MICHAEL R. MITCHELL,                                                                     No. 99-55834

             Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                                                                                D.C. No. CV 98-08712-R
v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES;
DEWITT W. CLINTON, individually and
in his official capacity; JAMES K. HAHN,
individually and in his official capacity;
LLOYD W. PELLMAN, individually and
in his official capacity; CITY OF
LOS ANGELES,

          Defendants-Appellees
 

Before: BOOCHEVER, LEAVY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges

Michael R. Mitchell, an attorney, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal for lack of standing of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the City and County of Los Angeles and individual officials, alleging that their policy of offering and accepting lump-sum settlements⁽³⁾ in federal civil rights cases violates the constitution and discourages him from representing civil rights plaintiff (sic) by depriving him of his right to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291. Standing is a question of law which we review de novo. See San Pedro Hotel, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F. 3d 470, 474-75 (9^th Cir., 1998). We affirm.

Mitchell contends that the district court erred in determining that he lacked standing to challenge defendants' alleged policy mandating lump-sum settlements of federal civil rights actions. This contention lacks merit.

To show standing, a plaintiff must assert his own legal rights and interests. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have explained that the right to apply for statutory attorney's fees under Section 1988 belongs to the client not his attorney. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1986) (holding that Section 1988 vests the right to attorney's fees in a civil rights action in the "prevailing party," not the party's lawyer; consequently only the party has the power to exercise or waive that right); see Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 88 (1990) ("And just as we have recognized that it is the party's entitlement to receive the fees in the appropriate case, so have we recognized that as far as Section 1988 is concerned, it is the party's right to waive, settle, or negotiate that elgibility (sic)"); United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equip., Inc., 89 F. 3d 574, 577 (9^th Cir., 1996) (noting that if the client chooses not to ask for attorney's fees under Section 1988, the attorney has no standing to request them); Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 526, 527 (9^th Cir., 1986). Here, Mitchell's claims rest upon the erroneous contention that he has a right under Section 1988 to apply for attorney's fees. Because Mitchell has no right to apply for attorney's fees under Section 1988, he lacks standing to challenge the defendants' alleged policy mandating lump-sum settlements of federal civil rights actions.
 

AFFIRMED

1. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9^th Cir. R. 36-3.

2. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)

3. A lump-sum settlement offer is a single sum of money meant to be divided by the plaintiff and his attorney, including his attorney's fees.