By J.F.

For centuries, battles and wars among conflicting parties have taken place. Whether it is to settle a dispute or to gain power, the fact remains that the styles used in battle will vary from one nation to another. During the time period of 1744- 1761, a number of influential wars and battles took place in the Western world. In the time surrounding these wars, we see changes and developments in the art of war in both Canada and the continent of Europe. One of the most common and traditional styles of warfare used in the eighteenth century in Canada was that of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare was favorable for those parties who wanted a quick, rather effective battle. This type of warfare often appealed to those who were poorer, or rather those who did not have the technological advancements. These "guerrillas" were usually lacking the most advanced weapons, (ie. guns), and supply levels were always limited. Though guerrilla battles tended to be short in duration, their wars were ongoing. Furthermore, guerrillas often took on the role of the "survivalist". In other words, their actions were usually of a desperate nature. They often fought for their own homes, food, or for revenge. With these motives, their efforts were often greater because they had more to lose than the average regular soldier. This often lead to success. Guerrilla warfare was basically a way of evening the odds with those who practiced regular warfare. Guerrilla warfare held numerous advantages over the regular style. First of all, guerrilla warfare possessed the element of surprise. Most often, a guerrilla party would ambush their foes, or raid them at unexpected times. The victims, unless having received word of the oncoming raid, had little chance to defend themselves. For example, a party of guerrillas might ride into an encampment late at night, burning homesteads and stealing horses. Because the victims were not prepared for battle, no simultaneous attacks could be made. This meant that a guerrilla attack was basically always offensive. The object was to attack and quickly retreat. In essence, the retreat acted as their defence system so a raiding party rarely lost men unless their attack had been predicted by their foe. Guerrilla warfare also held the advantage of scare tactics. Not only could guerrillas surprise and ambush their targets, but they could take prisoners. According to Mark Nagler, guerrilla warfare constituted "...a condition of endemic raiding in which prisoners were sought in retaliation for previous losses. These prisoners were turned over to families whose members had been slain for adoption and torture." Though Nagler states that prisoners were used for adoption and torture, he neglects to mention that they were frequently used as ransom. If the raiding party held members of their foe at ransom, they could "exchange" him or her for food, guns, supplies, and even territory. This practice was simply a way of evening the odds in a war or conflict in which they were overmatched. In Canada, the guerrilla style of warfare was first employed by the Indians. Because this type of warfare was characteristic of short battles and fewer numbers, it best suited the Indians. The Canadians of the eighteenth century, mainly French settlers, quickly learned guerrilla warfare from the Indians and it became their style of warfare as well. The instincts and liberty of the Canadians and Indians would eventually, as we will see, cause problems for their French allies. However, it should not be assumed that this type of warfare was disorderly. As Henry E. Eccles states, "The concept of strategy's being the art of control applies to all types and phases of human conflict and is especially pertinent to the conduct of revolutionary or guerrilla warfare." Eccles' specification implies that where there is conflict, there is strategy. Furthermore, the use or application of strategy is most important in guerrilla warfare. Often, the goals of revolutionary or guerrilla action are specific and much planning and strategy are involved in the commencing of it. To support this statement, Eccles notes that "The practical application of a strategic concept consists of a group of specific tactical operations that must be preceded and supported by logistical actions and operations." In simpler terms, the strategy behind guerrilla tactics, and the planning of combat procedures dealt mainly with the questions of what, how much, where, and when. By being able to control when and where they wanted to do battle, guerrillas or revolutionaries held a serious advantage over their opponents. In total, guerrilla warfare was an extremely offensive type of warfare. It appealed to revolutionaries and those who could not acquire the most advanced weapons. Guerrilla warfare held the element of surprise and it was advantageous to choose the site and time of battle. Furthermore, there was little need for defence as the battles were short and there were often few casualties. Basically, guerrilla warfare was a warfare in which revolutionaries could equal the odds with those who practiced regular warfare. One other type of warfare that was used in the time from 1744 to 1761 was that of regular warfare. This type of warfare was used in Canada at this time, but stemmed from other parts of the Western world, namely Europe. Not only was this style new to the Canadians, but it differed from their guerrilla tactics. Basically, regular warfare was a more finite type of warfare than revolutionary warfare. It was also on a much larger scale than guerrilla warfare. Regular warfare was employed mainly by large militias, therefore meaning larger numbers of people were involved. Consequently, this type of warfare was rather destructive and casualties were often much higher than would be characteristic of a guerrilla battle. Furthermore, regular warfare was defence-oriented as a battle could go on for lengthy periods of time. Proof of this defensive-minded warfare is the establishment and integration of forts or strongholds. According to Neil Goldberg, "...maneuver forces armed and trained to conduct high-intensity warfare are generally inefficient in conducting offensive operations...against forces deployed in a dispersed nonpositional posture." This statement implies that regular offensive maneuvers were basically useless against those who were not practicing regular warfare. One major advantage that regular warfare held over guerrilla warfare is that technology was usually on its side. Because regulars fought mainly for a government, they were often equipped with the most advanced weapons and strategies. Guerrillas, on the other hand, usually never had the equipment, putting them at somewhat of a disadvantage to the regulars. However, because regular warfare involved such a large population, it was largely dependent on the supplies it would receive. Items such as food, guns, and ammunition were essential to the success of any regular force. Because supplies and resources were so important to a regular force, it was a common goal among almost any army, guerrilla or regular, to eliminate or destroy the supply lines of the enemy. This practice proved to be most effective and was often employed by both Canadian and Indian guerrillas alike. Regular warfare also differed from guerrilla warfare in that it the element of surprise was often non-existent. Both parties were usually aware of the ensuing battle and this gave each side a fair start to the battle. Furthermore, regular warfare in the mid-eighteenth century was a style in which the enemies were "face-to-face". The uniformity of the soldiers virtually prohibited any unexpected or "sneaky" attacks. This concept of uniformity stems mainly from regular warfare's most obvious characteristic: the integration of numerous battle lines and flanks into the battle scene. Now that we have some background of the differences and similarities between regular and guerrilla warfare, we can examine how it applies to the events that took place in Canada between 1744 and 1761. At the time of The Seven Years' War (1756-1763), the French forces in Canada consisted of colonial regulars and a Canadian militia which also included numerous Indian allies. Immediately, the French attempted to incorporate the Canadian militia men into the battle lines of the French regular heavy infantry. This spelled disaster for the French as the Canadians, being used to their irregular tactics, quickly broke formation and sought cover, as they were unaccustomed to standing in the open and being shot at. As previously stated, the Canadians had learned their tactics from both their Indian enemies and allies during the Iroquois wars a century before. These irregulars could strike quickly and retreat without taking a bullet, were incredibly mobile, and were deadly marksmen. Furthermore, their use of the forest cover and surprise attacks put them at an advantage. According to W.J. Eccles, "mixed war parties of Canadians and Indians [wreaked] havoc on the Anglo-American settlements and tied down enemy forces vastly superior in numbers. The enemy's supply lines were constantly threatened, his advanced bases frequently destroyed." This statement illustrates the effectiveness of the Canadian and Indian guerrillas in battling the British during The Seven Years' War. For about the first two years of The Seven Years' War, the French forces allowed the Canadians and Indians to launch their own attacks and raids on the British, as great success was reached in doing so. The role of the irregulars in the early stages of The Seven Years' War, according to Martin Nicolai, was that they "...tied down large numbers of enemy militia on the frontiers and lines of communication, carried out reconnaissance, ambushed detachments of enemy troops, and provided some firepower during sieges and other engagements." Thus, the Canadians and Indian allies were of enormous value to the French forces. For the two main forces in Canada, the French and the British, their regular tactics remained influenced by what was customary in Europe. For these regular armies, there were two basic formations. The "line", employed by the British, consisted of three succeeding ranks and relied on the firepower of the musket as well as a bayonet charge against the enemy. This charge followed the initial firing. The French on the other hand, attacked by "column" which consisted of a quick, efficient attack on a weak point in the enemy's line, so as to cripple it. For the regular troops, the line formation required utmost discipline so as to make cadenced, efficient volleys or attacks. The column formation also demanded discipline of the French troops as they were ordered to press on into their enemy's fire. The power of each of the navies in Canada during The Seven Years' War also influenced the war's ultimate result. The French had superior ships than the British, yet had officers who were inferior to those of the British. The officers of the Royal Navy (British) were more aggressive, better trained, and had more experience. The greatest advantage that the Royal Navy held over the French was in its numbers. For instance, the British had many more seamen and about twice as many ships that the French Navy. As a result, the French Navy, with its stronger ships, was no match for the large, well-trained Royal Navy. By 1758, The efficiency of the Canadians and their Indian allies had greatly diminished. The British could now predict attacks and knew how to counter them. Basically, any guerrilla party needed the support of a heavy infantry in order to be effective. It is at this point where we see the French implementation of light infantry into their ranks. This change in tactics was not totally new to the French nor the British as there had been numerous instances during The War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748) where light infantry or irregular troops were used. The use of light infantry was more or less an adaptation made by the French regular troops in learning irregular tactics rather than the guerrillas learning regular warfare. General Montcalm, who took control of the French forces in Canada in 1756, hoped that the French and Canadian soldiers would learn from each other, making the Canadians more reliable infantrymen and the regulars better woodsmen. This process took longer than expected as the Canadians, still accustomed to their original style, required more discipline and training to assume the regular tactics. Nevertheless, regulars and irregulars learned to support each other in battle as well as compensate for each others' weaknesses. For example, the French developed a grenadier company in each battalion. These grenadiers were strong, well-trained men who stood behind the front line, preventing them from fleeing, and also assisted the front line in the event of a collapse or loss of formation. The newly- developed role of the light infantry was to form a "skirmishing line in front of the regular troops." Upon doing so, their job was to use the terrain to their advantage and proceed to liberally fire upon the enemy. Furthermore, if the light infantrymen were pushed back, they would turn around and join the heavy infantry in their advance. Basically, the role of the light infantryman evolved from an irregular sharpshooter who stayed on the edges of the battlefield, to a full-fledged regular soldier who lead the attack. As a result, the light infantrymen could be used either offensively or defensively, depending on the situation. In the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, for example, Canadian troops had performed as skirmishers in front of the heavy infantry, as both defensive and offensive flankers, and as regular heavy infantry. Basically, irregular tactics were combined with regular discipline in order to produce a most effective soldier. It is difficult to determine where and when exactly irregular warfare was first used. At any rate, the concept of ordered or conducted firing was on the decline by the end of The Seven Years' War, and the idea of free-moving, free-firing troops became the norm. In conclusion, the tactics of war varied greatly among time and place. Guerrilla warfare differed from regular warfare in the mid-eighteenth century in that it was small-scale, liberal, and extremely offensive. Regular warfare, on the other hand, was large-scale, controlled, and defensive. Regardless, all types of warfare held their own advantages and disadvantages. Regular warfare underwent a substantial change in that irregular or voluntary warfare was soon incorporated into battles. Subsequently, the evolution of military tactics holds strong today and our society still struggles with the inevitability of war.

Endnotes

Thomas Biolsi, "Ecological and Cultural Factors in Plains Indian Warfare," in Warfare, Culture, and Environment, ed. R. Brian Ferguson (Orlando: Academic Press, Inc., 1984), 155.

Ibid., 181.

Mark Nagler, Perspectives on the North American Indians (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1972), 56.

Ibid., 63.

Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 34.

Ibid. 39.

Nagler, Perspectives on the North American Indians, 73.

Ibid., 45.

Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 212.

George F.G. Stanley, New France: The Last Phase (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), 140.

Henry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, 258.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 119.

George F.G. Stanley, "The Defence of Canada During the Seven Years' War," in Policy By Other Means, ed. Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1972), 63.

Neil J. Goldberg and Frank J. Findlow, "A Quantitative Analysis of Roman Military Aggression in Britain, circa A.D. 43-238," in Warfare, Culture, and Environment, ed. R. Brian Ferguson (Orlando: Academic Press, Inc., 1984), 376.

Ibid., 377.

Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 114.

Ibid.

Henry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy, 86.

Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), 93. Ibid., 95.

W.J. Eccles, "The French Forces in North America During The Seven Years' War," in Reappraisals in Canadian History, ed. A.D. Gilbert (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1993), 165.

Martin L. Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Irregular Soldier During The Seven Years' War," in Reappraisals in Canadian History, ed. A.D. Gilbert (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Canada Inc., 1993), 175.

W.J. Eccles, The French Forces in North America, 166.

Ibid., 167. Nicolai, A Different Kind of Courage, 180.

W.J. Eccles, The French Forces in North America, 164.

Ibid.

Ibid. Ibid., 165.

Ibid.

Stanley, New France: The Last Phase, 143.

Nicolai, A Different Kind of Courage, 179-181.

Ibid., 185.

W.J. Eccles, The French Forces in North America, 168.

Nicolai, A Different Kind of Courage, 186.

Ibid., 187.

Ibid., 188.

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