarism that was characteristic of the international relations in the last few decades. On the regional level, disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and war on the part of her territory. Finally, on the national level, radical internal changes in the countries that used to belong to the so-called socialist bloc. The Balkans, that always have had - often due to outside forces and great powers - a reputation of a “Powder keg” - has again become a zone of instability, of real or potential conflicts. One could argue that, after a few decades of stability, we are again witnessing, at least partially, the continuation of the process of “Balkanization”, that could by defined as a “constant conflict among the Balkan nations over territories and a chain-line atomisation of the Balkan region.” .

          Liquidation of the bloc-restrictions and of the one-party monopoly created a vacuum that was primarily filled by nationalism, by territorial and national claims and pretensions. Nationalism was understood and used as the most efficient instrument for both preservation of or gaining power, for preserving the old and forming new states. This was primarily felt in the case of former Yugoslavia. History of the Balkans is a history of nationalism; it already was a source of conflicts in the past; but never nationalism had been in such a contrast with democratic and integrative processes in Europe, as well as with a true interests of the Balkan peoples as it is the case now. Historically speaking, as Serguey Russev argues, “this new militant nationalism is fundamentally different from the historically rooted concept of national identity as a precondition for the establishment of civil society” . Recent events especially in the former Yugoslavia, threatened to significantly discredit the key positive elements of processes in Eastern Europe at the end of the eighties, such as breakdown of the structure of bloc confrontation, drastic reduction of the nuclear-war danger, gaining a real independence by the former Soviet allies, internal democratization and affirmation of market economy based on dismantling the historically obsolete model of “real socialism”. "But while we greeted the appearance of the old flags and symbols as signs of liberation after decades of oppression in Riga, Moscow or Bucharest, we more often than not failed to see the magnitude of the dangers this represented in the ethnic mosaic of South-Eastern Europe."  Objective problems of transition - common for all of Eastern Europe - were supplemented in the Balkans by renovation and reemerging of the conflicts from the past. Since “for historical reasons, the Balkan societies lack a democratic legacy and a tradition of civil society” they are now facing a task of “the emergence of civil society and containing of ethnic
          nationalism.  ”Along with escalation of nationalism on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, national tension rose in other Balkan countries as well, aggravating some border or minority issues. Fortunately, if one could speak about any positive effect of Yugoslav experience, it may considered to be influencing the others in the Balkans to behave with more restraint and rationality in solving international problems.
           
          We are now clearly witnessing the process of “restructuring” of the Balkans in sense of international security. The most important issue here is balancing two parallel currents: first, disintegration of the Eastern bloc and liquidation of the bipolar confrontation in the region where three Warsaw pact countries used to face two members of NATO, with one non-aligned and one neutral country also present. Second, emergence of the newly independent countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Both processes are conditioned by internal transformation of the former communist countries and acceptance and realization of the main principles of parliamentary democracy, multi-party political system, market economy and observance of human rights. So the internal changes are a priority. Foreign policy of such countries is influenced by internal processes - social, political and economical - maybe to a higher degree than ever in the past. It is especially visible in the case of former Yugoslavia. Breakdown of this country and the war that followed - and that has the most tragic consequences in Bosnia and Herzegovina - was primarily of internal political origin. As for the outside factor - international community and influential countries - their biggest failure is that they did not react in time and did not try more efficiently to prevent the “slipping” into military conflict. The thesis about the primary responsibility of the international community and the great powers mostly serves as a way of avoiding a discussion about responsibility of internal political factors in former Yugoslavia. In Belgrade one can often hear accusations that the outside world was a source of breakdown of the country, being biased against Serbia and Montenegro; in Zagreb the opinion is that international factors were basically against independence of Croatia, while in Sarajevo an opinion prevails that international community did not do enough to preserve the independence and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All that contributed to the feeling of distrust toward the outside world that is hard to surmount and that hinders participating of all these countries in international security structures. Besides, it is clear that these states could not pretend to participate seriously in the processes of European integration without solving basic problems between themselves, such as definite recognition, establishing of diplomatic relations, renewal of transport links, dismantling trade barriers, return of the refugees etc. Although it is clear enough that antagonism and hatred cannot be easily overcome, it should also be clear that these countries and peoples could not simply leave the region - they are bound to live, coexist and cooperate with each other. So far, all important issues are being solved with permanent participation of international factor, primarily of the USA. There is no short-term military exit strategy possible without a substantial political collapse as a result.  At this moment, pressure is indispensable element of settling the existing problems. In the long run, however, such pressure will not be efficient enough if a climate of at least minimal mutual confidence is not created, stressing the common interests of all these countries first on the economic, and finally on the security plan.
           

                          A new regional security structure
          Participation of international organizations and institutions in shaping a new political and security structure in the Balkans is of the key importance for many reasons. According to D. Triantaphyllou, “since ex-communist Balkan states have no collective arrangement and little money to spend on defense, they must look to be integrated into the Western European stability network via various European and Transatlantic institutions such as NATO, EU and WEU” . The crucial factor of reducing tensions in the Balkans still doesn’t originate from bilateral or multilateral arrangements between the Balkan countries, but from either belonging to the same military and political alliance (Greece and Turkey), or from the intention of all countries to join European economic, and also security integrative structure - which requires restraint and reduction of tensions in border, minority and other questions. In this context Yugoslav analyst Ranko Petkovic claims that “in the entire history of the Balkans after liberation from Turkish rule there was no record of the Balkan countries striving towards the same goal, as is nowadays the case: joining the European institutions and organizations” . This seems to be the key positive element these days in the Balkans. Historically, the Balkan countries often were members of different alliances, had different ideologies and political systems and relied upon various outside powers. Unfortunately, such heritage still has a serious impact on mutual relationship between Balkan countries and peoples. However, gradual stabilization of the Post-Cold War Europe, adopting to the absence of bipolar division and confrontation, settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and appeasement in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of Dayton Agreements will enable Balkan countries to definitely face the fact that joining the European integration requires solving of inherited or newly created problems. If all the Balkan countries accept the European framework, it means that, basically, all of them opt for the same model of political and economic development, regardless of the part of political spectrum to which their leading political forces or parties belong. This implies accepting the obligations and standards determined by European organizations - in this regards one could point to reduction of tensions in Hungarian - Rumanian relations as an example of a decisive role played by the European orientation of both countries. That’s why a regional approach by the European Union seems to be adequate solution for the Balkans. Mutual connecting of the Balkan countries will obviously be made a condition for their closer ties with Europe, since European organizations want a guarantee that Balkan states, while joining the European institutions, will not bring their own unsolved problems. It is an illusion that any country could develop its relations with European centers without first settling issues with its own neighbors.  That means that European logic must prevail in the Balkans, meaning that social and economic development should be given a priority. This brings us to a crucial moment - a necessity of redefining all previous Balkan concepts of international security, not only in current - political, but also in historical and philosophical sense.
           
          The security in the Balkans had so far been understood in the narrow geopolitical sense, in categories of borders, sovereignty, alliances and blocs. In the recent few years, some of the mentioned elements gained strength, instead of being made relative. The basic European trend, however, is quite opposite. Security in the Balkans clearly escapes all this categories: borders must not be made fetish of and turned into national myth; sovereignty in contemporary world is relative and necessarily limited by accepted international obligations and standards; economic development, human rights and living standard, rather than military might and power of the state, become more and more a criterion of role and weight of particular country in international relations. The very conception of relations in the Balkans as a competition between states and peoples over borders, territories and influence must be altered. European framework must work to eliminate the very philosophy of the international relations in the Balkans that has its roots in the past centuries and that was source of conflicts and often of the great powers’ interference and turning the region into their playground. In spite of all the problems, the Balkans are gradually entering a period when social and economic aspects of security will prevail over geostrategic and military ones.
           
          However, all this is rather a political and philosophical basis of the new system of international relations in the Balkans. More concretely, the main issue is organizational and institutional framework of security in the region. Notwithstanding the obvious importance of mutual relations between the Balkan states, stability in the Balkans, and especially in former Yugoslavia is closely connected with wider and more universal organizations and alliances. Very important in this regard is a role played by NATO. Yugoslav crisis very much contributed to shaping a profile of NATO in the post-Cold War era, after the dissolution of the main adversary - the USSR and Warsaw Pact. Also, the crisis pointed to the rising influence of the USA in international relations, but also to the problems and limitations the US are facing, particularly in relations with Western European allies and Russia. As Stephen Larrabee emphasizes, “... if anything, the crisis has reinforced the importance of the United States - and NATO - for the resolution of European security problems. At the same time, it has prompted a significant shift in the American perception of NATO's role, especially in out-of-area conflicts. These conflicts, once regarded as beyond NATO’s responsibility, are now seen as legitimate NATO concerns.  Consequently, NATO faces now three tasks:
           
            a)  full defining of NATO’s role “out of area”
            b)  restructuring of the alliance, since some countries want to join it
            c)  redefining of the NATO’s raison d’etre with regard to the absence of previous threat and emergence of new hot spots and sources of instability.
          In such context the Balkans, in the long run, are not a priority of NATO in the way Eastern
          Europe and Russia are. However, although the Balkans did to a certain degree lost their strategic importance for the West due to disintegration of the USSR, the Yugoslav crisis has reminded of the risk of considering any problem in the Balkans as a “local” one and of underestimating measure to which crisis in the region and its slipover could threaten the new post - cold war security order in Europe.  NATO is now present in the Balkans directly (Greece and Turkey as members, troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and by membership of the former communist countries in Partnership for Peace and NACC. Although there are different opinions among political forces in Balkan countries about NATO’s future role, it is obvious that in contemporary Europe NATO and the EU are the only real and efficient frameworks for creating a system of security that would also include the Balkans. However, for this to happen, it is necessary that NATO redefines itself and adopt a new order of priorities; its main role will not be opposing a particular adversary (USSR), but prevention and settlement of conflicts in Post-Cold War period, whose nature differs from conflicts in the Cold War era. Also, there will be a growing role for NATO not as a primarily military alliance - with a goal of common defense - but as an alliance of the states that accept common values - democracy, market economy and human rights. Accordingly, a membership or some form of association of a particular country with NATO will not mean only - or even primarily - common defense, but also a guarantee of strengthening of democratic values and institutions. That will lead to a certain relativization of military and stressing of political and economic components of NATO’s development. Certainly, the military aspect will remain to be important, especially in case of unpredictable events or emerging of crisis spots, but political and economic aspects are obviously gaining importance with regard to internal difficulties that countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe face. The enlargement of NATO and its general opening towards these countries will have a full sense and logic if it would be accompanied with such redefinition of the role of the alliance.
           
          Needless to say, in such context special importance must be attached to NATO’s relations with Russia. The termination of the Cold War gradually discovers the existence of some (more or less legitimate) interests that had been hidden by layers of ideology and bloc-antagonism. These interests could be partly conflicting, differing, or simply not always fully overlapping. That’s why a transition period - and obviously a rather difficult one - is necessary. The interests of Russia and her key partners (USA, Western Europe, China, Japan...) should be identified and defined under new circumstances, in order to establish which interests have become closer or overlapped with the end of the Cold War, and which are still differing, or even conflicting. It is a sort of  “crystallization” of interests in their natural and objective form, without ideological and Cold War layers. With certain oscillations, the new Russian policy, is searching for a “middle road” - without confrontation, which is ruinous, but also without absolute harmony, which is impossible. Overcoming of long lasting confrontation is a reality, but the presence of certain differences in also inevitable. The point is that such differences should be accepted as normal and legitimate, and should be solved realistically and reasonably, avoiding moves that could serve in favor of extremists and confrontation - minded on the other side. At this point political wisdom of Russia, as well as of her leading Western partners, is at a very serious test. Russia should, with of all the existing problems, evaluate realistically her position, especially internal needs, and contain or limit all the temptations that could lead to serious confrontation with key partners or to possible new isolation, since this would mostly damage Russia herself, and particularly her population. For their part, the USA, Western Europe and Japan should take into account not only legitimate Russian interests, but also a very sensitive position of this country and oscillations of Russia’s public opinion and the electorate. A possible intention to weaken international position of Russia - which might, intentionally or not, be conjectured from some Western moves, could fire back and hit primarily Western interests. Isolation of Russia and possible internal disturbance would threaten the structure of contemporary international relations as a whole.
           
          The room for maneuver and compromise between Moscow and the West clearly exists. What is necessary is more tactfulness and flexibility on both sides. The West must understand the complexity and delicacy of the situation in Russia and her wish not to feel isolated or infringed by enlargement of NATO. Russia, on her part, most accept the fact that tension with the West, and particularly manifesting of neo-imperial tendencies toward the neighbors could, primarily, aggravate the position of Russia herself. Moscow also should appreciate the concern of the countries of Eastern Europe for instability in Russia. However, these countries should be aware of the importance of Russia as their essential and unavoidable partner.
           
          Still, the key for all problems lies in the internal situation in Russia. There is no international factor, or any foreign policy issue that could decisively influence internal situation in Russia, which has become a first rate factor of international relations. It seems that the world depends more on developments in Russia, than vice versa. For this reason any analysis of Russia - NATO relationship bears the stamp of relativity - since it would be easier to formulate various possible forms of NATO enlargement and of institutionalization of its relations with Moscow, than to predict further developments in Russia herself.

          New Yugoslavia and new environment

           Disintegration of the USSR and of the Warsaw Pact fundamentally changed the international position of Yugoslavia. The country lost its place as a "buffer zone " between two military and political alliances. During the Cold War both sides - East and West - were primarily concerned that former Yugoslavia remains neutral - or non-aligned - and that Belgrade denies access to Yugoslavia's territory or military facilities to the other side. This was a source of an important room for maneuver for Belgrade, and it was skillfully used by Yugoslav government at that time. Consequently, former Yugoslavia appeared to have more political weight and used to play a more important role in international relations than it could be judged by its size or population. That's why the disappearance of the Cold War division was an important factor of Yugoslavia's disintegration, since in the "old" constellation the dissolution of the country probably would have been prevented by the super-powers in order to avoid damage to the established relationship. However, this is not to say that the break-up of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact dissolved Yugoslavia. The changes in international constellation made the disintegration possible only under condition that there already existed internal forces and circumstances that led to the crisis and, finally, dissolution. So the international changes rather served as a necessary, but not sufficient source of Yugoslavia's fall. Actually, Yugoslavia disintegrated before the Soviet Union did.
           
          As was already mentioned, the main fault with international community was an initial underestimating and than under-reacting to the Yugoslav crisis, which led to the absence of the preventive measures. It is a common opinion among the analysts that in the 1989 - 91 former Yugoslavia had a better starting position for economic and political reforms than other East or South - East European countries, since the political and economic system of the SFRY, with all its faults, was more democratic, flexible and adaptable in comparison with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Since that time, however, the situation dramatically changed in favor of such countries as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. That means that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has to adapt not only to the new neighborhood, but also to a profoundly different role and influence in the international community, in comparison with the former Yugoslavia. Such adaptation requires not only political and economic measures and reforms, but also a sort of psychological identification with a smaller size of the country and the more modest international role. Yugoslavia is now before the task of coping with problems that most Eastern-European countries started to solve-although not with equal success-back in the 1989. Unfortunately, the starting position now is much weaker and the circumstances more unfavorable. The foreign policy or Belgrade, thus, will have to adopt not only to a new international role and a new neighborhood, but also to limited political and economic capabilities of the country. There is also one additional change in comparison with the former Yugoslavia: the Yugoslav crisis became an important international issue and the settlement of the crisis is an international responsibility. It appeared that a seemingly internal or local conflict, (particularly in such a delicate place as the Balkans) could have far worse repercussions for international community than it was understood at the very beginning. The problems of former Yugoslavia will certainly continue to be the burden on international community`s shoulders. As a consequence, the political choices for former Yugoslav republics, including FRY, will be limited and marked by international demands and requests. The Dayton Agreement itself is a form of such combination of obligations, demands and pressure. The Belgrade government, besides, faces certain conditions for reestablishing ties with Organization of the United Nations, Organization of the European Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and with international monetary and financial organizations. These conditions are connected with, a) regulation of remaining sensitive issues with former Yugoslav republics; b) certain internal issues in Yugoslavia, including minority issues and Kosovo. According to Willy de Clercq, Chairman of the Committee on External Economic Relations of the European Parliament, "the EU considers that the development of a good relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of its position within the international community depends on a constructive approach by the FR of Yugoslavia to the following points:
           

            1. Respect and full and correct application of the Dayton and Paris Peace agreements. This is the precondition and the very base of the European Commission's approach, … including respect of the Hague Peace Tribunal.
            2. The development of regional cooperation between the countries of former Yugoslavia based on mutual recognition among all the states.
            3. Constructive approach toward Agreements among all the States the former Yugoslavia on succession issues.
            4. Principle of democratization, including the solution of the Kosovo problem.
             
           Closer commercial links within the region and reestablishment of trade with traditional partners is of great importance for Yugoslavia.  The state of the national economy is the most serious problem that Belgrade faces now. Needless to say, it is closely interrelated with the problems of democratization and stability. If the FR Yugoslavia is to cooperate effectively with its neighbors and with the EU and other partners, it will have to undergo a substantial internal transformation in particular with regard to the privatization of the public sector and a restructuring of the commercial banking sector. There is simply no way out of economic crisis without access to foreign capital and foreign investment. With GNP of about 10 billion dollars, foreign debt amounts to about 9 billion, debt to domestic citizens who lost their life savings in foreign currency in domestic banks equals roughly 5 billion dollars, trade deficit is climbing up permanently. Pension funds are in serious trouble, and the foreign currency reserve is poor. Financial institutions lack the credibility of the public.  That's why the country desperately needs net inflow of foreign capital. Precondition for that, however, is normalization of the relations with the international economic and monetary institutions: International Monetary Fond, World Trade Organization, The World Bank, London's and Paris` clubs of creditors, etc. Such normalization presumes compliance of the clauses of the Dayton agreement, which means that solution of all political issues is closely connected to the prospects of the economic recovery of Yugoslavia. Whatever the importance of the foreign policy and relationship with the international environment, the decisive factor will be Yugoslavia's ability to undertake serious internal political and economic reforms in order to achieve stability and economic recovery. A very important precondition for all changes is a containment of nationalism, isolationism and xenophobia phenomena that have taken roots in the country during the dramatic events in the last decade. It is not possible to have democratic changes in the country if the population is exposed to a psychology of a besieged fortress, and the relations in the world and with the world are primarily understood as alleged inevitable conflicts and divisions, alliances of one against the other, constant conspiracies etc.
           
          What Yugoslavia needs is a realistic and rational approach, without creating an atmosphere of threat and siege. In this context, a great importance should be attached to the regional initiatives for security and cooperation. These could be, geographically and politically, divided into following categories:
           
            - Cooperation between Balkan countries. - Should include gradual solution of the open political issues. Although there is always a temptation to avoid political questions as too sensitive, and to limit the cooperation to economy, transport etc., it is extremely important that gradually, under appropriate conditions, all this problems be approached and solved;
            - Balkan - Danube cooperation. - It could serve as an efficient way of connecting South-East Europe, and especially Serbia, with Central and Western Europe;
            - Balkan - Mediterranean cooperation. -  If the Danube is Yugoslavia's link with Europe, Mediterranean is a link with entire world;
            - Balkan - Black Sea cooperation. -  Important way of establishing closer relations with Turkey, Russia and Ukraine.
          From political and economic point of view, there are initiatives by the Balkan countries themselves - meetings of ministers, parliamentary cooperation, free trade zone in the Balkans and rather controversial idea of a "Balkan OSCE". There is also European initiative - regional approach by the EU, cooperation between regions of different countries and reestablishment of the links between the former Yugoslav republics. Finally, there exists a US initiative (SECI), which covers not only Balkan Peninsula, but also broader region of SouthEastern Europe. Its core is examining and financing of infrastructure projects, stimulating of private investment and surmounting administrative barriers.  All the differences notwithstanding, the general idea behind all the European and an American initiative is clear: to stimulate all the SouthEastern European countries to solve existing problems and to achieve stability and economic recovery through the cooperation and integration. Of course, this primarily applies to the countries of former Yugoslavia and former communist countries.  Since the war in former Yugoslavia end turmoil in Albania clearly demonstrated dangers of civil and intra-national conflicts that could easily slip over the borders of particular countries or regions, the international community is very interested in finding the appropriate formula for containing nationalism and territorial or border disputes. As the policy of prevention once failed - or was not exercised in full strength - there are now two instruments at the international community's disposal: first, political and military measures to secure that conflicts don't resume, which means implementing Dayton. Second, stimulating economy and democracy in the hope that stable and prosperous environment would deprive the nationalists of their steam and will strengthen moderate and liberal political forces. Moreover, this formula contains a very useful idea that the access to European integrative processes and institutions would be denied to those who fail previously to resolve their local problems. Although there will not be lack of politicians ready to call such approach a "pressure" or even "blackmail", it seams that such policy could be rather efficient in bringing former parts in conflict closer to establishing normal relations, at least in the economic field. Outside pressure is likely to remain an important stimulating factor for stabilization in whole region.
           
          The Yugoslav crisis also demonstrated that nationalists are quite ready to sacrifice economic prosperity to their own territorial and other goals. Still, after all the suffering, the population in the former Yugoslav Republics is much less likely to welcome another round of conflict and more likely to respond positively to economic stimulation. Of course, no kind of foreign assistance could be effective without fundamental internal reform. This is exactly the crossroads point where FR Yugoslavia is now.
           
          There is no doubt that the top priority for Yugoslavia is relations with the neighbors, particularly the former Yugoslav Republics. It is vitally important to solve the problems caused by war and the disintegration of the former common state, such as the issue of succession and to ensure conditions for a free and safe return of refugees and exiles and to regulate their status and property issues. Such approach would truly end the war and tension on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, constituting an essential condition for lifting of the "outer wall" of sanctions. In view of all circumstances related to the Serbo-Croatian relationship and the complexity of disputable issues, normalization and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Croatia are of foremost bilateral importance and vital to peace and stability in the region, including the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A mutual and long-term interest of both countries is to urgently open up the prospects for cooperation, free flow of people and assets, solving the issue of refugees, renewal of communications and economic links etc.
           
          The relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina should be marked by full implementation of the Dayton Accords including the commitment to full integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and realization of this objective, enabling and securing the return of refugees, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, establishing full diplomatic relations etc.
           
          Yugoslavia has a long history of relations with most of the "old neighbors". This relationship also suffered, more or less, from the Yugoslav crisis and war. This relation should be adjusted now to the new realities. Since some grievances and limitations from the past have been mostly overcome by now, Yugoslavia could with gradual rejoining the international community, enter an era of stability with both direct and more distant neighbors (Greece, Austria, Italy, Turkey).

          The second "circle of priorities" for Yugoslavia consists of the EU countries and such CIS countries as Russia and Ukraine. The EU is the most important source of economic and financial support. The absence of cooperation with EU has drastically affected the overall political and economic position of Yugoslavia. So the cooperation with the EU remains vital target and only way to prevent further lagging behind and to secure access to capital, technology, know-how and a developed market. The crisis has driven Yugoslavia away from integration courses and left it in a position sui generis towards the EU and European organizations, with the EU prescribing concrete conditions for cooperation: democratic parliamentary order, market economy and a legal state. Secondly, in order to gain access to the internal market of the European Union this country must observe the conditions stipulated in the so-called White Paper. Thirdly, its ability for integration must be proved. The first condition is checked by the Council of Europe, the remaining two by the European Union.

          This practically means that Yugoslavia must: first, build all institutions of a democratic system, market economy and legal state; second, carry out all adjustments from the level of state to local self-government and enterprises in line with the White Paper and establish a long-term strategy of its society; third, work on the internal regional links and development; forth, achieve foreign-trade and foreign-policy opening; fifth, become integrated into regional forms of co-operation which are the future of the region.

          Finally, relations and co-operation with the European Union can no longer be reduced to the economic sphere, despite its doubtless primary importance, but full account must be taken of the role of the EU as one of the key factors of the European policy and, in perspective, also its increasing role in the military-security sphere. Therefore, the approach to the normalisation and promotion of relations and co-operation with the European Union must start from its role in all aspects of intra-European relations as a whole.

          Although Russia has a largely changed global geo-strategic role with problems of internal transformation making a decisive influence on its international engagement, it is still one of the key factors in international politics that plays important role in the Balkans. In view of the numerous historical, traditional and cultural ties, Yugoslavia could develop its relations with Moscow, as well as with other former Soviet republics, without the political burden characteristic for the period when the USSR existed. Particularly important for Belgrade are economic links with Russia and CIS countries. Their development, however, requires adaptation to the entirely new circumstances of free market and competition.

          Relations with the USA require the largest attention. In addition to the undoubtedly decisive influence it has on Yugoslavia’s access to international political and economic institutions, the USA is increasingly reinforcing its position in Europe. Over the past few years, the USA has exercised a growing influence in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc and, more importantly for Yugoslavia, in South-East Europe by using both its diplomatic leverage and military presence independently or within NATO. The Dayton Accords and the American engagement in Eastern Slavonia ensure the USA a long-term role in the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and the most recent initiative for co-operation among countries of south-eastern Europe (SECI) makes this engagement still broader and more ambitious. Therefore, Yugoslavia's relations with the USA should be given special attention in the foreign policy engagement of Yugoslavia, since the degree of trust and the nature of contacts and co-operation with the USA will determine numerous other interests of vital importance for Yugoslavia.

          Normalisation of Yugoslavia’s relations with the USA is a difficult, delicate and an exceptionally important issue, but also indispensable for its future.

          Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is, at this moment, the only state in the Balkans without any kind of arrangement with NATO. The official position of Belgrade towards Partnership for Peace and enlargement of NATO and alliance’s further role in the Balkans has not been defined yet, which is, at least partly, understandable. Political forces in Yugoslavia express different, and often indefinite attitudes and public opinion could be rather divided in if this issue emerges in the concrete. Besides, Yugoslavia now faces more urgent and immediate tasks: implementation of Dayton agreements and definite and full return into international community, organizations and institutions - OUN, OSCE, IMF, regional organizations such as Central European initiative, joining Council of Europe etc. Since Yugoslavia is gradually emerging from isolation, the country is more in a situation to solve these immediate problems, than to define its long-term foreign policy. However, for Yugoslavia to strengthen her international position - in addition to full implementation of Dayton - the Belgrade government should take into account at least two important facts: first, all Yugoslavia’s neighbors and all the Balkan countries have certain arrangements and links with NATO in various forms. It will be political and geo-strategic risk for Yugoslavia to be the only country to stay outside these arrangements. Today Belgrade could hardly exercise the policy of non-alignment, that was characteristic of the former Yugoslavia. Second, building of a civil society, economic reforms and fulfillment of the international financial organizations’ criteria is hardly possible without association with European integration, including military and security aspects. All this is a condition for economic reconstruction and progress. These issues were discussed in Belgrade on the conference  “Partnership for Peace and FR of Yugoslavia”, in February 1996.  Clearly, strategic decision - making concerning possible arrangements with NATO depends primarily on internal situation and correlation of political forces in Yugoslavia. However, any realistic and rational policy will have to consider very seriously the issue of joining the European security structures - whose core, evidently, will be NATO, and finally to take long term decision in this regard. Although it is too early to predict all possible forms of such relationship, it would clearly require serious internal changes and adaptation to European criteria and standards.

          CSS Survey, No.20, October 1997

           

           
           
          Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) - Makedonska 25 - 11000 Belgrade - Yugoslavia