In the last century there has arguably been no greater technological achievement
than that of putting man and machinery into outer space.  As each corner of the globe
was swallowed up through empire expansionism, outer space remained to be the only
untouched domain in man's pursuit of the unexplored.  Unfortunately, space exploration,
as a means in itself, was not the sole factor driving man into outer space.  Behind the
explorer's initial curiosity asking, "What's out there?" there almost always seems to exist
militaristic reasoning for fashioning an exploration in the first place.  The exploration of
space has certainly not been immune to such reasoning.  As the second World War came
to an end, man realized that he had created a weapon that could destroy the entire earth,
many times over.  Accordingly, the two countries that were most keen to this awareness
were the world's two most competitive countries, the United States and the U.S.S.R.
Although they had been allies against the German and Japanese forces during World War
II, a "cold" tension had grown between the U.S. and Russia.  The days quickly grew
longer for Russians and Americans alike, as they fed off the fear of the realization that a
nuclear war was quite possible.  As the threat of nuclear war moved into the 1980's, the
focus of the Cold War turned to the skies.  "Star Wars," as it became known, posed the
threat of nuclear war using space satellites.  However, eventually the fall of communism
brought an end to the Cold War, thus opening the door to full cooperation in space
between the United States and the Former Soviet Union.  Today, despite having been
enemies over a good portion of the twentieth century, the United States and Russia have
developed a unique collaboration in the exploration of outer space.
In analyzing the so-called, "race for space," there appear to be three significant
arenas in which the essential elements of the space relationship have taken place.  The
following report provides an analysis of the economic, political, and technological
factors that have contributed to the present condition of the U.S.-Russian space
relationship.  Because of its sincere importance, and because it greatly affects the other
two arenas of influence (political and technological), the economic aspects of the space
relationship will especially be closely examined. In order to obtain a full understanding
of how such a distinctive collaboration has been formed, there are two significant periods
of time in which the economic, political, and technological factors must be considered.
The first period of time is that between the birth of space technology, up until the end of
the Cold War.  During this period of time the United States and the Soviet Union were
heated rivals on many significant levels.  This heated competition between the two
powers proved to be the incentive that drove space technologies forward.  Political
leaders realized that economic spending in space issues was of the utmost importance to
military concerns.  The second notable period in time is that from the collapse of the
Soviet Union, marking the end of the Cold War, to the present day condition of the space
relationship.  In this period of time both the United States and Russia have discovered
that in working together, technology can reach new heights.  Also meaningful is the fact
that political leaders on each side have come to realize that certain space projects simply
cannot be funded by one country alone.  In short, the United States and Russia need one
another, economically, if space sciences and technologies are to reach new levels in the
future.
 Unquestionably, competition has played a major role in affecting the economic
decisions that the United States and the Soviet Union have made concerning space issues.
As previously pointed out, the United States and the Soviet Union were not the closest of
friends during the Soviet era.  The two powers clashed with one another at many levels.
Indeed, there remains a simple answer as to why the Soviet Union and the United States
despised each other so; this answer in question being simply, ideologies.  The U.S.-Soviet
standoff during the Cold War matched the world's strongest capitalist ideology against,
what was thought to be, the world's ultimate command ideology.  In Game Plan, author
Zbigniew Brzezinski writes:
In 1960, Nikita Khrushchev, in issuing a ringing challenge to the United
States, proclaimed "We will bury you."  Khrushchev's challenge was based
on the belief that in the next two decades the Soviet Union would surpass
the United States in social and economic productivity.  In the two and a half
decades following Khruchev's prediction, nothing even remotely resembling
it came to pass. (122)
Truly, Khrushchev's proclamation had a confident tone to it.  Explicit statements such as
this seemed to give the Russian economy a "false" sense of economic strength and
security.  This false sense of economic strength may have been a significant factor
affecting how the Soviets eyed the American challenge.  If the Russians believed that
they could be superior to America in economic aspects, than it is also likely that they
believed they could be superior to the United States in outer space as well.  What is
interesting to take light of is the fact that Russian success in outer space came out of the
false sense of economic security.  Although its economy was nowhere as strong as it
assumed, Russia ended up winning the race to outer space.  The Soviets, and their
command ideology, had actually put a satellite into orbit before the Americans (who truly
had a much stronger all around economic base).
In 1957, the first space satellite, Sputnik, was launched into space by the Soviet
Union.  Four years later, in 1961, the Russians were first in space again, this time putting
the first human, Yurii Gagarin, into orbit.  These historic events marked the successful
beginnings of a Soviet space program that would last until the U.S.S.R.'s disintegration in
1991.  During the Soviet period, Russian satellite launches often outnumbered American
launches nearly six to one (U.S. Cooperation. 26).  It was at the level of production in
space that the quality of American products was matched, simply, by the sheer quantity
of Soviet products.  There exist two primary reasons for the Soviet Union's large number
of launches during the Soviet era.  The first reason lies in Soviet production philosophies.
While American satellites were small, highly sophisticated instruments, Soviet satellites
were often very large, bulky objects with relatively few highly developed electronic
components (Osman 39).  The Soviet failure rate for satellites and rockets was very high
in comparison to American standards.  Because of the fact that rockets were not likely to
work properly, the U.S.S.R. made large numbers of them to account for any sudden
failures.  Also, the Russian system tended to stick to a rocket design if that specific type
of rocket proved to work well.  In producing many of the same types of rockets, the
Soviets simply believed that quantity was just as good, if not better, than quality.  The
second reason for the large number of Soviet rocket launches lies in the fact that Russian
economic resources (attributed to space) were simply enormous in comparison to
American space standards.  While the United States had established military and space
programs that were separate from one another, the Soviet space program was part of the
Russian military budget.  Instead of having a legislative body that determined space
funding, Soviet monies went directly to design and production establishments (Morris
180).  In the end, it was always the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union who got what they wanted in terms of space funding.  This Communist
Party Committee usually had its eyes on America when it came time to decide where
funds needed to be dispersed.
On the American side of space economics during the Soviet era, no one questioned
the idea that the United States needed a space program that equalled or surpassed that of
the Russians.  American space economic worries took a back seat to up-front concerns
that the U.S.S.R. was surpassing the United States in the area of technological military
achievement.  Speaking of the slow pace President Dwight D. Eisenhower took towards
establishing a space program, author Tony Osman states, "He was slow moving-too slow
for the space enthusiasts and too slow for the military departments who said, and may
well have believed, that the defence of the USA depended on being able to put a man into
space, and even on being able to establish military bases on the moon" (42).  Although
the concerns of being able to put a man into outer space, and putting bases on the moon,
have never developed in a militaristic sense, these were very real concerns to many
Americans during the Soviet era.  At the same time that anti-Sovietism was strong in the
American public, President Eisenhower believed that militaristic concerns should not
block the path to scientific possibilities.  Osman writes:
Eisenhower and his scientific adviser, James Killian, were impressed by the
arguments of scientists and by the strength of public opinion in favor of a
space effort, but they were anxious to keep the effort in civilian hands and
well away from the military, who tended to be spendthrift and had no
genuine scientific purpose in view.  They needed to find, or create, a civilian
body to direct the space effort. (43)
The civilian body that Eisenhower found turned out to be the National Advisory Council
of Aeronautics, which was set up in 1915 for aeronautical research.  With a little
revamping, Eisenhower and Killian retitled the organization the National Aeronautics
and Space Agency (NASA).  In July, 1958, an act was signed that established NASA as
America's civilian space administration.   The United States now had a civilian space
organization that would focus on all the possibilities space might hold (not simply
militaristic ones).  By having a separate budget altogether, the American space program
was not limited strictly to defence funding.  That is to say, the civilian space program
could always continue functioning, even if military threats in space ceased to occur.
In the years since the collapse of communism, the Former Soviet Union has
experienced drastic economic hardships, to say the least.  These hardships have indeed
had a profound affect on the funding allotted to the former Soviet space program.  In fact,
there is no longer one single Soviet space program.  With the 1991 dissolution of the
Soviet Union there came the formation of independent space agencies in each of the
states of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan.  Although the latter
four of these five states play serious roles in international space operations, Russia is the
prominent space power in the group.  Today, the main task at hand involves getting the
newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union to work together on the issues of
space.  In the previous command economy, each state held specific roles in contributing
to economic objectives held by the entire Soviet Union.  Author David Remnick
explains, "For decades the Soviet empire was held together by ideology and coercion and
even the perversity of the imperial economy.  Under Stalin, especially, whole nations
were directed to assume responsibility for economic monocultures: cotton in Uzbekistan,
for instance, or rocket parts in Ukraine, cigarette filters in Armenia.  To challenge that
imperial arrangement was to invite not only brutal punishment but economic disaster"
(15).  Now that each state has its own independence, each must conduct economic
business on its own.  Certainly, the "economic disaster" that Remnick refers to, has
happened.  The separate republics are now in positions to demand payment for the uses
of the facilities, hardware, and services that formerly all contributed to the same Soviet
cause.  For example, the large Russian launch facility, Baikonur Cosmodrome, is
currently being leased from Kazakhstan, indefinitely.  The facility, which is one of
several launch sites within republics outside of Russia, serves as the main launch site for
a good number of Russian space operations (U.S. Cooperation. 30).  The breakup of the
components of the Soviet space program is only one of several major problems that
Russians face in reassembling a working space program.  As previously stated, funding
for current Russian space projects is of major concern.  Even though the Russian Space
Agency (RSA), which was established in February 1992, now has a separate budget than
that of the Russian military, capital is simply not available for its use.  Privatization of
several Russian space enterprises has helped out a little in funding, but the major source
of economic capital will come directly from abroad (mainly the U.S.).
Certainly, the United States has played a major role in helping the Russian space
program get back on its feet.  In the period from 1993-1997, the U.S. "contributed" over
$650 million dollars to the Russian government for space operations (U.S. Cooperation
53).  Of course, American incentives exist in helping out the Russian economic system.
In its April 1995 report, the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(COTA) writes, "Today, the U.S. desire to promote economic and political stability in
Russia and to provide tangible incentives for positive Russian behavior in areas such as
preventing proliferation of missile and other military technologies is a powerful engine
behind cooperation" (46).  Indeed, the United States has realized that aiding the ailing
Russian space program economically, provides political and technological incentives to
all parties involved.  That is to say, the Russian side of space operation productivity has
focused primarily on different elements than has the American side.  If the Americans
provide the Russians with the hard capital that they desperately need so badly, than the
Russians will allow use of the vast amounts of booster rockets they have assembled, and
have little need for now.  An example of this economic collaboration can be found in the
partnerships that American corporations, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have
formed with Russian coequals.  Lockheed Martin, for instance, pays for the use of
Russian boosters to get its satellites off of the ground (McClenahen 54).  Similarly,
Boeing Co. is in partnership with the Russian enterprise RSC Energia, to form a seaborne
satellite launching pad (Moss 17).  These partnerships reflect the over all attitudes
currently holding the U.S.-Russian space relationship together.  Each empire realizes that
it is indeed better off economically if international space collaboration exists.
On the political front, the space programs in both the United States and the Soviet
Union developed out of military concerns held by leaders in both countries during the
Cold War.  Although President Eisenhower publicly displayed an interest in the scientific
aspects that space exploration might hold, he, and many presidents following him,
recognized potential military uses for space as well.  Unfortunately, Soviet leaders also
saw space exploration in much the same way.  At the end of World War II, Soviet and
American forces alike gathered together German scientists.  These scientists had made
extensive advances in the area of rocket sciences.  From there, the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
went different directions in developing their respective rocket programs.  While the
United States focused mainly on the development of ICBM's (inter-continental ballistic
missiles), the Soviet Union looked to the skies.  Indeed, when the Russians announced to
the world that they had put a satellite into orbit in 1957, the United States was very
unprepared for such a declaration.  At first, American scientists did not believe that
Russian technology was capable of such work.  However, as the faint radio signal proved
Sputnik's presence in space, the scientists realized that the Soviet claims were very real.
Immediately, pressure was put on the U.S. government to catch up the Russian
technology that, indeed, seemed to be "out of this world."  After Sputnik's launch into
orbit, American leaders realized that they had to take all Soviet claims very seriously.
The realization that the Soviet Union had leapt ahead in space science technology fed
American fear; the fear that continued to be the very nature of the Cold War itself.
Despite having lost the initial race to space, the U.S. came out ahead in the Cold War
because of its stable political and economic systems.
Today, the United States recognizes the desperate need for a stable Russian
economy.  Politically speaking, aiding the Russian space economy indirectly influences
the possible spread of weapons to unfriendly nations.  Specifically, the U.S.
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment writes, in Proliferation and the Former
Soviet Union, "The economic situation in Russia is very serious and, if not radically
improved soon, could lead to the emergence of a government much less friendly to the
U.S. and much less likely to cooperate with it in the nonproliferation area.  Increased
economic stability will also reduce stresses that could tempt some with access to nuclear
material or information to sell them to foreign parties" (73).  Clearly, nonproliferation
goals are a major part of the United State's long-term foreign relations agenda.  In
keeping such goals, the U.S. must continue to sustain a healthy and lasting relationship
with Russia.  One way of keeping a friendly relationship has been the development of
several long-term space science projects.  Speaking of the significance of such projects,
COTA reports:
Technical space cooperation with Russia is seen as an important tool for
supporting U.S. foreign policy goals, which include Russian adherence to
the Missile Technology Control Regime and the general goal of supporting
the transition to a market-oriented democracy in Russia.  This conjunction
of financial, domestic political, and foreign policy imperatives should result
in a U.S.-Russian agreement to cooperate in a broad range of project design,
construction, and supply activities.  (International 84)
These projects have not been set up to simply yield the discovery of new scientific and
technological advances, but they also have been set as a nonchalant system of checks and
balances.  Political leaders believe, that by keeping the American and Russian space
agencies busy with space projects, there exists a less likely chance that one of the
countries will try to jump ahead in military space innovations.  Simply, it exists as reason
enough, that the U.S. should want to keep deadly weapons out of the hands of those who
might misuse them. Naturally then, the United States feels that it has nothing to lose in
cooperation with Russia precisely because of the nonproliferation incentives that exist.
Competition was also the most influential factor contributing to the technological
advances made in space by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. during the Soviet
period.  The rivalry that existed between the two powers chiefly affected the speed and
quality at which technologies were developed in the two systems. Unlike the American
market system, where military technologies eventually crossed into the mainstream
consumer market, Russian military technologies stayed within the military.  That is to
say, Russian scientific endeavors were always colored by politically motivated military
influences.  If Russian scientific advances were made, they always were looked at first,
through a military lens.  Because the space program was a part of the Russian military,
American leaders had to assume that any type of Soviet space experiment had a military
end means.  Holding this idea, American scientists felt compelled to do their best in the
quickest approaches that were feasible.  Granted, the Russians were the first in space, the
Americans failed to miss a key technological factor that had always been present.  The
missing factor that existed was that America always was, in fact, technologically ahead
of the Russians.  The Soviets had made it to space earlier than the Americans simply
because space rocketry was the main focus of Russian science.  Despite the fact that they
were already ahead of the Russians technologically (even if they knew it or not), the
United States took the Russian advances in space as reason to kick-start its own space
exploration.  The manner in which the space race started has been significant to the
development in space technologies in each country ever since.
Accordingly, the American-Russian space relationship today reflects the
technologies that each country developed during the Cold War.  As previously stated,
Russian space technology has mainly focused on quantity while, inversely, American
technology has tended to focus on quality.  For instance, if Russia did develop a new
space capsule, ship, etc. it sometimes had the form and shape of its direct predecessor,
with very few modifications made to the overall design (Morris 125).  The United States,
on the other hand, has explored all avenues of possible space design and manipulation.
Russia, as soon as it found a design that worked, simply stuck with that design precisely
because it worked.  Frankly, the Soviets could not find a reason to build entirely new
designs if they already had a design that could serve the overall purpose of putting man
and machinery into outer space.  As a consequence of following this quantitative method
of space rocket design, Russia has always had enormous stockpiles of space rockets and
boosters.  Today, these "leftover" rockets and boosters are key elements in international
space collaborations.  Because space science is a very expensive venture for any country
to undertake, space science projects must be carried out with the cooperation of several
different powers.  Russia, although economically burdened, does not want to lose the
prestige it has gained in space.  However, even with its economy facing questionable
times, Russia can still participate in space collaboration because of its massive launching
stockpiles.  As a result of having Russian stockpiles of rockets and boosters available for
use, the United States (and other countries involved in international space relations) can
focus on the technological aspects of the space projects instead of worrying about how
the projects will get into the air.  Also important is the fact that, in working together,
advances in space technology will certainly arrive sooner than they would if each
individual country explored space on its own.  Indeed, full cooperation in space between
the U.S. and Russia opens many doors (especially to advances in technology) that were
closed to both empires during the Cold War.
In short, the United States and Russia have discovered that, through full cooperation
in space science issues, many more things can be accomplished, in a shorter period of
time, that are of greater benefit to each world power.  Certainly, it was out of the
competition that existed during the Cold War that present space relations have developed
in the manner they have.  The fact that America believed Russia was a genuine threat in
space, kick-started an American space program that would go on to be uncontested
technologically in its space exploration.  In a similar way, the fact that Russian
quantitative design philosophies produced an enormous amount of boosters, that keep the
country in space science cooperation today, is extraordinary.  Without the specific
economic, political, and technological factors that occurred, both before and after the
dissolution of the Soviet empire, the U.S.-Russian space relationship would most likely
not share the friendly connection that it has today.
 
 

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