The Demilitarization of Cyprus

Presented by: The Hellenic Studies Center, Dawson College, Montreal

HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA 1 MAY 1996

In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Cyprus is one of the most highly militarized regions in the world. The first consideration is the Turkish army of occupation of the northern part of the island and the second factor, which is related to the first, is the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations since the Turkish invasion in 1974. Other factors have also contributed to the poor relations between Greece and Turkey since 1974 but it can be argued that the occupation of northern Cyprus remains the principle impediment of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

The failure of the international community to end the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus for over twenty years has created a moral vacuum and a security conundrum for the Western Alliance. Even more significantly this failure has established a dangerous precedent of appeasing aggression at least until it reaches limits unacceptable to the media or affects the strategic interests of the major powers.

The case of Cyprus is unique not only for the longevity of the occupation of a sovereign state, but by what can be defined as institutionalized aggression whose long-term status has desensitized world opinion and reduced the plight of Cyprus within acceptable limits.

In this vein it is perceived that the Turkish army in Cyprus has remained within a specific zone of occupation and has not ventured to inflict additional damage or seize more territory. At the same time the Cypriot Government, following international law has not undertaken to counter-attack, thus leaving both sides within a defined military and political status quo.

However, behind this veneer of hostile tolerance events in Cyprus and in the Aegean are creating a critical mass of potential military confrontation that is preceded by an arms build up by Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and other countries in the Middle East. In this respect the military figures speak for themselves.

From June to December 1995 the Turkish forces in northern Cyprus included: 30,000 soldiers plus the 4,500 regular Turkish Cypriot forces. During the last eighteenth month period they completed a program to upgrade their M-48 main battle tanks, which now number 265, thirty more than earlier. At the same time the Turks have improved their air defense capability with additional guns, shoulder-fired SAMs, a new air defense radar system, and improved surveillance and battlefield communications.

There is little doubt that Cyprus can be the cause or the casualty of a future Turkish-Greek conflict. For example, during the latest Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean, the Turkish army in Northern Cyprus was reinforced with 75 upgraded M-48A5T main battle tanks equipped with thermal imaging, stabilized guns and new fire control systems.

The Turkish army corps in northern Cyprus has also received new M-113 APCs and at least two batteries of 155mm guns. The circumstances and the type of these new military acquisitions by the Turkish occupation army certainly indicate an offensive posture. The implication, that can be surmised, is that an outbreak of hostilities in the Aegean would result in further Turkish aggression against Cyprus.

Although the recent Aegean crisis was averted, Turkey is continuing to expand her armed forces causing a similar response from Greece. In recent years Turkey has added to its arsenal more than 1,000 US built M60 and German Leopard 1A main battle tanks; 600 M113 APCs; and 100 M110 203mm self-propelled guns.

The Turkish Air Force is undergoing a major improvement with the addition of 240 F-16CD fighters (most of them built under license in Turkey), including dozens of F-4E Phantoms and F-5AB fighters from Germany and the Netherlands, while Israel has undertaken to upgrade Turkey's 60 aging F-4s. The Turkish Navy has also received 8 Knox Class frigates from the US and has ordered another 8 Meko 200 Class frigates from Germany.

Greece, on her part, has acquired 1,400 M60 main battle tanks; 23 combat planes from the US; and 40 F16 fighters for the Greek Air Force. The Greek navy is also expanding with the acquisition of 10 frigates and four missile destroyers.

This arms build up and the potential of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey will continue to have direct implications for the Cypriot Republic. In this respect Cypriot security is directly linked to the status of peace or war in the Aegean. Lacking an air force and with a national guard of only 9,700, Cyprus is in no position to defend herself against another Turkish invasion. Under these circumstances the Cypriot Government must rely on Greek military support in order to offer a credible defense and deterrent.

One result has been the formulation of a joint defense doctrine with Greece accompanied by a modest upgrade of Cypriot military equipment. However, the Turkish government reacted by establishing a similar arrangement with the puppet regime of Northern Cyprus. Since such a state does not actually exist, Ankara's response to the Cypriot-Greek defense arrangement is simply to demonstrate that any hostilities in the Aegean would also target Cyprus.

It is apparent that the Turkish occupation army in northern Cyprus has become an integral part of Turkey's military strategy for a potential conflict in the Aegean. It is an open question whether the Turkish army in occupied Cyprus evolved into this strategic role or was it part of Ankara's policy from 1974? The rhetoric of succeeding Turkish governments since the invasion has been that the purpose of their occupation army is to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Despite world-wide condemnation of the Turkish occupation and dozens of attempts at a negotiated settlement Ankara has thus far declined to accept any plan that leads to the re-unification of the island. Indeed the official line of Turkish policy towards Cyprus continues to underline the security of the Turkish minority.

However this argument is baseless and more so since December 1993 when the President of the Cypriot Republic proposed to the Secretary General of the United Nations the total disarmament of Cyprus.

According to President Clerides, the Government of Cyprus is willing to undertake the following measures:

1) disband the Cypriot National Guard and turn over its weapons and equipment to the UN peace keeping forces.

2) the use of these weapons and equipment by the UN forces to patrol the buffer zone between the Government controlled part of the island and the Turkish occupied area.

3) the security of the island to be the responsibility of an enlarged UN peace keeping force, and the cost of maintaining that force will be met by the Cypriot Republic from the savings resulting from the suspension of defense funds. The remaining funds will be placed in a United Nations account for financing bicommunal projects after a settlement.

4) the police force will be maintained at its current strength armed with light weapons.

5) the 36,000 Turkish army of occupation will withdraw and also hand over their military equipment to the UN.

Under the terms and conditions of this proposal the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority will be guaranteed by the UN and by the demobilization and disarmament of the Cypriot forces. The Clerides proposal does not demand an immediate unification but rather it offers an opportunity for the two communities to negotiate freely and without the threat of force.

This new initiative is gaining momentum in the international community since it provides for an innovative approach to ending the diplomatic and military stalemate over the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. On 15 March 1995 the United States House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling for the demilitarization of Cyprus followed by the Australian Federal Parliament on 23 November 1995, while a similar procedure is being undertaken by the Government of New Zealand.

Demilitarization in and of itself does not guarantee instant reconciliation by the two communities but it does provide the first concrete measure toward the re-unification of the island. In addition Cyprus's entry into the European Union will further enhance the security of the island as well as provide economic benefit to all Cypriots.

Furthermore, in the dynamic of Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean it will remove Cyprus from the strategic loop as a base of operations in a potential conflict. Such a policy could also provide a natural confidence building measure for Greece and Turkey assuming that the Ankara government is serious about the interests of the Turkish Cypriots and rejects aggression as an instrument of policy.

If on the other hand the Turkish government ignores demilitarization as a first step in establishing a secure environment for both Cypriot communities, it will confirm Ankara's strategy of using northern Cyprus as a forward base of potential military intervention in the Aegean. In effect the proposed demilitarization of Cyprus undermines the fundamental premise of the Ankara government that the occupation is necessary to protect the Turkish minority.

Dr. Andre Gerolymatos Director Hellenic Studies Center Dawson College Montreal