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Representative systems rest on combinations of trust and suspicion between citizens and governments. To a large extent we have to trust those in government to act in our best interests, given that they work, usually very long hours, on policy questions and can call upon specialised knowledge in the face of complex problems of the economy, the environment, the health system, for example. We have no mechanisms between elections for recalling individual MPs who do not follow our wishes.

And yet there are recurrent reminders as to the need for suspicion. Can MPs really be trusted with public money? The revelations of travel rorts by MPs of both parties suggest that our trust should not be extended too readily. Such revelations raise the question as to whether regular elections are an adequate means of keeping government in check and there are calls for closer auditing of politicians. Yet, these encroachments on the realm of trust make other aspects of governing, principally policy-making, less efficient. They may even paralyse political vision and problem-solving capacity. Conversely, the more powerful government becomes the more we should be suspicious.

Of course trust is reciprocal. How much do politicians trust the people? Requests for longer parliaments could be interpreted as distrust in popular judgement. The failure of successive governments to propose constitutional reform to allow citizen-initiated referendums could be interpreted as a lack of trust in the people. So too could the Constitutional Convention's decision not to propose that the people elect their head of state. Is this suspicion justified?

Conventionally political elites dislike referendum power believing that the public can easily be swayed by the passions of the moment and make decisions that they would, in other circumstances, regret. Certainly most of us are not armed with the full information for deciding on most issues. We have other jobs and other pre-occupations, which is one important reason for the trust we invest in our representatives. The case of the head of state is rather different, though, requiring that the political class trust the people with choosing the person to symbolise Australia and /or to adjudicate in cases of constitutional crisis (depending on the sort of head of state desired). Opinion polls suggest that here the electorate is suspicious of not being trusted by politicians.

Both trust and suspicion are important in representative politics and the tides of politics inform shifts from one emphasis to another. But given my premise that trust is vital for all forms of cooperation, the question arises as to whether trust can be increased in representative politics? I conclude with two suggestions for increasing trust which also recognise the need for suspicion.

The first is that we press for maximum transparency in politics; that politicians have to act as if their every action is laid bare before their electorates. This is not to say that every action is monitored - this level of distrust would hamper politics such that hopes for cooperation and progress would be nullified.

The point would be though that constituents, other representatives, their rivals and the media could focus on the behaviour of parties, parliaments and governments. As transparency would meet our desire to ensure that our suspicions were followed through, so our trust in the system might increase. Notice also that increased transparency would constitute an increased trust of politicians in the people.

Secondly, why don't we give greater significance to the reputation for trustworthiness in our own political choices? Shouldn't we reward with our votes those individuals who have proven themselves trustworthy? Clearly we need to be careful. Once the spin doctors get wind of this they will produce all sorts of trustworthy unworthies for our delectation. We will still need to be suspicious.

Nonetheless, if we reward what we see as trustworthy and those politicians who we see as trusting us, trust and trustworthiness may increase and our capacity for winning the fruits of increased political cooperation will also multiply.

So our political system assumes quantities of trust and suspicion. Generally, while trust breeds trustworthiness and trustworthiness more trust, generalised trust also provides an environment for deceivers. Transparency and the reward of those with a reputation of being trustworthy provide means by which our suspicions can be met and, paradoxically, thereby our trust can increase. To put this more simply, basic means to allay our suspicions of politicians could increase trust in our political system without paralysing it.

(This is a revised version of a talk given in the 1998 UWA Summer School series on 'Vices and Virtues'. Jeremy Moon is Associate Professor and Head, Department of Political Science