From: aditjond@psychology.newcastle.edu.au (George J. Aditjondro)
Subject: GJA: Guns, pamphlets & handie-talkies (1 2 3 4 5)
Revised paper for the Proceedings of the Conference on "Conflicts and Violence
in Indonesia," organised by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Department
of African and Asian Studies, Humboldt-University in Berlin, July 3-5, 2000.
GUNS, PAMPHLETS AND HANDIE-TALKIES:
How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve
their political and economic privileges
George Junus Aditjondro
(Dept. of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Newcastle, Australia)
INTRODUCTION
The violence in the Maluku (Moluccas) islands has taken between 4 000 and 10 000
lives since January 1999 000 (Ivan A. Hadar, pers. com., June 17, 2000; Barr,
2000; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 26, 2000), out of a total population of
1,19 million people in 1997. This death toll is approximately evenly distributed
between North and South. About fourty percent of the casualties, or around 4000
people, have died in North Maluku, another fourty percent in Central Maluku
(Seram, Ambon and the Lease islands), and twenty percent in Southeast Maluku,
especially in the Banda, Aru and Kei islands (Alhadar 2000: 15; Dodd 2000).
This wide range of the death toll is caused by the fact that many fatalities
have not been accounted. The victims might have died in burning houses and other
properties, were unceremonially buried after being slashed to death, or drowned
in the sea while trying to escape on overloaded ferries, as has happened on June
31, 2000, when Cahaya Baru sank during its voyage from Halmahera (North Maluku)
to Manado (North Sulawesi), drowning nearly 500 refugees (International Herald
Tribune, July 1-5, 2000; Sydney Morning Herald, July 3 & 5, 2000).
In several cases, Moluccans were intentionally killed and their bodies dumped
into the sea during voyages to and from Ambon (see Appendix I). Such type of
executions are similar to the ones applied to dozens of Timor Lorosa'e students
on a state passenger ship, KM Dobonsolo, before and after the UN-supervised
referendum (ETHRC 1999: 15, 20).
In addition to the death toll, up to 860000 people have been displaced, with
around 280000 persons living in refugee camps in Southern Maluku and around
78000 persons in North Maluku. The only totally mixed shelter in Halong Naval
base, six kilometres east of the city of Ambon, accommodated around 10000
refugees (Tempo, August 7-13, 2000; Jakarta Post, August 29, 2000; Indonesian
Observer, September 20, 2000).
The majority of the refugees fled to the neighbouring islands, with North
Sulawesi being the main destiny for Christian Moluccans. Muslims displaced from
Maluku were predominantly Bugis and Makassarese migrants and have returned to
their respective homelands in South and Southeast Sulawesi. The number of
Butonese returnees have swollen to 107000 people, around 22% of the pre-existing
population (Collins 1999; Antara, May 17, 2000; Jawa Pos, June 16, 2000;
walhi@pacific.net.id, April 6, 1999). Meanwhile, the total number of Christian
Moluccan refugees in North Sulawesi have reached 16,293 persons.
After Jihad ('Holy War') fighters from Java and other islands began to ransack
Christian villages on Ambon, new waves of Christian Moluccan refugees have fled
their home islands. Between 18000 and 30000 refugees fled to West Papua (South
China Morning Post, July 29, 2000; Kompas, July 31, 2000; Tempo, August 7-13,
2000), and about 4000 refugees fled to East Nusa Tenggara. The Netherlands is
now home to between 500 to 600 Moluccans who fled on tourist visa (Infomaluku,
August 8, 2000), and a family of five fled on a 25-metre fishing boat to
Australia and is currently living in Adelaide (The Age, July 27, 2000).
This sectarian violence has left a deep scar on the social fabric of the people
that inhabit the archipelago: the new province of Maluku, which covers the
former Central and Southeast Maluku districts, and North Maluku, which covers
the four sultanates (Ternate, Tidore, Bacan and Jailolo) that once dominated
the entire archipelago and the Northwestern coast of New Guinea (Ellen 1986:
57).
The violent social upheavel has created severe effects on the Moluccan children.
It has left many families fatherless, or separated fathers and other able-
bodied males from women and children, many of whom live as refugees in the
forest and in refugee camps in the towns of Maluku. As has happened in nearby
Timor Lorosa'e (Galvao-Teles 1999; Aditjondro 2000a, 2000b), the intense
militarisation of Moluccan society has inflicted a culture of violence, with
elementary and secondary school children becoming skilled producers of crude yet
deadly weapons from commonly available materials (Australian Financial Review,
Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, March 16, 1999). Between 2000 to 4000
children aged 7 to 12 years have also taken part in raiding "enemy" villages and
protecting their own villages from "enemy" raids. They are known as Pasukan
Agas, or 'sandfly troops,' and have fought lethal battles on both sides of the
community (Tapak Ambon & LERAI 2000: 31; AP, February 24, 2000; Tempo, January
23, 2000: 23).
This adverse psychological impact on the psyche of young Moluccans has been
aptly illustrated by an architecture student, Umelto Labetubun, 25, as follows:
"Everyone has become hard. Even girls don't play with dolls any more; they play
with guns. In the future, when we have disputes, we will sove them with guns.
All of us in Ambon have experience now in defending ourselves in a hard way.
Even me, I am sorry to say, I can tell you now, that's the sound of an M16,
that's the sound of an AK47." As Roman Catholic priest Agus Ulahayanan further
added, describing the despair that have driven so many people into religious
warfare: "No one can stop them any more. A boy goes and burns down a house and
he come to me and says proudly. 'I burned down a house.' And already for him the
burden is lifted from the frustration and depression. There is nothing left for
me to say to him" (Mydans, 2000a).
Tertiary education has also badly suffered. Muslim villagers supported by Jihad
fighters and soldiers have destroyed the campuses of the Maluku Christian
University (UKIM, Universitas Kristen Indonesia di Maluku ), the state-owned
Pattimura University (UNPATTI) and the Pattimura Polytechnic University (Tapak
Ambon 2000; AFP, June 23, 2000).
Finally, Maluku and the island and city of Ambon, and even the shipping service
linking Maluku with the rest of Indonesia have become a society segregated by
religion. Christians have to board ships from the state shipping company, Pelni,
which are considered to be save for Christians, such as KM Dobonsolo, while
Muslims have to board KM Bukit Siguntang and KM Lambelu. Practically, no
Christian Moluccan dare to sail on those so-called 'Muslim ships', after several
Christians were stabbed to death and their bodies thrown overboard from KM Bukit
Siguntang.
This form of 'religious apartheid' also applies to the use of speedboats and
ferries in and around the city of Ambon. Being on a ship, ferry or speedboat,
however, does not fully guarantee one's safety, since gun battles have also been
fought recently between passengers and people on land, especially when a vessel
associated with one religion passes too close to land marks associated with the
opponent's religion.
To deal with this complicated and sensitive subject, I have constructed this
chapter in the following order. After outlining my research methodology, I will
outline the background of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence in
Maluku. Then, I will outline the main outside actors which channeled the inter-
ethnic and inter-religious tensions into an ever-widening spiral of violence.
Consequently, I will expose the agenda of the security forces in maintaining
this so-called 'low level insurgency,' and conclude the chapter with
recommendations for further action and research.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Conducting research about such a sensitive topic has not been easy, especially
being based outside Maluku. In addition, having Christian background makes being
labelled as "biased against Muslims" a challenge which I continuously have to
face. To overcome those obstacles I have complemented my library research with
attempts to elicit information from as many and as varied respondents in Maluku
as well as among Moluccans living outside their homeland, employing two levels
of cross-checking.
First, I cross-checked each important piece of information from each key
informant by asking for confirmation and further elaboration from other key
informants unknown to the first one, also making sure that information coming
from Christian respondents have been cross-checked by Muslim respondents and
vice versa.
Then, I further cross-checked information from Moluccan respondents with human
rights activists and academics who are either knowledgable about the situation
in Maluku or are knowledgable about similar cases of human rights violations in
Indonesia and Timor Lorosa'e. I collaborated in particular with journalists and
social scientists associated with Tapak Ambon (Team Advokasi Penyelesaian Kasus
Ambon), or Advocacy Team for the Resolution of the Ambon Case, an alliance of
seventeen non-governmental organisations in Jakarta and Ambon, which takes a
non-partisan humanist approach to the whole issue.
Tapak Ambon has been assisted in their field investigations by members of AJI
(Aliansi Jurnalis Independen), or the Independent Journalists Association, and
two human rights watchdogs, namely KontraS (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban
Tindak Kekerasan), or the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence,
which was then led by a young dedicated lawyer, Munir, and LERAI (Lembaga
Rekonsiliasi dan Perdamaian Indonesia ) or the Institute for Reconciliation and
Peace in Indonesia, which is led by Tamrin Amal Tomagola, sociology lecturer at
the University of Indonesia, who hails from North Maluku. This enabled me to
benefit from the data that had already been collected and analysed by AJI,
KontraS and LERAI activists.
This 'interactive' and 'snowballing' mode of open-ended interviews were carried
out mostly through email and partly through phone interviews, with one in-depth
face-to-face interview with a key human rights activist conducted during the
'Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia' Conference organised by the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Department of African and Asian Studies of Humboldt
University in Berlin on July 3-5, 2000. In addition, my media articles about the
political economy of the violence in Maluku as well as my media interviews about
this topic enabled
me to widen my circle of information as well as my increasing number of diehard
critics.
BACKGROUND
The background of the violence has to be found in Maluku as well as in Jakarta
with its large Moluccan diaspora. In this section I will first deal with the
internal conflicts in Southern Maluku, what is now the new province of Maluku,
then with similar factors in Northern Maluku, and finally with tensions between
Christian and Muslim Moluccan gangsters in Jakarta, which eventually 'spilled
over' to their homelands.
Southern Maluku:
By the end of 1999, Maluku - then still a united province -- was a powder keg
waiting to explode, ridden by numerous vertical and horizontal conflicts. The
previous year, Ambon, the provincial capital, had been rocked by student
protests which had lasted for months. Echoing the demands of the student-led
reformasi movement in Java which had forced General Suharto to step down, the
Ambonese student movement also demanded an end to the military's political role
(Bhakti 1999: 175).
These student demonstrations reached its climax on November 18, 1998, involving
up to 7000 students from several institutes of higher education, including
Unpatti, Ukim and the Institute of Public Administration (STAIN). This massive
demonstration in front of the headquarters of the Pattimura Army Resort Command,
or Korem 174 Pattimura ended in a physical clash between students and soldiers,
injuring 63 students, one academic staff, 24 soldiers, and three bystanders. One
student activist eventually died. The Army, however, also suffered a blow to
their reputation in Ambon. Its Javanese army commander, Col. (Inf.) Hikayat, was
reprimanded by provincial officials and religious leaders at the Governor's
office. Hikayat was eventually replaced by an Ambonese officer, Col. Karel
Ralahalu (Ecip 1999: 49; Kastor 2000: 185, 197-207; Hohe and Remijsen 2000;
Kelompok Solidaritas Reformasi di Maluku (KSRM) Press Release, November 25,
1998; Berita KontraS, No. 3/1999: 12).
This 'anti-state' uprising, which echoed the December 28, 1977 protest of about
600 Pattimura University (Unpatti) students against the killing of a Muslim
Unpatti student, Abdul Kadir Nurlete, by the son of an army police (Salemba,
January 23, 1978), also has its roots in the three decades history of Maluku's
economic marginalisation under Suharto's New Order. To understand this history,
it is important to contrast the treatment of Maluku by the central government
under Sukarno and Suharto (see Aditjondro 1990, 2000a).
After crushing the South Maluku Republic or 'RMS' (Republik Maluku Selatan)
rebellion in Ambon in 1950, Sukarno located several national development
projects in Maluku, namely the Wayame shipyard on Ambon, the Oceanography
Research Institute at Poka, Ambon, and the huge sugar mill at Makariki, on
Seram. Also, Sukarno appointed several top Ambonese Christian intellectuals in
his cabinet, and named Indonesia's first research nuclear reactor after an
Ambonese engineer, Siwabessy.
After Suharto replaced Sukarno, Jakarta's attitude towards Maluku changed
radically. One by one, Sukarno's 'prestige projects' in Maluku, according to the
New Order, were dismantled and moved to Java. The Wayame shipyard was moved to
Surabaya, East Java, and became the Navy shipyard, PT PAL. The Makariki sugar
mill was dismantled and re-installed at Jatiroto, also in East Java. Finally,
the status of the Oceanography Institute in Ambon was reduced to become a
station of the Jakarta-based National Oceanography Institute (LON). Construction
of the institute's main laboratory in Ambon was discontinued.
Consequently, Suharto-linked conglomerates began to feast on Maluku's abundant
natural resources (Aditjondro 1990; Aditjondro & Marlessy 1987). The Banda Sea,
abundant with its tuna fish, was leased out for 25 years to a Japanese fishing
cooperative, but was discontinued after eight years after protests by local
fisherfolks, environmentalists, and nationalists (Marten et al 1987).
This is when the Moluccan intelligentsia began to feel deprived and
marginalized, becoming 'stepchildren of progress' and guests in their own house.
Strong regionalist feeling began to emerge, and Ambonese intellectuals began to
join environmental watchdogs, after Suharto began to use environmentalism to woo
young radicals away from campus-based and Jakarta-oriented politics.
Unfortunately, while this emerging environmental awareness was fully endorsed by
the State Minister of Environment, Emil Salim (Aditjondro 1983), it was
differently perceived by the military in Maluku. In 1988, Pattimura University
academics who assisted local villagers in defending their land rights against
economic interests of the Djajanti Group, were arrested and accused of being
members of the outlawed 'RMS' movement (Fakta, July 15, 1988: 44-45).
In addition to exploitation by Suharto-linked conglomerates, such as the
previously mentioned Djajanti Group which has Suharto's cousin, Sudwikatmono on
its board (IBRA 2000), the Barito Pacific Group which cooperated closely with
two of Suharto's children (Brown 1999: 14-16) and the Banda Sea fishing fleet
of Suharto's middle son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, with his business partner, Tomy
Winata, and a Taiwanese company (Swa, August 22-September 11, 1996: 128-129),
Maluku's wealth was also syphoned away by two Javanese generals appointed to
govern the province, namely Brig.-Gen. Sumeru (Tempo, June 4, 1975: 22, July 12,
1975: 5, January 21, 1978: 38) and Brig.-Gen. Hasan Slamet (AMP 1980). These
generals were both from the Brawijaya Army Command in East Java.
These vertical conflicts let to the horizontal conflicts. According to Dieter
Bartels (2000), five internal factors created the fertile ground for the ongoing
Muslim-Christian fratricide. First, the influx of non-Ambonese Muslims; second,
the destruction of the traditional village government system based on local
customs (adat ) with the introduction of the Village Government Law No. 5 of
1979; third, the increasing land scarcity caused by urbanization; fourth, the
emergence of western-style gangs among less-educated Ambonese youngsters; and
fifth, the erosion of the
traditional Ambonese inter-village alliance system called pela.
As Bartels points out, Protestant-Christian Ambonese had long been apprehensive
about the large influx of Muslims from other parts of Indonesia, as were the
small minorities of other Protestant denominations and Catholics. In the 1970s,
this apprehension was also shared by many Ambonese Muslims. This influx of non-
Ambonese Muslims, which was officially encouraged by the nomination of Central
Maluku's largest island, Seram, as a transmigrasi destiny, did not only skew the
population balance in favour of Muslims, but also added to the already critical
urban and rural population pressure on land.
The swelling numbers of non-Ambonese Muslims also contributed to diminish the
traditionally strong influence of Christian Ambonese in the provincial political
structure. This, in turn, aggravated the power struggle on provincial level.
During the Sukarno era, the Christian political elite could be satisfied by the
appointment of two governors and one military commander from their ranks. In the
Suharto era, their loss of power is symbolized by the fact that no Christian
Ambonese was ever appointed to these two key positions. In total, the Muslim
Ambonese have had three
governors, two of them the most recent ones, with the latest appointment being
made during the transitional period of Suharto's immediate successor, B.J.
Habibie.
Beyond its symbolism it does not really matter, since the power of provincial
leaders was quite curtailed by the central government in Jakarta. Also, with the
introduction of Law No. 5/1979, Moluccan provincial leaders became even more
uprooted from their own local constituency.
Increasing population density caused by natural growth and migration from other
islands increased the pressure on land in urban and rural areas, which have been
indicated by an increasing frequency of inter-village feuds over border disputes
and ownership of real estate. How important land is in the current struggle is
pointed out by Bartels in the following example from Saparua: in the Muslim
village of Iha, the village secretary lamented Iha's land loss in the 17th
century when they were defeated by the Dutch who then divided most of Iha's land
between its neighbouring Christian
villages which had allied themselves with the Dutch. The village official called
for a conference between the Dutch and Indonesian governments to restore some of
the land to Iha, even though centuries have passed.
Another internal factor which Bartels mentions is the emergence of Western-style
gangs among the less-educated youngsters in various districts of Ambon City
which fought one another. After the social upheaval, these gangs, according to
Bartels, metamorphosed themselves into 'freedom fighters' defending their
neighbourhoods against outside attacks and invading those of their enemies to
burn them down. Before the upheaval, these youngsters hedged resentment against
their parents, teachers and the government but had to repress their feelings
because of the social strong control in the Suharto era. In the freer atmosphere
that followed the period of Reformasi , says Bartels, they felt free to rebel
against traditional values of adat, politics, and religion.
This description gives the impression that 'western-style gangs' had to operate
clandestinely during the Suharto era, and could only surface after the former
dictator had been forced to step down. This is quite different from the picture
which I have obtained through my library research and interviews with sources in
Ambon and elsewhere, namely that gangs of thugs have been operating 'normally'
during the Suharto era in Ambon and in other cities with high concentrations of
Ambonese migrants. In fact, these gangs later provided the excellent cover for
professional trouble-makers, recruited from the Indonesian army and the Suharto
family's 'private army', to initiate the spark that blew the Moluccan powder keg
up. In other words, it was the presence of these thugs - in Ambon and in Jakarta
- which enabled the masterminds of the Moluccan violence to 'indigenise' - or
more accurately, 'Ambonise' - the state-sponsored violence in Maluku.
Contrary to Bartels' image, this use of violence is deeply rooted in popular
Ambonese culture. It is embedded in the Pattimura cult, developed by Indonesian
independence fighters to symbolise one of the earliest resistance against Dutch
colonial rule, but was equally embedded in the Captain Jonker cult, used by the
Dutch colonial army, KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlands Indische Leger ) to recruit
Ambonese soldiers (Nanuilaitta 1966: 90-116).
Also, contrary to Bartels' belief, Suharto's New Order did not repress the
emergence of gangs, but rather transformed them into instruments of political
thuggery. This, in turn, has its roots in the Indonesian military practice of
using civilians to advance its political ambitions, dating back from the failed
coup d'etat of October 17, 1952, which was successfully repeated thirteen years
later (Pontoh 2000: 165-171, 174; Aditjondro 2000: 10-11).
During the Suharto era, the most well-known political thugs were organised under
the banners of Pemuda Pancasila, or Pancasila Youth. Political thuggery is also
not limited to the Suharto family, but practically all main political actors -
including the current President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice President Megawati
Sukarnoputri - are involved in this practice (Loren 1998; Hadar 2000;
Simanjuntak 2000).
In this city of Ambon with its nearly 350,000 inhabitants (LSEM, 1998: 32), the
underworld was dominated by two top figures, Berty Loupatty and Agus Wattimena,
who vied for the leadership of the largest gang, called Coker. This gang was set
up the early 1980s in the Kudamati neighbourhood, near the Dr. Haulussy public
hospital by Berty Loupatty, after returning from Makassar. As the amalgamation
of smaller gangs in Ambon with exotic names, such as Van Boomen, Papi Coret, Sex
Pistol, Coker had about one hundred members, including Muslims and women.
Literally meaning 'Handsome Boys' (Cowok Keren) some people also called provided
another meaning for Coker, namely Cowok Kerempeng ('Skinny Boys'), since most
of its male members were actually rather skinny young men. Later, after its
Christian members got involved in defending Christian neighbourhoods from
invaders, Coker obtained another meaning, namely Cowok Keristen , or 'Christian
Boys' (Tajuk, April 1999).
The intertwining problems of overpopulation, land shortages and immigration are
compounded the erosion of the traditional Ambonese inter-village alliance
system, called pela. According to Bartels, pela alliances, which originated long
before Europeans invaded Maluku in search of spices, are concluded between two
or more villages and in a few rare cases, between clans from different villages.
It is conceived as an enduring and inviolable brotherhood between all peoples of
the partner villages or clans, who have to assist each other in times of crisis
caused by war or natural disasters. "If Ambonese customs and beliefs would not
have been subjected to the systematic destruction discussed earlier and people
on both sides would still have considered themselves as Ambonese first and
Moslem or Christian second," says Bartels, "I believe the pela concept could
have had some soothing influence on the conflict."
Tanja Hohe and Albert Remijsen suggested an opposite view about this traditional
custom. By analysing the myths and ceremonies in upholding this tradition, which
balances the two contrasting values of fertility and violence, they argue that
"pela is the instrument through which existing tensions may be amplified" (Hohe
and Remijsen 2000). The unity between two parties bound by this pact is based on
opposition towards a third party. Pela thus intensifies divisions by
strengthening existing conflict potential. One source of tension is the relation
between the indigenous Ambonese and the Buginese and Butonese migrants from
South and Southeast Sulawesi. Only by establishing a relation of violence
towards an 'outsider' the indigenous Ambonese establish the value of solidarity
between themselves. Hence, the foundations for an ethnic conflict are created.
If this analysis is correct, than the campaign to popularise pela and even to
uplift it to provincial level, as proposed by law scholar M.G. Ohorella (cited
in Bartels 2000), may have also contributed to escalating the inter-ethnic
violence in Maluku.
Northern Maluku:
The new province of North Maluku was officially split of from Maluku on
September 16, 1999, after sectarian violence had erupted on the island of
Halmahera less than a month earlier. Here the violence began when the district
administration of North Maluku was planning to inaugurate the establishment of a
new subdistrict, Malifut, on August 18, 1999, as stipulated by the Central
Government Regulation (PP, Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 42/1999.
This new subdistrict was supposed to consist of sixteen villages of migrants
from Makian, a volcanic island west of Halmahera, five villages of Kao people
who are indigenous to this geographic area, and six villages of Jailolo people.
The Makianese are predominantly Muslim, and so are the Jailolo people, while the
Kao people are divided between Christians and believers of their native
religion. The Kao and Jailolo villagers refused to be included in the new
subdistrict of Malifut, since they would clearly become a minority on their own
ancestral land. On the other hand, the Makianese settlers insisted that PP No.
42/1999 should be implemented without further delay. Communal violence then
erupted between the Makian settlers and Kao villagers, with casualties from both
sides (Jong Ambon 2000; Tomagola 2000a, 2000b).
Hence, one of the root causes of the sectarian violence in North Maluku was the
decision in 1975 of the Moluccan provincial government, to evacuate the
Makianese to the transmigration area of Malifut at the Kao Bay, on Halmahera's
northeastern peninsula. By 1980, about 6,000 Makianese had been relocated to
Malifut, far away from their traditional circulatory migration villages on the
western coast of Halmahera (Lucardie 1985: 70).
Long before the social conflict erupted, criticism of this program had already
been expressed by Ronald Lucardie (1985). His 1979-1981 field work on Makian and
Malifut identified two trends that were endangering the success of the
resettlement scheme: first, the Makianese settlers in Malifut increasingly
resented the entire project; and second, many settlers were secretly returning
to their home lands, leaving their plots at Malifut in the hands of relatives or
friends. One of the reasons why the settlers disliked the scheme was the poor
reception from the local, mainly Christian
population. The local villagers disliked the settlers, since Malifut was planned
predominantly for Makian settlers, with only two settlements on the periphery
established for the local population (Lucardie 1985: 70). Lucardie advised the
government to abandon the entire project, "for the great discrepancy between
Makianese traditions of mobility and the resettlement project at Malifut can
only widen." He suggested instead that "it would be far better to identify
another area for transmigration, such as the south-west coast of Halmahera, that
meshes with long-standing destinations favoured by the people" (1985: 78).
The fact that 15 years later, the Makianese settlers in Malifut strongly
defended the establishment of the new subdistrict, is certainly related to the
fact that gold mining had began in this area. This Gosowong gold mine is
operated by PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals, a joint venture of the Australian
company Newcrest Mining Limited with the state-owned PT Aneka Tambang. It began
to produce its first ore in July 1999. After suspending mining in early 2000
because of the violence, in mid 2000 it was producing at a rate of 20,000 troy
ounces of gold a month, with long-term production forecasted at 154,000 ounces a
year (Dow Jones Newswires, June 20, 2000).
Hence, Tamrin Amal Tomagola rightfully states that competition over control of
the gold mine and its revenues is one of the local factors underlying the inter-
ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in North Maluku. Two other factors
according to Tomagola are competition between the elites of the two most
powerful sultanates - Ternate versus Tidore - for the seats of governor of the
new province, and competition for areas for religious expansion (2000a, 2000b).
The first factor, I believe, carries more water than the second one, and has
also been raised by other North Maluku
analysts (Raimadoya 2000; Arianto Sangaji, pers. com., January 4, 2000). In
fact, power struggles for governorial seats will become more prevalent in
Indonesia in general in the coming years, since two new laws, Law No. 22/1999
which grants more autonomy to local administration and Law No. 25/1999 which
provides a larger proportion of revenue for the provinces, districts and
municipalities, will provide more real power to the governor than it has been
for three decades during the Suharto era.
The other factor, territorial competition for religious expansion is more
doubtful, especially since Tomagola bases his argument on opposition of a
Pattimura University soil scientist against the Malifut resettlement scheme for
the Makianese who had to be evacuated from the volcanic eruption in their home
island. Tomagola explicitly states that the soil scientist was a Christian who
hails from Kao (2000a). As I have discussed earlier, opposition against the
Malifut resettlement scheme has been raised not only from an agronomical, but
also from an applied anthropological angle by Lucardie. In addition, further
investigations have shown that the soil scientist in question was indeed a
Christian, but did not hail from Kao.
One fact that has not been raised by Tomagola, Raimadoya and Sangaji is that
opposition against Muslim domination in North Maluku has not only come from
Christians, but also from Halmahera's indigenous people, the Togutil, who have
mostly retained their traditional, non-Semitic belief. They also fought against
Muslim militants, motivated firstly by solidarity with Christian relatives who
were killed by Makianese, and secondly to reject domination by non-Halmaheran
migrants from Tidore or Makian (Jong Ambon 2000; Jubilee Campaign 2000). This
Togutil opposition against outside control should also be seen in the light of
other forms of indigenous Halmahera peoples' resistance against successive
waves of outside domination by the Tidore sultanate, North Sulawesi-based
Permesta rebels, Javanese transmigrants and lately, timber concessions (Leith
1998; Bubandt 1998).
Jakarta:
In the 1980s, a Christian Ambonese gangster in Jakarta, Onki Pieters, commanded
respect and fear among the Ambonese youth, regardless of their religion. Despite
eking a living from their brawns rather than brains, Ambonese gangsters in
Jakarta still respected the pela tradition and often wore red bandanas, which
was more as a symbol of their Ambonness - rooted in the Alifuru culture --
rather than of their religion. This differs radically with the current meaning
given to 'red' to symbolise being a Christian and 'white' to symbolise being a
Muslim (Tanja Hohe, pers. com.,
July 2000; Marthin Nanere, pers. com, July 2000).
After while, another hristian Ambonese youth, Milton Matuanakotta, appeared on
the scene.He was claimed to have many younger supporters among both Christian
and Muslim Ambonese, and was rapidly becoming more popular among Ambonese in
Jakarta than his predecessor.
At hat time, the Muslim Ambonese reckoned that they also need to have their own
'hero', so they chose Dedy Hamdun, an Ambonese of Arabic descent, as their
leader. Dedy was a contradictory character: on one hand he actively campaigned
for the only Muslim political party permitted during the Suharto era, PPP
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United evelopment Party), but on the other
hand he used his fighting skills to clear land for the real estate business of
Ibnu Hartomo, a brother-in-law of then President Suharto(D&R, Aug. 9, 1997 : 96
- 99).
Whether it was because of his political or business activities, in early1998
Dedy Hamdun's name also on the list of 'disappeared persons, 'together with a
group of student activists and leaders of Megawati Sukarno putri's party, in a
clandestine operation involving the Indonesian Army's Special Forces, Kopassus.
Dedy Hamdun's disappearance caused a major shift in the politicall nd scape of
Ambonese gangsters in Jakarta. he leadership of the Moluccan Muslim outh was
taken over by Ongen Sangaji, a Muslim Moluccan gangster who is also a member of
Pemuda Pancasila (Jubilee Campaign, 1999 : 4).
Ironically, competing for loyalty among Moluccan youngsters in Jakarta drove the
two gangster leaders also to compete for access to the Suharto children's
private security business opportunities. Milton obtained access to the Suharto
children through Yorris Raweyai, the Pemuda Pancasila deputy leader who hails
from West Papua and is close to Bambang Trihatmodjo, Suharto's middle son. While
Ongen was closer to Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Suharto's eldest daughter, through
Abdul Gafur, whom we will further encounter in this chapter. Ongen's 'boys'
mainly came from the villages of Pelauw and Kailolo on Haruku (SiaR, January 26
& February 5, 1999; Xpos, January 28-February 3, 1999, February 4-10, 1999;
interview with sources in Maluku and Java, February 1999).
In the wake o fthe Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) in November 1998, when Suharto's successor,
B.J.Habibie sought a legitimate mandate for his presidency, certain politicians,
generals and business people created a new vigilante group to counter the
student demonstrations. It was called Pam Swakarsa, which consisted of the
Muslim Ambonese gangsters recruited by Dedy Hamdun and Muslim villagers
recruited from various areas in West Java. Financial support for these vigilante
groups came from the Suharto family and from a North Moluccan businessman of
Arabic descent, Fadel Muhammad, whose businesses were closely linked to the
Suharto family.While political patronage for those groups came from then Defense
Minister, General Wiranto, MPR Deputy Speaker, Abdul Gafur, who hails from North
Maluku, and the Jakarta Military Commander, Maj.-Gen. Djadja Suparman (Tempo,
November 30, 1998: 44, 48, 50 ; Hadar 2000).
A former Minister for Youth and Sport under Suharto, Gafur had consistently
tried to divide the Moluccan community in Jakarta along religiouslines. On May
15, 1995,when the Ambonese community in Jakarta were commemorating the day that
Pattimura launched his rebellion against the Dutch in 1817,Gafur boycotted the
all-Moluccan celebration in Gedung Joang in the Menteng neighbourhood, where
both Christian and Muslim religious leaders said their prayers. He organized
instead an exclusive celebration for MuslimMoluccans at Mrs.Suhartinah Suharto's
Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park, by organizing a Pattimura torch run. On
another occasion, Gafur claimed that Pattimura was Islam, refuting a well-
documented fact that the national hero,whose real name was Thomas Matulessy, was
a Christian (see Chauvel 1990:111,369; van Kaam 1977 : 11 - 37).
Returning to Ongen Sangaji's group, four of them who hailed from Kailolo
(Haruku), Tulehu and Hitu (Ambon), and Kei (Southeast Maluku) were killed by
locals who rushed to defend the student activists from attacks by the Muslim
vigilantes. It is also important to note that to raise the militancy of these
poor and lowly educated vigilantes were brainwashed to believe that the student
activists were "Communists" and were supported by Christian generals and
businessmen. Many vigilantes thus saw their mission as a 'holy war' (jihad )
against "infidels." The fact that the fiercest
battle between students and soldiers took place at the campus of the Atma Jaya
Catholic University -- due to its proximity to the parliament building -- gave a
sense of credibility to this sectarian and anti-communist propaganda (Tempo,
November 30, 1998: 27; Xpos, January 28 - February 3, 1999).
So, when four Muslim Moluccan gangsters were killed, the ground was laid to
provoke Muslim Ambonese revenge not against the student movement, but against
Christian Moluccans gangsters in Jakarta. That opportunity emerged during the
riots in the Ketapang neighbourhood on Sunday and Monday, November 22-23, 1998.
What began as a relatively harmless brawl between Christian Ambonese security
guards of a gambling centre and locals instantly developed into a massive anti-
Christian riot, where dozens of churches, schools, houses, banks, shops and
dozens of motor vehicles were burned and destroyed.
Further investigations show that outside forces were involved in turning this
local conflict into an inter-religious conflict. These outside forces included a
group of 'Ambonese-looking' men, who raided the Ketapang neighbourhood at 5.30
am at dawn. They were paid Rp 40,000 plus three meals a day to terrorise
Muslims. Although one of them was a Batak person from North Sumatra who was
executed by the locals, the majority of these gangsters turned out to be members
of the Muslim Ambonese vigilantes who had joined Gafur's PAM Swakarsa forces.
They attacked all local residents who were seen moving around, and burned down a
motorcycle parked in front of a local mosque, causing some of the mosque's
windows to be broken. This then became the 'apparent spark' that turned the
local conflict into an inter-religious riot, since rumours were spread around
that a mosque was burned down by 'infidels.' The local Muslims began to counter-
attack those earlier outsiders, supported by members of a Muslim paramilitary
group, FPI (Front Pembela Islam ), who had been brought in from various places
around Jakarta. During these riots, six people found their death in raw justice
handed out by local Muslims and their outside supporters, and seven died after
being burned alive in the local entertainment centre which was the original
cause of the conflict. Three of the victims were Christians from Saparua and
Haruku (Simanjuntak 2000: 54-55; Tempo, November 30, 1998: 30-31; SiaR, November
24, 1998, January 26, 1999; Waspada, November 24, 1998; RAPwashjp@aol.com,
November 27, 1998; interviews with sources in Ambon and Java, February-June
2000).
It is unclear whether the successive killings of Muslim and Christian Ambonese
gangsters in Jakarta were premidated by political allies of Suharto. The
Ketapang riots in particular, however, created a monopoly for another gambling
centre on Jalan Kunir, Jakarta. Claimed to be one of the largest gambling centre
in Southeast Asia, this 'Paradise entertainment centre' is managed by Tomy
Winata, a Sino-Indonesian business partner of Suharto's middle son, Bambang
Trihatmodjo, and close friend of Yorris Raweyai of Pemuda Pancasila (SiaR,
November 24, 1998; Tempo , June 6, 1999: 39-51).
Regardless of the motive behind the burning of the Ketapang gambling centre, the
killings of Muslim and Christian Ambonese gangsters did provide both groups --
unaware of the forces 'higher up' manipulating them - with strong motivations to
take revenge on each other later in their homelands, Maluku.
Using the Ketapang riots as an excuse, the security authorities rounded up all
Moluccans in Jakarta who had no proper identification papers (KTP) and put them
on passenger ships as well as Navy ships bound to Ambon. According to a
respondent who sailed on KM Bukit Siguntang to Ambon in December 1998, a group
of Ketapang gangsters travelling on the ship's public space loudly expressed
their intention to take revenge against their Christian rivals. They had taken
their knives and machettes with them, which was kept by their leader, a tall man
who travelled on the ship's third class for tourists, in the large drawer below
his bed.
These measures by the Indonesian security apparatus did not look suspicious
because many of Christian Ambonese were returning home for Christmas, while
Muslim Ambonese were also planning to spend the Muslim fasting month (Ramadhan)
and Idul Fitri holiday with relatives. Hence, between 165 and 600 young Ambonese
men were later identified of having sailed to Ambon during the end of 1998.
Among them were Christian Ambonese gangsters, who were involved in the dawn raid
at Ketapang, as well as Sadrakh Mastamu, the head of the security guards of the
Ketapang gambling centre (Tempo, February 8, 1999: 37; Forum Keadilan, February
8, 1999: 25; Humor, September 1995: 45; interviews with sources in Ambon, Java
and Australia, February-June 2000).
The two arch-rivals, Ongen Sangaji and Milton Matuanakotta were also among the
Ambonese gangsters that returned to Ambon at the end of 1998, to create the
initial spark for the Ambon riots. Their return to Ambon was co-accidental with
the assignment to Ambon of between 50 and 100 West Javanese volunteers by
Yayasan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Indonesia (Yakmi). This foundation is led by
Suharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana and Abdul Gafur. Its
volunteers are officially called Satgas Tebas (Satuan Tugas Tenaga Bantuan
Sukarela ), which literally means 'Volunteers Taskforce', but the abbreviation
'Tebas' can also mean 'Slash,' so, Satgas Tebas can also mean 'Slashing
Taskforce.' They had previously also been involved with Ongen's boys in the PAM
Swakarsa militias which fought pitch battles with the student activists in
November 1998. Ten Satgas Tebas members were caught by the police in Ambon, but
were probably soon released (SiaR, December 2, 1998, January 26 & 29, 1999;
Xpos, January 28-February 3 & February 4-10, 1999; interviews with sources in
Jakarta and Ambon, July - August 2000).
EXTERNAL ACTORS:
Following Bartels (2000), the conflict in Maluku can be divided into two
distinctive phases. The first phase began in January 1999 and ended at the end
of April 2000. This phase was characterised by mutual attacks of native
Christians and Muslims using largely primitive home-made weapons and self-made
bombs (bom rakitan ). Generally, there was an equilibrium of strength. Then, the
second phase began in May 2000, characterised by the arrival of non-Moluccans,
mostly Muslims from Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra, called Lasykar Jihad (Holy War
Forces). They brought with them sophisticated modern weaponry and allied
themselves with Muslim personnel of the military which constituted about eighty
per cent of the troops stationed in the Spice Islands. These developments
totally destroyed the previous balance, tipping the scale in favour of the
Muslims.
During the first phase, when relatively fewer people had been killed and the
level of inter-religious hatred had not been reached its climax, carefully
planned intelligence operations conditioned both communities to jump at each
other's neck as soon as a social spark had been ignited. These intelligence
operations included the distribution of provocative pamphlets among the ordinary
population, and the distribution of handie-talkie phones among ring leaders, to
ensure that the riots could be triggered simultaneously over a wide range
(Nation, February 19, 1999). Some anonymous pamphlets which circulated in Ambon
prior to the January and February 1999 riots warned both parties that the other
party was planning to burn their houses of worship, and others warned one ethnic
group that another ethnic group was planning to annihilate them (Nation,
February 19, 1999; Warta Berita Radio Nederland, January 12, 2000; Sydney
Morning Herald, January 15, 2000; Forum Keadilan, January 30, 2000: 19, 25).
Similarly, pamphlets were circulating among Muslims in North Maluku, prior to
the August and November 1999 riots, ostensibly signed by Protestant church
leaders in Ambon, urged Christians to convert or annihilate all Muslims. One of
these pamphlets was brought to the attention of a village administrator in
Tidore. A meeting was called and when the local minister, Ari Risakotta, did not
turn up to explain the letter's content, he was attacked and killed in his
house. With fighting still going on in Ambon, it is most unlikely that any
church leader would want another conflict in the
archipelago. So, it can be concluded that these pamphlet must have been made by
highly professional agitators who knows the North Moluccan society very well
(Alhadar 2000: 15; Bubant 2000; SNB 2000).
Eventually, after the fratricide had been going on for several months, and
enough victims had been killed on both sides, calls for waging the 'holy war'
(jihad ) were aired by militant Muslim organisations, supported by several of
the most highly ranked Muslim politicians in a mass rally on January 7, 2000 at
the Monas square in Jakarta, which became the platform to mobilise jihad
forces to be sent to Maluku.
On the surface, all these developments looked very spontaneous, but deep below
the surface, one can see two interlinking networks, a military network, and a
militant Muslim network, each with their own agenda, but joined by the common
aim of sabotaging the government's aim to roll back the military power and to
create an open, tolerant society, free from any religious domination.
Military network:
The military network, which links the two phases discussed by Bartels, stretches
from Jakarta to Pattimura officers in Ambon, who worked hard to provoke Muslims
and Christians to fight each other. This nation-wide network includes two
retired Army and Navy officers and once active Police officer in Ambon. They
belong to the military faction which strongly opposes any reduction of the
political power and business interests of the military (Pereira 2000b).
One retired and three active generals have been named by Moluccan sociologist,
Tamrin Amal Tomagola, as leading this network. They consist of (Ret). General
Wiranto, Lieut.-Gen Djadja Suparman, Lieut.-Gen Suaidy Marasabessy, and Maj.-
Gen, Sudi Silalahi (TEMPO Interkatif, June 29, 2000; Jawa Pos , August 5, 2000;
NRC Handelsblad, June 23-24, 2000; Sydney Morning Herald, January 19, 2000).
Wiranto was the Indonesian Armed Forces commander who oversaw the post-
referendum orgy of violence and destruction in Timor Lorosa'e in September 1999,
and also oversaw the outbreak of violence in Ambon eight months earlier.
Djadja Suparman was the commander of the Jakarta Army Command that oversaw the
formation of the Muslim militias under the banner of PAM Swakarsa to fight the
student activists in November 1998. He was eventually promoted to command the
Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), and had ordered the Kostrad troops in
Makassar (South Sulawesi), to fly to Ambon, only hours after the first clash
between a Christian Ambonese public transport driver and a Muslim Buginese
passenger broke out in Ambon on January 19, 1999.
Suaidy Marasabessy, a veteran from the Timor war, was then the commander of the
Hasanuddin Army Command in South Sulawesi, who approved the sending of these
troops to Ambon, despite the fact that their would emotionally biased against
the Christian Ambonese and defending the Bugis and Makassarese migrants in
Ambon, driven by ethnic solidarity.
Marasabessy was consequently moved to the Armed Forces Headquarters and promoted
to TNI Chief of Staff of General Affairs (Kasum) by President Abdurrahman Wahid.
Both his as well as Djadja Suparman's promotions were based on recommendations
from Wiranto, who was then still Coordinating Minister for Politics and
Security. Wiranto then appointed now Marasabessy to head a team of 19,
predominantly Moluccan, officers, to investigate the background of the violence
in Maluku and suggest ways to solve the problems.
During both phases of the conflict, Sudi Silalahi has been the commander of the
Brawijaya Army Command in East Java, and has overseen the deployment of
Brawijaya troops - side by side with Kostrad troops - in escalating the inter-
religious violence in Maluku. In his capacity as Brawijaya commander, he has
also allowed thousands of Jihad militants to board passenger ships to Ambon, in
spite of President Wahid's call to the armed forces to block them.
Interestingly, during the early months of the violence, the entire Moluccan
archipelago was still subordinated under the Trikora Army Command with its
headquarters in Jayapura, West Papua. However, instead of sending Trikora troops
from West Papua to Ambon, Wiranto sent troops from Java and South Sulawesi, who
were predominantly Muslims, to deal with the troubles in Maluku. Then, on May
15, 1999, with tens of new batallions deployed in the archipelago, the status of
the Pattimura Sub-Regional Military Command, or Korem (Komando Resort Militer )
was upgraded to become a full-fledged Regional Military Command, or Kodam
(Komando Daerah Militer ) (Tempo, January 23, 2000: 25).
In Maluku itself, two Colonels based at the Kodam headquarters in Ambon fanned
the flames of animosity between Christians and Muslims. The Pattimura
Territorial Assistant, Col. Budiatmo, nurtured links with Christian thugs,
especially Agus Wattimena, to maintain their rage against their Muslim
neighbours, while Intelligence Assistant Col. Nano Sutarno, kept the flame alive
among Muslim thugs (Aditjondro 2000f; Tomagola 2000b; TAPAK Ambon 2000).
Those two colonels, who had already been stationed in Ambon under Suaidy
Marasabessy as Korem Pattimura commander, also had friends in high places. A
brother of Nano Sutarno, Mariner Brigadier General Nono Sampurno, is the
commander of the security guards of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This
has made her practically 'captive' to the military agenda, although she was the
one assigned by President Wahid to solve the Maluku problems.
Apart from those two colonels, who were removed from Maluku after their names
were exposed in my articles in Sydney Morning Herald (July 18, 2000) and Jakarta
Post (July 20, 2000), several retired and active officers living in Ambon also
played a role in 'fanning the flames.' They are (Ret). Brig.-Gen. Rustam Kastor,
(Ret). Police Lieut.-Col. R. Hasanussi. and ex- Navy officer, M. Jusuf Elly.
Born in Ambon on July 9, 1939, Rustam Kastor was the former Chief of Staff of
the Trikora Army Command in Jayapura (West Papua) and had also been stationed at
the TNI headquarters in Jakarta. He can rightly be called the 'ideological
father' of the violence in Maluku. He gave a pseudo-scientific justification to
invite 'holy war' (jihad ) forces to Maluku to save Muslims from annihilation by
Christians Moluccans, by accusing the Christians of trying to revive the banned
1950-1964 'South Moluccan Republic' rebellion. Not only the Protestant Church of
Maluku, or Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM), but also the Moluccan chapter of
Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan) does support this RMS ideal, according to Kastor.
Actually, this conspiracy theory was first raised on January 28, 1999, in a
press conference organized by two militant Muslim organisations, KISDI (Komite
Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam) and PPMI (Persatuan Pekerja Muslim
Indonesia) (SiaR, January 29, 1999). It acquired some sense of credibility when
it was officially adopted and disseminated by Ret. Maj. Gen. A.M. Hendropriyono,
then Minister for Transmigration, in a public meeting with the Maluku governor,
religious and other informal leaders, students and youth in Ambon on Tuesday,
March 9, 1999 (Kompas, March 10, 1999). Another retired general, Feisal Tanjung,
instantly underlined Hendropriyono's accusation (SiaR, March 11, 1999).
The theory then spread like bushfire as it was disseminated by the Muslim
controlled media in Indonesia, where the abbreviation of 'RMS' became distorted
to mean 'Republik Maluku Serani', or the 'Christian Moluccan Republic', thereby
distorting the fact that Ambonese Muslims had also taken part in founding this
liberation movement, which goal was not to set up a Christian state (see Chauvel
1990).
After nearly a year of being propagated by certain Muslim and pro-New Order
media, this theory was formalised by Rustam Kastor into his book (2000), which
has become a best seller not only among certain Muslims circles in Maluku, Java
and Sulawesi. Apart from its provocative language about Christians, the book
blames the massive Moluccan student demonstrations in November 1998 for
preparing the ground for the so-called 'RMS-led Muslim-cleansing operation.'
This was, according to Kastor, a conscious attempt to weaken the military so
that they would not be able to crush the subsequent 'RMS-led rebellion' which
aimed at cleansing Maluku from its Muslim population (2000: 33-34, 185, 197-
207).
Kastor also accuses Christians of manipulating the student-led Reformasi
movement to destroy the Indonesian economy and thereby to promote the Republic's
disintegration by separating the Christian-dominated provinces in Eastern
Indonesia -- including East Timor -- which would then form a new Christian-
dominated country with fantastic natural resources, since it will include West
Papua and the current province of Maluku (Kastor 2000: 108).
What Kastor's book ommits is the fact that Timorese and Papuan freedom
fighters have Muslims in their leadership ranks, who are certainly not fighting
to create a greater Christian alliance. Besides, separatism is certainly not a
Christian monopoly as is shown by the Achehnese people .
Apart from writing a book to justify an anti-Christian war in Maluku, Kastor was
personally involved in inviting the jihad forces from Java to Maluku (Kompas,
April 7, 2000), and built up their fanatism through his sermons calling for the
'holy war' to liberate Muslim Moluccans from their Christian oppressors
(zulfan@iname.com, April 9, 2000; AgungPrimamorista@tpj.co.id, May 30, 2000).
The next person , H. R. Hasanussi is one of the few -- if not the only -- police
officer who heads a provincial branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI,
Majelis Ulama Indonesia). In July 1999, Hasanussi went to Makassar (South
Sulawesi) to recruit about sixty Muhammadiyah members and ship them to Ambon to
join the local Muslim militias (TPG, 1999). Ironically, he lost his son, Alfian
("Eki") Hasanussi (19), a Police Sargeant who was fatally wounded by a sniper on
Wednesday, May 17, 2000 (Detik.com & Tempo Interaktif, May 18, 2000).
The third person, Mohammad Jusuf Elly, related through marriage to Hasanussi, is
a retired Navy officer who served in East Timor from 1975 to 1983. He claimed
even to be in East Timor before the invasion, and seemed to be closely linked to
Indonesian commandos who were stationed in the territory during the Indonesian
occupation. His hatred against Australian InterFET troops that had pushed the
Indonesian occupation forces out of Timor Lorosa'e showed up, when he accused
the Australian mining joint venture in Halmahera of supplying helicopters to
Christian groups for weapons and ammunitions transport. "Those Australians
think they can send in Interfet to do as they wish, just like they did in East
Timor," so Jusuf Elly told The Australian of January 13, 2000.
Then, after many people had put the blame on the jihad forces for the troubles
and called for their expulsion from Maluku, Jusuf Elly has strongly opposed
those calls. He event threatened to kill the Governor of Maluku, Saleh
Latuconsina, a Muslim, if the governor was going to order their expulsion (AFP,
May 25, 2000). However, by August 2000, the former Naval officer who is married
to a Javanese woman ceased his attacks on Christians and was even recorded as
aiding Christian humanitarian workers who needed protection in the Muslim
quarters (Sanubar 2000).
With so many high-ranking army figures involved in inciting the troubles in
Maluku it is no wonder that the soldiers could operate without impunity in the
twin provinces, where until May 2000, 70 per cent of the victims on both sides
were killed or injured from gun shots by the military and police (Tomagola
2000c). Basically, three Army and one Police units have taken part in the
carnage, namely the Kostrad, Brawidjaja, Kopassus and Brimob troops.
The Kopassus' involvement has not been so obvious as the three other troops,
which has been well-documented by foreign journalists. The Kopassus soldiers
often disguised themselves, using Arabic robes and false beards, the trade marks
of the Muslim militias or using Laskar Maluku t-shirts, the trade mark of
Christian militias. Some of them were intercepted before reaching Ambon, such as
what happened when five long-haired Kopassus soldiers were arrested aboard KM
Lambelu, on Sunday, July 29, 2000, before entering Ambon from Buru (The
Australian, August 2, 2000). On the other hand, however, on August 5, 2000,
about 70 Kopassus officers were spotted by journalists and humanitarian
volunteers leaving Ambon boarding a Hercules military aircraft, pushing a large
wooden box of their gear on the plane. They wore their military uniform, wearing
their military stripes as well as their Kopassus badges. In addition, the
presence of Kopassus members in Ambon had already been noticed by journalists
since January 1999 (Sanubar 2000; other sources in Ambon, pers. com., July-
August 2000).
Kopassus presence among the paramilitary forces could also be deduced from the
typical combat skills - such as shooting and throwing granates from within empty
oil drums, pushed by Jihad militants who attacked the UKIM campus - or by the
prevalence of snipers, who often took deliberate care to take equal number of
victims from both communities in each inter-religious confrontation. Given that
fatal head shots are not a monopoly of the Kopassus soldiers, and have also been
mastered by other special forces of the Navy and Police, the Army special forces
have had more time and occasions to develop this mortal skills in their
assignment in Timor Lorosa'e and in their training exercises with the Australian
SAS sharp shooters.
Without this military backup, the Jihad forces themselves could impossibly on
June 21-22, 2000 break into the police headquarters in Tantui, Ambon, burn down
a housing compound occupied by about 2,000 police members and their families,
break into two ammunition warehouses, and steal 832 guns, 8000 bullets, and
dozens of Mobile Brigade (Brimob) uniforms (Djari 2000; Republika, June 24,
2000; Straits Times, June 25, 2000).
The militant Muslim network:
This brings us to the militant Muslim network, which cooperated with the
previously described military network to send up to 100000 young Muslims to
Maluku - about 8 000 in the Northern half and about 2000 in the Southern half,
according to Tamrin Amal Tomagola (InfoMaluku, June 12, 2000) -- supposedly to
'liberate their Muslim brothers and sisters from their Christian oppressors.'
Many of the leaders of the masses recruited to wage the 'holy war' in Maluku
came from a new stream of Muslim militants, which follows the teachings of the
Wahhabi movement. This international movement to return to Islam of the first
generation is funded by members of the House of Saud. It is named after its
founder, Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab (1703-1787), whose teachings were adopted by
Ibnu Saud when he founded the Saudi monarchy in 1925 (Aburish 1994:12-13; Jansen
1979: 87).
In Indonesia, they found a rapidly growing support -- outside the two largest
Muslim organizations, Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah -- in the Tarbiyah
Movement, which formed conggregations or jamaah salaf, among students in
several prestigious state universities, such as the Bandung Institute of
Technology (ITB). Their goal is to establish an Islamic state, hence they are
also known as the 'neo-NII [Negara Islam Indonesia ]' movement', to distinguish
them from a prior clandestine movement linked to the army's intelligence
operations.
One well known NII-campaigner is Al-Chaidar, an Achehnese who organised the
gathering of between 100000 and 400000 people at the National Monument park in
Jakarta on January 7, 2000, calling for Muslims to wage the holy war to Ambon.
This gathering was addressed by the chair of the People's Consultative Council
(MPR), Amien Rais, a former minister in Wahid's cabinet, Hamzah Haz, and a
former minister in Suharto's cabinet, Fuad Bawazier, and was attended by 22
militant Muslim organisations, which include Kisdi, PPMI, FPI and Ongen
Sangaji's Muslim Maluku Association (Xpos, January 22-30, 2000; Jubilee Campaign
2000).
The commander of the jihad forces in Maluku, Ustadz (Teacher) Ja'far Umar
Thalib, also comes from the Wahhabi movement, who after studying in Madinnah
joined the Taliban guerillas in Afghanistan, that odd tactical alliance between
the US CIA and the Wahhabi businessman, Osamah bin Laden (SiaR, January 28,
2000; zulfan@iname.com, April 15, 2000; sources in Jakarta and Sydney, April-
October 2000).
In the Spice Islands, and especially in the predominantly Muslim North, there
exist a strong bond between the Jihad movement and one of the militant Islamic
parties, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan). In areas currently under control
of the local and national jihad forces, the Wahhabi ideals of establishing
Muslim societies with the first generation of Muslims as model is currently
being carried out.
The close links between the Jihad forces and the Justice Party (PK) is through
PK's ideologue, Abdi Sumaiti alias Abu Rido. This former Islamic religion
lecturer at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) pursued his education at
the Madinah University where he joined the Wahhabi movement. A strong anti-
Semitic and anti-Christian figure, Abu Rido also opposes other Islamic sects
which he feels do not teach the right doctrine.Sabili, the magazine which he
started while still in the underground neo-NII movement in 1989, is currently
one of the most vocal mouthpieces of the Jihad movement.
Meanwhile, support for the jihad forces within the armed forces has not only
come from the Wiranto faction in the Army. They also have enjoyed tacit support
- if not active backing - from factions in the Police and Navy. Despite
President Wahid's order to all the forces and the police to block the jihad
forces from leaving Java, the East Java Police commander, Mayor General Da'i
Bachtiar did nothing to stop them from boarding a state-owned ship, KM Rinjani,
in Surabaya to sail to Ambon. They were also allowed to ship their weapons on
another ship, Tanto Sakti, hidden in soap boxes in 200 containers which reached
Ambon after the arrival of the troops. In Ambon, the authorities allowed these
containers full of weapons to be disembarked at the Muslim-controlled Yos
Sudarso harbour in Waihoang, instead of in the Navy harbour of Halong.
MILITARY AGENDA:
Judging from the perseverance of the inter-religious killings in Maluku, the
rapid deployment of Jihad forces in the twin provinces, the open involvement
of soldiers in siding with the villagers and the jihad forces, and the
perseverance of military officers linked to the Wiranto faction, none of whom
have been court-martialed or even investigated for ordering the attrocities in
Maluku, one cannot argue that these are just 'rogue elements' in operation, as
has been the standard line in Indonesian official rhetoric. The explanation for
the continuing troubles in Maluku have to be found in a more systemic way in the
interests of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia), the Indonesian armed forces.
From analysing the data and studying the way of thinking and operation of the
military, one can say that there are five points on the military agenda in
perpetuating the conflict in Maluku. The first point and the most immediate
agenda was to counter the students opposition against the military's dual
function by turning that vertical conflict into a horisontal conflict; the
second point is to defend the archipelago concept, or Wawasan Nusantara ; the
third point is to defend the territorial
structure of the armed forces; the fourth point is to defend the economic
interests of the armed forces; and last but certainly not least, the fifth point
is to defend the high-ranking officers from humiliation in criminal, human
rights and corruption trials.
First of all, as pointed out by Munir (2000), triggering the horizontal
conflicts in Maluku and elsewhere was a deliberate act by the military to divert
the attention away from the demand of the students in Ambon and elsewhere in
Indonesia to reject the military's dual function.' This has been achieved, not
only by the destruction of two campuses where the students had been on the
forefront of the reformasi movement in Maluku, but also by driving the
religious wedge between Muslim and Christian students in the province, and to a
certain degree, also in Indonesia in general.
Secondly, as pointed out to the author by military analyst, Ingo Wandelt, the
forced retreat of the Indonesian state apparatus from Timor Lorosa'e, after the
East Timorese people overwhelmingly voted for independence, has left a big gap
in the chain of defence in the Eastern Indonesian region. According to the
Indonesian defense doctrine, Wawasan Nusantara, islands protect an inland sea,
in this case the Banda Sea. With East Timor breaking lose, in the TNI eyes, the
islands chain of defense in Eastern Indonesia has been seriously opened and
weakened. Maluku, which lies just north of East Timor, is thus directly exposed
to potential threats from the South, especially the perceived threats by the UN
forces, dominated by the Australian Defense Forces, currently based in Timor
Lorosa'e.
Apart from the geo-strategic break away of half of the Timor island, the large
Christian population in Maluku is seen as less trustworthy in the military's
eyes to defend the southeastern flank of the Republic, believing that they may
have the same separatist tendencies as the predominantly Catholic East Timorese
people.
Hence, strategic demographic adjustments were made by the military by settling
pro-Indonesian East Timorese in West Timor, to act as a buffer against future
incursions into the West from the Eastern part of the island. On the same time,
pro-Indonesian East Timorese incursions into the East, backed by regular
Indonesian soldiers may in the future force East Timor into becoming a satellite
state of Indonesia, as Lebanon currently is in relation to Syria, thereby
mending the broken link in this archipelagic chain.
In the light of these strategic demographic adjustments, the deployment of
thousands of jihad militants, who may eventually settle down in the Spice
Islands and bring in their relatives from Java and elsewhere can be seen as
population shift to prevent Maluku from following East Timor's example. In other
words, the deployment of thousands of Muslim militants into the Christian areas
of Maluku had to be expected as early as January 1999, when the independence
option was offered by then President B.J. Habibie to the East Timorese people.
It eventually took fifteen more months, since the military had first to
concentrate on reshuffling Timor's population, in the wake of the UN-supervised
referendum.
The third point on the military agenda, namely defending TNI's territorial
structure, was raised by Tomagola, noticing how quickly General Wiranto upgraded
the Pattimura Korem to Kodam, thereby justifying the stationing of more troops
in Maluku (Tempo, January 23, 2000: 20).
To clarify the meaning of this changes, it is important to understand the Army's
territorial structure, where the line of command flows from the Chief of Staff
of the Army to the commanders (Panglima) of the Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer),
where the commander is a two-star general. Each Kodam consists of four to six
Korem (Komando Resort Militer ), headed by a colonel. Below the Korem are the
District Military Commands, or Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer ), headed by a
lieutenant colonel (Kammen & Chandra 1999: 20-26).
Each Kodam has a number of associated battalions representing the different
service specialisations within the Army. Commanded by a major or lieutenant
colonel, these battallions are, according to Douglas Kammen and Siddharth
Chandra, "the real troops behind the Army's territorial structure." In addition
to these territorially based units, there are the Kopassus and Kostrad
battalions (1999: 28).
Under then Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto, the Army planned to re-
establish the seventeen Kodams which his predecessor, General Benny Murdani, had
reduced to ten, due to the lack of adequate officers at that time (Kammen &
Chandra 1999: 20-21). According to Wiranto's plan, apart from reviving the old
Kodam Pattimura, other Kodams which had existed between 1958 and 1985 were also
going to be revived (Forum Keadilan , March 29-April 4, 1999: 18).
To find a rationale to recreate those dormant military commands was to show that
the troops were needed to deal with unrest in those regions, and after the
troops had been deployed, they needed to be stationed there permanently. In
other words, to justify the presence of fire fighters, the fire has to be
created.
The importance of this territorial structure and its expansion by Wiranto can
not be underestimated, since it is the backbone of the military's claim to carry
out its function as a political force, in addition to its function as a defense
force, the well-known 'dual function' doctrine. This territorial structure is
parallel to the government's structure, a type of state within a state, were
orders flow down from the top (the national capital) to the bottom
(subdistrict), while bribes to facilitate promotions flow from the bottom to the
top.
Speaking about bribes is speaking about the fourth point on the military's
agenda to perpetuate the violence in Maluku, namely to defend its economic
interests. This point has been raised by Amir Hamzah, a former columnist for the
armed forces newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata . He says certain officers, both
active and retired, feel threatened by the prospect of decentralisation. If
Jakarta implement plans for regional autonomy and local revenue-sharing in 2001,
local parliaments would have the power to cancel or refuse to renew lucrative
contracts with military-backed companies engaged in fisheries, forestry and
mining. Riots, he argues, would delay such losses (Cohen 2000).
Maluku was indeed ridden with military business interests, which was mostly
through charities which had shares in the conglomerates operating in Maluku,
through joint ventures with members of those conglomerates, or by using certain
Sino-Indonesian business people as their financial operators. These economic
interests are also not limited to the Army, but also to the Navy and Air Force.
PT Green Delta, a company owned by the Air Force, supplies logs from their 74
000 hectares concession on the island of Morotai to Barito Pacific's mill on
another North Maluku island (Brown
1999: 8, 62).
Maluku is, however, not the only region ridden with military business interests,
since this is a nation-wide phenomenon. As a study by the International Crisis
Group (ICG) has concluded that the military raises funds to cover around 75 per
cent of its expenditures through business enterprises and other means. These
fund-raising activities are generally not subject to public scrutiny: military
commanders have access to large sums of money that could be used to finance
future political manouvres (2000: iii). The Rp 189 billion (US$ 22 million)
corruption scandal at Kostrad's Dharma Putera Foundation, which was only
uncovered after Lieut.-Gen. Djadja Suparman was replaced by the pro-reformasi
Lieut.-Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, is just the tip of the iceberg. Still, it had
cost Wirahadikusmah his job, since he then was removed from the Kostrad command
after exposing that corruption scandal (Australian Financial Review, August 1,
2000; Jakarta Post, September 22, 2000).
Ironically, when the violence began to perpetuate by itself, troops deployed in
Maluku began to find ways to make big bucks for themselves from the unrest. In
Ambon, soldiers offered protection for shops and travellers, who had to make the
dangerous routes through warring villages to and from the airport and harbour.
Soldiers from the 321 Battalion of Kostrad, who reportedly attacked three banks
in Ambon on Sunday, July 16, 2000, and tortured the banks' security guards when
they were not given the keys to the banks' cash deposits (Antara, July 17,
2000). In North Maluku the Brawijaya troops stole coconuts from Muslim farmers
and forced Christians workers to produce copra which the soldiers exported to
Manado (Tomagola 2000b). And in both provinces, the military became the main
source of weapons and ammunition to both warring sides, and offered their
shooting skills to whoever paid the best wages.
Last but not least, the fifth point on the military agenda is the observation
that the fightings in Maluku often flare up, whenever interrogations of former
President Suharto for his corruption, or interrogations of former General
Wiranto for his role in the post-referendum mayhem in Timor Lorosa'e, takes
place (Jawa Pos , August 5, 2000).
Unfortunately, until September 2000, the military were not looking forward
towards reducing their role in the Spice Islands. On the contrary, they were
looking towards expanding their role. Pattimura Military Commander, Brig.-Gen.
I Made Yasa, made the revealing statement that the military was considering to
open a military district (Kodim) for two new regencies of Buru and Maluku
Tenggara Barat (Jakarta Post, September 2, 2000).
CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that the ongoing inter-religious violence in Maluku was
fomented and maintained by a network of retired and active military officers,
supported by certain politicians from the 'Central Axis' coalition of Muslim
parties. These intertwined military and militant Muslim networks exploited the
simmering ethno-religious tensions in Maluku using gangsters from Java and Ambon
to trigger communal violence and later deployed of thousands of Muslim militants
after the internal fightings in Maluku were declining. In this second phase of
the conflict, the nature of
the violence was transformed from inter-village conflicts to an open war with
Christian villages defending themselves from massive attacks by thousands of
Muslim militants, openly supported by active military units.
This situation parallels the war between pro-independence fighters and pro-
Indonesian militias, backed by the Indonesian police and soldiers, before and
after the UN-supervised referendum in Timor Lorosa'e. While in Timor Lorosa'e
the Indonesian armed forces chose Catholic Timorese paramilitary forces and in
Acheh former Achehnese guerilla fighters as their collaborators, in Maluku the
military chose to side with militant Muslims shipped in from Java and other
islands.
For the armed forces, the social upheavel in Maluku fulfills several strategic
goals, which ultimately aimed at consolidating their political and economic
power which is deeply threatened by the reformasi movement, and the new
political trend towards real devolution of power to the regions.
Most probably, the militant Muslims and the politicians backing them in the
national parliament are aware of the 'temporary' nature of this alliance, and
have also been trying to turn this to their benefit, by using the unrest in
Maluku to incapacitate the administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid, whose
views about the role of Islam in Indonesia's political system differs radically
from the views of the politicians who support the jihad movement. At the end of
the day, however, it is still
the military that calls the shots, as proven in the latest MPR sitting where the
seats for the military and police were not scrapped but instead extended for
another five years.
Considering the fact that the current regime in Jakarta is practically hijacked
by the forces which refuse to end the violence in Maluku, there seems to be no
alternative than to exert international pressure on the Indonesian government -
especially on the armed forces and their parliamentary supporters -- by the
United Nations and all is its agencies, including the UN Human Rights Commission
in Geneva and the Security Council in New York, to end the sufferings of the
twin provinces of Maluku.
This political pressure should be accompanied by economic pressure aimed at the
financial sources of the Indonesian military, to deter them from instigating
proxy wars in faraway regions, from Acheh to Maluku and West Papua, and even in
supporting militia incursions into Timor Lorosa'e.
Newcastle, October 5, 2000
Appendix I:
List of Moluccan intellectuals who have lost their lives during the violent
conflicts in Maluku
Lukas Domingus Paliama, S.H. (34 years), lecturer at Pattimura University
(Unpatti) in Ambon: his body was found, stabbed to death, in Ambonís Air
Kuning neigbourhood, on March 2, 1999, after the night before he had been seized
from his motorcycle, while riding through the Batumerah neighbourhood with his
fiance, Marlen Sitanala, M.Sc. (30 years), also lecturer at Pattimura
University. They were forced into a Kijang van by six persons and taken to the
house of a retired Army officer in Ambon. An Army provost, Kacong, was involved
in this case. Invitations for their wedding had already been circulated, and
from their place of captivity, they allegedly were still able to call their
parents at home to ask them to come to the place where their bodies were dumped
on the next morning. Although Marlen was the only daughter of the charismatic
village chief (raja) of Suli on Ambon, her father refrained from ordering his
subjects to take revenge.
Edwin Nanere (24 years), son of former Unpatti Rector, Dr. Jan Nanere and last-
year law student at Unpatti, was stabbed and tortured to death by a group of
booted men on KM Bukit Siguntang, on his voyage from Ambon to Makassar with his
parents and brothers on August 25, 1999. So far, nobody has been apprehended and
tried for this murder case. It has been speculated that the real target of this
mob was Dr. Nanere, since he was on his way to Europe to testify about the
'invisible' hands behind the violence in Maluku.
Joyce Dangeubun, M.Sc. (37 years), lecturer at the Fishery Faculty of Unpatti
was stabbed and her body was thrown overboard by a group of men on KM Bukit
Siguntang on her voyage from Makassar to Tual, via Ambon, with five relatives
and three neighbours on September 18, 1999. She was planning to do field work
for her Ph.D. thesis research at Dalhouse University in Canada. Her body was
never retrieved and nobody had been apprehended and tried for this murder case.
Sources: Daily Telegraph, March 3, 1999; Forum Keadilan, Jan. 30, 2000; PGI
Press releases of August 25 & September 2, 1999; interviews with relatives and
friends of the deceased, June - July 2000.
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