French Army of Champagne
Commander: Maréchal de Guiche
Infantry: 7 000 men
Cavalry: 3 000 men
Artillery: 10 guns
Losses > 7 000 men (3400 prisoners)Spanish Army of Flanders
Commander: Don Francisco de Melo
Infanterie ~ 13 000 men
(Spanish Tercios ~ 5 000 h)
Cavalry ~ 6 000 men
Artillery : 20 gunsPertes: 500 men
Strategic Situation: In spring 1642, cardinal Richelieu concentrated his forces to besiege the city of Perpignan in the province of Roussillon, leaving the rest of his armies in a defensive position. In Flanders, the Spanish governor Francisco de Melo decided in a war council to attack some fortress in French hand in an attempt to distract some French troops from the main front. In April 1642, Francisco de Melo concentrated a powerful army and started his campaign taking Lens the 19th of April and later the important fortress of la Bassée which surrender after 22 days of siege. In front the two French armies (Count of Harcourt and Maréchal de Guiche) maintained a defensive position avoiding an open battle to save the fortress. After the loss of la Bassée the French armies separated, Harcourt, with 17 000 men to cover the region of Boulogne and de Guiche with 10 000 men to cover the Champagne and Vernandois. Learning the split of the French forces, the Spanish react quickly, sending the main army against de Guiche leaving just covering force in front of Harcourt’s army. For some reason de Guiche refuse to take cover behind the river Escaut and decided to entrench his army at on a hill in front of the village of Honnecourt-sur-Escaut, and wait the Spanish attack. The 26 of May Francisco de Melo take position in front of de Guiche and occupy a dominanrt position on the same hill..
The French army was commanded by the Maréchal de Guiche and consisted in; 8 infantry battalions coming from the following regiments, Rambures, Piedmont, Marquis de Persan, Marquis de Saint-Mégrin, Vervins and possibly the regiments of Huxelles, Beausse, Quincy, Hill (English), Bellins (Irish) and Fitz William (Irish); 21 cavalry squadrons and 10 field guns. The army was deployed as follow: the right wing with 7 squadrons and 1 battalions (Vervins) under the Sieur de Courcelles, the centre with 7 battalions and the artillery under the Sieur de Lennoncourt, the left wing with 8 squadrons under Josias Count of Rantzau and a reserve of 6 squadrons under the direct command of de Guiche in the centre of the position. At last, the Abbey of Honnecourt is defended by 500 musketeers of the regiment of Batilly.
The Spanish army was commanded by Don Francisco de Melo seconded by Jean de Beck and was deployed as follow: the right wing had some 24 cavalry squadrons coming from the caballeria ordinaria del rey made of Spanish and Italian trozos (ie squadrons) and from German regiments. The centre had from right to left: in first line, 5 Spanish battalions coming from the following Tercios, de Avila, Alburquerque, Castelvi, Count of Villalba and Velandia and 2 Italian battalions from the Tercios of Strozzi and Giovanni Delli Ponti; in second line we have the Irish battalion of Owen O’Neil and 3 Walloon battalions from the following Tercios (Prince de Ligne, Count of Grobendonck and Lord of la Grange); in third line or reserve we had 5 battalions coming from 2 amalgamated German regiments (Jean de Beck and Frangipani), the Walloon Tercio of the Lord of Conteville, 2 German regiments (Van der Bar and de Rouvroy) and 2 amalgamated German regiments (von Metternich and Baron of Verwoert). The left wing was composed of 16 cavalry squadrons from the Walloon cavalry under the Count of Bucquoy. At last the Spanish had 20 field guns deployed in the centre in an advantageous position. In total the Spanish had some 19 000 men divided in 16 infantry battalions and some 40 cavalry squadrons.
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A) In the morning of the 26th of may the Spanish guns, situated 10 meter above the French position, open fire against on the French position with remarkable efficiency.
B) In the centre, the Spanish infantry launch a first unsuccessful assault on the French entrenchment.
C) The first move takes place on the left Spanish wing when Jean de Beck with the Walloon cavalry and the support of the 2 Italians Tercio attacked the French. Took by surprise and inferior in number the French of Courcelles retire in disorders.
D) In order to save his right wing, de Guiche, with his reserve, launched a furious counter attacked on the flank of the Walloon cavalry with success.
E) De Guiche follow his movement putting in disorder the Italian infantry and decided to attack the position of the Spanish artillery. The intervention of the Walloon Tercios of the second line commanded by the Prince de Ligne blocked the French cavalry and forced them to retire.
F) Meantime, on the centre position the Spanish infantry launch a new unsuccessful assault against the French entrenchment well defended by the regiment of Rambures and Piemont..
G) Attacked by the Walloon cavalry, the Italian and Walloon infantry the cavalry of de Guiche fled for they life abandoning the battlefield.
H) Manhandled by the fire of the Spanish guns, the cavalry of the French left wing did not resist very much the Spanish advance and fled for safety to the only bridge on the Escaut river.
I) On the centre the Spanish infantry take advantage of the situation and destroy the resistance of the French infantry taking the guns and thousand of prisoners as well as the baggage.
J) The last resistance was made in the Abbey of Honnecourt by a detachment (Batilly, Rambure and Piemont) commanded by François de Rambures who was killed during the confrontation.
Balance: The army of Champagne is annihilated, losing 3200 dead, 3400 prisoners, of which 400 were officers, and probably some 500 wounded and deserters. It is said that de Guiche found only 1600 men, mostly horsemen in Saint Quentin, 2 days after the battle. The Spanish victory was total but the prudence and the lack of ambition of Francisco de Melo, turn the rest of the campaign in nothing profitable for the Spanish. No important fortress or town were taken to the French in north France to balance the predicable loss of the city of Perpignan.
Complementary Sources
Pavel Hrncirik, "The battle of Honnecourt in 1642 by Peeter Snayers in the Prado", Boletín del Museo del Prado, ISSN 0210-8143, vol. 23, no. 41, Madrid, 2005, in press
Juan L. Sánchez Martín, "Critica Contemporanea sobre la campaña de 1642 en Flandes" R&D n°9, Madrid 1999
Juan L. Sánchez Martín, "Un plan inédito de la batalla de Honnecourt en 1642" R&D n°12, Madrid 2000
Mémoire du marquis de Montglat tome I, digital collection of the BNF
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