This last March Gen. Augusto Pinochet retired from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Chile to take the seat guaranteed him under the constitution of 1980 as senator for life. Students and other groups protested by holding up signs naming the victims of his dictatorship. Today, what took place during those years is still misrepresented, despite the volumes that have since been written on the subject. It is a particularly appropriate time to analyze the real relationship between workers and the Popular Unity government that Pinochet toppled, as well as the tension between the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT) and the Cordones Industriales, and the economic imperatives of the state under Popular Unity. Workers' support for the Popular Unity government was detrimental to the objectives of the workers' movement and insured the end of their movement in the event that Popular Unity lost power.

On hearing that workers at the Yarur textile mill had taken over the mill Allende could not believe that workers could organize themselves. Jorge Varras quoted Allende as saying, "The Masses can not go beyond their leaders..."1. Even when Yarur workers were first recieved by the Minister of Interior, Daniel Vergara. They were told that "the government would not permit the workers to sieze the enterprise because of the problems this would create2."

What caused such a negative response on the part of the Allende government was not a take over in the sense of workers seizing and running the textile mill itself but was an action very much in line with the legalist labor tradition in Chile. The workers arrived at the plant and put padlocks on the gates in order to protect what they thought would become a nationalized textile mill. What shocked the Allende government was that they did what they did this without the blessing of the ruling coalition. Allende was quoted as saying that "I am the one who commands here, and I do not agree that Yarur should be incorporated into the social property area right now 3."

Twice the Allende government denied workers' demands to allow them to take over the industry. Even with the work-place democracy schemes and the Area de Propiedad Social (APS) the government could not contain the growing demands of workers 4.

In the mine of Chiquicamata in 1971 a strike took place over the firing of a worker and the Union declared a strike in favor of the worker when the representatives of the workers on the council defended the position of the company and found the worker guilty of negligence. This was the first time that a serious division between the unions and the system of worker participation. After little more than three days the strike was over and the worker was reinstated 5.

When the Popular Unity government assumed power it was partially due to the failures of the previous Christian Democratic government and the economic troubles that plagued it during the late sixties. When Allende first took power immediate steps were taken to restore integrity to financial and marketing practices 6. Government and party leaders claimed to "favor an acceleration of the revolutionary process", but they were forced into taking more industry into the APS by an organized working class that was gaining an increasing sense of self-confidence 7. The great reticence of Allende to meet the demands of Yarur workers for example was that he had to keep up an image of being a man that the opposition and business interests could deal with. "His image as "a man you can do business with" depended on his ability to keep his promises Ñ and keep the revolution from their door." 8

Fundamentally the Popular Unity vision of a socialist transformation of society was a bureaucratic process where everything would be carefully controlled and gradual reform would be dispensed to a working class that would "provide political and social support when called on, but otherwise await patiently the advances and benefits of the revolution from above." 9

Of the political parties in the governing coalition the Chilean Communist Party's attitude towards the Cordones industriales and all organizations outside the orbit of the CUT was most clearly hostile. This was so pronounced that when the coup was taking place the Communist party still opposed any organization outside the orbit of the CUT 10. What the Communist party saw as a threat or a challenge to their leadership was seen by other groups as providing a potential base of support. Indeed many in the Socialist Party and the guevarist Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolutionaria (MIR) hoped that the seizures would further the nationalization of the economy 11. Neither viewpoint saw an increase in worker power in the workplace as a goal in itself.

Before 1973 self-managment was advocated as a project of action in the hands of a groups linked to the Christian Democrats and the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic church, meant primarily to allow themselves to maintain a continued presence in the workplace where power over the unions was challenged. 12 At the same time more and more workers were going on strike and seeking to reform the unions or build new unions. This created a centrifugal tendency in which increased conflict with the ruling class and the state which was bound to lead to a confrontation between the workers and the ruling class.

Until the attempted coup of June '73, the CUT sought to marginalize the Cordones Industriales, labelling them as "ultraizquierdas" or ultra-lefts, ultimately their goal was to get rid of them. All participation in the workplace would've taken place under the ausipces of the CUT with the Cordones Industriales integrated legally into the stucture of unions 13. In the workplace participation scheme according to the government and CUT, union representatives would be a part of a partnership with the Popular Unity goverment. It was a very corporatist vision of a state-socialism that motivated the ruling coalition from the very beginning. The fundamental difference was the nature of management in which workers would be absorbed into voting for their own managers and bosses rather than the more feudal version of a corporation run either by one person or a board of shareholders. This, of course would not eliminate struggle but contain it in a formal legal framework, thus shifting the locus of struggle from individual employers into the apparatus of the state itself.

By the middle of 1973 the CUT begrudgingly accepted the situation where workers were to be allowed more participation in industry in an effort to appease the "ultra-lefts" and bring them into the state-union fold in order to make the goverment of Popular Unity more stable 14.

Allende saw the Cordones Industriales and similar organizations as an embarrassment. The increasing friction from the military forced the left to move to mobilize greater support for a government which had seriously demoralized key sectors of the working class and had no control over the armed forces.17

In November of '72, Allende named three officers to head the armed forces to his cabinet. In Edward Boorstein's book Allende's Chile, he writes that General Prats, the constitutionalist didn't officially resign his post but stepped aside to assume the role of minister of interior and only temporarily left it to Pinochet 18. This much of what the state-capitalist insider Boorstein, wrote was true. It was also true that General Prats as a "constitutionalist" supporter of the government was largely forced out of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the military by an opposition that mobilized demonstrations of military officers' wives outside of his home and basically harrased him until he left power. Ultimately Prats was murdered by the military. Allende allowed Pinochet to take over the armed forces. At that time the Popular Unity goverment saw Pinochet as a "constitutionalist" and a supporter of democracy. That "even the MIR declared that the inclusion of the military men was not intended to be permanent - it was to last only as long as necessary".19

On May 21, 1973, Allende described the economic objectives of the government to establish a single direction for the economy, to make sure the economy functioned in a planned way, and "to guarantee the greatest democratic participation of the masses." Also outlined were plans to tighten up the monetary supply and lower inflation by raising taxes, especially property taxes.20

The UP government sought to increase state control over the economy, partly as a solution to the economic crisis of the late sixties under the Frei government. They also sought to increase support for themselves among the middle classes. This could only have been accomplished by eliminating any social-democratic or state-socialist content from its political and economic program. The ruling classes responded to this by stopping investment and support among the middle classes did not increase for Poplar Unity at all.21

The nationalization of industry during this period was spurred on by workers actions but not actually controlled by workers. The very definition of state-capitalism suggests that a capitalist class is in control and not the workers. Workers thought that they could force the government to nationalize industry through strikes and seizures thus allowing themselves a voice for their interests in the system. 22 This was due largely to the weight of illusions that people had in state-capitalism, as represented in the parties of the left in Chile, whether Communist, Socialist, MIR or even left christian-democrats, as well as the lack of any apparent alternative at the time.

The nationalization of the first fifty two companies caused foreign capital to leave, thereby causing shortages and lay-offs. Allende and the Communist party urged workers to produce more in an attempt to increase foreign exchange.23 Popular Unity offered to limit the nationalizations to "91 key monopoly firms". As a result of the Popular Unity conferences of the first two months of '72, would've needed to halt all further initiatives on the part of workers.

From 1972 to 1973 the government controlled more than 400 businesses and banks. By 1980, the government controlled 45 businesses including one bank. 24 What is most interesting is that privatization was in no way total even after seven years of the Pinochet government. For a government that is commonly seen to be one of the first Latin American countries to have embarked on the project on "neo-liberalism" it is unusual that even today privatization is not yet complete. Indeed, there was no reason to privatize the copper industry which at the same time prices of copper were skyrocketing throughout the seventies. Much of Popular Unity's existence and planning depended on when the price of copper would rise. 25

Popular Unity justified allowing a relatively small amount of work-place self-management out of concern that the APS might appear to be state-capitalist. 26 This reveals an awareness of the critique of the dominant vision of 'socialism' as state-capitalist among the ruling coalition as well as a desperate scramble to maintain a modified form of state-capitalism, one with a "human face" that could prop up the illusion that state-capitalism is better than "free enterprise" capitalism. This is interesting in that it reveals an awareness of the critique of the dominant vision of 'socialism' as state-capitalist, it also reveals a desperate scramble to maintain a modified form of state-capitalism one with a "human face" that could prop up the illusion that a state-capitalist state is better than a "free enterprise" capitalist state. In actuality the differences between the workers and the Popular Unity government are most clear when we examine the conflicting views of the nature and purpose of the APS. The government saw the APS primarily as a means of extending state-capital and militant workers saw the APS as their chance to exercise control over their jobs.

It is a testament to workers in Chile that they could be so confident in organizing outside the unions and in advance of the state. Popular Unity Government's unwillingness to meet the demands of workers in advance of their own plans must be taken into account as well as the actions of Allende's administration in the months preceeding the coup. With this one must realize the nature of the dominant union the CUT which like all unions is a part of the state and negotiates labor costs with the ruling and serves as a pressure valve to derail or limit class conflict rather than fight for workers. All unions do this today, in Chile the process occurred very early in the century that by the time that the major left parties of Chile started their version of the popular front during the Second World War it was already well intrenched in the apparatus of the state and the ruling class and far from its roots in the bitter struggles of the Chilean working class at the turn of the century. The mythology that grew around the Allende regime was present in all of the works on the subject, whether for or against Popular Unity. Often what is dismissed as typical leftist sectarian politics underlies much more fundamental conflicts. When the Communist Party of Chile blamed land and factory seizures on the MIR they were seeking to scapegoat a political rival by placing blame for the seizures on an organization that in no way could organize so many such actions in an attempt exonerate themselves in the eyes of the state and isolate their competition. Finally the support that workers showed for the Popular Unity coalition shows how heavy the weight of state-capitalism was at the time. That even during the final days of the Allende government the ruling coalition was still prepared to oppose workers in the event that they sought build autonomous organizations outside the orbit of the CUT and the ruling coalition. The sharp antagonism between the interests of traditional state-capitalist parties and workers is apparent in the completely divergent reactions to the seizures.

The swing from Christian Democracy to Popular Unity occurred because of a crisis in Chilean capitalism which laid the basis for the election of Popular Unity. It shows the swing from classical capitalism to a brief flirtation with state-capitalism and a return to a more traditional "neo-liberal" capitalism encapsulated in the space of a few short years. Both the economics of Popular Unity's state-capitalism and Pinochet's austerity capitalism were both reactions to crises of capitalism. This raises the question of how the same old "free market" capitalism could be advanced as a solution to the same problem in capitalism that caused the ruling class all over the world to use the state as a vehicle for capitalist development and stability in the first place. It is this reveals the bankruptcy of a system that has no solutions for the problems it creates.

It was not in the long term interests of workers to tie their ambitions to a ruling coalition of the left and it ensured the destruction of this workers' movement in the event that Popular Unity lost power. Ultimately, the interests of Chile's national capital took precidence under Popular Unity and under Pinochet's state. In the resistance to the coup workers were dragooned into dying for their national capital rather than attempting to keep alive their own autonomous resistance to the ruling class in the very likely event of a military coup. The hopes that workers had for the Popular Unity government were illusory, the minute a coup took place or a change of government occured so to would end their "road to socialism". ASm

Notes

1 Winn, Peter. Weavers of Revolution The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism. Oxford UP. New York. 1986. pg.185
2 Winn pg.167-8
3 Winn pg.183
4 Winn pg.187
5 Zapata, Francisco. Las relaciones entre el movimiento obrero y el gobierno de Salvador Allende. Centro de Estudias Sociologicos, El Colegio de México. Cuadernos del CES No. 4. 1974.pg.53
6 Winn pg.213
7 Winn pg.148-9
8 Winn pg.189
9 Winn pg.140
10 Winn pg.242
11 Winn pg.145
12 Scurrah, M. Podestˆ, B. Experiencias autogestionarias en AmŽrica Latina. Grupo de Estudios para Desarrollo. Lima, Perœ. 1986. pg.97
13 Garret—n, M. N. Chile - Cronolog’a del periodo 1970-1973. Vol. 1. Santiago, Chile. 1978. pg.63
14 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development - Popular Participation Programme. Worker Participation in Company Management in Chile: A Historical Experience. Barrera, Manuel. Report No. 81.3. United Nations. Geneva. 1981. pg.24
15 Roxborough, I. O'Brien, P. Roddick, J. Chile: The State and Revolution. Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. New York. 1977. pg.222
16 Roxborough, O'Brien, Roddick pg.203
17 Roxborough, O'Brien, Roddick pg.203
18 Boorstein, Edward. Allende's Chile. International Publishers Co., Inc. 1977.pg.212-3
19 Boorstein pg.213
20 Roxborough, O'Brien, Roddick pg.129
21 Roxborough, O'Brien, Roddick pg.124-5
22 Casalet, M—nica. Trabajo social y participaci—n obrera--la Experiencia de Chile. Humanitas. Buenos Aires, Argentina. 1974.pg.36
23 Bayat, Assef. Work, Politics, and Power: worker's self-management and control in a global context. Monthly Review Press. New York. 1991. pg.83-93
24 Meller, Patricio. Un siglo de econom’a politica chilena (1890-1990). Editorial Andres Bello. Santiago de Chile, Chile. 1996. pg.186
25 Roxborough, O'Brien, Roddick pg.135
26 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development pg.11

Over the last ten years the state of Wisconsin has embarked on a program of welfare reform that culminated in the infamous W-2 or Wisconsin Works program. Workfare proposals have been pushed on and off for the last 25 years but when the state government was given the go ahead to pursue the program by the federal government, Wisconsin became one of the first "laboratories of welfare reform". One of the first set of reforms proposed here was "bride-fare" a program designed to force mothers on welfare to get married or lose some of their benefits, which promptly failed to pass through the state legislature. The first reform that passed made all Food Stamp recipients go to a job training program, whether they had a job or not, in order to keep receiving food stamps. Other changes proposed at the same time involved money vouchers for private religious schools instead of simply increasing funding to the public schools and the reconstruction of the state Department of Public Instruction as a state-governor appointed rather than electoral post. These constant efforts to gut welfare and education stem from the capitalist necessity to eliminate funding for all social programs.

The state teachers' union WEAC defeated a proposal recently from the Madison Teachers Inc. (MTI) local to wage a state-wide job action in the form of a day long strike or day of protest. This was promptly defeated by the leadership of the union but the Madison local continued their objective by making their own agreements with other bargaining units across the state. The teachers in Racine, Wisconsin recently went on strike. The refusal of school board officials to ratify a new contract for Madison teachers almost lead to a job action or a strike as well. With the new rules of the Qualified Economic Offer, which allows teachers' grievances during arbitration to be ignored. The backdrop for this has been charged by the local press with inflammatory articles and op-ed pieces about how the school teacher here make too much money and that teachers pay raises are driving up property values. None of which is true. Current educational restructuring plans are geared towards shafting public schools in areas where people are poorest. The school voucher pilot program in Milwaukee succeeded in giving money to failing religious schools while taking scarce funding from public schools. One high school teacher and MTI member described the situation to me that the board was trying to force a strike with the aim of breaking the teachers.

For years now the much vaunted upsurge in the economy has made unemployment go down but that real poverty has remained the same, with precarious temporary employment, part-time employment and low-wage service jobs masking the real poverty. The worst effects of this social re-engineering will effect those areas where the population is most concentrated, the cities. Where, real unemployment and poverty dwarf official averages. Wisconsin's welfare program was eliminated and turned into 66 million dollar a subsidy to employers combined with temporary assistance this was even more expensive than the program it replaced.

It comes as little surprise that counter-proposals for a higher minimum wage have fallen on deaf ears. The recent defeat of a W-4 Worthy Wage" proposal to raise the minimum wage by the city council in the state capital of Madison has ended any doubts as to who will benefit from this restructuring. The W-4 proposal will be pushed by the liberal-left at the state level and will fail because the rulers cannot allow such demands to jeopardize their competitiveness in low wages. The state government which has gutted welfare, is now turning its sights on the public schools. The biggest obstacle to restructure the public schools in the eyes of the state government are the teachers unions but while the leadership of the state teachers union is as pliant as befits the role of today's unions, large numbers of the teachers are opposed to current goverment initiatives and feel that they are being unfairly targeted by the state-government. What links these things is that the state is divesting itself of its role in maintaining its traditional responsibilities to social welfare and education. Further conflict with the state is assured, as teachers try to work out new contracts but there has to be a class-wide opposition outside the unions and the political system against these maneuvers to restructure the economy or no action on the part of any workers will be able to succeed. --INotes