The Jakarta Post, July 10, 2007
Where will the Jamaah Islamiyah strike this year?
Eric Koo Peng Kuan, Singapore
More than four years after the first Bali incident, the shadows of the Jamaah Islamiyah
(JI) militant network still loomed ominous over the political and social scene in
Indonesia. In June 2007, a JI leader called Zarkasih, and the head of JI's armed wing
Abu Dujana, have since been arrested by Indonesian authorities.
This latest arrests joined a long list of previous JI militants and leaders, such as
Hambali, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi and Azahari Husin, who had since been arrested or
eliminated.
The JI, once a notorious name of a terror group on regional government rolls, seems to
have declined much in news-arresting headlines in newspapers. Although Year 2006
passed by without any known major incident staged by this group, it remains to be
seen if it will remain so.
In late April 2006, in a shoot-out by special counter-terrorist police teams on a safe
house in a village in Central Java, Indonesia, two militants linked to the JI, Jabir and
Abdul Hadi, were killed. The main target of the raid, Noordin M. Top, has however,
slipped the net once again. In an attempt to evade detection and capture, Noordin has
even changed the name of his splinter group from the JI to the al-Qaeda for the Malay
Archipelago.
The alleged spiritual head of the JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was released in June last
year, having finished serving his 26 month long jail sentence. He has since resumed
his work as a preacher in Indonesia, and indeed, took on an important position with
the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, (MMI), a Muslim organization with considerable
social support and political clout in the local scene.
In mid January 2007, Indonesian police reported that they have killed Riyan alias
Abdul Hakim, another alleged high ranking JI militant.
Recent reported news of the surfacing of JI activities seemed to indicate drastic
decline in this group's capabilities to create havoc in their twisted vision of jihad in
South East Asia. The question of importance is, is the JI truly out of business?
October 2006 marked two anniversaries of tragedy on the scenic island of Bali, where
more than 200 people died altogether in terrorist bomb attacks on Oct. 12, 2002 and
Oct. 2, 2005 respectively.
This terrorist attack, following approximately a year and a month after the Sept. 11
incident, propelled to public consciousness of the existence of JI.
The Bali bomb incident radically changed the Indonesian government's policies and
attitudes towards Islamic inspired terrorism. Having previously denied the existence of
terrorists operating on its own soil, Jakarta quickly realized that allowing the JI's
activities to continue without impunity would hurt the nation's economic and foreign
interests. The Bali attack directly damaged the tourism industry and jeopardized
foreign relations with Australia.
As a result, swift and efficient investigations by the Indonesian police led shortly to
the arrest of JI members involved in the planning and execution of the Bali attack
within months, among them Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas, who were later
convicted and found guilty.
Subsequent to Bali 2002, the JI also staged other high profiled bombings in Indonesia
on an annual basis. In August 2003, the JI struck again on the Mariott Hotel, and in
September 2004, the Australian Embassy was bombed. Both targets were in Jakarta,
the Indonesian capital city. In October 2005, with perhaps a deliberate selection of
timing, another bomb attack occurred on Bali Island. It can be seen that the JI was
hardly out of business totally.
To be fair, governmental efforts in counter terrorism of various South East Asian states
since 2002 have led to a decline of JI's capabilities.
By an observation of the pattern of previous JI attacks, it is expected that the JI would
try again to stage another bomb attack in 2007. The question of importance is where
to expect this attack to take place. As the JI had previously struck in the precincts of
Jakarta and Bali, it can be inferred that the Indonesian government has doubtlessly
tightened the security of these two areas. Therefore, JI planners would likely give
these areas a berth.
Instead, as with sectarian strife between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims in Iraq today, it is
highly probable that the JI would seek to stage another incident in Poso, Sulawesi,
scene to where Indonesian Christians and Muslims are traditionally in conflict.
There were, of course, reports of concurrent bomb incidents and sporadic violence
since the Bali incident in 2002, such as the horrific beheading of three Christian
school girls in July 2005, but sectarian strife in this religiously divided province has
received far less media coverage and attention that this issue deserved.
JI's motives for stirring up civil violence and religious strife in Sulawesi would follow the
same logic as deviant insurgent groups in Iraq. Where anarchy reigns, terror and
disparate groups can thrive. The typical government response will often be to respond
with force in kind. This way, however, may have dire and irrevocable consequences,
especially percussions from the population.
Jakarta must not let down its vigilance against the JI, even if the previous year of 2006
passed by without incident. More importantly, civil and religious divisions between
Muslims and Christians in Sulawesi calls for serious address, with long term policies
designed to reconcile and heal the rifts.
Certainly, the least that the Indonesian government can do is to keep watch on the
ever volatile situation in this strife torn province and not let the JI take advantage of
dormant but definitely existent underlying social tensions between the two religious
communities.
The writer is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
London. The views expressed here are his own and he can be reached at
erickoopk@yahoo.com.
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