HTML pages designed & maintained by Alifuru67 Copyright © 1999/2000 - 1364283024 & 1367286044		2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Indonesia Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor U.S. Department of State, September 5, 2000 INDONESIA (section 1) (section 2) Section II. Societal Attitudes The concept of religious freedom generally is accepted within society. Religious organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), and individuals regularly conduct programs and activities aimed at promoting tolerance and cooperation between different religious communities. In the political sphere, leading government and opposition political figures regularly address the need for interreligious harmony. Several of the major political opposition parties and the current ruling coalition are nonsectarian. There were markedly fewer reports of specifically anti-Chinese violence during the period covered by this report. While attacks on ethnic Chinese churches clearly reflect religious tensions, other contributing factors are underlying socioeconomic and political tensions between Muslims and relatively more affluent Sino-Indonesians. During the period covered by this report, groups that actively advocate a more prominent role for Islam in society continued to emerge. However, there currently is minimal public support for the establishment of an Islamic state. The Government continues to oppose Muslim groups that advocate the establishment of an Islamic state or the supplanting of civil law with Shari'a (Islamic law). However, some Islamic political parties and Islamic groups advocate the establishment of what they describe as "an Islamic society." In early 2000, a movement known as the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) emerged on university campuses in Java. There were sporadic reports from some neighborhoods of Jakarta that student followers of the NII movement set up roadblocks, checked identification cards, and harassed passing non-Muslims, in some cases forcing them to recite passages from the Koran. Similar incidents took place in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Another Muslim group that appeared in early 2000, the Laskar Jihad ("holy war troops") engaged in paramilitary training and moved about freely, armed with swords, daggers, and spears. Some members of the movement reportedly believed that they could "enter heaven by killing infidels." Leaders of the group announced that they were planning to wage war on Christians in the Moluccas. The Government clearly was reluctant to challenge them openly. The Government did close a conspicuous Laskar Jihad training camp south of Jakarta, but as of June 2000, the group had not been disbanded. Many of its recruits were deployed to Maluku and North Maluku provinces starting in late April 2000; some continued training elsewhere. In Yogyakarta, central Java, members of the Laskar Jihad openly called for intervention in the Moluccas, while others collected funds for Laskar Jihad on street corners. There were numerous instances of attacks on churches, mosques, temples, and other religious facilities between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000. Christian groups recorded 135 attacks in which churches and other Christian facilities were closed, damaged, or burned during this time (including the violence in the Moluccas and Sulawesi). The attacks ranged in severity from broken windowpanes to total destruction. For example, on December 15, 1999, Muslim crowds burned and ransacked a Christian seminary and a social service complex in southeast Jakarta, killing 1 person in the process and injuring 20 others. According to many Christian officials, the anti-Christian sentiment behind this violence is not new, but the impunity associated with such acts is. This has contributed significantly to such attacks since Soeharto resigned in May 1998. There are no available national estimates of how many mosques were damaged or destroyed during the period covered by this report. The Government did not investigate fully most cases of attacks on religious facilities that occurred during riots, and in other cases, did not investigate such incidents at all. There also were reports of preaching and publications against Christians, which led to concerns that societal support for religious tolerance was under pressure. In the Jakarta and other incidents, interethnic tensions, as well as interreligious tensions, were factors that contributed to the violence. Other factors included a general breakdown in civil and military authority and a concomitant rise in societal violence, as citizens took justice into their own hands. Security forces, which have been criticized widely for previous human rights violations, for reasons such as lack of training, fear of criticism, and the potential for legal restriction, showed reluctance to intervene, as they routinely did under previous regimes, to stop religious and ethnic disputes from turning violent. During the period covered by this report, thousands of citizens were attacked by other citizens, and according to multiple sources (at times, official) perhaps as many as 4,000 to 5,000 persons were killed, largely because of their religious identity in North Maluku and Maluku provinces and in Central Sulawesi province in the eastern part of the country. Over 300,000 persons were displaced internally. Some Christian IDP's from Ambon fled to the southeastern part of the province; others fled to North Maluku; and many others fled to North Sulawesi province, which is predominantly Christian in many areas. Muslim IDP's from Ambon fled to parts of North Maluku; others fled to South and Southeast Sulawesi provinces. Many of these IDP's carried the conflict with them. In North Maluku alone, provincial statistics listed 97 mosques and 106 churches burned, as Christians and Muslims waged an internecine conflict. Other mosques and churches were attacked and many destroyed in parts of Maluku province and in Poso, Central Sulawesi. This represented the most widespread interreligious violence during the period covered by this report. The fighting in all three provinces had political, economic, ethnic, and religious overtones. While initial conflicts emerged over land tenure issues and the political and economic status of local residents versus transmigrants, in many cases the conflicts later evolved into highly charged religious clashes. Interreligious fighting in the Moluccas, which began in Ambon on January 19, 1999, spread in sporadic but steady waves from Ambon to neighboring islands in the central and southern areas of the Moluccas from July to December 1999. The use of firearms, mostly homemade but increasingly sophisticated, grew, as did the number of deaths. Buildings in the central business district of Ambon, many of them Chinese-owned, were destroyed in late July 1999 and early August 1999, marking the first time that major fighting spread from outlying neighborhoods. Allegations of outside provocation and interference rose during this period, and authorities came under increasing criticism for failing to halt the violence or actively abetting it (see Section I). >From December 1999 and continuing to June 30, 2000, religious clashes rapidly spread to most major islands in the Moluccas. Violence erupted in North Maluku province after Christmas as Christian gangs and militia (and to a lesser extent, Muslim gangs and militia) launched offensives against isolated villages. Meanwhile, IDP's fleeing conflict-torn areas of Ambon island poured into the city of Ambon. Many directed their anger against Ambon; extensive damage resulted in which numerous houses, shops, and places of worship were burned. Predominantly Muslim military units dispatched from Java and Sulawesi were accused of siding with Muslim vigilantes and using excessive force against Christians. Muslims on Ambon charged that the predominantly Christian police force also was acting with bias (see Section I), and Christian gangs also were guilty of severe attacks. On December 28, 1999, Christian militia invaded a small Muslim town in north Halmahera Island (North Maluku province) and massacred at least 113 men, women, and children in and around a mosque. Several hundred more persons died in other attacks, apparently initiated by Christian gangs. Following the December 1999 incident, Muslims became more militant. During the first half of the year 2000, they drove Christian populations away from many areas of North Maluku and Maluku provinces. As IDP's fled to neighboring areas and islands, their resentment against those who had attacked them often sparked conflict in their new places of residence. In response to the increased violence, the armed forces deployed fresh troops to the Moluccas in January 2000. In Ambon, army, marines, and police personnel enforced a curfew and began disarming civilians in house-to-house searches. By late January 2000, a semblance of normality had returned to Ambon. However, internecine fighting escalated in Halmahera and other parts of North Maluku (including Bacan, Obi, and Morotai islands) and in Maluku (Seram and Buru islands). By April 2000, there were some signs of reconciliation in Ambon as the provincial government inaugurated reconstruction programs and markets were established in border areas. The cease-fire in Ambon abruptly ended in late April 2000, when serious rioting immediately broke out upon the conclusion of Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri's visit. There was a further upsurge in violence in mid-May as boatloads of Laskar Jihad volunteers (ultimately reaching 2,000 to 3,000 persons) began arriving in Ambon and other parts of the Moluccas. Periodic waves of violence and destruction continued in Ambon during the weeks that followed. Law and order continued to deteriorate steadily, all but collapsing by late June 2000, when violent mobs stormed through the city with little or no interference by the security forces. In May and June 2000, there were large-scale Muslim attacks against Christians in Halmahera, in apparent revenge for the January 2000 massacre. There were further allegations that the security forces were taking sides in the fighting (see Section I). For example, on June 19, 2000, about 4,000 Muslims surrounded the town of Duma and killed from 110 to 180 largely defenseless Christians before burning down their church. Laskar Jihad later claimed that it was involved, but locally based Muslim groups primarily were responsible. The military forces admitted that they stood aside because troops were outnumbered (officials have alleged that only 70 to 100 troops were available at the time). Other witnesses (including a local Laskar Jihad leader) claimed that at least six soldiers joined the Muslims in the attack. However, troops were able to prevent 300 Christian gang members from counterattacking days later. On June 23, 2000, President Wahid announced a ban on all travel to Maluku and North Maluku provinces; however, the ban was enforced loosely. On June 26, 2000, the President declared a state of civil emergency for both provinces (see Section I).   It is estimated that over 2,000 persons died in the Moluccas between January and June 2000, and that 300,000 persons, or 15 percent of the population, were displaced internally. These population movements have resulted, in effect, in the partition of the Moluccas into Muslim and Christian areas. For example, in Ternate the original population of 105,000 persons included 15,000 Christians. During the period covered by this report, all Christians fled, and 80,000 Muslim IDP's arrived from elsewhere in the same province. While religious tension and hatreds have been the main sources of intercommunal warfare in the Moluccas, the conflict partly is rooted in social, political, and economic grievances among the many diverse communities living there. In some cases, Muslims and Christians from the same or affiliated ethnic groups banded together and attacked Muslim migrants from another, distant ethnic group. This phenomenon occurred in Halmahera in the clash between the villages of Kao (local Christian and Muslim ethnic groups) and Malifut (largely settled by Muslim transmigrants from the island of Makian). In addition unverified reports of provocators and conspiracies have fueled what has become a continuous cycle of violence. Both sides claim that outside agitators helped trigger the violence. Both insist that coreligionists fought back only after being assaulted by persons of the opposite religion. Furthermore, traditional leadership structures have eroded, leaving conflicting groups without a respected and effective mechanism for resolving intercommunal and interreligous tensions. In January 2000, there were anti-Christian riots in Mataram, Lombok. Several rioters were killed and numerous persons were injured in the violence. In addition Muslim gangs destroyed, damaged, and looted Christian homes, businesses, and other property. Thousands of Christians fled the violence. However, by the end of January 2000 the situation became calmer, and as of June 30, 2000, reports of further violence were rare; nevertheless, tensions remained. Small-scale rioting broke out in pockets of Makassar, South Sulawesi on January 17 and 18, 2000. The problem began when about 2,000 Muslim gang members began stopping motorists in front of Hasanuddin University, demanding identification to determine religious affiliation, and in at least six cases, dragging out and beating Christians "in retaliation for what happened to their brothers in Maluku." On January 30, 2000, there was a series of attacks on churches in Yogyakarta, central Java. The problem began after a Muslim rally of from 10,000 to 20,000 persons to protest the interreligious violence in the Moluccas ended. Hundreds of participants drove through the city on motorcycles and threw rocks through the windows of eight churches, a Christian campus dormitory, and two houses. Beginning in late May 2000, the area of Poso in Central Sulawesi, as well as numerous villages in the region, experienced renewed religious riots and violence, resulting in numerous deaths and widespread destruction. Christian gangs from surrounding villages reportedly expelled Muslims from the town of Poso in retaliation for past hostilities, which included the burning of hundreds of Christians' houses in the preceding months. In the most serious incident, Christian gangs brutally murdered well over 100 unarmed Muslims in a small village outside Poso. Foreign Christian missionaries, who were worried about the possible spread of religious violence, fled Central Sulawesi. While Christian gangs and militia burned mosques and Muslim houses, Muslim gangs and militia reportedly burned what Christian property they could while fleeing town. As of June 10, 2000, over 120 persons were confirmed dead. The most recent casualty estimate listed 214 victims, and casualty estimates ranged as high as 500 persons dead. Over 2,000 houses were destroyed in the Poso area. Both Christian and Muslim outsiders were accused of helping to instigate the violence. Between July 1999 and July 2000, there were a number of reports of persons who practice traditional medicine magic ("dukun santets") being killed. In the Malang area of East Java, villagers broke into the home of suspected shamans in the middle of the night on January 18, 2000, and beat to death a 45-year-old woman in front of her teenage sons. The mob then dragged her body to a cemetary and hung it from a tree, where it hung until dawn. That morning, 200 villagers turned themselves in to the local police station. The police stated that they were searching for the "true instigators" of the violence; no arrests were made. Since then, more individuals were attacked for suspected shamanism in the Pasuruan area of East Java. While it is difficult to estimate accurately the frequency of such attacks, journalists believe that lynch killings still occur. Aside from killings, "dukun santets" faced other constraints on their freedom. For example, in Banyuwangi, East Java, many known shamans essentially were forced (by the authorities) to migrate to Bali to get them out of "harm's way." Many others were forced to renounce their craft by local Muslim leaders who told them that it was forbidden by Muslim law. In West Kalimantan, 40,000 persons who were displaced by communal fighting in early 1999 remained in temporary camps as of June 2000. They were displaced as a result of clashes between groups composed of Dayaks (mostly Christian or animist) and Melayu (mostly Muslim) on one side and Madurese migrants (Muslims) on the other. Ethnic differences and tensions between indigenous people and newcomers appeared to be the source of the conflict, rather than religious differences. Muslims are a religious minority in the easternmost province of Papua (also known as Irian Jaya). Local sentiment against the efforts of Muslim missionaries to win converts in the predominantly Christian province, as well as resentment of the arrival in the province of mainly Muslim migrants from other parts of the country either under government sponsored "transmigration" programs or with the encouragement of various government incentives, has in the past led to attacks on mosques in Papua. However, there were no reports of attacks on mosques in Papua during the period covered by this report. Nevertheless, tensions stemming from ethnic differences and economic disparities remain and sometimes are expressed in religious terms. Section III. U.S. Government Policy The U.S. Government publicly criticized the intercommunal violence that occurred in various parts of the country by continually: expressing its deep concern with the ongoing cycle of violence and retaliation between Christian and Muslim communities in the Moluccas and elsewhere; urging the Government to take further measures to prevent bloodshed and take action against those who initiate violence, while adhering to international standards for the protection of human rights and exercising appropriate restraint; and calling on all parties to show restraint, refrain from violence, and resolve their differences through dialog and negotiation. With respect to the violence between Christian and Muslim communities in the Moluccas, Central Sulawesi, and elsewhere, President Clinton and other senior U.S. Government officials raised their concerns with Indonesian counterparts on numerous occasions. The Ambassador and embassy and consulate Surabaya staff routinely conveyed to government officials at all levels the U.S. view that religious freedom must be respected. In addition throughout the period covered by this report, the Ambassador and embassy and consulate staff regularly met with leaders of religious communities and traveled widely throughout the country to keep abreast of developments affecting religious freedom. During the period covered by this report, the public affairs section of the Embassy funded the travel of several persons under the International Visitors program, as well as exchange visitors, to study human rights and religion in the U.S., among other topics. They included religious and student leaders, and legal activists from Aceh, Papua, East Timor, and other locations. The Fulbright Commission in Indonesia funded one senior U.S. scholar to teach comparative religion at the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Jakarta and a senior U.S. scholar/researcher who studied and taught women's role in Koranic verse at the same institution. The U.S. Government also provides significant funding for NGO's that implement projects to promote religious tolerance in various parts of the country. [end of document] X-URL: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_indonesi.html Received via e-mail from : Tali_Hulaleng Copyright © 1999-2000  - Ambon Berdarah On-Line * http://go.to/ambon HTML pages designed and maintained by Alifuru67 * http://www.oocities.org/ambon67 Send your comments to alifuru67@egroups.com