The Jakarta Post, July 11, 2007
Indonesia's anti-terrorism struggle
S.P. Seth, Sydney
The recent arrest of two top Indonesian terrorists has rightly caused jubilation, shared
in abundant measure here in Australia. As reported here, Australian technical and
other forms of cooperation played an important, if not a key role, in the operations.
This and other similar police operations against the terrorists, after the Bali bombings,
have seriously dented their organization, thus thwarting what might have been more
killings of innocent people.
But this is not the end of the story. Terrorism is the gruesome face of an ideology
preying on massive frustration and anger among Muslims all over the world over their
perceived humiliation, principally by the Christian West. Which gets reinforced by
local causes in each country and region, from despotic rulers (seen as doing
America's bidding) to depressed economic conditions.
But coming back to Indonesia, the obvious question is: Why has Indonesia made
such successful inroads against terrorism where others haven't? One important
reason is that for most Indonesian Muslims the clarion call of back to the future of
Islamic past of the Caliphate doesn't have the same resonance, if any at all, of many
Muslims in the Middle East.
Islam came to Indonesia largely as a peaceful religion through Arab traders. And in
the process, it didn't seek to supplant local traditions and beliefs already strongly
entrenched in people's lives. Which accounts for its eclectic nature.
For most Indonesians, the defining moment of their national destiny was the struggle
against Dutch colonialism and that was based on secularism. In the present day
world, they do empathize with the sufferings of their co-religionists in Palestine, Iraq
and elsewhere, but it lacks the sharp edge that tilts the balance from empathy to
militancy.
Indeed, even among the extremists (a small minority as they are) there are reportedly
divisions among those who favor terrorist bombings of Western targets (like Bali with
Western tourists, Australian embassy and so on) and others who would rather target
local Christians in sectarian warfare.
Interestingly, Both Zarkasih and Abu Judana, now under police custody and said to be
the chief and military commander respectively of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), were
opposed to al-Qaeda kind of bombing operations favored by Noordin Mohammed Top,
essentially an outsider.
Which, in a way, would suggest that they, as local leaders, probably have a better
understanding of the psyche of their people. At a local level, it is relatively easier to
mobilize and organize Muslims in a sectarian conflict against the Christians in places
like Sulawesi than some distant global crusade of the al-Qaeda targeting Western
interests.
It is not to suggest that sectarian conflict is less abhorrent. The suggestion is that
this kind of conflict becomes more a national concern than part of a global crisis. And,
by the same token, is more manageable by the country's law and order agencies.
Which makes Indonesia less of a regional terrorist hub, as it tends to be colorfully
described sometimes.
The benefits of this (successful inroads against terrorism) in terms of foreign
investments and image projection could be quite substantial. But it might take time.
But returning to what makes Indonesia different in terms of managing and containing
the terrorist threat: It is quite noticeable that none of country's mainstream Muslim
organizations, with many million-strong memberships, has supported the JI and its
terrorist operations. Indeed, JI finds itself quite isolated from the country's political and
religious mainstream.
Its importance becomes evident when one compares Indonesia with Pakistan, where
political and religious elements are playing politics with religious extremism. In
Indonesia, the JI hasn't succeeded in creating that sort of political space for itself. And
without the oxygen of popular and wider organizational sympathy/support behind
terrorism and its political ideology, it is no wonder that JI has continued to flounder.
However, Muslim militancy has become a magnet of sorts for all kinds of disparate
grievances, frustrations and resultant anger, with the killings in Palestine and Iraq
being its most dramatic manifestation. And these are largely blamed on the West (the
United States in particular) and Israel.
Its espousal of terrorism is an off-shoot of the Afghan war of the eighties against the
Soviet Union, with generous help from the United States and the involvement of Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan and other outside elements, which brought together volunteers from
a number of Muslim countries.
The significance of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan for global Muslim militancy is
not sufficiently recognized. For the first time in contemporary history, many Muslims
felt good and energized when a superpower like the Soviet Union was forced into a
humiliating retreat from Afghanistan.
With its cast of volunteer Muslim soldiers from outside Afghanistan, there started to
develop the myth of an Islamic project investing it with a politico-religious mission.
After the Talibans wrested power in Afghanistan, it became the virtual headquarters of
the al-Qaeda. Which ran training camps for a global jihad against the United States
and other enemy targets.
How does Indonesia fit into it? It is now known that the JI leaders like Zarkasih and
Abu Dujana were graduates of the Afghan Mujaheddin training camps, and thus
became part of the al-Qaeda ideology. They might have had second thoughts later in
terms of targeting Western interests as being counter-productive, but their eventual
commitment to an Islamic state remains steadfast.
And it is in sectarian conflict that they see their opportunity. It is relatively easier to
mobilize people against local targets as being easily identified and worked up. There
is a danger here, though.
Any anti-Christian conflict has the potential of developing into an anti-West campaign,
as Christianity tends to be identified with the West. This is especially so if Indonesia
were to remain economically backward and depressed. And this is where Western
help is most needed in terms of investments and an employment-geared strategy.
Indonesia's success in nabbing terrorists is praise-worthy. But unless it is
complemented with the lifting of its economic profile, it might be like treating the
symptoms rather than the disease.
The writer is a freelance writer based in Sydney and can be reached at
SushilPSeth@aol.com
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