Indonesian nationalism: A western invention to contain Islam in the East Indies
(Part 1)
by Hasan M. di Tiro

The idea of secularization led naturally to the idea of an Indonesian 'nationalism'. But how can one inclusive 'nationalism' be created in a multi-national empire, covering an area as large as western and eastern Europe put together?

The problems of 'Indonesian nationalism' cannot be understood without knowing the geographic setting that governs it. The former Dutch colonial empire of the East Indies, whose territorial 'integrity' is still kept intact, i.e., un-decolonized, and has got away with only its name changed from the 'Dutch East Indies' to 'Indonesia', is not a natural geopolitical entity.

The entire region has been brought under one single super-colonial administration by the bloody sword of Dutch colonialism that held sway over the vast region from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the present time, although since December 27, 1949, the super-colony has been administered by the Javanese on behalf of the Dutch and other western interests under the name of the pseudo-nation of 'Indonesia'.

Henry Kissinger had aptly observed long ago that Indonesia was nothing but a 'geographic expression' until the Dutch found it more efficient to unite the islands of the Indies under a single administration. This was indeed the genesis of the present-day 'Indonesian nation' and 'Indonesian nationalism', created solely to justify the unified administration of the huge colony as a preserve of western imperialism.

As there is no sense in talking about the existence of one European nationalism today, so there is equally no sense in talking about the existence of an 'Indonesian nationalism', although western media and scholars have naively propagated this concept.

Islam and the Dutch East Indies

There is only one common denominator among the various peoples at-the Dutch East Indies, namely Islam: the religion of 95 percent of these peoples.

However, the Dutch could hardly build anything on the basis of Islam which had been their number one enemy to begin with. Had they not in fact wrested control over these huge territories from half-a-dozen Muslim States that had existed before their arrival, such as Banten, Demak and Mataram on the island of Java; Bandjar on the island of Borneo (Kalimantan); Bone and Macassar on the island of Celebes (Sulawesi); Temate' on the islands of the Moluccas; and finally Aceh on the island of Sumatra, against which the Dutch had to fight the biggest war in all their history?

As the Dutch historian, Paul Van't Veer commented:

The Netherlands had never fought a war greater than the one against Aceh. In terms of its duration, this war can be called the eighty years war. In terms of casualties--more than 100,000 dead--it was a military event that has no equal in the history of our land.

But the Acehnese are simple Muslims. They are the living proof of the strength of Islam in the East Indies. General Van Swieten, who was the commander of the Dutch second invasion of Aceh in 1873- 1874 (the commander of the first Dutch invasion, General Kohier, was executed by the Acehnese forces) and who was hailed, somewhat prematurely, as 'the conqueror of Aceh', finally came to the conclusion that 'there was no way to defeat the Acehnese in war', and he recommended withdrawal and a negotiated peace. The Dutch government rejected his proposal and so the war went on.

It was the continuous defeat of the Dutch that finally brought the orientalist and 'Istamicist' Christian Snouck Huurgronje to the forefront. He was considered a genius by his people and was described by Multatuli, a famous Dutch writer, as the second most important man in the history of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia during the nineteenth century.

In orientalist circles he was regarded as one of the two foremost European authorities on Islam (the other one was Ignaz Goldziher of Hungary).

Huurgronje was asked to use his knowledge of Islam to find ways to defeat the Acehnese Muslims. His official instructions from the Dutch government read, in part, as follows:

'To study the conditions of the religious party in Aceh after the death of Tengku Tjhik di Tiro, and to find out their new disposition and to make recommendations."

The Dutch had entertained high hopes that the martyrdom of the Acehnese leader, Al-Malik Tengku Tjhik Muharnmad Saman, on January 25, 1891, would bring the Acehnese resistance to an end.

That, however, did not happen; the resistance continued. This was why Huurgronje was dispatched to Aceh. Ultimately, he failed to achieve his objectives in Aceh because the Acehnese Muslims refused to co-operate with him; he could not influence them.

However, despite his failure in Aceh, Huurgronje did emerge as the architect of the Dutch government's 'Islamic policy' in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia. His recommendations were accepted as official policy to the very end of the formal Dutch control of the East Indies, until the time of the illegal transfer of 'sovereignty' to their marionette, Javanese Indonesia, created in their own image, on December 27, 1949.

The Dutch 'Islamic Policy'

Christian Snouck Huurgronje formulated, in no uncertain terms, the objectives the Dutch colonialist regime must attain: namely, that Islam be destroyed as a politico-religious faith, albeit slowly and very subtly, Indonesia must he secularized and westernized, preparing the way for an eventual lasting union with the Netherlands that would be made possible on the grounds of a 'common' culture obtained through the success of his policy.

This end, among others, was to be achieved by isolating the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies from any contact with the Ummah outside the Dutch East Indies.

For this purpose, pilgrimage to Makkah and Hajj was to be very strictly controlled. Huurgronje was for using violent tactics, if necessary, to depoliticize Islam; for the Acehnese he even prescribed torture to destroy their 'over-confidence' and 'superiority complex' viz-a-viz the Dutch. In Huurgronje's own words, "Acehnese must be hit in the most sensitive painful manner so that their superiority complex can he destroyed."

This was strange advice from a student of theology. But it was to no avail because it merely strengthened the Acehnese resolve to achieve martyrdom. Huurgronje had mistaken the proper Acehnese Muslims' attitude towards the invading infidels for a 'superiority complex'.

In short, the Islam that was to be allowed in Indonesia, under Huurgronje's scheme of things, was in the form of rituals only. Meanwhile, the educational system for Muslim children was to be secularized. Finally, the overall supervision and leadership to implement these policies was to be entrusted to the Javanese aristocracy, the group that Huurgronje trusted would be willing and able to secularize and westernize Indonesian Muslim society according to Dutch prescriptions."

However, when Huurgronje permitted that a ritual Islam be allowed to continue, he had, in fact, conceded practically the whole thing, because Islamic rituals are in a different category from the rituals of other religions. Islamic rituals are in themselves the fount, the living, vibrant roots of the faith. This escaped Huurgronje's comprehension because he was not a Muslim. Islamic rituals are yearly, monthly, weekly, daily, nightly, even hourly 'rites of passage' that renew the Muslims' commitment to Islam anywhere, any time and under any situation.

In the event, Huurgronje's advice was fully adopted and enforced as the official 'Islamic policy' of the Dutch colonial government towards the Ummah in the Dutch East Indies until the outbreak of World War II, and again when the Dutch returned from 1945-1949.

The Dutch wanted to keep every inch of their conquered territories united under a single administration in Jakarta for maximum profit, economy and ease of control, but they recognized the need to create a new common denominator to replace Islam among the peoples. This new common denominator was to be a secular, westernized culture in common with the Dutch culture to facilitate the eventual political union between Indonesia and Holland. So the Dutch search for an alternative to Islam as a base for Indonesian 'unity' was a principled and most serious pursuit.

The idea of secularization led naturally to the idea of an Indonesian 'nationalism'. But how can one inclusive 'nationalism' be created in a multi-national empire, covering an area as large as western and eastern Europe put together?

If one European nationalism could not be created until now, with all the background unity of a European civilization, a European culture and an integrated system of communication, and a contiguous territory to boot, how could the creation of an 'Indonesian nationalism even be contemplated in a vast non-contiguous region, composed of myriads of archipelagoes, with one part separated by thousands of kilometres from others, without either a common language, culture, economy, or history?

A unity under the banner of Islam would have been the most natural and desired by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of all nationalities, but that was against everything the Dutch stood for and wanted. A unity based solely on the force of the sword would have been fragile and illusory: that was admitted by all Dutchmen. So, a secular Indonesian 'nationalism', purged of any association with Islam, was accorded a consensus among Dutchmen of all persuasions, left, right, centre, liberal and conservatives alike, except for the most obtuse.