ALBANIA'S TURMOIL ONCE AGAIN: POLITICAL DECAY AND THE MILITARY
 

At the beginning of 1992, after the second pluralist elections when the Democratic Party won the victory, it seemed like the Albanian democracy was on its way. The political turnabout seemed to be an overture in a new phase of the development of this, for many years, mysterious and obscure Balkan country. However, Albania's enigma has not been resolved yet. This has been proved by the recent developments.
 
In this still anarchic society the major challenge is re-establishment of the political institutions. One of the primary tasks of the new government is re-building of its military organization, which has practically collapsed coincidentally with the other parts of the state apparatus. At the moment, Albania looks like the mythological king Sisyphus, who whenever had almost reached the top of the hill rolling a heavy stone - suddenly found himself at the very beginning. Establishing central state authority on the whole territory and, at least, minimum civilian control over the armed forces (regular and irregular) is one of the most urgent problems Albanian state is faced with.
 
Political Mutations and the Military

One of the most interesting aspects of the 1991-92 liberal turnabout in Albania is the attitude and the behavior of the military in such dramatic social moment. The common conclusion is that the Albanian Army stood still without real willingness to make anything for rescuing the Party and its regime. There was nothing left for the Army in the communist system to be sorry about. The demoralized, impoverished and humiliated Albania's military had nothing to lose any more, and that is why it decided to take a chance with the new political option which emerged on the democratic side of the political spectrum. The majority of the Albanian military corps welcomed all the  promises about "departyization", "depoliticization" and democratization.

During the last decade of the communist rule the Army suffered and shared the same pains and illnesses as the rest of the society. The widespread process of degeneration and decay of every segment of the state apparatus and the social institutions directly reflected on the Army as an institution and the defense system in general.

At the beginning, in late 1980s, although very shy, in the newspapers and other sources, for the first time in public, appeared some information regarding the problems with conscription, unwillingness to accept assignments to remote areas of the country, social malaise, and a growth in religious belief among the youth.  Although the military press cited only instances of "individual and group excesses", unexcused absences, and the failure to perform assigned duties, the situation worsened rapidly until 1990s. At the time, the situation could have been described as a complete decline of a military order and discipline within the Army. However, the system of social discipline within the military completely disappeared by January 1992.

Finally, it became clear that something had to be done in terms of major military reform. The first step was made in November 1991, when the communist-dominated coalition government reintroduced military ranks and Western-style uniforms in place of plain Chinese fatigues.4 The main purpose of this initial act was emphasizing again military profession, training and discipline and to eliminate political indoctrination from the military. Newly assembled political opposition led by the Albanian Democratic Party called for further reforms in the Armed Forces to include reductions military spending, military units and conscription and the reorganization of unit structures.

In early 1992 the new post-communist political complexion was only beginning to evolve, but the position of the Army was still ambiguous. For example, the great majority of officers in the armed services were still formally party members in early 1992 (the party was renamed in June 1991 as the Socialist Party of Albania). Despite promised sweeping military reform that included the "depoliticization" of the armed forces, the communist-dominated coalition government could not finish the job in a democratic manner. The Political directorate of the People's Army, however, continued to exist as part of the Ministry of Defense. The Political Directorate controlled political officers within all services and units of the armed forces. The radical and essential military and civil-military reform had to wait for better times and for different political leaders.
 
Toward New Civil-Military Relations
 
From a normative (or formal) point of view, one can say that since the liberal turnabout in 1991-92, there has been set up elementary5 network of legal regulations  guaranteeing two very important constitutional and political principles - division of (civilian) power and civilian supremacy over the military. An insightful analysis of the current constitutional provisions indicates some points of ambiguity in terms of division of power principle regarding the relation between legislative and executive branch.

Current constitutional stipulations provide very conspicuous position of the President of the Republic and even imply indistinct division of competencies between the President, the Council of Ministers and especially, the minister of defense. The Defense Council is also allotted very significant role in the domain of security and defense policy. For example, among the other competencies, the Council of Ministers is authorized with "directing the activity for fulfillment of the tasks in the field of the country's defense, conforming to the decisions of the Council of Defense". This impression is emphasized by the fact on responsibility both of the government and the defense minister for implementation of the defense policy created by the Council of Defense. Another serious problem that deeply affects civilian control over the Army steams from the normative solution which define the Chief of Defense's responsibility both before the defense minister and the president of the Republic. In view to this a question raises: under whose control is the General Staff of the Army placed - under the presidential or governmental (and parliamentary) control?
 
This means that decision-making and exercising the authority in this domain are concentrated in few institutions, whose accountability is practically very difficult to control by the other branches of power. This has been particularly case with Berisha's presidency, which after while has transformed into a personnalistic form of governing. At the same time, despite its constitutional role in overseeing of the Army and all the defense matters, the Parliament has had very weak position. On one side, this has been due to the deficiency of competent civilian expertise in defense matters of the members of the parliament, and especially, of the members of the respective Parliamentary Committee. (The situation with shortage of qualified civilian staff has been very similar in regard to the other state bodies and institutions dealing with defense policy. The most urgent seemed the situation in the Defense Ministry, which whole staff - 100 per cent - was changed and every commissioned officer was removed from the post within this ministry.) The other and very important part of the explanation lies in the fact that the President as the leading party leader has had every opportunity for disciplining and controlling the work of the legislative body.
 
When he took over in April 1992, Berisha seemed like the right man to lead Albania out of its long communist nightmare. But within only four years, he had created what Human Rights Watch in March 1996 called "a one-party state based on fear and corruption." After very bitter experience from November 1994 when the population rejected his draft constitution in a referendum, in the next elections Berisha was more careful taking every
necessary move to secure his victory. He organized for himself a reelection landslide, widely seen as fraudulent, in May 1996.6 The manner in which this parliamentary elections had been carried on, and especially the re-election of the president of the Republic under martial law in March 1997 - has proved the painful true. The Berisha leadership had become steadily more dictatorial and even personalistic. Thus, it was most unlikely that it would allow itself to be removed from office as a result of a free and fair election. Although Albania possessed the institutions of a western democracy, she increasingly resembles the inter-war dictatorships of Eastern Europe.

As a result of such political circumstances, Berisha was able to control directly the work and behavior of every political institution, primarily of the parliament and the government. Therefore, it can be concluded that he was the real creator of every change in the military realm as well. Civilian control over the army became personal control of the president and the commander-in-chief. The positive (although cosmetic) reforms within the army were inspired by the wish to get wider international support, especially within NATO countries and USA.
 
The strengthening of military's functional rival - security forces, evidenced this. The recipe for this operation was very old and well known through Albania's political history. During his period in office, Berisha had tried to consolidate support for himself by appointing people from his native town of Tropoja and other parts of the north to powerful positions, particularly in the security forces. Thus most of the police, whether in plainclothes or the uniformed branch, were from the north. The National Intelligence Service - a security organization known as SHIK, after its Albanian initials - expanded to a force of 3,000 agents supported by another 3,000 informers and operated as an enforcement corps for Berisha's party.

The major shifts have been undertaken in regard to the professional military corps. The first action was directed toward downsizing the irrationally big number of commissioned officers. Thus, the first wave reached every officer over 48 years old and all commissioned officers that did not graduate from the military academy. This very painful measure was accepted without any serious reaction. Reconstruction of the army (going from 21 divisions to nine divisions) resulted, among other things, in releasing more than 50 per cent of commissioned officers as well as 30 per cent of enlisted officers. Albanian Army went from 18,000 commissioned officers to 8,200. At the beginning of this reform process, and after rank system within the military had been re-introduced, in the Army there was only one general. After a while, this number increased significantly to 25 generals. These dramatic changes happened within two years period, form 1992-1994.
 
Albanian Military between Desires and Reality
 
Dictatorship in the name of democracy and pyramid schemes instead of free initiative were the mutation of the communist political-economic system. At the beginning of 1997, thousands of Albanians who had put their savings into investment schemes that promised fabulous interest rates were infuriated to discover that they had lost their money. Their anger turned to indignation against the political regime. On March 3rd, the People's Assembly declared state of emergency, and the very next day Berisha was re-elected as a president for five-year term.

Berisha and his supporters believed that they had enough troops and police to suppress the insurgents in the "south-red communist units" as the president called them, "directed by foreign intelligence agencies." This was a miscalculation because, apart from the well-paid secret police, the authorities in Tirana had no public support at all. After mass desertion by military units, the insurgents in the south seized weapons from government arsenals and Berisha had to admit partial defeat. On March 5th army chief of staff General Sheme Kosova was replaced by Major General Adem Copani, President Sali Berisha's personal military adviser. It was only desperate step in order to stop the army's disintegration.9 Many cases were reported of army commanders and ordinary soldiers abandoning their posts without a shot after rioters stormed them. The behavior of some military officers was estimated as a real disgrace by some senior Democratic Party sources.

Rilindija Democratice, the Berisha party newspaper, said that military prosecutors were investigating cases of suspected dereliction of duty. Soldiers and officers "of all ranks" against whom there was evidence would be put on trial and risked stern punishment, it said.

Post-communist Albanian Army, which should have been granted new democratic military mission, during this upraising found itself in a very familiar role (as once before within the Hoxha's regime) - to defend the ruling party from popular insurrection. It was called to action in protests even before imposing a state of emergency. In late January military forces were posted outside the Defense Ministry, the other public buildings and the state radio and TV center. But at the moment when a state of emergency
was proclaimed the major problems within the army increased.

The explanation of this situation lies in several factors: first, it was almost impossible to maintain military unity and efficiency in actions performed against its own people (army was given shoot-to-kill orders under the state of emergency); second, there was a big number of Army members (both soldiers and officers) who had also lost their life savings in incriminated pyramid schemes; third, there were many officers dissatisfied with president Berisha's action during his administration when the army was practically decapitated. In course of 3-4 months the army staff was divided on two or three parts: one of them joined rebels, the other stayed loyal to the government and the third was composed of deserters who acted in a gang manner. There are even opinions that the unrest in the south was orchestrated by some generals who had been laid off by Berisha.
 
Peace was restored with political and military assistance of the international community (Operation Alba) and new elections were held in June 1997. Prime Minister Fatos Nano, the Socialist Party leader who came to power on July 24, has undertaken what looks at first glance like an impossible mission. A Socialist-led coalition swept to power in June elections and has vowed to start rebuilding the ravaged country by reforming the police, the army and the financial system. The police force has largely fallen apart, as has the army, and civilians have the guns from their arsenals. In fact, whole state apparatus have to be re-build and re-institutionalized from its ashes.
 
What is not difficult to predict is that Albanian military corps will be stroked once again. This can be seen most clearly from the character and scope of the recent reforms within the army. Replacing the army's chief-of-staff was one of the first changes in this regard. In mid August 1997 the new president's office explained that Albanian President Rexhep Meidani had sacked the army's chief of staff in a bid to rid the Balkan country's armed forces of the "old guard". New Defense Minister Sabit Brokaj told parliament he would dismiss "inexperienced and incriminated" people from the army and replace them with experienced officers. The top 25 army officers were called the same month for the resignation by the defense ministry.

Behind this official vocabulary there is a hidden meaning in every explanation. The term "experienced" seems to relate to officers who have been sacked from the army during the campaign from 1992. On the other hand, as "inexperienced" are estimated those officers qualified in the recent years in the military academies of the Western countries, and loyal to the Berisha's regime. In early September the North Atlantic Assembly protested against the purge campaign conducted by Defense Minister in the Albanian Army. At the same time the Democratic Party condemned these "Stalinist type" political purges in the Army.
 
Prospects
 
If recent events in Albania have taught us anything, it is that without radical democratic transformation of the political system and entire society, the military is condemned to be abused only as an instrument of certain political party. Sali Berisha, like Enver Hoxha fifty years before him, really thought he was the savior of his country. Led by such a Commander in Chief, the army also could easily be tempted by acceptance of self-messianic image. The final result could be either army's politicization or its inclination toward praetorian manners. Post-communist Albanian Army had a misfortune to be engaged without its wish into military action again its own people. Military action neither could safe the regime nor could solve country's internal problems. In course of several months all democratization achievements in the state, an especially in the army as institution were ruined. Thus, at the moment Albanian state as well as Albanian Army have to start from the very beginning.
 

CSS Survey, No.21, November 1997