DAYTON - TWO YEARS LATER: BELGRADE'S SELF-ISOLATION

The Dayton peace agreement certainly represents a turning point in the Yugoslav crisis and war. Basically, this Agreement established and directed the course of normalization of relations in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and primarily of the normalization of relations among the three signatories - FRY, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the region in general. The system of obligations under the Dayton Agreement contains the essential conditions for overcoming isolation of FR Yugoslavia, into which the regime has pushed the country by its war option and extreme nationalism, and for an international rehabilitation of FR Yugoslavia. Therefore, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement should be the corner stone of the foreign political orientation of Yugoslavia.

The Dayton Peace Agreement is not a classical peace treaty by which the victorious side or sides dictate the provisions to the defeated ones. The Dayton Agreement was concluded under strong pressure of the international community, first the United States, upon all belligerent parties. None of these parties had fulfilled their war aims, but an illusion was kept that none of them has experienced a final defeat. This is of particular importance for regulating post-war relations, for the creation of a new balance of forces and a democratic policy and behavior of all states in the region. The Dayton Agreement contains also a resultant of standpoints and interests of the main international factors - the USA, the European Union and Russia - in the newly emerged circumstances in the Balkans after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

The immediate task of Dayton was to stop the war and restore peace. That was achieved quicker and safer than expected by many. However, cynics say that this is of no surprise, because the "Balkan oppressors" understand best the language of force.

Some other results were achieved also in the military field - Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, also both entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, have undertaken obligations under the Agreement on sub-regional arms control in the Balkans (June 1996) to significantly reduce their military potentials till October 1, 1997. The envisaged system of inspection still has to confirm to which extent these obligations were really fulfilled.

The long-term aim of Dayton, is to create a broad spectrum of very complex conditions in which Bosnia-Herzegovina can function as a united state, as well as to secure respect for her territorial integrity, within which there are two entities with a high level of autonomy. Within this framework there are a number of problems that have to be solved - the functioning of common democratic institutions, respect for human rights and freedoms, the return of refugees, free flow of people and goods, services and capital, namely the abolishment of all obstacles between entities, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes - just to mention some of the most important problems whose solution is still at the very beginning.
 
Generally speaking, forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina which stand for disintegration and division are still very strong; although, since recently positive tendencies are also present, primarily due to the energetic engagement of the international community.
 
The role and engagement of the international community including also its military presence in one form or another, remain an irreplaceable factor in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and are a support for democratic processes. It is encouraging that the international community has shown a high degree of consent in this regard, which is particularly evident since the ministerial meeting of the Council for Peace Implementation in Sintra (end of May 1997). The resolve of the USA to continue the initiated peace process was undoubtedly demonstrated also in the speech of the special American emissary for the former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, on the second anniversary of Dayton. Calls for withdrawal of the international community and the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which can be heard in the USA and in other countries, he called shortsighted, dangerous and essentially immoral. He stressed the firm resolve of the USA, together with its European allies, to make by no means the crucial mistake and abandon the Dayton course, because that would - as he said - induce national extremism, aggression and destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and probably also in some other places.
 
Along these lines are also the recent initiatives of France and Germany, within preparations for the forthcoming international conference of the Council for Peace Implementation, on the level of foreign ministers, which is to be held in Bonn and which should evaluate the results achieved in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and establish directions for future actions. The Conference should particularly press the signatories of the Dayton agreements to be consistent in fulfilling the undertaken obligations, to secure the further development of the peace process.
 
However, the international community cannot replace completely the activity of internal democratic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are still not sufficiently strong or organized. Obstruction of the Dayton Agreement comes mostly from the Republic of Srpska, and it comes in the form of a demand for a consistent implementation of the Agreement and against its alleged revision. It is the Republic of Srpska and her citizens who suffer biggest damage because of this. Advantages of international economic and financial assistance have already been made visible in other parts of Bosnia - Herzegovina, while the Republic of Srpska is obviously lagging behind because the assistance is not coming due to such behavior of the leadership in Pale.
 
The Dayton peace agreement has imposed upon Yugoslavia major international obligations, which the regime is persistently trying to evade, but at the same time it represents itself as the main and unavoidable factor in the realization of the Agreement. The basic obligation of FRY - to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is neglected. This was particularly evident in the Agreement between FRY and the Republic of Srpska on special parallel relations, in which the provisions of the Dayton Agreement pertaining to the right to such relations are misused (Article 3 of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Annex 4 to the Dayton Agreement).
 
It is indicative that FRY, is also persistently avoiding to establish diplomatic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina although there is an agreement between the two states on this matter. Publicly there were also no statements given by any Yugoslav official in favor of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina and respect for her territorial integrity. There are, however, many statements in which the Republic of Srpska is called a state.
 
Similar attitudes towards Bosnia-Herzegovina are evident, mutatis mutandis, in the behavior of Croatia.
 
In the two-year period after Dayton, the Yugoslav authorities have practically made no significant step, which would bring Yugoslavia closer to the world. For two years, they were spreading illusions on a quick and full return of the country into the international community, but it all remains on a declaratory level and propaganda statements without background. The interests of the state and citizens obviously are subordinated to interests of the ruling structures, which profit from the isolation of the country because this is how they defend the monopoly of their political and economic power.
 
The Forum for International Relations has on many occasions pointed out that essential changes in Yugoslav foreign policy can be secured only based on fundamental democratic changes and economic reforms in the country.
 
The most recent deterioration of the situation in Kosovo rightfully provoked big international concern. Contrary to that, the official representatives of the government in Serbia give irresponsible statements, like the one that events in Kosovo are the last twitch of separatist forces, which are loosing ground. The French-German initiative for international mediation in the dialogue and negotiations between the regime and Kosovo Albanians is arrogantly rejected, with trite phrases on this being an exclusively internal affair and that they will not allow any interference from abroad. However, the problem of Kosovo has long been internationalized, and such statements are, in fact, yielding in to all nationalist forces in Yugoslavia which have a great responsibility for the extremely worrisome situation in Kosovo; encouraged are also the Albanian extreme nationalists. Even if part of these mentioned reactions is to be neglected as given in the presidential electoral campaign in Serbia, the fact remains that there is no understanding that a peaceful, political solution to the Kosovo problem is the major and most complex task of Serbia and Yugoslavia, one that cannot be postponed forever, because the Kosovo problem threatens to destabilize not only our country but also the entire region.
 
In the world, there is an indisputable interest that Yugoslavia overcomes her present problems that she seizes to be the source of instability that she returns to the OSCE, UN and IMF as a democratic state, that she cooperates with the European Union. In the recent Declaration of the European Union, addressed to the citizens of Yugoslavia, it is stressed that the EU wants a peaceful, successful and democratic FRY that will take her place in the European family; the presumption for this is that FRY respects the same norms as the rest of Europe. The Declaration condemns nationalist standpoints and policy that have caused harm to FRY and her citizens, making them one of the poorest in the region and it is neither the EU nor the international community that are to be blamed for that.
 
Undoubtedly, the essential decisions pertaining to Yugoslavia's way out from isolation and on abolishing of the outer wall of sanctions are not made in world capitals; these are questions on which decisions are made in Belgrade.

CSS Survey, No.22, December 1997