Source : The Indian Defence Review, © 1995 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.
Helicopters can transport troops and support them with both logistics and fire support. The modern military helicopter has become an integral part of warfare, being employed on Several battlefield missions, as part of naval aviation and in air combat. It is both an attack and transport platform. In its battlefield role, the helicopter is used for air assault and air mobility operations, on attack missions (anti-armour missions, for example) scouting and reconnaissance missions and anti-personnel area suppression. How a helicopter is used on the battlefield depends on the specific role it is given, the weapons provided and the operational doctrine of the user. The Persian Gulf war in 1991 demonstrated the kind of integration that the helicopter must achieve in the battlefield. Air mobile forces are today capable of all-weather, day and night operations in the FEBA, even deep in enemy territory.
The Indian experience
The Indian experience of the use of helicopters for military purposes, started in the sixties when they were used as air mobility platforms in North-East India. The Indian Army used helicopters to induct and de-induct troops in counterinsurgency (CI) operations in Manipur and Mizoram. Simultaneously, plans were drawn up to employ helicopters for crossing water obstacles to capture important bridgeheads. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, GOC 4 Corps used helicopters to ferry troops across the Soorma river with the intention of cutting off the Pakistani 202 brigade withdrawing from Sylhet. 1
In 1964, No. 105 helicopter unit of the IAF flew in Manipur in support of the Army in Cl operations. Tusom Kaulem, Chasec[, and Kungai were places to where Army troops were helilifted from Imphal. The No. 105 unit flying Mi-4 helicopters was also active in NEFA, Nagaiahd and Manipur during this period . 2 In 1966, 5 Para was involved in CI operations in Mizoram. The helicopter was used for air mobility operations, both for short notice operations and for long-range pre-planned Cl operations. These came to be called Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO). In 1967, the Home Minister of the MNF was captured near Dariung. Similarly, Sainghakha, the Defence Minister of the MNF was captured in another HBO. The same year Lieutenant General Sagat Singh as GOC 101 Comm Zone area launched an SHBO into Bangladesh to hit Mizo training camps located there. This mission was however unsuccessful. 3
During the 1971 war, plans were made to helilift a battalion of 4/5 GR to seize Sylhet in December 1971. The HBO to capture Sylhet was launched on 7 December. With only nine helicopters available, it was possible to lift only essential elements of the battalion. Over the next few days, the main strength of the battalion was transported. It later transpired that the enemy had estimated the helilanding of troops to be of brigade strength . 4 The capture of Sylhet bottled up a better part of the enemy there. On 9 December, the Meghna waterline was secured around Ashugung. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh now decided to make a dash towards Dhaka. Shortly after last light on 10 December, Mi-4s began their journey across the Meghna. In the next 36 hours, over 110 sorties were flown. The Mi-4, which normally carried fourteen troops, now had twenty-three men on board. 311 Mtn Bde was amongst the first units across the river, landing at Narsingdi. 4 Guards with a detachment of artillery was flown to Narsingdi on 9 December. Two days later, 10 Bihar was lifted to the area. The battalion secured the road and rail links over the local Brahmaputra the same day. The next day 4 Guards were in control of Narsingdi. The area thus became a base for further operations against Dhaka by this date . 5 The next hop for the helicopters was to Daudkandi. From here brigade HQ and two battalions moved to Baidha Bazaar on 14/1 5 December, without supporting arms and artillery. 6
The value of HBOs during the 1971 war was proved beyond doubt as they speeded up the pace of operations and surprised the enemy in many places. It is important to note that the success of HBOs in the 1971 war was facilitated by the air superiority achieved by the Air Force.
The peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka also saw extensive use of the helicopter both in attack and assault roles. During the build-up in the Jaffna Peninsula in October 1987, the IAF carried out some 3,000 tactical transport and assault helicopter sorties in twenty days. Mi-8s of both Nos. 109 and 119 helicopter units operated throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
Helicopters were used for insertion of units for search, raid, domination of selected areas and subsequent extraction. Helicopters were used in the initial stages in the siege of Jaffna to land troops of the Sikh Light Infantry. They were also used as observation posts to control large-scale ground operations in built-up areas. 7 The Mi-8 helicopters did good work in Sri Lanka and provided support to the army, usually under fire. The battle for Jaffna saw the Mi-8s flying supply sorties, as no roads were open. 8 The Mi-24 attack helicopters performed particularly well in the later stages of Operation Pawan, providing covering fire to troops and performing independent attacks on LTTE camps.
The helicopter has been used by the armed forces as elevated command posts and observation posts for the artillery regiment and have seen regular deployment in Siachen and other parts of India, where the terrain is inaccessible. The UN mission in Somalia saw the Chetak helicopters of the IAF being used as aerial convoy escorts on scouting missions and CASEVAC.
Despite extensive doctrinal studies and actual operational experience, it took fifteen years for the Army Aviation Corps to be set up. The main problem delaying the formation of this Corps was the battle for its control by the Air Force and Army. 9 Despite the passage of time, the struggle continues for the control of aviation assets within the services. 10 In 1985, India decided to convert 54 Infantry Division into an air assault division. One of its brigades acquired training in amphibious operations, and another one was given air mobile training in January 1987. But the division could not acquire enough helicopter assets. Insufficient helicopter assets meant that the division could only be used in more air mobile operations from transport aircraft. 11
The helicopter as an air mobility platform has been used by regular infantry units, para commandos, and special forces. The Mi-8/17s are operated generally for commando roles, supply and personnel mobility, SAR and logistics support tasks. The Mi8s can also be armed and used in attack roles. The Chetak is mainly used for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), communications and liaison duties. With the formation of the AAC in 1986, the Chetak and a certain number of Cheetah helicopters were transferred to the Army. The IAF still flies armed Chetaks in an anti-tank role, as well as for CASEVAC, while the Cheetah is used for FAC flights. At present the IAF has 11 Squadron with 50 Mi-8, 50 Mi17 and 10 Mi-26 Halo helicopters . 12
Air assault operations
The main areas where air assault operations can be carried out are, the plains of Punjab and the desert of Rajasthan. Limited HBOs can be carried out in J&K, for raids preceding a main attack. The employment of helicopters along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) will enhance the combat potential of forces. 'The IA could reduce its presence along the watershed to a mere tripwire, keeping adequate resources concentrated in depth and carrying out speedy heliborne deployment once the opposing Army commences its build-up. 13 The use of helicopters in the East against China are hampered by the mountainous and jungle terrain, but can be used to helitift mountain troops to salient heights in a specific topographic area. In the event of a border war with China, helicopters will be used in both attack and utility roles. In Arunachal Pradesh, the thick jungle and ever-changing weather makes fixed wing flying and attacking difficult. Thus attack helicopters will be essential. Similarly, transport helicopters contour flying' will be supported by attack machines.
The induction of troops into enemy territory in conjunction with conventional military operations will be essential in the future. These troops are to be earmarked for limited holding operations and must seek to achieve surprise. All such operations need a great amount of planning and co-ordination. The weather will determine the conduct of operations over varying terrain. To that extent, helicopters will have to be configured for that specific role.
As part of the main ground attack, India should use helicopters to infiltrate special forces into enemy territory to carry out clandestine operations. On the other hand, the Indian objectives could be to obtain a bridgehead, to carry out limited holding operations, or to secure and hold a particular area. Such operations will call for close co-operation between ground forces and helicopter units.
In mountainous and jungle terrain, the helicopter is best suited for vertical envelopment and replenishment. The operations in the Siachen Glacier largely depend on helicopters; 109 Helicopter unit of the IAF was active during the initial phases of Operation Meghdoot in 1984. In the jungles of the North-east, HBOs were used to land-scouting teams, ambush parties and interdiction groups, both for conventional and unconventional operations.
The helicopter is also a crucial platform for maritime survey and combined operations. This is important given India's huge maritime environment and island territories. The Westland Sea King used by the navy may be used to helilift troops to meet any contingency, such as threats to our off-shore assets.
For long-range border patrolling and policing, helicopters are used for observation and surveillance, combined with the insertion of ORTs to interdict intruders which will help in reducing active manpower deployment on the border. In India it is necessary to provide police and paramilitary forces with the necessary helicopter lifts to enable them to reach various "hot-spots".
Conclusions
Proper integration of the helicopter in the Indian armed forces will necessitate two things. First, the doctrines evolved have to be made operational as a part of the training. Second, it must be realized that air assault and air mobility operations are inter-services operations and the future will witness the increasing importance of combined operations, in,an all-weather, day-and-night conflict environment. Therefore, the setting up of a joint command HQ will not be out of place. Ideally, both services should have their own helicopter assets. But for air assault operations sufficient assets must be given to the air assault division. The IAF's present assets of Mi-8/17s and Mi-26 helicopters are just adequate for battalionsize operations. Alternatively, an "airmobile brigade" trained in 1987 could be given an integral fleet of Mi-17 helicopters.
It has been suggested that the air assault division for India be divided into three brigades, consisting of one parachute and two helicopter-borne battalions each. As seen earlier, India lacks the requisite asses, both serial and otherwise, to make the whole division air-assault capable. Therefore, it makes sense to plan operations at the brigade level using the assets of India's parachute regiment for this purpose. 14 Such organization combined with joint operational command is essential for air-assault operations.
In a resource-starved country like ours, the effort has been and must be to make the best use of available resources. Given this fact, India must look for a multi-utility/attack helicopter combined, as it may not be financially possible to acquire mission-dedicated helicopters. In this sense, the ALH being developed by HAL has to be capable of a dual role. The ALH will have a maximum take-off weight of 5,000 kg with two engines. And will have a crew of two and will carry 12-14 passengers or troops. 15 Whether, it will be configured for a dual role remains to be seen.
It is a moot point whether India needs to consider a merger of attack and utility roles in one platform. But on the whole a merger of roles makes sense, being more cost-effective.
The main thrust at present should be for proper integration of the helicopter within the armed services. A doctrine has to emerge for its use as an assault platform, and its command and control problem must be sorted out. It goes without saying that its utility as an air-mobility and air-assault platform need not be over emphasized. This is something that needs special attention in the future acquisition.
NOTES
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