• the State of Jammu and Kashmir houses a number of religious and ethnic group; and

• the political aspirations and needs of the people of Jammu and Ladakh - who constitute almost half of the State's population and inhabit about 90 per cent of the State's land area - and Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims are conflicting.

Prudent

It would be only prudent if we examined both these factors and that too dispassionately. Such an exercise would surely help us to evolve some definite Kashmir policy and restore peace in the State. Jammu and Kashmir, it must be remembered, is a multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-ethnic State. ⁹ The principal languages spoken here are: Dogri, Kashmiri, Pothwari, Balti, Ladakhi, Gojri, Dardi, Punjabi and Urdu. The main religious groups, as per the 1981 census, are: 38,31,292 Muslims (64.3 percent), 19,08,288 Hindus (32.1 percent), 1,29,393 Sikhs (2.17 per cent), 69,796 Buddhists (1.17 per cent) and 6,916 Christians (0.12 per cent).

The largest region of the State is Ladakh. It has a land area of 96,701 square kilometres and is predominantly Buddhist (52 per cent). The Jammu region is next in size. It has an area of 26,293 square kilometres and is predominantly Hindu (66.3 per cent) with 29.7 per cent Muslims and 3.58 per cent Sikhs. The Kashmir province, having a land area of 15,853 square kilometres, is predominantly Muslim (94.85 per cent) with 3.89 per cent Hindus and 1.04 per cent Sikhs.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is, in fact, a blend of several ethnic groups. Some of the major social and ethnic groups in the State are: Kashmiri's, Dogras, Gujjars and Bakerwals, Dards, Baltis, Gaddis, Ladakhis and Pothwari-speaking Muslims and non-Muslims and Chibalis. Kashmiris are mainly concentrated in the Kashmir Valley. Dogras are spread all over the Jammu region. Gujjars and Bakerwals inhabit the mountainous and Kandi area of the State. They are mostly herdsmen. They are said to have migrated from Rajasthan and embraced Islam. They trek along with their sheep, goats and cattle from the plains to the higher regions in search of green pastures in summers. The Dard and Balti Muslims have their abodes in Gurez, Tilel and Dras. Gaddis inhabit the South-East of the middle mountain region of the Jammu province. Pothwari-speaking Muslims and non-Muslims and Chibalis live between Chenab and Jhelum. And Ladakhis inhabit the trans-Himalayan Ladakh. They are all Mongolites.

The Muslim population of the State can be broadly divided into Kashmiri Muslims inhabiting the Southern portion of the Kashmir region, Gujjars and Bakerwals and Dard and Balti Muslims. In Kashmir there are more than six lakh Gujjars and Bakerwals and one lakh Dard and Balti Muslims. Nearly eight lakh Kashmiri Muslims are Shias. Added together, they form about half of Kashmir's population, the other half being Sunni Muslims. Nearly one lakh Shias live in different parts of the Jammu region and one lakh in Kargil district of. Ladakh. The distribution of most Gujjars and Bakerwals in the State - over 12 lakh - is as follows: Poonch - one lakh fifty thousand, Rajouri - two lakh,. Udhampur - one lakh, Jammu - eighty thousand, Kathua - fifteen thousand, Baramulia - one lakh fifty thousand, Pulwama - one lakh, Kupwara one lakh fifty thousand, Srinagar - fifty thousand, Badgam - thirty thousand. The population of Pothwari speaking Muslims and non-Muslims is nearly four lakh. About one lakh of them inhabit Poonch, eighty thousand in Kupwara, fifty thousand in Baramulia, thirty thousand in Srinagar and about one lakh in Rajouri.

Militancy in the State of Jammu and Kashmir is basically confined to the Kashmiri-speaking Sunnis. These are the people who dominated the State's political and economic institutions between October 1947 and January 1990. More than half of Kashmir's population, which include eight lakh Shias, one lakh Dard and Balti Muslims and six lakh Gujjars and Bakerwals, are totally indifferent to the separatist movement that has been going on in the Valley since December 1989, when the protagonists of the State's separation from India abducted the then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's daughter, Dr Rubiya Sayeed, to secure the release of eleven top-ranking activists of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).

Important factor

The composition of population is indeed an important factor in the State's political situation and just cannot be overlooked by policy planners while evolving a solution to the vexed Kashmir problem. Even more important perhaps is the attitude of different people inhabiting different parts of the State to India, as also to the State's existing politico-administrative structure " For instance, Shias and Gujjars and Bakerwals in the State in general and in the Kashmir region in particular vehemently oppose the concepts of "azadi", merger of the State with Pakistan and pre-1953 constitutional position on the ground that under the dispensation the militants and other Kashmiri leaders have been striving to achieve since 1960, their fate would be no better than That of the Mohajirs, Shias, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs and Ahmediyas in Pakistan. They, in addition, advocate a radical change in the State's existing politico-administrative and economic structure so that they obtain what they call their legitimate due in the State's political and economic processes. How else can one explain the statements made repeatedly by some influential leaders of the Shia and Gujjar and Bakerwal communities, including Sadiq Ati, Mian Bashir, Taj Mhi-Ud-Din and Chaudhuri Jaiai-Ud-Din.

Sheikh Abdullah's close associate and a prominent leader of Shias, Sadiq Ali, has declared in unequivocal terms that "The one million Shias in Jammu and Kashmir are in danger as they face discrimination from the Pakistan-supported militants and 1.8 million Sunnis [of Kashmir]. . . . Now they will brook no further exploitation. I know the crimes being committed under the garb of secularism. Secularism never means selectism. If we are 20 per cent of the population, why shouldn't we get 20 per cent of what the State offers? Give each section its due and there will be secularism." ¹⁰

Similarly, the Senior Vice President of the Jammu and Kashmir Pradesh Congress (I) and a highly revered leader of the Gujjar and Bakerwal communities, Mian Bashir, has strongly urged the Prime Minister to "use force to crush the Jamait-e-lsiami which wants to have a stranglehold" on the minorities by "terrorizing them". He has also justified the Kashmiri Pandits' "demand for a separate homeland".¹¹ Identical has been the stand of the Gujjar and Bakerwal-dominated Militancy Mukhalif Morcha (Anti-Militancy Front) top-ranking leaders, Taj-MhiUd-Din and Chaudhari Jaiai-Ud-Din. They have been consistently helping the Government of India in its endeavours to crush militancy and integrate the State fully with India. Besides, they have been seeking the Centre's support in favour of a change in the State's politico-administrative set-up that ensures the representation of Gujjars and Bakerwals in all spheres in proportion to their population. ¹²

Such an attitude on the part of leaders of the Shia and Gujjar and Bakerwal communities, barring a Shia leader - Maulana Abbas Ansari - of the 36-Party Hurriyat Conference, simply cannot be dismissed as something ludicrous and silly. They have a point ¹³ when they, or for that matter all other religious and ethnic minorities in the State, articulate their grievances against the Valley Sunnis and demand proportional representation ¹⁴ which, they believe, alone can protect them against exclusion by the Valley Sunnis. For example, Gujjars and Bakerwals, Shias, Dards, Baltis, Pandits and Sikhs have at no point of time during 1947-90 been allotted more than four seats in the legislative assembly out of a total of 42 seats meant for the Kashmir region. This despite the fact that they constitute about 55 per cent of Kashmir's population and dominate a large number of assembly constituencies, including Kangan, Bandipur, Pahaigam, Tangmarg, Noorabad, Kokarnag, Ganderbal, Verinag, Charare-Sharief, Beerah, Badgam, Zadibal, Nagin, Pattan, Sonawari and Habbakadal.

On the contrary, the Valley Sunnis, who form nearly 45 per cent of Kashmir's and just 22 per cent of the State's population, have all along returned no less than 38 legislators to the 76-memberassembly. But this unfair and preponderant share of representation of the Valley Sunnis in the legislature and State Cabinet, which decide questions of supreme importance to the happiness and well-being of the population, constitute just one example. They enjoy a similar position in the State Secretariat, Government services, professional and technical institutions and recruitment agencies like the Public Service Commission and recruitment boards. The reason: they control all political organizations, including the Congress, the National Conference, the Janata Dal, the CPI, the CPI(M), the People's Conference, the People's League and Jamait-e-islami.

It is indeed a great irony that those who rule the roost during all these years of independence are feeling alienated from India and challenging the nation's unity, integrity, and secular and democratic ethos. It is again a paradox that those who suffered gross discrimination and political neglect at the hands of the Kashmiri Sunni-dominated successive State Governments as well as New Delhi are bitterly opposing the separatists and doing everything possible under the sun to defeat the Pakistani design on Kashmir and enter the arena of mainstream politics.

The attitude of the people of Jammu and Ladakh and the displaced Pandits towards India is no different. The political demands of the people of Jammu include statehood within India, ¹⁵ regional autonomy ¹⁶ and a statutory development board¹⁷ with or without Article 370. On the other hand, the demands¹⁸ of the far-off Ladakhis range from "Union Territory status" to an Autonomous Hill Council, invested with "full political administrative and economic powers and without Article 370" under which the State enjoys a very special status. As far as the displaced Pandits are concerned, their demands range from a separate "homeland" ¹⁹ in the valley with Union Territory status" to a "security zone within Kashmir", "reservation" for the Pandit minority in all spheres and at all levels and application of the Indian Constitution to the State in full. ²⁰

Cleavage

More importantly, even the Kashmiri Sunnis are not a homogeneous lot. In fact, they are vertically divided into four groups demanding independence, merger with Pakistan, pre-1953 constitutional status (limited accession of the State to India) and full integration of the State with India.

That there exists a profound cleavage of opinion among the leaders of the Sunni community with regard to the State's political future can be seen from the JKPCC(I) President, Ghulam Rasool Kar's outright repudiation of his close ally and the former Chief Minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah's clamour for the pre- 1953 position on the ground that the ongoing process of the State's integration with India just cannot be allowed to be reversed. This is also clear from the 21 December 1994 statement of the People's League supremo, Shabir Shah, made in the general body meeting of the Kul-Jamait Hurriyat Conference. And, it reads like this: "The Hurriyat Conference cannot claim to represent the entire state as it only has members from six of the 14 districts and there is no representation from Jammu and Ladakh. Moreover, one of its constituents, the JKLF, is not participating in its activities for the past several months ." ²¹ But these are just two of the several such statements which serve to demonstrate how much the Kashmiri leaders are divided- in their political perceptions.

It is thus fairly obvious that the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh are not Palestinians, who are one against Israel as far as their struggle for a homeland is concerned. The people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh are a divided house, with an overwhelming majority of them vehemently opposing the clamours for Pakistan, independence and semi-independence and demanding a political system which not only promises to unite Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh and the rest of the country together in closer bonds, but also ensures their effective participation in the State's political and economic processes.

Way out

What then is the way out? Should we continue to devise solutions based on the assumptions that the Valley Sunni leaders represent the general will, and that accepting and implementing the political demands of a section of the Kashmiri leaders would be the same as meeting the political needs of the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh? Or, should we go in for the reorganization of the State in order to first accommodate the political aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh and then to start negotiations with the Kashmiri leaders of all shades of opinion, including those representing the internally displaced Pandits, to determine what could satisfy them and their constituencies?

These are the only two options available and we have to choose one. The first option we simply cannot exercise because it has the potential of creating more problems than resolving the existing ones. Clearly, we have to go for the second alternative.

Time is running out and there are cogent reasons to believe that unless the State is trifurcated, the best opportunity for any action would be lost forever. This action is imperative. Even otherwise there is no logic in maintaining the State as a single political unit. The people of Jammu and Ladakh are conspicuous by their absence in Kashmir. Those who had some immovable property anywhere in Kashmir have already sold it and settled down permanently in Jammu and Ladakh. A few employees from Jammu and Ladakh, who used to hold certain positions in the Government and semi-Govemment departments in Kashmir prior to the eruption of militancy there, have either got themselves transferred to Jammu and Ladakh or have tendered resignations. If there are some officials from Jammu and Ladakh still in the Valley, their number is not even 200 out of a total of 1.37 lakh Government employees.

Not only this, no person from Jammu and Ladakh could ever become chief minister of the State because the Valley leaders hold the view that since Kashmir has 42 seats (now 46) in the 76member assembly (now 87-member assembly), the office of the chief minister is their sole preserve.

These and several such things have only created an extreme form of inter-regional rancour and animosity. In fact, while the people of Jammu and Ladakh constituently complain that "they are being treated as second-class citizens by the Kashmiri leaders", the Valley leaders always accuse the 34 legislators of Jammu and Ladakh of hobnobbing with the Centre to bring down what they call their "legitimate Governments" and foist "Delhi agents" on the State. In this context they refer to the role of the legislators of Jammu and Ladakh which actually led to the fall of Sheikh Abdullah's Government in 1953 and 1977, Farooq Abdullah's ministry in 1984 and the ouster of Gul Shah in 1986.

The trifurcation of the State, it must be borne in mind, would remove all negative trends, and promote in each region sound politics based on purely democratic and economic issues. In such a situation the Kashmiri Muslims would become less vulnerable to the "syncretic" pulls of fundamentalism from Pakistan. R. Venkataraman, former President of India, it may be recalled, had in 1983 urged the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, to make Ladakh a "Union Territory as demanded by the local people", confer the status of "statehood" on Jammu and deal with the Valley as a "separate entity".²²

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, 3 March 1994.
2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 2 February 1993; 24 December 1993; and 10 February 1994.
3. The Hindu, Madras, 22 January 1992.
4. Indian Express, 5 May 1992; The Hindustan Times, 12 and 13 December 1993 and 25 March 1993; The Frontline, Madras, 2 June 1995; The Times of India, 6 August 1992, 19 November 1993 and 25 August 1994.
5. Indian Express, 3 March 1991.
6. The Hindustan Times, 15 July 1991; Indian Express, 5 February 1994.
7. The Statesman, Calcutta, 7-8, 8-9 and 9-10 March 1994.
8. For details see Census of India, J&K Part, 1981.
9. The Sunday Mail, 17-23 July 1994.
10. The Sunday Mail, 31 July-6 August 1994; Indian Express, 11 August 1994.
11. The Times of India, 24 February 1994; The Tribune, Chandigarh, 28 May 1995; The Hindu, New Delhi, 28 January 1995.
12. The Tribune, 23 February 1994 and 4 April 1995.
13. The Times of India, 4 October 1993.
14. Jammu Mukti Morcha: Aims and Objects, Jammu, March 1990.
15. Indian Express, 27 May 1995.
16. Memorandum and Policy statement of Jana Adhikar Manch, Jammu, 1993; Jammu demands justice? Jammu, 1988.
17. Ladakh People's movement for Union Territory status, Publicity Division, Leh, Ladakh; The Hindustan Times, 17 April 1995.
18. Indian Express, 29 December 1991; The Tribune, 29 December 1991; Kashmir Times, Jammu, 29 December 1991; Daily Excelsior, Jammu, 29 December 1991.
19. The Hindustan Times, 15 July 1990; Kashmir Times, 15 July 1990; Daily Exceisior, 15 July 1990.
20. The Times of India, 22 December 1994.
21. R. Venkataraman, My Presidential Years, Harper Collins, 1994.