Cedar Mountain
HDQRS. TWENTY-SEVENTH REGT. INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,
August 12, 1862.
SIR: I have the honor of submitting the following report of the
part taken in the battle of the 9th instant by the Twenty-seventh
Regiment Indiana Volunteers:
My regiment occupied the extreme right of our brigade in the
position first occupied. I was ordered by you to throw two companies
forward and occupy an advanced position. I immediately sent Companies
F and C about three-quarters of a mile to our right and front,
occupying a high ridge of ground covered with timber, and deployed a
part of each company forward about one-quarter of a mile as
skirmishers, holding about half of each company on the highest part
of the ridges as reserves. From this position the surrounding country
for some distance was in plain view, and from the disposition made of
the two companies our right was amply secured from surprise by any
flank movement of the enemy on our right. Shortly after this
disposition had been made of my two companies the artillery on our
front and left commenced firing, which continued until about 6 p.m.
War time sketch of Union center during artillery duel
at opening of battle
At or about this time I received orders from you through your
assistant adjutant-general, Captain Scott, for me to form my regiment
and march to the front, which order I complied with as promptly as
possible. I marched to the front and near the Sixteenth Indiana
Battery and was then halted by your command, as I suppose, for some
minutes and until I received orders to march to the front and on the
right of the Second Massachusetts Regiment. I immediately marched to
the front and right to gain my position in compliance with the above
order. As soon as I had gained the desired position I halted the
regiment and formed line of battle in an open field about 300 yards
in front of the foot of the ridge in our front, which was covered
with a thick undergrowth and heavy timber. About the time I commenced
forming my regiment into line the Third Wisconsin Regiment, or six
companies of it, that had been brought into the action some time
previous, fell back out of the woods and came down the hill
apparently badly cut to pieces, a part of whom rushed through my
ranks and delayed me some in forming my line of battle.
As soon as my line was formed I marched to the front in order to
bring my regiment into action. To gain the position of the enemy I
had to cross an open space of ground of about three yards, through
which meandered a small stream, with very deep and steep banks. In
crossing this my ranks became considerably broken. I halted the
regiment a moment in order to adjust my ranks. At this time you rode
up on my right and ordered me forward at double-quick. The regiment
moved forward at double-quick time. I think we had at this time about
a quarter of a mile to go until we reached the enemy. The shape of
the hill and woods was such that it brought my left wing to the foot
of the hill and into the woods at least 100 yards before the right
wing reached the woods. The hill on my left was also steep and
abrupt. From these causes the left-wing of my regiment was not able
to come into action as promptly as the right. The whole regiment
having had to pass through the woods and up hill at double-quick, the
result was that no part of the line at any time during the action was
as perfect as it should have been. When we had traversed the hill and
crossed the woods on its summit we suddenly came to a wheat field. We
hod scarcely reached the inclosure before the enemy opened a very
heavy fire upon us, which was promptly returned by my right wing, the
left not having arrived yet upon the line of battle. The enemy
appeared to be posted in great numbers in the woods in our front
across the field and within rifle-range. They also had skirmishers
thrown forward and screened behind the stacks of wheat in the field
on my right and nearly at a right angle with my line. The enemy had a
regiment drawn up in line of battle, the line extending nearly across
the field and facing toward my left. This regiment also opened a
cross-fire upon me.
Situation at about 6:30 P.M.
Shortly after the left wing came up and engaged the enemy it was
reported to me that we were firing upon our own troops. I saw you at
the right of my regiment and rode forward and informed you of my
information. You replied that you would ride forward and see. By this
time a large portion of my regiment, in consequence of said report,
had almost ceased firing. I saw you on the right of my regiment ride
forward to the fence and immediately a very heavy fire was opened
upon that part of the line by the enemy upon you. I cannot conceive
how you possibly escaped it without injury. From this moment the
firing of the enemy became heavier along the whole line, I suppose
induced by the temporary slacking of the firing in my lines. The
firing of the enemy seemed to me to increase. I soon saw symptoms of
disorder in my ranks, and in spite of all I could do the regiment
fell back, and was not rallied until it reached the open ground on
the other side of the woods, a distance of 150 to 200 yards. In
rallying and reforming the regiment at this point, and indeed during
the whole action, I was aided by yourself and your staff, and
particularly Captain Scott, your assistant adjutant-general, whose
energy and bravery it is impossible to commend too highly.
My regiment being reformed, we advanced across the hill the second
time, and when again near the line of the first battle I halted my
men in order to correct and close up my lines and rest them a moment,
after which we marched to the front and opened fire upon the enemy.
We had fired but one or two rounds when I was informed that the enemy
had gained our rear on the right flank. I immediately rode to the
right of my line, and by the time I got there I found a regiment of
the enemy marching in column by companies a little in front of my
line and within 20 steps of my right. I immediately gave the order to
my right to change front by the right flank and by file right, which
order was obeyed by Company A only. The enemy opened a very heavy
fire upon us. My regiment was soon compelled to fall back a second
time, and was not rallied until we had retreated to the creek in the
bottom. At this point again you in person (and I noticed Captain
Wilkins, assistant adjutant-general, of General Williams' staff, and
Captain Scott) assisted me in rallying the regiment. From this point
I was ordered by you to fall back on my original position.
There are many cases of individual bravery, and especially among
my non-commissioned officers, that I might mention. The whole conduct
of my regiment and officers transpired under your own personal
observation, so far as it was possible for one man to observe. I
therefore forbear making any special mention of it.
Inclosed is a list of casualties of the regiment during the action
(see below).
Your obedient servant,
S. COLGROVE,
Colonel Twenty-seventh Regiment Indiana Volunteers.
General GEORGE H. GORDON,
Comdg. Third Brigade, Second Corps, Army of Virginia.
Commentary
by Steve Russell
The Battle of Cedar Mountain was bloody for the 27th Indiana. The
day was excessively hot for the Hoosiers, estimated at near 100
degrees. The terrain was rough. Some soldiers were injured by the
ditches, ravines and steep banks of Cedar Run. By the time the 27th
was committed to action, the situation for Banks was desperate. He
had handled his troops fairly well during the opening moves. He
surprised Confederate General Thomas J. 'Stonewall' Jackson. Union
Brigadier General Samuel W. Crawford's brigade inflicted a terrible
punishment on Garnett's brigade and a portion of Ronald's brigade of
Virginians. It was the only time the famous 'Stonewall' brigade was
routed during the war. There is no doubt this happened though it
receives little attention by historians. Read this excerpt of
Confederate Brigadier General L. O'B. Branch's report of the battle:
Journal entry for August 13th. "General Jackson came
to me and told me his left was beaten and broken, and the enemy was
turning him and he wished me to advance. I was already in line of
battle and instantly gave the order, 'Forward March.' I had not gone
100 yards through the woods before we met the celebrated Stonewall
Brigade, utterly routed and fleeing as fast as they could run" (From
Battles and Leaders, Vol II, page 459).
Crawford's men hit them hard, charging across the wheat field and
into the woods. The rebels broke and ran under the onslaught. It was
short lived. Archer, Branch and Pender quickly responded with their
Confederate brigades. Crawford's men could not hold and suffered
terribly as they fell back across the wheat field. Banks had no
reserve. He was outnumbered 22,000 rebels to his 12,000 Federals and
he needed to use the remaining brigade to protect his right flank.
Men of the 10th Maine of Crawford's Brigade revisit the
wheat field a week later. Note the dead horses still on the
field.
The remaining brigade was Gordon's. Gordon had selected a good
position back of the woods north of the wheat field and was sure he
could destroy anything that rose out of the creek. He, too, was
uncomfortable with the right and instructed Colonel Colgrove to send
some troops over in that direction. Colgrove dispatched Companies C
& F to the next clearing and Gordon sent his personal cavalry
escort to the same location. As Gordon braced himself for action,
Williams ordered him to advance immediately to the front and support
Crawford. While understandable, it was not the best order in
hindsight. Gordon would now have to leave his protected position and
cross the same woods and creek that he expected would break up the
rebels as they attempted to cross it. Now it would be his brigade
that would struggle through the vines and creek banks. Even worse, he
did not know who was on the other side nor if Crawford's men were
still there.
As you can see from Colgrove's report, the situation was confused
once they hit the woods. Men tried to keep order but the terrain made
it difficult. Men slid, fell, and cursed. When they climbed the 45
degree embankment to get across the run, they found themselves
already in contact with the rebels. Combat was hand to hand with
these skirmishers or advance elements from Ronald's Confederate
brigade. Once near the clearing, the fire was galling. The Hoosiers
wavered and had to be reformed. They came back for more and poured
some effective fire at the rebels across the wheat field. Now they
were nearly flanked by Ronald's troops on their right. Company I was
especially hit hard as was A Company.
Dead Rebel in the Wheat Field
The regiment had suffered badly. So did the 2d Massachusetts and
what was left of the 3d Wisconsin. Gordon was doing all he could to
hold off two confederate divisions. Williams gave him the order to
fall back to the next wood line. The order could not have come a
moment too soon. Confederate general A.P. Hill was now maneuvering
his division around the union right. If they stayed they would have
been annihilated. The brigade left many dead and wounded on the
field. Some of the dead would be recovered in a truce a couple of
days later. Companies C & F were isolated and did not know that
they were actually being enveloped. As night fell, they skillfully
worked their way back skirting the wood line and found their regiment
after some harassing by Sigel's provost guards.
The battle ended with Augur's and Williams' divisions falling back
into Pope's army. The tragedy was that an entire Union corps, the I
Corps, was within supporting distance of Bank's beleaguered forces.
Banks had fought well and hard. Had he the proper support, the
initial success and shock of the attack could have spelled trouble
for Jackson. As it stood, numbers, not skill, won the rebel victory
this day. Jackson claimed it as his finest battle in his reports but
this can hardly be the case. He was surprised by the assault. He
misread the ground on his left, which caused him to have an open
flank, resulting in the complete route of his old brigade. He
recovered well, though, and soon took command of the situation with
clarity and skill. Had the Union been supported in force, the rebel
lines would have at best been forced on the defensive and perhaps
would have crumbled.
For the Hoosiers it was another defeat. They fought bravely.
Unlike Winchester, they got better than they gave due to the terrain
and instant contact with the rebels in the wood line. Still, they
reformed every time and fell back in an orderly retreat. They did not
rout. By nightfall they would have their regiment able to fight again
if needed. Instead, Banks troops were given a break due to their
battle this day and were on baggage detail during the upcoming Second
Battle of Bull Run. Banks was given an even longer rest. Transferred
to the defense of Washington, he would eventually lose his command
and be sent to the West where he would have additional misfortune in
New Orleans and along the Red River. His divisions were taken to form
a new corps--the Twelfth. The regiment underwent several officer and
noncommissioned officer changes during this time to replace the
combat loss. With the prisoners not yet exchanged from Winchester and
Buckton, and with another 50 men gone, the regiment would have a
little over 400 men ready for their greatest challenge of all in a
cornfield near Antietam Creek and
Sharpsburg, Maryland.
Steve Russell
By Name Casualty List
1 Officer and 19 enlisted men actually Killed (vice 1 & 18
reported)
Company A
|
Company I
|
First Sergeant William Allen
|
First Lieutenant George W. Reed
|
Sergeant Noah Allee
|
Private Thomas Devereaux
|
Private Richard A. Proctor
|
Private Charles Lewis
|
Company B
|
Private Henry Lewis
|
Private William R. Carson
|
Private George D. Martin
|
Company D
|
Private John W. Martin
|
Private Bloomfield Beavers
|
Private Abraham Schwartz
|
Private John H. Culbertson
|
Private David Tuggall
|
Company E
|
Company K
|
Sergeant Thomas Hill
|
Private Bernard Hock
|
Corporal John M. Jones
|
Private George Yochrin
|
Private John B. Jones
|
|
Private Philip Ross
|
|
2 Officers and 25 enlisted men actually Wounded (vice 1 &
28 reported)
Company A
|
Company G
|
Corporal Emanuel Nicewander
|
Sergeant Charles A. Kelso
|
Private William Dodson
|
Private Joseph Stimson
|
Private Simpson Evans
|
Company H
|
Private Charles W. Gibbons
|
Private Philip Cox
|
Private Evan T. Grider
|
Private Francis Dooley
|
Private Charles Wishmeyer
|
Private William Francis
|
Company B
|
Private Nicholas Warner
|
Private George M. Critchlow
|
Company I
|
Company C
|
Captain Tighlman H. Nance
|
Private Emanuel Fulp
|
Company K
|
Company D
|
Sergeant John B. Melchoir
|
Sergeant Silas Whitler
|
Corporal Conrad Eckert
|
Corporal Austin N. Wilder
|
Private Celestine Eckert
|
Private Elijah I. Crawford
|
Private Bernard Knust
|
Private Clemmons Johnson
|
Private Jouhn Meister
|
Company E
|
|
Captain George W. Burge
|
|
Corporal Abner McDonald
|
|
Private Seth White
|
|
1 Officer and 5 enlisted men Missing
Company A
|
Private Earl Moore, wounded, captured & exchanged
|
Company D
|
First Lieutenant Thomas J. Box, wounded, captured &
exchanged
|
Company H
|
Corporal Newton H. Fitzgerald, wounded, captured, died
|
3 remaining others are unknown
|
TOTAL CASUALTIES = 54
For comments or suggestions, please contact Steve Russell
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