

HR 2056 IH
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 2056
To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity
of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, intelligence
and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's independence.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 8, 1999
Mr. FORBES introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and
Means, and Banking and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity
of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, intelligence
and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's independence.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Lebanon Independence Restoration Act
of 1999'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The people of Lebanon have a rich, proud, and honorable history
dating from biblical times to the present, and Lebanon has been a free
and democratic nation for much of its modern history.
(2) Lebanon and the United States have enjoyed a history of friendship
and cooperation which has been witnessed by the immigration of millions
of Lebanese to the United States where they and their descendants have
contributed greatly to the fabric of American life.
(3) Lebanon witnessed foreign incursions and occupations during its
15-year civil war. Although that war ended in 1990, non-Lebanese forces
still control much of the country. These forces include an Israeli force
that controls a 9-mile wide security zone in Lebanon contiguous with Israel's
northern border, and approximately 30,000 Syrian troops, several armed
Palestinian factions, and other terrorist groups that control the remainder
of the country.
(4) There is a crucial distinction between the presence of Syrian and
Israeli military forces in Lebanon. Israel exercises no control over the
Government of Lebanon and in 1998 offered to withdraw unilaterally from
the security zone in return for security guarantees, whereas Syria has
never recognized Lebanon's independence, or exchanged ambassadors with
Lebanon, and effectively dictates the major policies and actions of the
Government of Lebanon.
(5) Various Lebanese factions signed a peace settlement in Taif, Saudi
Arabia, in 1989 as a step toward ending the civil war. This accord provided
for the phased redeployment and withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon
beginning in 1992.
(6) The Government of Syria has refused to carry out any redeployment
as envisioned by the Taif Accord. Syrian domination over Lebanese politics
and political leaders is at the root of the Lebanese Government's failure
to press Syria for a withdrawal of Syria's occupying forces.
(7) In addition to its armed forces, Syria maintains a massive intelligence
service presence in Lebanon to enforce its control over the Lebanese people.
(8) Syrian domination is so pervasive that Lebanon has effectively
become a Syrian satellite state. This relationship with Syria does not
reflect the will of the majority of the Lebanese public. Moreover, Syria
has sought to change Lebanon's demographic balance by the population transfer
of as many as 1,000,000 Syrian laborers to Lebanon.
(9) Syrian domination has prevented Lebanon from developing direct
contacts with Israel and participating in the multilateral track of the
Middle East peace process.
(10) Syrian domination has been associated with a deterioration in
Lebanon's human rights situation. Syria has engineered Lebanese election
results to its liking, Syrian intelligence units have been implicated in
the disappearance of Lebanese citizens, and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese
Parliament has imposed curbs on Lebanon's media, once the freest in the
Arab world.
(11) Syrian domination has failed to curtail international narcotics
traffickers or terrorist groups, including Hizballah and the Kurdish Workers
Party, that operate in Lebanon under Syrian control.
(12) Syrian domination has prevented the Lebanese Army from entering
southern Lebanon to restore order and stability in that region. Consequently,
southern Lebanon has been a staging area for military provocations against
Israel by terrorist groups supported by Syria and Iran.
(13) The United States Congress is concerned about the potential for
a miscalculation between Israel and Syria that could inadvertently lead
to large-scale hostilities, especially in southern Lebanon. In this regard
the Congress views with grave concern Syria's acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction, especially chemical and biological weapons and missile
delivery systems. Syrian surface-to-surface missiles can reach major urban
centers in Israel, Turkey, and Jordan.
(14) The United States Congress has expressed itself repeatedly in
resolutions that insist that Syria make good on its commitments to withdraw
its military and security forces from Lebanon.
(15) It is not in the interest of the United States that freedom and
democracy depart irreversibly from Lebanon. Lebanon has a constructive
role to play in the search for Middle East peace. It can only do so when
it is free, sovereign, and governed by a truly representative government.
(16) The withdrawal of Syrian and other foreign forces from Lebanon
would not only promote regional stability, but also would create the necessary
conditions for the restoration of Lebanon's independence, freedom, and
democracy. Truly free elections are not possible with the presence of foreign
military and security forces and terrorist groups in Lebanon.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The Congress calls for the following:
(1) A complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all Syrian
military, intelligence, and security forces and their proxies and all Palestinian
and other terrorist forces from Lebanon, to be followed by the eventual
withdrawal of Israeli forces.
(2) Following the withdrawals described in paragraph (1) and restoration
of a freely elected, democratic government in Lebanon, the deployment of
the Lebanese Army to southern Lebanon to restore order and stability in
that region, and for disbanding all armed groups in Lebanon with the exception
of the legitimate national armed forces.
(3) At the same time as the deployment described in paragraph (2),
the assurance by the Government of Lebanon for the safety and well-being
of all members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO FUTURE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
SYRIA AND ISRAEL.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should not ratify
or in any other way affirm, support, recognize, or participate in any peace
agreement between Syria and Israel that does not provide for the full and
verifiable withdrawal of Syrian military, intelligence, and security forces
and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 5. WITHDRAWAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR IMPORTS FROM SYRIA
AND LEBANON.
(a) WITHDRAWAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except
subsection (b)), nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment)
shall not apply with respect to any goods that--
(1) are the product of Syria or Lebanon; and
(2) are entered into the customs territory of the United States on
or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) RESTORATION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT- The President may restore
nondiscriminatory treatment to goods that--
(1) are the product of Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President
certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence
forces and their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from
Lebanon and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely
elected and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) are the product of Syria beginning 30 days after the President
certifies to the Congress that the requirements described in paragraph
(1) have been met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have
been freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 6. PROHIBITION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND LEBANON.
(a) PROHIBITION- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, economic
assistance may not be provided to Syria or Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION- Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President certifies
to the Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces
and their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon
and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the President certifies
to the Congress that the requirements described in paragraph (1) have been
met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature.
(c) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE- In this section, the term `economic assistance'
means any assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or any related assistance under any other provision
of law.
SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.
(a) PROHIBITION- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, military
assistance may not be provided to the Government of Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION- Subsection (a) shall not apply beginning 30 days after
the President certifies to the Congress that Syrian military, security,
and intelligence forces and their proxies in Lebanon have been completely
withdrawn from Lebanon and the Government of Lebanon is certified to have
been freely elected and wholly democratic in nature.
(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that any
assistance prohibited by reason of the application of subsection (a) should
be redirected to assistance for humanitarian, democracy building, human
rights and educational efforts in Lebanon.
(d) MILITARY ASSISTANCE- In this section, the term `military assistance'--
(1) means any assistance under part II of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.) and any assistance under the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); and
(2) includes any other form of military cooperation with the Government
of Lebanon.
SEC. 8. REQUIREMENT TO OPPOSE LOANS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND LEBANON
BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) REQUIREMENT- Beginning 15 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall instruct the United States representative
to each international financial institution (including the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
to which the United States is a member to use the voice and vote of the
United States to oppose the initiation or renewal of any loan or other
form of assistance for Syria or Lebanon.
(b) EXCEPTION- Subsection (a) shall not apply--
(1) with respect to Lebanon beginning 30 days after the President certifies
to the Congress that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces
and their proxies in Lebanon have been completely withdrawn from Lebanon
and that the Government of Lebanon is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature; and
(2) with respect to Syria beginning 30 days after the President certifies
to the Congress that the requirements described in paragraph (1) have been
met and that the Government of Syria is certified to have been freely elected
and wholly democratic in nature.
SEC. 9. ANNUAL REPORTS.
As part of the annual human rights report required under sections 116(d)
and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and
2304(b)), the Secretary of State shall pay special attention to the report
on Lebanon and shall include in such report the following:
(1) A detailed assessment of Syrian influence in the three branches
of the Government of Lebanon.
(2) An assessment of human rights abuses attributable to Syrian influence
in the Government of Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of the role played by Syrian intelligence services
in Lebanon.
(4) An estimate of the number of Syrian military, security, and intelligence
forces and their proxies and terrorist groups in Lebanon.
(5) Progress made by the Government of Lebanon in disarming terrorist
groups, and an assessment of the causes for the Lebanese Government's failure
to disarm such groups.
(6) The specific steps and concrete actions taken by the Department
of State to affect a withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, and intelligence
forces and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 10. DEFINITION.
As used in this Act, the term `Syrian military, security, and intelligence
forces and their proxies' includes Syrian Army regulars, paramilitary forces,
and plain clothes intelligence and security officials.
END
H.R.2056
Sponsor: Rep Forbes. Michael P. (introduced 6/8/1999)
Latest Major Action: 6/25/1999 Referred to House subcommittee
Title: To establish United States Government policy regarding the necessity
of requiring the full withdrawal of all Syrian military, security, intelligence
and proxy forces from Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's independence.
COSPONSORS(12):
Rep Salmon, Matt - 6/16/1999
Rep McIntosh, David M. - 6/16/1999
Rep LaHood, Ray - 6/16/1999 (withdrawn - 6/25/1999)
Rep Hayworth, J. D. - 6/22/1999
Rep Cook, Merrill - 6/22/1999
Rep Saxton, Jim - 6/22/1999
Rep Shows, Ronnie - 6/22/1999
Rep Towns, Edolphus - 7/1/1999
Rep Maloney, James H. - 7/12/1999
Rep Souder, Mark E. - 7/12/1999
Rep English, Phil - 7/14/1999
Rep Cannon, Chris - 7/14/1999
Rep Andrews, Robert E. - 8/4/1999
STATUS:
6/8/1999:
Referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition
to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services,
for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case
for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of
the committee concerned.
6/8/1999:
Referred to House International Relations
6/8/1999:
Referred to House Ways and Means
6/8/1999:
Referred to House Banking and Financial Services
6/25/1999:
Referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary
Policy.
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