THE CHURCH IN INDONESIA:
FACING NEW CHALLENGES TOWARDS A NEW INDONESIA
The plurality of the Indonesian society
Indonesia is a pluralistic society: multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-
religious. A diversity of ethnic groups, cultures, customs, languages and
religions exists in this vast archipelago of more than 13.000 islands. There are
five religions: Islam (87%), Protestantism (7%), Catholicism (3%), Buddhism
(2%), Hinduism (1%). The total population of Indonesia is around 210 million
people.
This plurality is at times a reason for pride when a unity in diversity can be
maintained. There are many local languages and dialects, but there is one
uniting language for the whole country, called Bahasa Indonesia (the Indonesian
language). This diversity has enriched the inclusiveness and openness of various
regions. Pancasila (five pillars), the five guiding principles for the whole
country (belief in one God, unity, humanity, democracy and social justice for
all), has united the people in shaping one nation.
But at the same time this plurality is also prone to social problems and
conflicts. Amidst this plurality a fragmented society has emerged, which is
characterized by frictions in inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. SARA
(suku, agama, ras, antar golongan = ethnicity, religion, race, inter-group
relations) are the most sensitive issues and keep the potentials of social
problems.
Ethnicity is sometimes used to incite a conflict and religion is used as a
medium of dividing the adherents of different religions. Ethnic and religious
primordialism, which is the weak point in Indonesian society, is easily
manipulated by sharpening primordial prejudices.
This is aggravated by fanaticism (ethnic, political, religious), which sometimes
becomes a source of problems and particularly in recent years it has tended to
intensify. A series of violence since 1996 to the present has been closely
related to political, ethnic and religious issues. A multi-dimensional crisis
Unfortunately, in the era of New Order of Suharto nation building, democracy and
respect for human basic rights were abandoned. It strived to achieve a high
economic growth, but for political legitimacy only. In fact its economic
policies only created fragile economic fundamentals, and the result was an
economic growth in appearance only. The Asian economic crisis in 1997 destroyed
not only the Indonesian economy; it also opened up the hidden social,
political and judicial fractures of the nation.
An in-depth analysis showed that this crisis situation was rooted in the system
and structure of the society and the practices which put aside human dignity and
basic rights.
Firstly, already since the beginning of the New Order the economy system was not
taking side with the interest of the people; the economic development tended to
benefit certain government officials and business people/groups (conglomerates)
to the detriment of ordinary people. Low morale in the government officials and
politics of interest of certain groups have also played a major part in
provoking such a crisis, as noticeable in instrumentation of human persons and
abuse of structures and system. Secondly, in that system every party tried to
gain benefits for its own self, group or family. The consequences were
corruption, collusion and nepotism, which grew wildly, and the unjust and
fraudulent practices became a way of life. Thirdly, the exercise of state
authority, which put priority on state stability and people's security,
supported by a strong military domination, had resulted in sacrificing a great
number of human lives, especially in the military operation areas, such as Aceh,
West Papua/Irian Jaya, East Timor. Also kidnapping of pro-democracy activists by
certain members of military Special Forces was used to silence those who might
endanger the statusquo. Fourthly, the reason why the majority of people, who
were involved in various forms of violence (incidents related to SARA) were the
grassroots people, seemed to be that they had been the main victims of
marginalisation and displacement caused by development programs. Fifthly, the
fact that schools education, which was carried out as instrument of political
control, with orientation to (blind) obedience to conform to the will of the
government, had failed to foster formation of human values and of right
conscience. Sixthly, the legal system was corrupt; it often did not side with
the truth and justice but with the interests of government, of conglomerates,
e.g. for monopoly; money could also buy 'justice'.
This bad situation signals that the society was infected by "le mal modern", the
evils of the time, which had destroyed both social-political-economic
systems/structures and human conscience.
Human life had no worth, others were considered mere instruments of one's profit
and even the critics or the opponents were considered as threat or problem to be
"resolved".
This unfavourable situation culminated and exploded as a national crisis, which
was triggered by the invasion of the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, 27 July 1996, which then triggered a series of
violence in many parts of Indonesia: Situbondo, Pasuruan, Tuban, Jember,
Banyuwangi (East Java), Tasikmalaya (West Java), Solo (Central Java), Pontianak
and Sambas (West Kalimantan), Medan (North Sumatera), Makassar , Luwu (South
Sulawesi), Jakarta (Ketapang, May 1998 riots and the shooting of Trisakti
university students and Semanggi tragedy), Kupang (West Timor), Mataram (Lombok)
and Poso (Central Sulawesi). The monetary and economic crisis in 1997 aggravated
the life of the Indonesian people and opened up a multi-dimensional crisis.
This crisis was actually ingrained in one fundamental crisis, namely moral
crisis of the nation.
Unfortunately, this crisis exploded in various forms of violence and the society
became very sensitive and reactive to issues related to SARA. This national
crisis was also complicated by East-Timor question, particularly before and
after the referendum on August 1999. And in recent months terror such as
bombings has also used as a means of intimidating people and the new
government. The 32 years of Suharto autocratic regime also created a
stigmatisation, which led to marginalisation.
This was expressly indicated in:
a). Personal stigmatisation: a person or a group was given a stigma, a bad name,
a certain mark, e.g. those who were involved in Communist Party. Their identity
card was given a certain mark. They were later marginalized and became victims.
b). Territorial stigmatisation: people from certain territories got a bad mark.
They were those who were conscious of their self respect, of their rights and of
the impoverishment of their environment. They were labelled as GPK (Gerakan
Pengacau Keamanan = the Movement of Security Trouble Makers): GPK Aceh, GPK
Irian Jaya, etc. They were also marginalized and unwanted and could be
eliminated.
c). Identical stigmatisation: this relates to someone's identity. A Chinese was
called a non-pribumi (non-indigenous), and so he/she belonged to a certain
group. This was the beginning of his/her marginalisation. The Chinese people
were marginalized from political role and positions, so they concentrated on
business. They were then considered rich, they had money and were often
extorted by those in power. This New Order regime of Suharto (now called "Old
Indonesia") was noticeable in:
1) centralisation as a form of colonialisation of regions by central government,
2) militarism, 3) developmentalism, 4) destruction of environment, 5) conflict
among the different elements of society, 5) intellectual impoverishment through
education (cf. youth problems such as drugs and unqualified education), 7)
discrimination and harassment against woman, 8) violation of law which led into
chaos. Against this background the Indonesian people are aspiring to move
towards a "New Indonesia", characterized by: 1) regional autonomy, 2) civilized
society, 3) nurturing social relationship, 4) sustainable environment, 5)
different elements as an opportunity for unity in diversity, 6) education for
formation of human values, 7) emancipation for all, 8) authoritative and well
observed laws which promote justice. In other words, a New Indonesia, now
aspired by the Indonesian people, is Indonesia which is human, civilized and
just, which respect freedom, human rights, and which strives for justice and
prosperity of all. These are the main challenges being faced by Indonesia today.
The change of government to President Wahid has opened up a new era of openness
and democracy. A new consciousness of one's basic rights is growing, as well as
a strong sense of freedom: freedom of speech without fear, free press, etc.
There is a kind of euphoria of freedom, which can be seen as a reaction to
suppression, limitations and tight control by Suharto regime.
The parliament is not reluctant any more to call the president to hold a debate
around his policies, and open critics to the government officials by individuals
or press are not taboo any longer.
The Islam factor
Speaking of Indonesia it is indispensable to mention about Islam, since Islam is
the biggest religion in the country and Indonesia has the largest Islam
population in the world. A revival and a new awareness of being majority has
grown over the years, along with a demand to control political, economical and
religious areas.
There are two main Islam organisations, which determine the existence and the
influence of Islam in the society: the Nahdlatul Ulama/NU (traditionalist –
formerly led by Abdulrrahman Wahid) and the Muhammadiyah (modernist – formerly
led by Amin Rais). NU literally means "renaissance of Islamic scholars". It was
established in 1926 by a group of ulama of East Java. The NU conserves and
adopts the Javanese tradition in their religious belief and practices. Its
original constitution committed it to a range of religious, social and economic
activities, in particular proselytising and the protection of traditionalist
religious education. The authority of the ulama and the strength of the
organisation are rooted in pesantren (religious boarding schools). It claims to
have around 35 million followers. NU is tolerant and open to other religions and
does not resort to fundamentalism or fanaticism. The Muhammadiyah was aimed at
adapting Islam to modern Indonesian life and was founded in 1912 at Yogyakarta
to counterbalance the development of Catholic and Protestant mission. It is now
much involved in schools, hospitals, orphanages, boarding houses, with Islam as
its ideological and moral basis. Its membership counts around 25 million people.
To achieve these aims, it employed many methods of the Christian missionaries.
In the political sphere the Islam population, mainly of these two organisations,
proliferated into so many Islamic parties, which rose following the fall of
Suharto from power in May 1998 and the transfer of power to B.J. Habibie, which
heralded a new phase of Indonesia's history. Among the 48 contesting political
parties in the 1999 general election around 20 were Islamic. There are at least
two elements that identify a party as 'Islamic'. First, in their documentation,
many such parties have officially adopted Islam as their ideological basis.
Second, in some cases Islamic parties have retained Pancasila but, at the same
time, employ Islamic symbols such as the star and crescent (ka'bah) or one of
the other symbols widely associated with Islam. In addition, a number of
'Muslim' or at any rate 'Muslim-oriented' parties could also be considered
'Islamic'.
The result of the election indicated that parties with a religious affiliation
were not popular among the masses. The majority of Islam population preferred
more nationalistic oriented parties, such as the Indonesian Democratic Party for
Struggle and Golongan Karya Party.
The Islamic parties, which adopt Islam as their ideological basis, could be
included in what is called 'Islam Politik' (Political Islam). They strive to
influence every political orientation and decision with Islam aspirations in the
government and parliament, and to revive Piagam Jakarta = the Jakarta Charter).
They make every effort to include some elements of syariah into marriage law,
patrimony law, alms law, education law etc, and that these laws be adopted
as national laws. They use Islam as a political commodity and ideology to
attract their voters and followers.
They are mainly represented by Islamic parties such as PPP (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), PDR (Partai Daulat Rakyat) in the
parliament and hardliner groups such as KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk olidaritas
Dunia Islam), FPI (Front Pembela Islam).
On the other side there is 'Islam Kultural' (Cultural Islam). It was a result of
Suharto's repression of Islamic politics. Muslims, whether they liked it or not,
had to employ 'cultural Islam' in order to advance Islam and Muslim interests.
The aim was to create an Islamic culture, environment and atmosphere or to
permeate the society with Islamic values. They aimed at creating the so called
'masyarakat madani' (civil society), which resembled the society of Madinah
during the time of Mohammad. It was Nurcholish Madjid, a Muslim prominent
scholar, who provided a strong impetus to the rise of 'cultural Islam' through
his slogan, 'Islam yes, Islamic party no'. The end result of 'cultural Islam'
has been the renaissance of Islamic religion and culture in Indonesia. Among
indicators are: the increase in number of mosques, madrasah (Islamic schools)
and hajj pilgrimages to Mecca. Others are the establishment of ICMI (the
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals), Bank Muammalat Indonesia (the
Islamic Bank), Islamic insurance (takaful) and the like since the early 1990s.
ICMI, for instance, has played an important political role since its
establishment in 1990, bringing Islam into the power centre in the last years of
the Suharto era.
The aspiration of certain Muslim groups, particularly the hardliners, to make
Indonesia an official Islam country is no secret. When the founding fathers of
Indonesia were preparing the birth of a new nation (1945) a heated debate
emerged on whether to base Indonesia on a certain religious ideology or to be
secular. But the main concern of the founding fathers was the unity of the
diverse islands, cultures, ethic groups and religions, and so a religious basis
was rejected.
But from time to time certain Muslim groups tried over and over to revive
'Piagam Jakarta' (the Jakarta Charter), which includes the following words:
"with the obligation to observe syariah law for its adherents". They mean to add
these words to the first principle of Pancasila: "To believe in one God" (? "To
believe in one God with the obligation to observe syariah law for its
adherents").
During the 32 years regime of Suharto it was not allowed to discuss or to talk
about the Jakarta Charter. It was a taboo. But in this era of reform and
openness efforts to revive the Jakarta Charter have emerged again. Parties and
groups such as PPP, PBB, PDR, KISDI, FPI have made public their intention to
revive the discussion on the insertion of the Jakarta Charter into Pancasila.
On the verge of the annual meeting of MPR (People's Consultative Assembly), 7-18
August 2000, there was a move of these groups to include in the agenda the
discussion on Piagam Jakarta. On 7 August 2000 the first congress of Mujahidin
was concluded with a resolution called "Piagam Yogyakarta" (the Yogyakarta
Charter) which obliges the observation of Islam syariah for all Muslims and
rejects any ideology contrary to Islam.
This has sparked a heated discussion and although the recent People's
Consultative Assembly rejected the insertion of the Jakarta Charter into
Pancasila but it has once again opened up a public debate on the issue.
It is to be noted that the stance of these hardliners does not represent that of
the Muslim majority. These groups want to give an impression of their hardline
stance and that they are fighting for the interests of Islam. Not only they have
made the life of the non-Muslims difficult, but also that of the Muslims of good
will by creating a bad image of Islam in Indonesia.
The communal conflicts, particularly in the Moluccas
The conflict in the Moluccas is not separated from conflicts in other regions.
The invasion of the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party in Jakarta
on 27 July 1996, which killed a number of people, triggered other subsequent
social unrests and violence in different regions, as mentioned above (p. 2).
Ambon, the provincial capital of the Moluccan Province, which was once
considered peaceful and tolerant, had in fact kept the potentials of a great
conflict. The migrants, mostly from South Sulawesi and Java of whom the majority
were Muslims, became better off economically. While the indigenous Ambonese,
mainly Protestants, were left behind. This fact created an economic jealousy. In
the meantime the government higher positions were shifting from the Protestant
to the Muslim officials. This was also another reason of competition between the
Christians vis-a-vis the Muslims.
Another factor, which helped create and easily provoke conflicts in the
Moluccas, was the legacy of the colonial system of settlement of the
inhabitants. In some areas the settlements or villages
of the Christians were separated from those of the Muslims. In this way each
group had created a 'ghetto' and not so much integration into daily life. So
when the conflict started Muslim villages, whose inhabitants were mainly from
other ethic groups, would attacked Christian villages and vice versa.
Ambon was once known as a Christian region with 60% Christians and 40% Muslims.
But this has changed since the launching of transmigration program (moving
people from other regions such as overpopulated Java – mainly Muslims - to other
less populated regions).
In these recent years the ratio of the population has reversed: out of total
population of Ambon 300.000 people 55% were Muslims and 45% were Christians of
which 5% were Catholics, of about 2 million people of the total population of
this Moluccan archipelago.
In such a constellation of this archipelago of 1000 islands a conflict related
to SARA could be easily provoked. In a relatively short time all the main parts
of the Moluccas were affected by social unrest. Besides Ambon, the northern part
of the archipelago (Halmahera and its surroundings), where Christians were very
minority, was also hit by disturbances and the Christians were wiped out of the
region and were forced to move to other regions. In the central Moluccas Buru
and Seram were also affected, as well as the south-eastern Moluccas such as Kei
Islands, Dobo in the Aru Islands and Tanimbar Islands, which counted a good
proportion of Christians.
Similar patterns could be detected in other conflict-afflicted regions, such as
in Poso, Central Sulawesi (last May-June) or Luwu, South Sulawesi most recently
(last August) affected again by ethnic and religious conflicts.
The actors behind these conflicts There has been a strong belief that the whole
scenario was orchestrated and played from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, by
certain groups, for their personal and political ends. They are called
'auctores intellectuales' and 'provocateurs'. They do not hesitate to use the
issues related to SARA as an instrument of their personal and political ends.
The conflict in the Moluccas and in other regions normally started as a communal
conflict, which manipulated ethnicity and religion for certain ends rather than
as an inter-religious conflict. Religion was politicised.
a). Since the downfall of Suharto in May 1998 riots and communal violence have
increased. The followers or the cronies of Suharto, who are financially
powerful, did not like to see him being blamed on the collapse of the country
and being tried in court, which would also mean that they might end in the same
fate. They wanted to maintain the statusquo of which they have profited
politically and economically. They wanted to see a country destabilized and the
present government discredited. They were anxious to slow down reforms and
apparently to prevent recriminations against those involved in political and
human-rights abuses over the past three decades. They are also still present in
government, parliament, business and military circles.
Some of the former cabinet ministers, military generals and some business people
were publicly mentioned as those involved in this conflict.
b). Also, the military was divided between the reformists ("the red and white
military") who are willing to adjust to the demands of new reforms and those who
want to maintain a statusquo and are not content with the reduction of their
socio-political function. Up to the time of Suharto regime the military
exercised powerfully a "dual function": military and socio-political function.
Also within the military there are those who support the cause of hardliner
Muslim groups ("the green military"). Now there is also a talk about the
progressive and the conservative groups within the military.
It was difficult to understand how the military was incapable to prevent
thousands of Laskar Jihad (Holy War troops) from Java to reach the Moluccan
Islands, although the president had ordered to block their departure. There were
strong allegations on partiality of certain military personnel in the field and
on their help to facilitate the departure of these Jihad troops and the supply
of guns and ammunition they carried along or that were sent to the Moluccas.
They also became part of the problem. The minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono
was quoted as saying:
"There are some, or even many members of the army, according to information
gathered from both of the warring camps, who have become a major cause of the
clashes." Also, the presence of the deserter-soldiers complicated the
situation.
c). There are also groups of fundamentalist and radical/hardliner Muslims. They
want Indonesia, which counts the largest Muslim population in the world but is
not an official Muslim country, to become an Islam Republic. They use this
conflict situation to reinforce their aspiration to make Indonesia an official
Muslim country. They do not like President Wahid, who is a man of dialogue and
tolerance and who does not support their cause.
The unbalanced reports in the Muslim media have helped provoke a spirit of Jihad
(Holy War) to defend their Muslim brethren, who according to these media were
being exterminated by the Christians. After being trained in Java thousands of
Jihad troops arrived last May in Ambon and Halmahera, equipped with standard and
automatic weapons, and also with the intention to cleanse the Christians from
the Moluccas. Their arrival has worsened the situation, which once was already
calm, and their continuing presence has made the desire to end the conflict
difficult.
"From the data obtained, it is clear that the Ambon affair has been masterminded
from outside of Maluku with a view to 'ethnic cleansing' based on hate towards a
CERTAIN RELIGION."
Semmy Waileruny, a lawyer, was quoted as saying: "Also, shady provocateurs have
played a hand in creating the unrest … there was a coordinated campaign of
attacks against Christians to drive them out of the once-idyllic Spice Islands …
a pattern had begun to emerge of Christians being driven out by Muslims … There
are no more Christians in Ternate. This process of Islamisation is already
happening. This is an effort to make an enemy of the Christian religion."
"Analysts trying to make sense of the Moluccan violence, which has claimed more
than 3,000 lives in the past 18 months, believe it represents a confluence of
interests.
Those range from disaffected retired and serving military officers trying to
stir the political spot in far-off Jakarta, to well-funded Muslim extremists
seeking to capitalize on a shift in the demographic balance of a region that
once had a clear Christian majority in an otherwise overwhelmingly Islamic
nation."
In an urgent appeal of 22 June 2000 the Crisis Centre of the diocese of Amboina
reported that "What is happening in the Moluccas now cannot possibly be called
'riots' or 'violence' or 'bloody conflict' or even 'war': this is an organized
cold-blooded murdering of innocent people, conceded by the Moslems themselves by
means of the loudspeakers of their mosques which call for annihilating all
'Christian infidels'. The violence can no longer be looked on as a conflict, but
a straightforward endeavour to clear the Moluccas from everything that is
Christian." In reality Christians were already wiped out from some areas in the
northern Moluccas such as Ternate, Tidore, Morotai, Obi, Bacan, Sula, Buru.
Ambon and other parts of the Moluccas have become killing-fields.
Although the situation seems to have improved, but it is still very fragile. The
enforcement of a civil state of emergency on 27 June 2000, followed by a limited
isolation of the territory to prevent arms and ammunition smuggling, did not
help much. Only the recently forced expulsion of a number of Jihad fighters and
the confiscation of thousands of weapons, hand-made bombs and other sharp
devices, along with the mounting pressures from the international community and
governments, seemed to have helped ease the situation.
In the meantime the desire to end the conflict has grown. "The desire to end the
conflict is more and more heard from both sides of the Christians and the
Muslims. Many of the latter also wish the jihad warriors to leave the place as
soon as possible. The police chief commander almost every day goes to meet with
either Muslim or Christian communities, even as far as Masohi (the island of
Seram). He declared on local TV that virtually nobody wants the conflict to go
on. On the contrary, people wish to re-establish normal mutual relations, based
on the traditional Moluccan pela gandong (brotherhood). A Siwalima reporter
recounts that not seldom he can hear Muslims say: the Christians suffer because
of what is done to them by the jihads; actually we, the local muslims, equally
endure much suffering from them".
This prolonged conflict in the Moluccas and occasionally in other regions has
forced people to flee their homes and land, and became refugees. Thousands of
people have fled the afflicted areas and took safer shelters in North Sulawesi,
and others returned to their original places such as the South-Eastern Moluccas,
South Sulawesi or Java. In turn, this unprecedented flow of refugees has created
some grave problems, such as food, evacuation, new settlement, home, work,
damaging psychological effects, etc.
The response of the Church of Indonesia
The concrete situation of the society also determines the response of the
Church. The joy and the hope, the suffering and anxieties of the people are also
those of the Church. In response to the crisis situation the Church has stood as
a critical and moral voice, as expressed for instance in the Bishops' pastoral
letters: the Lenten letter 1997 (just prior to the general election) in which
the bishops expressed their concerns on the crises which have intruded all
levels of life, and were mainly rooted in moral decadence; the 1999 Easter
letter ("Risen and firm in hope") which was issued to respond to the ongoing
moral crisis, with special mention of current issues such as 1999 general
election, regional autonomy and special regions. In their Moral and Political
Call, 12 August 1999 (prior to the Independence day celebration, 17 August) the
bishops voiced their concerns and stance on general situation of the society and
on the incidents in Aceh, Ambon and East-Timor. The annual assembly of the
Bishops' Conference, November 1999, issued a pastoral exclamation "Let Us
Change". It expresses the long crisis, which originally was triggered by the
monetary and economic crisis. The Bishops beg the Church to carry out the Gospel
by prioritising those who are victims and suffer from crises.
Above all, in their letters they speak of the defence of humanity, regardless
one's religious affiliation or ethnicity. This unfavourable situation has also
deepened a great sense of solidarity among the faithful for all those who suffer
from crises and conflicts. A crisis centre affiliated to the Bishops' Conference
office was established.
It is significant to also note the shift of emphasis on the Church's stance and
view: from a more sacramental and institutionalised Church, ad intram (an
inward-looking), to a more ad extram (an outward-looking) Church. The emphasis
of a more ad intram Church is on sacramental services and well organized, well
run institutions such as internal organisations, qualified schools,
hospitals, media, etc. Until around 1990 the Church saw herself as a minority
and did not intervene in the socio-political sphere or was very 'careful' to
speak out on socio-political issues.
In the words of the late Indonesian Cardinal Justinus Darmoyuwono: "We regard
ourselves as 'an efficacious silence'." The influence of the Church was largely
felt through the presence of her services in schools, hospitals, media, etc, and
of a good number of lay people in the government departments. In this time
emerged an accusation of christianisation of Indonesia by certain Muslim groups.
An ad extram Church is a prophetic Church, a moral voice in the society, and is
involved in the cause of justice and peace, is open to and in dialogue and
partnership with various components of the society. Solidarity with the
suffering, especially the victims of conflicts and violence has been generously
demonstrated by the faithful by sharing what they can offer, by defending
one's rights, by finding the truth and justice. In this time communication,
dialogue and cooperation with other religions and other components of the
society such as NGOs has emerged as a major challenge to the Church. Team of
Volunteers for Humanity, started by a Jesuit Father Sandyawan in cooperation
with both Catholics and non-Catholics, is an example of common efforts not only
to help the marginal people and the victims of violence but also to defend
people's rights and to find truth and justice. The most difficult challenges
come from Muslim hardliners, who are not open to dialogue.
Another aspect of being an ad extram Church is a shift from a receiving to a
missionary/sending Church. In terms of personnel there is a good number of
Indonesian religious sent abroad as missionaries, as well as in a number of
religious congregations Indonesians have become part of general administrations.
A still great challenge to the Church is to be financially self-sufficient,
particularly in many local Churches, where the contribution of the people cannot
fill in the pastoral needs in place, especially in the aftermath of the economic
crisis.
Facing the present crisis of the society the Church is expected to play a role
of hope-giving to those in depressed situation, and facing the conflict
situation a role of reconciliation in a non-violence struggle for democracy, of
defence of humanity and to change potential conflicts into enriching and true
brotherhood. Particularly the role of the local Churches in mediating conflicts,
in promoting justice and peace, in defending humanity, such as in Ambon has
become very significant. From the beginning the local bishop of Ambon, Mgr P. C.
Mandagi MSC, has acted as acceptable mediator between the two fighting groups.
This role has become more difficult once the Jihad troops arrived in different
parts of the Moluccas.
Catholic institutions also became target of attacks and many Catholics became
victims of clashes. The complexity of the solution of the conflict has forced
him to lobby the international community and governments to help find solution
of the conflict. In July the Bishop, accompanied by other religious leaders,
travelled to Europe and then to the United States for this purpose.
Looking forwards to a new Indonesia the Indonesian Bishops envision a great need
of building up the Indonesian Church as basic community, a communio, with an
emphasis on 'ad extram', meaning being a part of the society at large and in
partnership, dialogue and communication with all components of the society. An
honest dialogue and an open attitude towards other religions, particularly Islam
as the main religion, are required, because the daily life of the Catholics is
in the midst of them. Also the right pastoral approach, which includes analysis
in the fields of culture, socio-politics, economics and religion, is necessary.
In order to express the Church as communio the Bishops have agreed to hold a
Grand Catholic Gathering as culmination of the 2000 Jubilee celebrations, at the
beginning of November 2000. It will gather the representatives of laity,
religious, clergy from all dioceses of Indonesia, in communion with the Bishops.
The theme of the gathering is "Empowering Basic Communities towards a New
Indonesia." Empowering Christians of all walks of life can be a great
contribution to the creation of a new Indonesia, that is peaceful, prosperous,
built on a true brotherhood and characterised by mutual understanding and
acceptance, mutual appreciation and respect, justice, peace and honesty.
In order to empower basic communities the quality of human resources takes a
great importance. Not only the formation of religious and priests but more
importantly also that of lay people, particularly the youth, is indispensable.
To be the salt and the light of the Indonesian world, to be prophetic, and in
order to be present and influential in the society, the Indonesian Church needs
qualified lay people and pastoral agents. They are in the forefront of the
society.
There are many lay people who are capable to do further studies on various
subjects, or are available to follow formation courses, but often times the main
barrier is financial limitations. I believe that the future of the Church lies
in the hands of lay people. Already from the beginning of the Catholic Church in
Indonesia the lay people have been the determining agents of evangelisation and
growth of the Church. But facing the mounting challenges, as mentioned
above, and those of this era of globalisation, which has been affecting the
Indonesian society as well, we need to build a prophetic Church with ample and
significant participation of qualified lay people.
*******
Rome, 1 September 2000
J. Mangkey, msc
(Presented at the Annual Conference of Kirche in Not/Ostpriesterhilfe,
Königstein, Germany, 19 September 2000)
I N D O N E S I A
a pluralistic society:
cultures, ethnic groups, languages, religions etc
a cause for pride: prone to social
problems: SARA
- one country/nation
- one uniting language
- Pancasila: 5 guiding principles multi-dimensional crisis: moral crisis
economic, politic, social, riots, conflict, unrest legal, ethnic, religious
terrors, such as bombings
structures/system - violation of basic human rights,
KKN: corruption, collusion, nepotism blunt conscience
stigmatization: personal, territorial, identical
marginalisation
FROM AN OLD INDONESIA TOWARD A NEW INDONESIA
- centralisation - regional autonomy
- militarism - civilized society
- developmentalism - nurturing human/social relationship
- destruction of environment - sustainable environment
- inter-groups conflict - nurturing unity in diversity
- intellectual impoverishment - formation of human (education as indoctrination
values + conscience
- discrimination, esp. against woman - emancipation for all
- violation of law - enforcing laws which promote justice
I S L A M
Nahdatul Ulama Muhammadiyah
PKB +others political parties PAN Political Islam Cultural Islam
(hardline groups/islamic' parties)
Islamic State Islamic culture - Islamic laws (syariah)
'civil society' (masyarakat madani)
(Jakarta Charter)
COMMUNAL CONFLICTS
special reference to the Moluccas
trigger: invasion of PDI causes headquarters 27 July 1996
communal violences politicaleconomic -in many parts
- migration - gap between
- 'divided settlement' migrants and
- competition inlocals/indigenous govern.position - unemployment
- victims of devel.programs
ethnic manipulation religious
actors involved politicising
statusquo/New Order elements of military Islam hardliners
- in government - 'special forces'- groups such as Jihad troops
- in parliament - army deserters - individuals?
- in business - siding with one's religion adherents
- to discredit the govern. - military domination - 'dechristianisation'
- to divert attention from/ - assessing dual function - islamisation
to avoid court cases
- to regain power
the grassroots/ordinary people(also as main victims)
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
ad intram ad extram
sacraments institutions/in the society sending church organisations
= critical/moral voice education, health in justice and peace
missionaries care, socio-economy, (cf. recent pastoral letters abroad
media, politics, etc + the role of the (cf. religious) local church/leadership)
= solidarity with the suffering people in the society= dialogue/communication/
cooperation/partnership with other religions and components of the society (e.g.
NGOs) 'efficacious silence'= a role of hope-giving, reconciliation,(influential,
pervading) defence of humanity, promotion of justice through services and peace
a new Indonesia COMMUNION of basic communities credible witness in society
empowerment through formation lay people qualified pastoral agents financially
self-sufficient Grand Gathering 2000 "Empowering basic communities
towards a New Indonesia"
------------------------
See William Chang, OFM Cap., "Menuju Indonesia Baru (Sebuah Tinjauan
Kemasyarakatan)", in Spektrum, no. 1, XXVIII, 2000, p. 26.
See I. Ismartono SJ, "Sebuah Pengantar Pembicaraan Tentang Menuju Indonesia
Baru", in Spektrum, no. 1, XXVIII, 2000, pp.14-16.
See Suzaina Kadir, "Contested Visions of State and Society in Indonesian
Islam: The Nahdlatul Ulama in Perspective", in Indonesia in Transition: Social
Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, ed. Chris Manning & Peter van Diermen, The
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Iseas), Singapore, 2000, p. 322.
The NU controls 5742 pesantren, encompassing 4114 kindergartens, 780 junior
high schools, 299 senior high schools, 19 universities and 26 other academic
institutions.
Azyumardi Azra, The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, in Indonesia in
Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, ed. Chris Manning & Peter
van Diermen, p. 310.
PPP = the United Development Party; PBB = the Moon and Star Party; PDR = the
Popular Sovereignty Party; KISDI = The Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of
the Islamic World; FPI = the Front of Islam defenders.
See Azyumardi Azra, op.cit. p. 313.
Cf. George J. Aditjondro, Playing Political Football with Moluccan Lives, in
Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 2000.
The Jakarta Post, 17 July 2000.
An Open letter of J.E. Sahetapy, a member of parliament, dated Jakarta 21 July
2000.
Quoted in Richard Mann, A Nation Reborn, Gateway Books, 2000, pg. 193-194.
Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, ed. 6 July 2000.
Update report from the Crisis Centre of the Diocese of Amboina, no. 37., 14
August 2000.
SARA = Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Kelompok (Ethnicity, Religion, Race, Inter-
Group Relations)
KKN = Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism)
PKB = Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Nation's Awakening Party), closely associated
with Abdurrahman Wahid, now the President of Indonesia; PAN = Partai Amanat
Rakyat (People's Mandate Party), founded and led by Amin Rais, now the speaker
of People's Consultative Assembly, the highest legislative body.
(
geocities.com/ambon67)