Interview With FARC Leader "Tirofijo" Manuel Marulanda Velez
Mariela Guerrero, "Alternativa" magazine research director
interviews Manuel Marulanda Velez, alias Tirofijo (Sureshot),
leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Exchange Of Prisoners
Q: This week you will chair a meeting to discuss the prisoner
exchange. Is this an important issue for the FARC [Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia]?
We can give you a brief explanation about the exchange of
prisoners. We are experiencing an internal confrontation. This is
nothing new it has been going on for many years. In every action,
when a hamlet is occupied, during an inspection, whatever kind of
action it may be, soldiers are captured. We can prove that for
years now we have been capturing policemen and soldiers. Whenever
a soldier or a policeman was captured we would talk to them and
later let them go asking them to report to the police. However,
our situation has now changed and we can now retain those we
capture and ensure their wellbeing.
Q: What are you suggesting in this regard?
The country has no law that covers the exchange issue
because this is a domestic conflict. We are suggesting that the
parliament conduct a study, that it be analysed, and that a law,
to be called the exchange law, be approved. There are two reasons
for this: if we do not achieve a political solution through the
talks, then we need something that will provide an opening
because the confrontation will continue. Should the confrontation
continue more soldiers will be captured, which is quite normal.
Therefore, we need an opening for both parties: for those they
capture and for those we capture. We cannot have prisoners being
held for 30 years on this side, and prisoners held for 30 years
on the other. The situation must be defined between the two sides
and this must be done by means of a law of the republic.
Q: But why does it have to be a law?
We have been told: If you want to we can conduct an
exchange. But we want a law. We believe a law is needed because
we do not know - they speak of peace, but who can ensure that,
after the dialogue begins and four or five meetings are held in
three months, there will be peace followed by the exchange of
prisoners? No. Let us draft a law independently of the dialogue
table. Four or five meetings have been held to discuss this.
Q: What is going to happen at this week's meeting?
We are going to discuss details as to whether there will or
will not be a law. We have already been told that the parliament
will study the law. There are some parliamentarians who are going
to present the draft to the National Congress for its approval.
Q: In the meantime what will happen to the soldiers?
We can hold them for as long as we need to. We have quite a
few of them. We have more than 300 of them and that is not a
small number. This is why we are suggesting a law. Perhaps this
will not be possible in January or February. The law must be
studied once the parliament is back in session because the
parliament must handle this matter.
Q: And if this cannot be done legally?
What we are asking for is that they regulate the law so that
we can open this chapter. If they do not have the appropriate
instruments, then find them. In the meantime, and as long as
there is no law, we will continue to hold the soldiers.
Q: And what will happen if there are delays in the process?
We have already told them: Look here, the longer you take to
draft the law and make it into something important, there will be
more people detained. They are constantly detaining eight or 10
civilians and reporting: "We captured 20 guerrillas and among
them a very important commander." In another region they detain
another 15 or 20 civilians and again they report: "We captured 30
very important guerrillas who are guilty of everything that is
happening in the country." And they are really detaining
civilians. They have captured very few guerrillas.
Q: How many?
Not more than 100 of our guerrillas. We gave them the list
of officers, noncommissioned officers, and below. The idea behind
this is that when the time comes, the government will set aside
the 100 guerrillas of ours they are holding and we will do the
same with their soldiers.
Q: But the list you submitted has approximately 500-
The others are being tried as guerrillas because a law has
put an end to the term political crimes. These are now considered
criminal offences.
Q: Why did you include Caraballo [Francisco Caraballo, Popular
Liberation Army (EPL) leader] on the list?
Because we know him and know that he is an honest person. He
can influence the masses and this merits getting him on this
side.
Dialogue With The Government
Q: Now on the matter of the dialogue; what is the real reason why
you did not attend the meeting with President Pastrana?
Some military command agents were sent to check out the area
and find adequate places to position snipers. They selected some
high places, the sides of the church, across from the plaza. They
were not very lucky because one of them told us: This is being
planned. He gave us the details, showed us maps and told us how
the plan was drafted. If they could "drop" Pastrana and me there
would be no problem. That would solve the problem.
Q: Do you think someone could have killed you in San Vicente,
surrounded by thousands of your men?
It is always good to be careful. One never knows. They could
always find themselves a gunman to carry out the action on behalf
of Carlos Castano [leader of the Colombian United Self-Defence
Groups (AUC)]. It is very difficult to spot a gunman in the midst
of the townspeople. It is very difficult to know who is earning a
salary and willing to die as well. Therefore, it is better to be
cautious.
Q: Were you sure you were going to get killed?
They did it with Pizarro [Carlos Pizarro Leongomez, leader
of the April 19 Movement (M-19)] with the liberals, with
[Guadalupe Salcedo], with [EPL leader] Oscar William Calvo, with
[M-19 leader] Carlos Toledo Plata, and others. Therefore, one
cannot overlook these things.
Q: Why was the site of the meeting not changed?
We did not think it was right to invite him [Pastrana] to
come all the way over here after he had already made plans to be
in San Vicente. We do not know if he would have come here because
this area is not part of his theatre of operations nor did he
have his guards here.
Q: When will you get down to the really important matters at the
dialogue table?
What we must be very clear about at this time is that a
political front has been opened for the search of solutions to a
social crisis. We will work based on this. We will hold meetings,
and we will talk and talk, and see what comes from the table. If
nothing happens, if we do not reach an agreement, surely the
chapter will be closed. Regarding the three months, we believe
that the three-month time limit we established is more than
enough time to see if we are really going to get somewhere. Why?
After agreeing on what is called a working agenda (how are things
going to be done, who will participate, and how they will
participate) we will begin to discuss the 10 points. But before
we do that we must decide on an agenda and the participation of
the people.
Q: Are the negotiations not between the guerrillas and the
government?
The former governments and the current government have
always wanted the talks to be held between the two parties:
guerrillas and government. They do not want anyone else to know
what is being discussed. We want to talk facing the people.
Q: How?
The political parties, the various power sectors, the
civilian society and all those interested in finding a political
solution to the conflict should be represented at the dialogue.
That is what we have said. The workers are the ones who must say
what their problems are and how they believe these should be
solved. And like them, many others. The peasants and the land
issue. The students must be represented at the talks because they
know the problems they confront and how they should be solved.
And so on with each issue. The talks must be facing the people
and not behind their backs.
Agenda For Talks
Q: Do you feel the negotiating agenda is too broad?
No. It is an agenda that covers all the problems that need
solving. For example, at the table we are going to bring up the
problem of the national and international moneylenders and the
control of the dollar, an extremely complicated issue. That is
going to create big problems because we will be discussing
economic power and the handling of the dollar. We cannot continue
to tolerate the fact that interest rates for a worker who
requests a loan is 25, 30 and sometimes 40 per cent. It is
impossible to live like that. We cannot continue to tolerate an
exchange rate of more than 1,500 pesos to the dollar.
Q: Do you think the establishment is going to give in on all
those points?
Well, we know that the fight will be a hard one when we
broach those issues. They are all smiles about the 10 points.
However, when we expand on them, when we begin to discuss each
issue, they can be pretty broad. Then who are we going to
challenge? The large capitals, those that must be curbed. We
cannot allow our people to continue dying of hunger, without a
home, without a car, without a roof over their heads, without
education, without health, while others have huge buildings
filled with dollars. No. That must be changed. It will not be
easy because the confrontation will be with a state that has
given nothing and wants to give nothing.
Q: How does the issue of paramilitarism work its way into the
agenda?
That is one of the future issues to be discussed at the
table. We will discuss it when we come to it. We must wait and
see how the government is going to broach the subject because
paramilitarism is the state. What will they do? They like to
blame others. There you have Carlos Castano. Every time the
police or the army commits a crime or a massacre they blame it on
Castano. That is the complicated phenomenon. Let us use the
Cazadores Battalion as an example of this. Members of the
Cazadores Battalion would travel to a place called Los Pozos.
They arrived in uniform and set up camp. Next day they would
dress as civilians and head for a nearby hamlet. They would
arrive there where there are paramilitaries. That is the way it
is all over the country.
Demilitarization
Q: There is only one month left to do all the things you are
planning to do; February 7th is just around the corner. Does this
mean that the demilitarization will be extended?
That is something the government must decide. The government
must say: OK, since we wasted so many months, let us add those
months we wasted to the time we have left. Here is where they
feel lost. Then it is up to the government to say that it is
going to add the two months wasted to the time we have left. We
really only have from January 7th to February 7th.
Q: Why did the start of dialogue take so long?
When Serpa [presidential candidate Horacio Serpa] and
Pastrana were campaigning we informed the people that we were
interested in initiating talks. We said that there were two
conditions. We said that we were willing to talk with whomever
won the elections and that the basis for the talks would be the
demilitarization of five municipalities and the dismantling of
paramilitarism. We cannot accept their condition of talking in
the midst of war. We had to get them to agree on the
demilitarization of the five municipalities because it is
impossible to talk with planes flying above and bombs falling.
The first conclusion we reached in our analysis was on the need
for demilitarization and an agreement that there would be no
armed conflict within the area.
Q: President Pastrana promised there would be demilitarization
and he kept his promise, but you were not satisfied. Why?
They demilitarized La Uribe, Vista Hermosa, Mesetas and La
Macarena, but not San Vicente. They used whatever excuse they
found to remain there. They said it was going to be the residence
of the president of the republic, the government's seat during
the talks. That they were going to leave some allegedly unarmed
school graduates there, and that they had nothing to do with the
army. In the beginning they said they would be leaving 130 men,
but we counted more than 200 of them. And the problems with the
demilitarization began.
Q: What problems?
The first one was a statement made by Victor G. Ricardo
[high commissioner for peace] who said that they were not willing
to demilitarize San Vicente del Caguan. Then the commander of the
5th Division said that they would remain there for the sake of
dignity and I do not know how many other things he said. Later,
Army Commander General Fernando Tapias repeated the same things
and so did the defence minister and the president of the
republic. They just kept repeating that there would be no
demilitarization. And the tug-of-war began.
Q: How was the problem solved?
At the December 14th meeting with Victor G. Ricardo I told
him: OK, we want to know if the president is going to keep his
word or not. To this we added a letter in which we practically
had to tell him to get serious, because of the inconsistencies of
the president of the republic.
Q: And what happened?
Finally, the so-called school graduates were withdrawn. They
were so unarmed that helicopters, trucks, equipment to carry
mortars and ammunition, and a lot more equipment had to be
brought in to move them out. The news showed the "unarmed" school
graduates. One school graduate soldier after another, all armed
with their rifles. So what is the difference? The difference is
that there is no difference. Can you not see that the school
graduate is also trained for combat and knows how to handle a
weapon?
Q: Why do you think the government chose to leave the soldiers
there?
The government probably felt under enormous pressure. It did
not want to make a bad impression on the unions, the monopolies
and others, and was forced to do this. But the people also
pressurized the government. Pastrana made a promise to six
million voters and they asked him to keep his promise. When we
talked about complete demilitarization we did not say that school
graduates could remain behind.
The Chances For Peace
Q: There are many Colombians who feel that you are not interested
in making peace-
We are the most interested in making peace. As we said in
Marquetalia, before we began the operation against the 48 men:
Would it not be nice if the International Bank, the church, the
whole world, were to come here and see us working and see what it
is we need? Unfortunately, the government refused to listen and
today the conflict is much bigger.
Q: Would you be willing to submit to a reintegration process?
We are not fighting - to talk for the sake of talking - so
that they will give us a scholarship, a little house or for a
little car. No. That is not what this is all about. We want
changes made for the good of a people that has been suffering for
many years. These people understand what we are doing. The fact
that the number of guerrillas around the country keeps growing is
proof of this. And this is one way those changes can be made.
Q: What will happen if the process fails?
We are open. If they close this chapter on us, we will
continue. If it is opened, we will be there. That is what we are
going to do despite what is achieved at the talks. We are there
and we are up to date.
Q: And the war continues?
That is what I wish to clarify. There is room for talking.
Why say: Well, they are talking but there is fighting. That is
what is happening. We have said: If we make progress with our 10
points - talking for the sake of talking - with eight of the 10
points then we could begin considering the possibility of a
cease-fire. But in the meantime there is nothing.
Q: What would be the basis for a cease-fire?
We have agreed on nothing that would allow for this to
occur. That is the phenomenon.
Q: Does the FARC aspire to be considered a military force?
As a matter of fact, we are the authority throughout a vast
area of the country. You can see this along our fronts. You can
walk into a police station and see two guerrillas arrive and hear
the police inspector tell them: I have a problem and need your
help to solve it. The guerrillas are the authorities in those
areas. The mayors cannot work unless they ask the guerrillas what
it is they should do. In practice, we are the other government
within the government. This is why we are seeking recognition as
a military force.
Q: What would being recognized as a military force mean to the
FARC?
As long as we are not recognized as a military force and as
long as we cannot be on good terms with the government, we cannot
accept certain meddling from international organizations.
Solutions To The Drug Problem
Q: By the way, the recent meeting between Raul Reyes [Luis
Eduardo Devia, FARC International leader] and U.S. government
representatives has awakened many suspicions. Has the FARC's
position regarding U.S. policy changed?
That only happened recently and we are just beginning to
discuss it. The FARC wants to show the world and the United
States, as well, that it is not involved in drug trafficking,
that it does not grow drugs, and that it does not live off the
drug business. The FARC is willing to invite them to come to
Colombia and see for themselves the reasons why peasants plant
these drugs; to see, first hand, the problems these people
confront and why there is nothing else they can do. And we have
invited them not only to visit the demilitarized areas but the
whole country. They should visit the Middle Magdalena area,
[Carlos] Castano's territory, Cordoba, all those regions where
there are plantations, not only coca plantations, but poppy
plantations as well. The media only mentions the plantations in
the southern areas of the country, but there are other huge areas
where raw material for the production of drugs is produced.
Q: It has been said that you can help solve the coca problem.
How?
We believe that if the government wants to eradicate the
drug problem then it must first draft a development plan for the
peasants. That is all we want. Thousands of peasants need to
produce and grow drugs to live because they are not protected by
the state. This is why we come before the government to say: Mr.
President, draft plans that will allow the eradication of coca on
the basis of alternative crops. I told Comrade Raul [Reyes]: Go
out there and approach the international organizations. Tell them
that if they trust us, to go ahead and deposit some money, which
we promise will be used to eradicate the coca crops in, shall we
say, a municipality.
Q: How can you put an end to those plantations?
We can get a group of agronomists, good agronomists, to tell
us what other crops can be grown in those areas. It could be
rice, cacao, corn or cotton. On this basis, and depending on what
the agronomists have to say, we could use the money to begin
destroying the drug crop and planting something else - by the
time we finish destroying the drug crops, the new crops will be
beginning to produce - but not on the basis of shooting the
people, dropping bombs on them, dusting their sown land, killing
their birds and leaving their land sterile. That is how we would
fight against the coca plantations. A new crop must grow before
we can destroy the drug crops. If we do not do this, then we are
going to continue the way we are. They want to convince us that
we are the ones who must eradicate those plantations. No. That is
something the government must do. We are not the government, yet.
Once we are the government, we will do it.
Meeting With U.S. Representatives
Q: In the meantime will you profit from the illegal crops?
Ah yes. They say we live off that. Even the government's
policy claims that destroying the illegal crops will be the end
of us. As if that is our source of money. All the government
documents state that putting an end to the coca plantations will
be the end of the revolutionary movement. It so happens that coca
is not the roots of the guerrilla movement, but rather the
country's social, political and economic problems.
Q: What interest does the United States have in the process?
The responsibility for the drug trafficking phenomenon does
not fall solely on the producing countries like Colombia. It is
also the responsibility of the countries that consume the drug,
like the United States. It is also the responsibility of those
who produce the raw materials, and the chemical precursors. We
believe that once the United States understands this, it will
then have to decide if it will continue to give the Colombian
military, army and police money, which is not used in the
struggle against drug trafficking, but which could be seen as
meddling in Colombia's domestic affairs. That is what we aim to
do. We also want to keep Colombia from becoming a new Vietnam.
Q: What does that mean?
That Colombia can develop its own social and economic plan
and that the international organizations must let the Colombians
solve their own problems.
Q: Are you going to meet again with the U.S. government
representatives?
Another meeting will be scheduled when deemed necessary.
Q: Did the FARC soften on this issue?
Those are rumours spread by the media and by the
narrow-minded people who think: "They met the gringos; does this
mean they no longer want power? Have they renounced their
commitment to struggle for socialism?" It is only normal that
some people should think this way. Many times they are not aware
of the commitment the FARC has to the Colombian people.
Q: Do you think socialism failed? What kind of socialism would
you want for Colombia?
First of all, we do not know when we will triumph and reach
power and we do not know what changes will have taken place in
the world when this does happen. However, we have said that the
socialism we want for the Colombian people is one that will
select from the various socialist experiences, the Soviet
socialism that no longer exists, the Chinese socialism that still
exists, the Vietnamese socialism, and the Cuban socialism. We
will begin by selecting from among them their good as well as
their bad experiences, never forgetting that Colombia is not like
those countries, but instead a country with its very own
revolutionary culture and roots. We are nearing the 21st century
and the FARC cannot repeat the mistakes others have made.
Q: The U.S. Congress strongly criticized the meeting between
President Clinton's representatives and the FARC. Do you not
think it was a pretty unusual meeting?
In a way, yes. They themselves stressed that it is unusual
for their government to meet with rebel organizations like ours,
especially when we had not begun talks with the government. They
must have their reasons for thinking like that and we know that
decision did not come easy. This decision made us realize that
there is a group within the State Department that feels it is
necessary to really look at what is happening in Colombia and
around the world. The decision to meet with representatives of
the empire that has kept our people subjugated and that continues
to impose subjugating policies on our people did not come easily
for us either. But we did it and we are glad we talked with them.
We want to continue that relationship.
New Political Group
You have said that you plan to create a new political group
called the Bolivarian Movement [Bolivarian Movement for the New
Colombia.] What kind of a group will it be?
The idea of the Bolivarian Movement is the result of what
happened to the Patriotic Union [UP]. We suggested a policy for
the UP while the appropriate national, departmental and municipal
mechanisms were being created. Once the mechanisms had been
created, this policy would become a new political movement born
from an armed organization through agreements reached. Surely,
there was no want for people who failed to understand its
importance. It was a policy capable of developing a broad
political movement, a third force different to the traditional
political parties, capable of confronting the policies of the
oligarchy. That was what we wanted. The UP was riddled with
bullets. Later, at the Eighth Conference we agreed to go at it
seriously and create the Bolivarian Movement for the New
Colombia.
Q: What characteristics will this movement have?
It is a movement that is being created in hamlets, cities,
villages, wherever there are people to hear our platform. Once we
achieve truly positive agreements in this country, we will have
to show that we are a force that can gather a large number of
followers at the public plaza.
Q: Will you participate openly in an election?
The Bolivarian Movement will have to be a clandestine
movement. It will continue to be a clandestine movement until the
appropriate conditions are achieved for it to act legally. Using
the UP experience, many of our people will be elected to support
the process and ensure that the past will not be repeated. The
people did not understand that changes had to be made. We do not
want to make that mistake again.
Q: Is there anything left of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla
Coordination?
As a coordinating group there is nothing left. The Simon
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination was formed by the M-19 [April 19
Movement,] the EPL, the reinserted, the Quintin Lame, and the PRT
[Revolutionary Workers Party]. They have disappeared from the
political picture and from the armed struggle. Circumstances -
which I know nothing about - led them to demobilize and they
disappeared. All that was left was the ELN [National Liberation
Army] and a very small group of Caraballo's EPL. Their
demobilization ended the coordination.
Q: How are relations between the ELN and the FARC?
Our relations with the ELN are good, even though they are
not close relations. They are rather somewhat cold. Some time ago
we called them and told them that we should end the coordinating
board because the actions of one or the other should not be
blamed on some or on others. However, we have suggested what we
have called the principle of solidarity or action. It means that
when they need help, we help, and vice versa. We are trying to
find points of agreement with them. And the rest, well we are
working on it.
(Source: Semana - Colombian weekly newsmagazine - January 18,
1999)
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