The History Of The Guerrilla Movement In Colombia
The Guerrilla: An Answer To The Suppression By The Ruling Class
The guerrilla movement in Colombia was not invented by the
left. It dates further back and is the answer of the lower classes
to the violence of the rich and mighty. Since colonial times,
protest and revolts have always been put down with bloodshed.
Anyone who has read "A Hundred Years Of Solitude" by Gabriel
Garcia Marquez knows the history of repression and of the dozens
of civil wars which constantly raged in that country during the
19th century. Those wars have officially gone down in history as
conflicts between the two big parties: the conservatives and the
liberals. But more than that they were wars breaking out because
of social injustice and in which the leading figures of the two
parties enriched themselves at the expense of the lower classes.
That is way the armed struggle, being an expression of social
conflicts, dates back way further than the guerrilla
organizations.
The Civil War (1948-53)
The "War Of A Thousand Days" (1897-1899) was followed by a
brutal suppression of the union movement and of the indigenous
people in the twenties. In 1928, the banana multi-national United
Fruit Company slaughtered hundreds of strikers waiting for a
negotiation delegation (see Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "A Hundred
Years Of Solitude" - The Strike Of The Banana Workers). In 1948,
the popular liberal left-wing politician Jorge Elicier, who at
that point incorporated the hopes of millions of Colombians for a
better life, was murdered by order of the oligarchy. This murder
was succeeded by the so-called 'violencia' (1948-53), a civil war
costing the lives of at least 200,000 people. The population was
again slaughtered on the pretext of it being a conflict between
liberals and conservatives. Again, it was, in reality, a war of
land owners against the rural population. Still, the 'violencia'
became a turning point in history. Independent peasant groups
developed in different regions to defend themselves against the
terror of the mighty. They formed the first nucleus of today's
Colombian guerrilla.
Although the leaders of the conservative party and the
liberal party reached an agreement in the fifties to establish the
'Frente Nacional' (both parties simply took turns with the
presidency and ministries every four years), some armed groups of
peasants do not dispose of their weapons. While liberal and
conservative governments come and go, resistance from below is
rising. In rural areas, the power stays in the hands of
self-organized peasants. They found so-called Independent Republics.
In the beginning of the sixties, a broad mass movement against the
Frente Nacional of the oligarchy was being formed. It is called
the 'Frente Unido del Pueblo' (FUP) and is lead by the
revolutionary priest Camilo Torres. Tens of thousands of workers,
slum inhabitants, students, and peasants mobilize against social
injustice and the undemocratic two-party regime.
The Independent Republics as well as the Frente Unido del
Pueblo are transformed into targets of the oligarchy. The
Peasant's Republic of Marquetalia is extinguished by the army in
1964. Camilo Torres, the leader of the FUP, has to go
into hiding due to death threats. He retires to the countryside
where at that time the first group of the ELN existed.
The Birth Of Today's Guerrilla
The first two "modern" guerrilla organizations come into
being in 1964: as an immediate answer to the massacre of
Marquetalia, a couple of peasant groups influenced by the
Communist Party founded the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP).
At the same time, a guerrilla focus inspired by the Cuban
revolution and well anchored in the peasant's resistance in
Santander was being formed. This organization called itself the
National Liberation Army (ELN), and, relying on the strategies of
Che Guevara, gained a great deal of support after Camilo Torres
joined its ranks (the revolutionary priest was killed during his
first combat on February 15, 1966).
In 1967, after the international division of the communist
parties into "pro-Soviet" and "pro-Chinese" factions, a third
organization was born: the Maoist People's Liberation Army (EPL).
This new organization soon spread, especially in the northern
parts of the country.
Just A Peasant's Guerrilla?
All three guerrilla groups were mainly present in the rural
areas, which is an important factor in understanding the conflict
in Colombia. It has often been stated that the roots the guerrilla
has among the peasants stopped them from gaining a foothold in the
cities. Whereas the armed organizations influence or even control
large rural regions, they hardly have any influence on the
conflicts in the cities. Although this criticism is legitimate to
a certain degree, one should not forget how difficult it is to
work illegally in the cities. Repression there is much harder than
in the countryside. Still, the guerrilla has achieved a lot in the
cities in spite of these restrictions.
The Expansion Of The Guerrilla Until The Armistice In 1984
In the seventies, more guerrilla organizations were being
formed, many quite different from the already mentioned ones in
their political program and their operations. The most important
one was the Movement April 19th (M19), which was rapidly becoming
known abroad due to their spectacular operations (e.g. the
occupation of the embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogota in
1980) and their significance in the big cities.
In spite of numerous splits and crises of the different
organizations, the guerrilla transformed into a real menace to the
government in the late seventies. A massive general strike in 1977
manifested the dissatisfaction of the population. President Turbay
Ayala (1978-82) reacted with new waves of repression. The security
forces start to "disappear" political opponents, torture became
common in police stations, and the government passed new
"anti-terror laws".
But other than expected, resistance spread in Colombia. At
that time, the M19 in particular was leading the war against the
regime. The organization conjured up an army of peasants in the
south, especially in the department of Caqueta, and spectacularly
reached the important cities in this region.
The government of conservative Belisario Betancur (1982-86)
grasped the danger emerging from the guerrilla's expansion. With
the Nicaraguan revolution still being young, and civil war raging
in El Salvador, Betancur was trying hard to neutralize Colombia's
revolutionary movement. He suggested a very risky project: a
general amnesty for political prisoners, many guerrillas among
them, and direct negotiations with the armed organizations. He
thus succeeded in further splitting the guerrilla. In 1984, the
FARC-EP, the M19, and the EPL agreed to an armistice while the ELN
(and two other organizations) rejected the government's proposal.
According to the ELN, the government's initiative was only aimed
at keeping the opposition calm.
Growth Of The Protest Movement
The next few years were very active ones. In the middle of
the eighties, a new mass movement formed by workers, Christians,
feminists, blacks, indigenous people, and the inhabitants of slums
was spreading and taking over the streets. Several legal political
organizations arise. Socialists, communists, and former guerrillas
of the FARC-EP established the 'Union Patriotica' (UP).
Sympathizers of the EPL ran as the 'Frente Popular' in the local
elections. The most radical parts of the mass movement founded the
political movement 'A Luchar!'. The Betancur government was
playing a double game. While presenting itself as a government of
dialogue in front of the world public, it promoted the creation of
paramilitary groups at the same time.
In 1984, the dirty war against the opposition began. An
alliance of the military, secret services, ranchers, and the drug
cartels formed hundreds of paramilitary groups which, unlike the
Central American death squads, did not confine themselves to the
murder of political opponents and the slaughter of alleged
guerrilla sympathizers.
Today, paramilitary groups control everyday life in dozens of
communities. Especially Puerto Boyaca in Magdalena Medio (in the
center of the state) and the ranching regions of Cordoba (on the
Atlantic Coast) have become something like radical right-wing
"independent republics".
Dirty War: The Government's Strategy
Although the armistice of 1984 was still in force, several
political speakers of the M19 and the EPL were being murdered.
Paramilitary groups shot the popular presidential candidate of the
Union Patriotica, Jaime Pardo Leal. At the same time, the army
breached the agreement and attacked guerrilla camps. Unionists and
peasants were indiscriminately slaughtered in the regions of war.
All told, the UP lost 2,000 representatives and activists
since 1984. All in all, an estimated 30,000 murders are charged to
the paramilitary. Their victims are not only political opponents,
but also homosexuals, prostitutes, criminals, and street kids. In
the mean time it has become known that the most important
massacres effected by the paramilitary were directly ordered by
the army. Investigations by human right groups and even the
Colombian justice system accuse generals as important as Jesus Gil
Colorado (chief of the army until 1994) and Farouck Yanine Diaz
(former brigade general, then teacher at the Inter-American School
for Defense Issues in Washington, D.C.).
Worst of all, the ones responsible for the dirty war enjoy
complete freedom of punishment. Without international pressure,
not even the modest investigations now pursued by the justice
authorities would be enforced. The only general ever punished for
war crimes and his violations of human rights was Jesus Gil
Colorado, assassinated by the FARC-EP close to Villavicencio/
Meta in 1994. It sounds brutal, but this is the truth: without
such guerrilla operations, no general would have to fear
punishment for his crimes.
1987: The Guerrilla Coordination Simon Bolivar Is Founded
The dirty war and the attacks by the army finally led to an
end of the "peace process". The M19 and the EPL resumed their
operations after one year of armistice because they could not see
any genuine readiness to democratize the country. In 1985, the
National Guerrilla Coordination is created consisting mostly of
the M19, the EPL, and the ELN. In 1987, the FARC joins the
coordination and it is renamed Guerrilla Coordination Simon
Bolivar (GCSB).
As a result of the unsolved social problems in the eighties,
the armed struggle spread throughout the whole country. The ELN,
consisting of 4 fronts in the beginning of the eighties, grew to
more than 30 in 1990. The same applies to the FARC-EP, even though
it had followed an entirely different strategy in the eighties.
The guerrilla has become a considerable power in many regions of
the country.
The Demobilization Of The M-19
In the late eighties, the mass movement was collapsing due to
the dirty war and the breakdown of the "socialist" world. In spite
of quantitative growth, this development led to a crisis in the
rebel movement. The M19 in particular was extremely weakened
between 1985 and 1989. The majority of its leaders were arrested
or killed and it is sought negotiations with the government. In
1991, the M19 demobilized itself and changed into a legal
political party, the Alianza Democratica M19, reaching a little
over 10% of the vote in its first participation in elections. It
is not the actual military significance of the M19 but the
political implications of the demobilization which caused a crisis
for all of the Colombian guerrilla. The 'Eme', as M19 was called,
possessed an extraordinary international recognition and enjoyed
much sympathy in the cities - but later on it only symbolized one
big lie: that the demobilization of the guerrilla could bring
social justice.
One can state today that the peace process of the M19 had was
a big deception maneuver by the oligarchy. Carlos Pizarro
Leongomez, most important leader and presidential candidate of the
M19, was murdered shortly after his return to legal life because
the government feared his popularity. There was not a single
drastic social reform enacted which would have improved the living
conditions of the poor. Not even the human rights situation
changed with the legalization of the M19. As ever, the dirty war
remained a state-run policy against the opposition. But in 1990,
the strategy of the M19 was still convincing to some. Two small
guerrilla organizations also demobilized themselves, and the EPL
split into two factions. There were terrible symptoms of decay
among the guerrillas. Demobilized members of the EPL start working
for the paramilitary in Uraba (Atlantic Copast). Other former
fighters become criminals.
This development was partly due to the state not being able
to offer real alternatives to the demobilized fighters, but also
to fatal errors by the guerrilla itself. Only the authoritarian
structure of the organizations and the lack of political training
and convictions of the fighters made this possible. Today, a
realization of this fact is self-critically recognized by the
organizations themselves.
No Justice - No Peace
In spite of all these problems, the majority of the GCSB,
nowadays consisting of the FARC-EP, the ELN, and a minority of the
EPL, remained militarily active without refusing a dialogue with
the government.
In 1991, the GCSB started a number of negotiations with the
state. These contacts were unilaterally broken off by the Gaviria
government in 1993. In opposition to the "peace process" with the
M19, the suggestion of the GCSB proceeded from the assumption that
the armed struggle is not the cause but the result of the
violence. That is, that violence springs from social injustices
and the terror of the oligarchy against the mass movement. Armed
groups, therefore, are legitimate forms of resistance.
Under such conditions, the demobilization of the guerrilla
doesn't make sense. The only way of pacifying the country is a
radical democratization, en end to repression, the punishment of
those responsible for the dirty war, and a social economic policy
in favor of the poor majority of the population. Eduardo Pizarro,
professor of political science at the Universidad Nacional in
Bogota, recently pointed out in an analysis that only a small part
of the violence in Colombia has to do with the armed conflict
between the army and the guerrilla. The large majority of the dead
are victims of the dirty war, of the "social purge", or of
criminality, the last one in its turn being a result of poverty.
Nevertheless, The Guerrilla Has Grown In Strength
Today, the Colombian guerrilla is stronger than ever. This is
due more than anything to the government's oppression of the
opposition. There are hardly any opportunities for legal political
activity in Colombia today. Trade unionists, Christians, students,
the inhabitants of the slums - they all become the victims of
death threats once they start to be politically active in the
opposition. It's a sad but true fact that the safest place for a
Colombian political opponent today is the rain forest, that is,
with the guerrilla.
The organizations of the GCSB have prepared for this
intensified situation. According to government sources, they are
now present in more than 500 of the 1,000 Colombian communities.
The guerrilla are also closing in on the cities. There are
guerrilla fronts in the suburbs of Bogota, Cali, and Medellin,
people's militias have come into being in the poor neighborhoods,
and the FARC-EP is operating with irregular units in the municipal
area of the capital Bogota.
In the countryside, the guerrilla is exercising governmental
duties. It administrates budgets and controls the mayor's job.
Anyone who has ever been to the remote areas forgotten by the
government will confirm that, in spite of all restrictions, the
guerrilla accomplishes this administrative work more effectively
and honestly than Colombia's political class. There is less
corruption and more social investment in favor of the poor.
The national uprising has transformed itself into a new
power, an alternative government and a military force that will
prevent a bloody "pacification", which is what the government
wants. The armed movement is a legitimate factor not to be
overseen. And it will go on growing, because it wants an end to
the daily violence against the poor majority.
(Source: Colombia Popular - http://www.berlinet.de/eln)
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