(Following
is the text of the Keynote Address delivered on December 28, 1998 by
Prof. Panikkar at Dastak, a five-day SAHMAT convention and festival on
secular cultural action held in Delhi. It is reproduced here with the
permission of the author.)
We are meeting almost at the end of the millennium when Indian polity
and society are pregnant with several possibilities. What future holds,
however, is uncertain; its nature and direction would largely depend
upon human intervention, not only in the domain of politics, but also in
the social and the cultural. At this historical conjuncture, therefore,
the secular initiatives assume certain immediacy, if Indian society and
polity were to preserve and strengthen their democratic character.
During
the last fifty years a secular-democratic system has managed to survive
in India, though only limping along in many a field. The recent
developments in Indian polity have, however, cast a shadow of doubt
about its continued survival. For, Hindu communal forces with inherent
fascist tendencies have succeeded, in however opportunistic a manner, to
gain access to state power and thus to control the state institutions.
Simultaneously they have also mounted an unprecedented attack on the
minorities and vilification, even physical assault, on secular artists
and intellectuals. Whether the dawn of the next millennium will witness
a change in Indian polity, from its present secular-democratic to
Hindu-fascist character is a question, which looms large today. No
citizen of India, who subscribes to a political order based on democracy
and secularism, howsoever differently they are defined and understood,
can afford to overlook the danger inherent in this possible change.
This
possibility has emerged out of a fairly prolonged and careful
construction of Hindu identity and rooting of politics in the
consciousness thus generated. The evolution of such a consciousness has
a long history, dating back to the second half of the nineteenth
century, when religious community based reformist-revivalist movements
sought to impart a sense of homogeneity to an otherwise disparate and
caste ridden Hindu order. Unfortunately, the anti-colonial movement,
despite its inherently secular character, witnessed the communalisation
of both the Hindus and the Muslims, resulting in the partition of the
country. Although India made a conscious secular choice in 1947, the
Partition did not put an end to communalism; instead it served as a
powerful symbol of communalisation in independent India, particularly of
the Hindu community. For, the Partition was attributed to the Muslims
being historically outsiders to the Indian nation. This exclusivist view
of the nation and the imputed responsibility of the Muslims for the
Partition have been used to identify the Muslims as the other, the
enemy, an identification on which much of the recent Hindu communal
propaganda and consolidation are anchored. Recently the denominational
scope of the enemy has been further expanded to include the Christians
as well which is another step towards the demarcation of the nation as
Hindu.
The
construction of this identity of the Hindu and the alien other draws
upon the historical past in which the religious and cultural aggression
of the latter adversely affected the fortunes of the Hindu community,
the details of which has been graphically, even if falsely, described by
Hindu communal ideologues and political activists. Their interpretations
of the past--if they can be termed interpretations, for they are more in
the nature of falsifications and distortions--have provided the
necessary justification for sanitising the present of the sins of the
past. That the Hindus were marginalised and oppressed by alien rulers,
both Muslim and Christian, has been internalised by many, particularly
by the middle class whose role in the making of public opinion is quite
decisive. The dissemination of these ideas to a large section of the
Hindu population is ensured by the Sangh Parivar through the network of
institutions and channels of communication painstakingly set up during
the last many years. More recently, the media, both print and
electronic, which are largely at their command, have further extended
their reach. The communalisation that followed, inter alia, has
led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on 6 December 1992
and the fairly widespread attack on the minorities during the last few
months.
The
historical demarcation of Hindus from other religious denominations has
substantially helped the Hindu communalism to make substantial political
advance. Not that alone. A variety of factors have contributed to the
present state of politics in which the communal formation represented by
the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] has managed to gain a leading position,
at least in terms of numbers in the Parliament, though not in terms of
popular support. Although its share of votes in the last election was
only about twenty per cent, the BJP has mobilised sufficient support to
control the levers of state. This development heralds a qualitative
change in the secular-democratic polity enshrined in the Constitution,
since the BJP is communal in its ideology, undemocratic in its practice
and fascist in its methods. But then steps are afoot to change the
Constitution itself.
The
reasons for the success of the BJP can be traced to two main sources:
one internal to its own history, and the second integral to the social
and political developments in independent India. The recent rise of the
BJP to power was at the crest of a wave of Hindu religious assertion.
What made this groundswell possible was the sustained activities of a
network of cultural and social organisations carefully nurtured during
the last many years. Unlike other political parties, which draw support
from their front organisations, the BJP is in reality a political front
of these organisations, particularly of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh
[RSS], which has become increasingly clear from the functioning of the
present government.
The
activities of these organisations, which cover almost every field of
social and cultural life, are the channels through which the electoral
support of the BJP is marshalled. The organisations like the Rashtriya
Swayam Sevak Sangh, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bajrang Dal
are relatively well known, but there are a large number of others
actively engaged in building up a network of institutions dealing with
issues which impinge upon the quotidian life of the people. Unlike
political formations, which function sporadically and intermittently,
and some only at the time of elections, the presence of these
organisations is continuous and uninterrupted in civil society. Their
social and cultural engagements, however, are not an end in themselves
but only a means for the dissemination of the ideology of Hindutva and
for furthering its political influence. Be it education, history,
archeology, music or media, the Parivar has tried to promote its own
institutional network. It reportedly runs about twenty thousand schools
in different parts of the country under different denominations, has
scores of publishing outfits in almost every language, has set up
committees to write the history of each district, has organised literary
associations and drama clubs, and has temple renovation committees under
its control in several villages; in fact, there is hardly any area in
which the Parivar has not managed to make its presence felt. This
network also serves as a channel for the distribution of the propaganda
material, which is aplenty in audio, video and print. As a consequence
communalism today is not only a political phenomenon, but also a social
and cultural force in civil society. The success of BJP’s campaigns in
the recent past- --be it Advani’s Rath Yatra or Ramshila Puja-- is
mainly because of the social power thus achieved by the Parivar.
However,
the BJP’s political power is not solely drawn from its own
organisational strength. It is as much rooted in the nature of
development, both political and economic, in independent India which
belied much of the expectations aroused by the freedom struggle and left
almost every section of society dissatisfied. Democratic system has
remained in place, but to most people its benefits have not gone beyond
elementary political rights. It has not succeeded in ensuring to the
people their rightful share of the wealth of the nation; an overwhelming
majority of the population lives without the bare necessities of life.
Even the middle class who gained most from the system are not fully
satisfied, as much of their aspirations have remained unrealised. As a
consequence, the Indian National Congress which ruled the country most
of the last fifty years steadily lost much of its electoral support, and
failing to retrieve it through populist slogans and measures, appealed
to the primordial sentiments of religion and caste. Such a strategy
ruled out the possibility of a confrontation with Hindu communalism, but
more grievously, to compromise and accommodation with it. The demolition
of Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 by the Sangh Parivar and the Shiv
Sena was made possible by the vacillation bordering on collusion by the
state then controlled by the Congress.
Another
factor, which helped advance the political fortunes of Hindu
communalism, was the Emergency of 1975, which was a defining moment in
the history of the nation. Undermining as it did the democratic texture
of Indian polity, it opened up political space in an unprecedented
manner to the communal forces which till then occupied only an
insignificant fringe in the political firmament. By forming a part of
the anti-authoritarian bloc during the post-emergency period the Hindu
communal forces were able to gain access, though briefly, to state
power. More importantly, it gave them political legitimacy, which they
lacked so far. The opening thus gained was the beginning of the road,
which led them to 1998. Not that there were no hurdles in between, but
they were cleverly and successfully negotiated. A major stumbling block
was in 1996, when in the wake of the assault on democracy at Ayodhya the
secular formations thwarted their bid to power. Such an opposition to
communalism then emerged not out of the inherent commitment of some of
the centrist political parties to secularism, instead they were forced
by circumstances, particularly by the secular assertion in civil society
after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Between ‘96 and ‘98,
however, a qualitative change has taken place in the general attitude
towards the BJP. Many former socialists and liberals, who were earlier
opposed to Hindu communalism, have changed their stance. This political
turn about was a major break for the BJP. Its immediate gain was access
to state power, which in turn has helped expand its social support. This
development is different from the 1977 experiment when the Jan Sangh was
disbanded to become part of a larger political formation to oppose the
authoritarianism as represented by the Emergency.
Thus the
success of the BJP is more a result of the failure of the secular
parties to uphold the principles of secularism and order their politics
accordingly. Most of them have followed a rather opportunistic policy of
both compromising and profiting from communalism. That two all India
leaders of a secular party fought and won the last election with the
support of communal parties or parties allied to communal forces is an
indication of fragile convictions. This lack of idealism is undoubtedly
a major reason for the political discomfiture of secularism. The public,
it appears, has lost faith in those who profess secularism, as their
track record has been quite suspect in this regard. Moreover, secularism
can not be viewed as a virtue in isolation. Those who practice caste
politics, have connection with criminal Mafia and are involved in
corruption can hardly have public credibility only on secular grounds. A
reconfiguration of secular forces, in both conviction and practice, is
an urgent need for which the initiative has to come from the Left which
is the most committed and credible anti-communal force today.
II.
The
coalition government headed by the BJP has been in power for about ten
months. Its rule has belied the expectations in some quarters that it
will not be different from that of other bourgeois parties in the past.
Setting aside the national agenda agreed upon by the coalition partners
it has steadily unfolded its communal and fascist programmes. By now it
has become clear that the direction and policy of this government is
neither formulated nor controlled by the co-ordination committee of the
coalition partners but by the top functionaries of the RSS who are keen
on implementing a Hindu agenda.
In the
recent past no other issue has been as contentious as the Ram temple at
Ayodhya. On the question of constructing a temple at the site of the
demolished mosque no political party agrees with the Parivar. It was not
included in the national agenda because of the overwhelming opposition
of the coalition partners. The AIDMK chief, Jayalalitha, had insisted
that it should be put on the back burner for a long time. The
disagreement was also voiced by the ‘socialist’ George Fernandes,
the ‘liberal’ Ramakrishna Hegde and the ‘radical’ Mamta Banerji.
But that has not deterred the Parivar from initiating the process of
construction. It is reported that a pre-fabricated structure would be
soon ready for transportation to and installation at Ayodhya. The
construction of the temple is in fact in progress, even if it is not in
the chosen site. There is enough evidence, in both words and deeds, that
the BJP has not given up the temple project, it has only postponed it
till such time when it will be politically possible to implement it. The
BJP prefers to fudge the issue whenever it is raised in public, but the
other members of the Parivar, particularly the VHP, do not make a secret
of their intentions, not only with regard to Ayodhya but also about
Mathura and Varanasi. That they are very much on the agenda is
emphatically and repeatedly stated. Yet, the liberal and socialist
partners of the BJP choose to feign ignorance which, to say the least,
is nothing short of collusion with a concerted communal attempt to
transform India into a Hindu Rashtra.
What the
BJP and other members of the Parivar are pursuing after the assumption
of power is to create the social, ideological and political conditions
for the eventual realisation of a Hindu state and society. The three
major constituents of this project are a homogenised Hindu community
based on brahmanical scriptural prescriptions, subordination, if not
elimination, of the members of other denominations, and the creation of
an aggressive Hindu community. The control of the central government has
opened up the space to promote all the three objectives, even if the BJP
had to make all sorts of opportunistic alliances and suffer humiliating
treatment by some of its partners. The importance of remaining in power
is so great for ensuring the future, by both infiltrating the various
apparatuses of state and creating an ideological climate, that its
leaders have chosen to preserve the throne at any cost.
The
education and culture are areas in which the Hindutva project has
already become evident. That two stalwarts of the RSS control the
ministry of Human Resource Development is not entirely accidental, but a
reflection of the importance the Parivar attaches to cultural and
ideological work. During the last few months the RSS has quickly moved
in to control several educational institutions and academic funding and
research agencies, like the Institute for Advanced Studies, the Indian
Council for Social Science Research, the Indian Council for Historical
Research, the Indian Council for Philosophical Research and Abul Kalam
Azad Centre for Central Asian Studies. It is also busy recruiting its
cadres in universities and other educational institutions. The
institutional control is not intended only as a means for the
dispensation of patronage, which indeed it is as evident from the recent
appointments of old RSS hands and those habitual opportunists who shift
positions with change in government, but for bringing about an
ideological shift in favour of the Hindutva. Such a shift can be
effective only if the secular scholars, artists and intelligentsia are
discredited. The recent attack on historians by journalist turned BJP
ideologue and MP, Shourie, with the support of the ministry of
education, is a part of this design. Apart from pandering lies and
indulging in character assassination, Shourie has sought to establish
how poor liberal and Marxist historiographies are! None of the front
ranking historians of India, including D.D. Kosambi, has escaped his
vituperative journalism. Kosambi, according to Shourie, did not know how
to write history and all that he did was to churn out theory without any
empirical evidence! Shourie had earlier prepared the climate through his
venomous writings for the attack on the Muslims and the Christians. Now
it appears to be the turn of the secular intelligentsia, which is
already manifest in UP and Gujarat.
The
Parivar’s eagerness to implement the Hindu agenda is evident in the
recent attempt by the minister of education, Murali Manohar Joshi, to
saffronise education. Since assuming office he had dropped enough hints
about his intention to restructure the system of education and to
introduce qualitative changes in the curriculam. That indeed is not an
unwelcome idea, as education undoubtedly is a field which can do with
some reform and innovation. A swift move, however, was not expected as
education is a state subject and the role of the central government is
quite limited. But under pressure from the RSS the minister has violated
all norms of federal governance to propose at the state education
ministers conference a scheme prepared by Vidya Bharati, an RSS outfit,
which runs about 1200 schools in tribal areas. This scheme is both
communal and retrogressive and, if implemented, likely to undermine the
secular fabric of the society. It advocates that ‘the curriculum from
the primary to the highest education should be ‘Indianised,
nationalised and spiritualised’ and 10 to 25 percent of all courses
should consist of ‘essentials of Indian culture’. Nobody is likely
to object to the idea of incorporating Indian culture in the curriculum.
On the contrary it is highly desirable. But the catch is what should
constitute the essentials of Indian culture. According to the proposed
scheme it will be drawn from the Hindu religious tradition-- ‘the
invaluable heritage of the Vedas and Upanishads’--excluding all other
streams which have enriched Indian culture. In pursuit of this the study
of Sanskrit is suggested as a compulsory subject at the school stage as
well as setting up of four Sanskrit universities. In the whole scheme
the influence of Hindu patriarchal ideology is quite evident, as a
distinction is made between the curriculum for girls and boys. The place
the Parivar assigns to women in society is evident from the training in
home keeping the new scheme proposes to impart exclusively to girls. At
the teeth of opposition from the secular parties and intelligentsia the
Parivar has quickly backtracked on it, but it is a foretaste of its
future cultural and ideological intentions. The purpose of its
introduction is not so much to implement it now, but to mobilise the
Hindus in defense of their culture. In this attempt at Hindu
consolidation the Parivar appears to have gained some success, as
evident from the general Hindu response.
A
proposal put forward at the conference was to generalise the provisions
of the articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, which empower the
minorities to establish and manage educational institutions. The
intention of this proposed change may as well be to water down the
minority rights, but not that alone. The Parivar as mentioned earlier,
has already taken the initiative to organise a parallel system of
schools in which teachers trained by the RSS impart Hindu education. The
present move is to expand and consolidate this network which is an
important part of its ideological work.
The most
alarming development during the BJP rule is the concerted and organised
attacks on the minorities. Emboldened by the BJP’s rise to power, the
members of the Parivar, particularly the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, has
pursued the goal set by M. S. Golwalkar: the elimination or
subordination of the minorities. The physical assault of the minorities
has become alarmingly regular. What happened to them during the last few
months in different parts of the country is unprecedented in brutality
and viciousness. The Muslims have been for long targets of VHP-Bajrang
Dal aggression. It has intensified under the BJP rule, particularly in
states like Gujarat , Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. In Gujarat the
Muslims of a whole village were forced to evacuate and their properties
were confiscated. Recently the Christians have suffered more,
particularly the missionaries. The nuns are abducted and raped, the
priests are stripped naked, paraded in public and some brutally
murdered. The schools run by them are attacked and ransacked and Bible
and other religious literature are burnt or destroyed. The leaders of
the VHP have justified these acts of vandalism and the governments have
been rather tardy in taking action against the criminals.
The
assault on the minorities is a part of the ongoing quest to demarcate
the Hindus from the anti-national and unclean ‘outsiders’. The
attempt to prove that all Hindus are indigenous to India is to underline
this demarcation. The migration theory of the Aryans is, therefore,
dismissed as a myth in favour of their indigenous origins. The alleged
vegetarian habits of the Hindu are yet another myth invoked with the
same intent: the vegetarian Hindu is clean and the meat eating non-Hindu
is a mleccha. The recent rather clumsy attempts in the media to
prove that Aryans did not partake of beef, though militates against all
literary and archaeological evidence, is to popularise this distinction.
Even a militant Hindu like Vivekananda testifies to the meat eating
habits of the Aryans; he even quotes Ramayana and Mahabharata to suggest
that Rama, Sita and Krishna were meat eaters. In fact, he deplores the
decrease in this habit, which, according to him, has adversely affected
the prowess of the nation.
The
concern about the prowess of the Hindus, articulated by Vivekananda in
the context of colonial subjection, continues to obsess the leaders of
the Parivar. Several of them have in their speeches and writings harp on
the ways and means of arousing the Hindus from their slumber and making
them virile. The BJP’s decision to go nuclear is not without this
aggressive intent. Only that the enemy now is not imperialism, but as
the Prime Minister conveyed to the President of the USA, the Muslim and
the Communist neighbours, Pakistan and China. Given that the Parivar’s
proclaimed internal enemies are the Muslims and the Communists this
identification may have ominous implications. The nuclear weaponisation
has finally given the Hindu the aggressive self- image, which he has
been seeking for quite some time. Not without costing the nation dear.
Since
independence India has been the most ardent champion of world peace and
disarmament. As a prominent member of the Non-alignment movement it
acquired a stature in the comity of nations far beyond what an
under-developed country could aspire for. This was not on the basis of
its military strength or material prosperity but mainly due to its moral
force acquired through the principled positions it took in international
affairs. The departure from this past practice as represented by the
nuclear adventure has irreparably dented its international prestige,
without much gain in matters of national security. It has only opened
the floodgates of a possible arms race in the sub-continent to the great
detriment to the pressing needs of development.
The
record of the BJP government during its brief tenure is proof enough of
its intention to use the state power for realising a communal-fascist
goal, though its ‘liberal’ and ‘socialist’ allies do not seem to
be alive to it. What is preventing it from going the whole hog is its
precarious political position of not having a working majority. The
Hindu agenda, which includes the abrogation of article 370, the
enactment of a common civil code, and the construction of Ram mandir, it
is stated by several leaders, is postponed and not abandoned. If and
when an absolute majority is achieved the original agenda will resurface
which will undermine, if not negate both secularism and democracy. Such
a possibility appears real, though not immediate. But given the
configuration and internal fissures within the secular forces, it may
not be very distant as well, unless the secular forces regroup
themselves and take new initiatives. What these initiatives should
consist of needs immediate and open discussion, which at any rate can
not be confined to an alliance of the present secular political parties
whose commitment to secularism has proved to be quite fragile in the
past. Instead a possible solution lies in the realignment of secular
forces, regardless of the parties to which they belong. For promoting
such realignment new initiatives preceded by open ideological discussion
is imperative.
III.
Given the
past record of secular action, any attempt at new initiative should
begin with introspection. Despite conviction and commitment secular
forces have not so far succeeded in stemming the increasing influence of
communalism, either in politics or in social consciousness. This failure
is attributed by the critics of secularism, both secular and
anti-secular, either to the alien character of secularism as a concept
or its inherent inability in practice to measure up to the challenge
posed by communalism. The former is a Euro-centric view which tends to
ignore the process of secularisation within the Indian civil society.
The latter, on the other hand, is essentially an anti-modernist view,
which seeks a solution in religious toleration and in the revival of
indigenous institutions. These critiques, though intended to be
constructive, have in reality helped the communal cause by questioning
the relevance of secularism to the Indian situation. Many Western
scholars with whom the Indian secular critics share much common ground
go to the extent of arguing that religious mobilisation has provided the
Indians an opportunity to participate in the democratic process! The
secular critics have hardly helped advance the necessary process of
introspection or refine the concept of secularism. Instead they have
lent some legitimacy, even if indirectly, to the communal denigration of
secularism.
Pursuing
a reactive agenda the secular formations have so far tried to retrieve
the communally appropriated space while communalism is constantly
engaged in advancing its frontiers in civil society through cultural and
ideological work. The yet unoccupied space is in fact the real area of
future contest, the success in which would largely depend upon the
pro-active role, both socio-cultural and political, of various secular
formations, whose combined strength is far greater than that of the
communal. Yet, the secular forces appear to be on the defensive and the
communal is poised to dominate both society and polity, notwithstanding
the set-back it suffered in the recent election, as the social base of
Hindu communalism is still intact.
It is a
paradox that the majority is secular and yet the communal threatens to
conquer. This is because the secular space has become increasingly
vulnerable in recent times. The aggressive communal campaign during the
last few years only partly accounts for this vulnerability. The
weaknesses and limitations of secular action are equally responsible.
The strategy of communalism has been to construct an identity between
religion and culture in the public space through a series of symbolic
actions and political mobilisations. Towards that end the cultural
practices which have evolved through daily secular life experience are
given religious attributes and meanings and cultural forms are traced to
religious sources. Since religious and cultural developments are
historically intertwined in all societies the cultural and religious
practices converge at some point in their evolution. Although such
convergences are neither absolute nor universal they are invoked to
underline the religious identity of cultural practices. Such efforts in
the recent past have considerably contributed to the growth and
consolidation of communal consciousness. As a result the cultural
commonsense hegemonic in the secular space has assumed a religious
colour and the consciousness of those who inherit and live that
commonsense has undergone what Antonio Gramsci has termed a ‘molecular
transformation’.
The mode
and means of communication that Hindu communalism has evolved is a
crucial factor in effecting this transformation. Both draw upon
religious resources: its language and vocabulary, its metaphors and
symbols, and its institutions and infrastructure. A close scrutiny of
the communication strategies employed by the members of the Parivar
during the Ramajanmabhumi campaign will be extremely rewarding in this
context. The hundreds of pamphlets and hand bills put out during that
period were laced with the idiom and events from the scriptures like the
Ramayana and Mahabharata and the public speeches of the leaders often
took the form of religious discourses. The symbols invoked during the
campaign were equally rooted in religious tradition. The cumulative
impact of these communication strategies which foregrounded the
religious in tradition and culture was to render the communal discourse
both easily accessible and emotionally acceptable to the public.
The Hindu
communal forces also had at their command institutional infrastructure
of organised Hinduism. The organisations linked with innumerable temples
in each locality became the conduits of the Parivar’s ideology through
large scale audio and video material elaborating the communal cause. The
Bhajan Mandalis and temple renovation societies controlled by the
Parivar members reached out to the devotees in the temples and
transformed the temple premises into an arena for the articulation of
communal ideology in the garb of religious faith. Even the one time
reformist movement like the Arya Samaj has been part of this Hindu
project; it even supported the construction of the temple at Ayodhya,
despite its strong anti-idolatrous commitment in the past.
In
contrast to this inherited and constructed means and methods of
communication the secular forces have very little to go by. Unlike the
communal forces, creative and innovative initiatives have also been few
and far between in secular action. What the secular forces have tried to
do to stem the tide of communalism has been mainly reactive, sporadic,
disjointed and short term. No effort has been made so far to find a
common ground in the fairly large secular space now inhabited by groups
and formations reluctant even to enter into a dialogue, let alone
participate in common struggles. If communalism is to be effectively
fought and defeated the first pre-requisite is to seek and identify the
common ground among the secular formations, despite the differences
within them. For, the threat posed by communalism to the plural
character of our society and the democratic structure of our polity is
so great that the fight against it assumes greater urgency than the
resolution of internal differences. But then it is likely that some of
these differences are resolved during the course of a common fight
against communalism. Even if they do not, common areas of action may
still be identified within the parameters of a secular society. One such
possible area is the field of culture in which the secular is still very
vibrant, but being increasingly threatened by the communal.
So far
the secular engagement with culture has not been effective enough to
counter the communal threat. Whether this has anything to do with how
cultural intervention is conceived and the mode of cultural
communication is employed by secular forces demands immediate attention.
The secular cultural action is generally confined to certain predictable
terrains by invoking, privileging and sometimes even idealising the
secular in tradition. Such an approach is essentially anchored in a
static view of culture and hence fails to take cognizance of the process
of secularisation within the cultural domain. The co-existence of the
secular and the religious in traditional culture is too obvious to be
stated. Yet, the communal attempt has been to equate the traditional
with the religious. Understandably the secular response to counter it
has been invoking, highlighting or celebrating the secular in the
tradition. But then it does not go beyond a counterposition of the
secular and the religious. What is more important is to tease out the
texture of the making of the present in which the traditional cultures,
both the religious and the secular, are creatively and dynamically
integrated. While interrogating the contemporary culture for secular
mobilisation it is necessary to be sensitive to this process of
integration. At present the communal tendency is to appropriate the
traditional as religious and the secular anxiety is to dissociate from
the religious in traditional culture. As a consequence, the former tends
to sacralise the tradition and the latter chooses to ignore it.
A
reorientation in the mode of communication which secular activism has so
far employed is imperative for a major break-through in secular
consciousness. At present the secular cultural action is hidebound and
repetitive. Thematic or idiomatic innovations are very rarely attempted.
The form and the message are mostly the same, based on communal harmony
or syncretic culture. The secular cultural action is, therefore,
predictable and hence fails to arouse curiosity and interest. There is
also a ring of unreality about the secular language. It hardly
comprehends the cultural experience of society and therefore fails to
establish a genuine link with people. To many the secular appears to be
alien, the reason for which is not integral to it, but located in its
social and cultural articulation. Most of the secular cultural work is
either too simplistic or too abstract. While the former tends to
sermonize, the latter is inaccessible.
A
possible reason for this stagnation and unreality is a disjunction
between secular action and democratic struggles. The divide, though
artificial, is real in contemporary practice. In fact, all progressive
democratic struggles are inherently secular in character and help
advance the process of secularisation in civil society. Yet, a
consciousness of this connection is rarely present and therefore an
organic link between secular action and democratic struggles is not
established. Almost all voluntary organisations engaged in fighting for
peoples’ rights are secular in their conviction. Yet, they all tend to
remain single-issue oriented organisations without incorporating a
conscious struggle for secularism in their activities. Therefore in
times of crisis their secular commitment becomes rather fragile, as
happened to some trade unions in Mumbai at the time of the
Ramajanmabhumi campaign.
The
campaign against communalism has been the main thrust of secular
activity so far. The past experience underlines the inadequacy of
anti-communal campaign to sustain the consciousness it seeks to imbibe,
as the popular participation in it is either passive or sporadic. Only
active and continuous engagement can ensure the sustenance of
consciousness, for which a change from anti-communal campaign to secular
mobilisation is imperative. The former is negative, where as the latter
is positive in perspective and programme. Unlike the anti-communal
campaign secular mobilisation sets its own agenda and generates its own
dynamism. There is perhaps no one universally applicable method for
effecting such a mobilisation, as the ground reality differs from one
locality to the other. Therefore the strategies of mobilisation have to
be locally evolved, without being localised in perspective, through
communities organised around secular issues. The activities of these
communities can invoke culture, in all its forms and practices, to
recover the currently muted articulation of the secular. Any initiative
in this direction calls for a critical introspection of the secular
cultural engagement, which would creatively integrate culture-its
traditions, practices and struggles-in secular mobilisation.
The
Indian society and polity, as I indicated in the beginning, are at cross
roads. The synergy of present historical forces is such that they may
take any direction. If they have to remain in secular-democratic course,
the cultural intervention has necessarily to assume the character of an
all India movement. Hoping that this convention will herald the
beginning of such an initiative, I submit these ideas for your
consideration.