The lot of the services

Source : The Indian Defence Review, © 1995 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.

The problem

In independent India, the world's largest democracy, there is presently a neck and neck race between different groups of politicians to take up the cause of the minorities, the Harijans (or Dalits as Ms Mayawati would call them) and the backward castes (or the OBCs to use the latest mandalized nomenclature). Both constitutional, as well as administrative action is being taken to alleviate their sufferings (sic). Yet, and it appears there is one sizeable group, practically a whole community, which is being deliberately, ignored; even under the constitution this community is denied the basic rights that the law vests in all her other citizens. Further, the politico-bureaucratic combine of the country has, by various fiats and administrative actions, reduced this once proud and elite segment of the society to the position of a pariah. Fathers today shudder at the idea of their sons joining the armed forces and mothers get hysterical if their daughters want to marry a serviceman.

The armed forces today mean different things to different people. For the common man the soldier is often an angel who comes to his rescue in times of natural calamities, internal disorders and external aggression. To the administration the armed forces are, invariably, the last hope to pull their chestnuts (invariably self-created) out of the fire. To the 'committed' politician they are a threat to his very survival. The halo around the image of the armed forces acts as a red rag to this breed and its sycophants from the administrative services. To the self-proclaimed leaders the armed forces are 'Bali ka Bakras' (an animal offered for sacrifice) whose blood can be shed to further their concept of vote-bank politics. India is possibly the only country whose worthy leaders managed to fritter away fruits of the victory given to the nation by the armed forces-in 1947-48, in 1965 and once again in 1971. The armed forces were lauded for their efforts. However, to the economist, particularly the American-instigated World Bank species, the armed forces are an economic bane and a drain on the national exchequer. For the self-appointed, so-called human rights activists, the soldier is a readily available scapegoat.

This adverse image has a deleterious effect on the psyche of the soldier and it affects his capability as the guardian of the nation's integrity against external threats, internal disorders and fissiparous tendencies.

It is interesting to note that while the American Constitution, in its Preamble says, 'We the citizens of the United States of America . . . pledge to defend the integrity of our country', or words to that effect, the Indian Constitution remains silent about any such eventuality; possibly that is the reason why India has done nothing to regain the portion of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and has, in fact, handed over a large portion of the same state to China. Despite the bias against the armed forces as reflected even in the Constitution, the nation had to call on the armed forces to defend its interests in Kashmir against Pakistani invasion as early as October 1947. It was only in 1976 that the Preamble was amended, inter alia to cater for the unity and integrity of the nation. However, in the conditions then prevailing, this reference to unity and integrity had more to do with the so-called threat from fissiparous tendencies than any external threat.

The direct impact of this thought process, or rather the lack of it, was that after every military victory (in the 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir conflict, or in 1965, or again in 1971) the armed forces officers were relegated further in the Order of Precedence. The Chief of Army Staff is, today, 12th in the Order of Precedence as against number 2 in the pre-independence India (Table of Precedence as published on 25th July 1979 and reprinted in the Manorama, 1992, page 759).

Yet we find that the other instruments of policy of the nation, i.e. the politicians and their civilian aides, though largely discredited in the eyes of the masses, are ruling the roost. Major General K. S. Pendse, in his article 'The Right to Say No', published in Defense Today, January 1995 says, 'The venal politician and the over ambitious bureaucrats, instead of solving problems in their nascent stage, allow them to simmer, while aggrieved people turn to violence, turning it thus into an internal security problem, for tackling which the army has to be called out of its barracks.' This helps the politico-bureaucratic combine in two ways. Firstly, the problem now is that of the army. If it succeeds, the credit still goes to the administration for having taken an appropriate step. If, on the other hand, the army fails the blame is passed on to the army.

In this state of affairs, is there any wonder that there are just not enough robust men of good intellect coming forward to join the armed forces? The situation is well described by R. Prasanan in his article in the Week dated 14th August 1991 titled 'Indian Forces Unfit to Fight'. He says that, 'There are too few men to fight in the world's fourth largest army. There are too few to fly her fighters and too few to sail her frigates.' Prasanan further adds that despite crippling unemployment everywhere, very few able-bodied and sharp-brained men are lining up to defend their country. Frankly, why should they, when they can join the gaggle of freebooters looking for means to squeeze their motherland? In this connection the survey conducted by the Marg and reported in The Times of India of 7th February 1995 is relevant. It finds that those opting for the civil services cite power, prestige and even opportunities for corruption as their reasons. All these are lacking in the armed forces. The survey further rubs in the point when it states that young men who come up for selection in the armed forces are those who have even failed to get selected as lower division clerks. Prasanan adds that India has one of the oldest of the large militaries in the world. This fact of the 'Greying Armed Forces' should have been worrying our netas. It appears our netas are still guided by the Nehruvian concept that 'There is no need for the armed forces'.

The figures given by Prasanan and corroborated by the Marg survey of January 1995 give the following shortfall in the strength of the army.

While in terms of percentages the number is very small, it drives home the point that when the need arises there will not be enough volunteers available to make up the deficiencies due to casualties, or expansion. The shortfall in the officer cadre is even more revealing. In1994, according to Prasanan, it was as follows.

• Army - 9000 going up to 12,000 in 1995 (Marg survey quoted earlier)
• Air Force - 900
• Navy - 800

As a large number of officers and men want to leave the service prematurely it is an obvious indication of their dissatisfaction with the service conditions. The following figures of officers who left the service prematurely in 1990-93 should be an eye-opener.

• Army - 2031
• Air Force - 730
• Navy - 609

It is illuminating to recall what George Tanham has to say in his essay, 'Indian Strategic Thought'. Amongst other things, he says, 'With India placed on the strategic defensive by a smaller and a weaker Pakistan, an ineffective national security is also proving an economic burden. . . . These initiatives are not visible and India and its resourceful and brilliant (sic) people continue to field incompetent teams in the international military-techno economic arena.' As much as we fielded an incompetent team in 1526, at Panipat or in 1527 at Khanwa, or for that matter in 1761 again at Panipat or 1962 against China. (U. R. Menon in his article 'Indian Strategic Thought' in The Times of India, 20th April 1994).

In the final analysis, it is this lack of perception and awareness of national security amongst the intellectuals and the media that has led to the situation where the armed forces are barely tolerated (and often resented) rather than considered as an instrument of the nation's policy.

Some remedies

The question is, where do we go from here? In this case there seems to be a vital need for creating institutions which should then work out clear-cut strategies in the military techno-economic sense. This would include the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff and an Apex Council with the Chief of Defence Staff as a permanent member, so that the defence implications of every decision taken can be properly weighed. Moreover, between the Apex Council and the Chiefs of Staff and/ or ministries there must be an organization where the implications of the decisions taken and the modalities of the steps required to be taken by the different ministries or agencies are worked out.

This committee should be chaired by the Chief of Defence Staff with the Cabinet Secretary as the co-chairperson.

Then there is a need to improve the 'War Machine'. For this the present-day situation, where the basic concept of the defence of the motherland is lacking, the psyche of the people must be changed. In the specific context of the 'War Machine' being effective, it is necessary that the men and their commanders are highly motivated, for they will be dealing with human lives, their own as well as those of their compatriots.

In this context, it may be noted that at present a Class 11 officer of the Central and State governments take precedence over a lieutenant, a Class I officer. Further down, we have upper division clerks, who are Class Ill employees, being equated with subedars, who are Class 11 gazetted officers. The analogy used is that if the maximum pay of a civilian scale is equal to or more than the minimum scale of the rank in the armed forces, the civilian will take precedence. Working on the same analogy, further down, we find that the PA of a brigadier, if he is a serviceman, is a havildar, should he be a civilian, his status is that of a junior commissioned officer. It is the continuous whittling down of the status of armed forces personnel that is rankling and a cause of resentment and anger. The following inter se equation is suggested.

Another major factor for the indifferent response of the general public to the armed forces as a career is the lack of promotional avenues. The service structure is highly pyramidical; on the other hand the civilian departments have a much gentler slope and the top is a plateau.

A major step in improving the service conditions would be to alter the rank structure completely. It is noteworthy that all the appointments at the pre-company level are tenable by any of the three ranks from second lieutenant to captain. Therefore, it would be smoother and a more attractive proposition if officers are commissioned directly as captains. Further, the moment an individual is selected and reports for training at the National Defence Academy, he should be given the rank of a midshipman and equivalent rank in the other two services. After one year the trainees should pick up the rank of second lieutenant while still in the National Defence Academy. They should report to their respective academies as lieutenants and remain in. that rank for the next two years, which would include all their Young Officers' training. Thereafter, they should report to their units as captains. Subsequently, they should be majors after five years of service and lieutenant colonels after another five years. With fifteen years of service the officers would become colonels and commanding officers, at the age of 37 years or so (a good six years younger than what we have today). The brigadiers would be with twenty years of service. The major generals would have a minimum service of twenty-five years and they should retire at the age of fifty-two.

The present system of retirement benefits for the armed forces is also inequitious. It not only denies the individual what his compatriots in the civvy street get but also emasculates him financially. To illustrate the point, in the private sector, an individual is made to join a contributory provident fund scheme. The individual contributes a given amount and his organization contributes an equal amount, subject to the limit of 10 per cent of the individual's salary. If that yardstick was to be used, working on the Fourth Pay Commission entitlements, for an officer who serves for thirty years without going beyond the rank of major, which 75 percent of officers do not, the organization's contribution works out to nine lakhs, forty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty-two. This has been worked out with the interest of 12 per cent being compounded on a yearly basis. If it was to be compounded on a monthly basis as is done in the case of Public Provident Fund with any scheduled bank, then the amount works to more than ten lakhs. If one was to include the dearness allowance, which should be done as the pension today is also being given dearness allowance, the total entitlement works out to more than fifteen lakhs. This would provide a monthly income of about Rs 15,000 per month, which would be more than the pension entitlements of a major even after the Fifth Pay Commission, leave alone the measly Rs 5,500 or so that is being given today. At present, should the individual die his wife would get a lower amount called Special Family, Pension, which would be discontinued when she dies. On the other hand, the lump sum, which would or should come to the officer would be available to the family for all times to come.

The problems of early retirement would, to a large degree, be obviated if the recommendations mentioned above are implemented. An officer will retire at a senior enough level, so as to be an attractive entrant for the corporate sector. He will also have enough funds available to branch out independently if he so desires.

Perquisites

The armed forces, in India, like any other organization have a number of perquisites (perks). However, unlike all the other organizations, who invariably convert their perks into entitlements and use them as stepping stones for more, the defence services have had theirs whittled down. in the early fifties, an officer of any rank, could and often did, pay just 3 paise from his pocket using the normal warrant, and travel in air-conditioned first-class comfort. Today this privilege is reserved for colonels and above. Similarly, before the Third Pay Commission an officer was required to pay only second-class fare to travel first class, by availing a concession form. He could do this as often as he liked as long as he was on authorized leave. Today he is required to pay 60 per cent of the first-class fare, double of which he was required to pay earlier. He can use this facility now for only six single journeys. Till the late sixties, the officers travelled on duty on cash TA which included the fare plus a mileage allowance (single for temporary duties and three allowances in case of permanent moves). When the order to switch to warrants was issued, a clear assurance was given that the officers would not lose monetarily. Yet that is exactly what happens today. In a number of instances the officers are moved from one station to another, without being given the benefit of claiming for the move of their baggage. For example, the young officers of the Navy are moved from INS Hamala in Bombay to INS Shivaji in Lonavala to INS Vaisura in Jam Nagar to INS Dronacharya in Cochin, without being given any reimbursement of the amount spent for moving of their baggage and personal transport.

Apart from restoration of all the above perks it is of vital importance that additional perks are provided to make the services attractive. One such perk could be the allocation of a flat at the place of his choice to the young officer. The cost could be adjusted from the rent recovered, plus his salary for the period spent in the Academy, plus the group insurance. This will also ensure that the shortage of accommodation which the services face is obviated. It will also be a step towards the national goal of house-building, and what is more important, it will give the servicemen and their families a sense of security.

Conclusion

The government and the public at large must realize that the defence services are an instrument of state policy, as important, if not more so than the bureaucracy or the diplomatic corps. They are essential, even vital, for the very existence of the state. They are not an institution which is just to be tolerated as a necessary evil. This realization should lead to the requirement of clearly spelling out our national interests and in which direction they lie. Based on the interests, the national policy parameters should be worked out along with methodology to ensure their implementation (in other words the grand strategy). It is only thus that the national security can be conceptualized and ensured.

This will also create an ambience towards a defence culture where the public associates itself with the defence services, as something which belongs to them and not some foreign institution which has been superimposed on the society. A necessary result will be the establishment of 'think tanks' who would think, discuss and publish matter on national security. Departments of defence and strategic studies in the major universities is a step in the right direction. However, there is a need to pull them out of theoretical dialectism into a more practical realm.

The next step is to make the organization more lean and mean with each level contributing something worthwhile towards making the defence services more effective. Starting from the top there is a need for appointing a Chief of Defence Staff, who can be an adviser to the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs on national security implications of all major decisions being taken by that body. Along with the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff there is a need for restructuring the rank structure.

Finally, to keep the defence services, which are so essential for the very being of a nation, satisfied, there is a need to make the services more attractive. Higher pay scales, better living conditions and attractive perks is the minimum that the nation can provide for the personnel who have till date never let her down.