Is A Science of the Mind Possible?

A Critique of Empirical Methodology

Phil Roberts, Jr.

FOOTNOTES

Only the rules pertaining to categorical inferences (identity, noncontradiction and excluded middle) are said to be endowed with logical necessity, that is to say, it is not considered logically possible that John is both a man and not a man. As a result, these rules generally form the foundation of logic. Nonetheless, of even greater utility is the causative inference, although it is on considerably less solid ground with respect to its empirical applicability. Even so, since so much of science is so heavily dependent upon causative considerations, every student of science should at some point be required to become familiar with "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects" set forth by David Hume in his A Treatise of Human Nature. This establishes criteria for the determination of whether a causative inference is warranted. Although it is beyond the scope of present considerations, I believe there is conclusive evidence that the causative inference is a subspecies of the categorical and quite reasonably justified. This evidence I intend to present in an article entitled "The Origin and Evolution of the Causative Concept."
The fact that psychical data arises in the form of cognitions rather than in the form of perceptions hardly constitutes a basis for considering them as mere figments of the imagination Such an extreme skepticism would in truth lead to its exact opposite, an almost mystical conception of human creativity. While human imagination is indeed capable of conceptions which have no correspondence with reality (e.g., werewolf), its creativity is limited to creative arrangements (associations) of notions derived from some form of experience (e.g., the synthesis of a man and a wolf). With notions as abstract as mind, consciousness, will, etc., there is no perceptual (sensuous) experience that could possibly account for their origin. Unless we accept the implausible presumption that imagination is capable of constructing fantasies out of "thin air," the reality of nonreducible psychical conceptions for which there is no apparent origin in perceptually derived experience seems to me as incontestable as the reality of nonreducible notions derived through the senses.
As to the peculiar status of psychical data in that it seems devoid of any coordinates of space, neither categorical nor causative inferences are dependent upon them. Nor is measurement. Measurements need merely be limited to measurements in time. As to difficulties which might arise with conducting experiments, it should be remembered that experiments are merely artificially arranged observations. While they are frequently convenient, they are by no means a necessary prerequisite. Relativity was confirmed by an observation (aberration of light during a solar eclipse) rather than a laboratory experiment in which the objects being observed were subjected to an artificial arrangement.
For the purposes of most experiences (physical, electrical, chemical events), Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is not a relevant concern.
Identicalness, both in form and behavior; also any entity or datum (psychology) endowed with this characteristic.
The objective verification of a subjective experience is a contradiction in terms.
It has been proposed (e.g., Bronowski) that both the physical individualization and the rapid transition from pre-man to homo sapiens can be effectively accounted for as a consequence of psychical individualization. In contrast to the somewhat more random sexual selection between surviving members of most species, the determination of what characteristics were of merit would no longer be determined exclusively by the effective but somewhat blind process of natural selection. Instead, conscious entities with individual differences (and preferences) would in all probability play an increasingly dominant role in the. determination of mating partnerships. This would undoubtedly result in an increased likelihood for unique or distinctive features as well as qualitative superiority, (e.g.. beauty, intelligence, etc.) to become selectively inbred and more frequently matched with the genes of other individuals equally endowed with unique or superior attributes.
Because of the mutual nonaccessibility factor and the ambiguities associated with any verbal communication of psychical observations, any endeavor to establish interpsychical identicality must rely almost exclusively upon inferences drawn from the principle of individualization. In contrast, it might be argued that the identicalities which form the foundation of empirical science can be directly confined by mutual observations of numerically different identical instances. However, the scientific community does not actually concern itself with such direct observational confirmation. Instead, acceptance is based upon a relatively small number of specific observations in which nature appears to repeat itself and from which a general conclusion pertaining to the unobserved remainder is inferred, Thus, the only real distinction between psychology and empirical science is that specific psychical observations can not be naively presumed to have universal applicability as is conveniently the case with most empirical observations.
Attempts at classification of emotional states have been undertaken (e.g., studies employing criteria of Woodworth), but they have been plagued with uncertainties arising from a heavy reliance upon descriptive terminology, or have become bogged down in attempts to correlate emotional states with objectively observable behavior. This obsession with objectively observable correspondents to psychical data has been based upon the myth that only physical events can be free of subjectivity (individualized associations). However, subjectivity (individualization) is not co-extensive with the entire psychical realm and in many instances the same sort of orderliness (identicality) can be found which exists so extensively throughout the physical realm. By identifying these regions it is possible for each psychical observer to regard his mind as his own private laboratory. Indeed, this is the only possible source of direct reliable psychical data.