Of all the endeavors to expand the frontiers or knowledge, none has yielded so little to the organizing functions of the human mind as the study of the mind itself. Although attempts at systemization have occasionally achieved notoriety (e.g. the psychoanalytic schools and the various pop psychologies), they have all too often resulted in controversy and unsubstantiated speculation. Perhaps H. L. Mencken most succinctly expressed the prevailing attitude when he referred to psychology as "chiefly guesswork, empiricism, hocus-pocus and poppycock." While this criticism may appear excessive, evidence of misgivings can readily be found that have at times extended even into the psychological community itself. Such misgivings were appallingly apparent in the usurping of the term "psychology" (by the psychological community itself) to denote a physical science committed to the study of objectively observable behavior.
And yet, as many of us are all too painfully aware, the major component of emotion is not in its physical manifestations, but rather in its internal affectations. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of emotional distress and disorder in an era of almost miraculous advances in the physical sciences should lead one to realize that a significant portion of these disturbances result from psychological causes beyond the sphere of the physical sciences -- that such pervasiveness requires a more comprehensive explanation than any mere physiological dysfunction can possibly account for.
Because there is an obvious immanent need for a science of the psyche, it is essential that psychology address itself to a question which is fundamental to its very existence as a science, that is, to what extent and under what conditions can subjective phenomena constitute a valid basis (as data) for a scientific theory? To answer this question, it will be necessary to undertake a brief examination of the disparities which exist between psychology (in the original sense) and the so-called empirical sciences (the physical sciences, including behaviorism).
Modern scientific and technological developments are directly attributable to the realization that the human mind is capable of an endless array of misleading fantasies --- that credible scientific conceptions are more the exception than the rule. This realization was not easily acquired and only gradually emerged from untold centuries of referring all questions about the nature of reality to religious (scholastic) authority. Even simply answered questions were rarely if ever examined in a scientific manner, that is, by actually addressing nature itself through observation and experimentation. As a result. misconceptions were not infrequently perpetuated. Take, for example, the long-standing misconception, disproved by Galileo, that light and heavy objects fall to earth at different velocities, or that the planets revolve in circular orbits rather than the elliptical ones first discovered by Johannes Kepler. Given this historical background, it is no small wonder that modern science should be founded upon a vigorous skepticism of all speculation not founded upon verifiable (mutually accessible) facts of experience.
Nonetheless, science is by no means restricted to that which can be immediately observed. Most of its truly significant accomplishments are comprehensive conceptualizations which only begin with established data, but then proceed to infer vast quantities of information not immediately accessible through the senses (e.g. atomic theory inferred from the law of multiple proportions, evolutionary theory inferred from fossils, big bang theory inferred from red shift and interstellar radiation, etc.). Further, while one must continually guard against flights of fantasy in the acquisition of a theory's factual origins, a vivid and active imagination is precisely what is most essential in the construction of a theoretical interpretation, provided it functions within the confines of universally acknowledged rules of thought. These are the basic rules which pertain to categorical and causative inferences.(1) As to whether these rules are self-evident, a priori, or even justifiable seems of less importance than the fact that they have proven immensely successful.
Human imagination functioning within the confines of accepted rules of thought is obviously indispensable in the pursuit of science. Nonetheless, it is a tool whose mental constructs must always be subservient to the factual data. It is for this reason that modern science is often referred to as "empirical." This term has a wide range of meaning but is frequently employed to denote a methodology which restricts data to only that which can be observed through the senses. It is in this manner (radical empiricism, sensuous empiricism. physicalism) that it shall be employed throughout that which is to follow.
Psychology is unique, not in the logical-conceptual aspect of its development, but rather in the source of its data. In the acquisition of psychical information, each observer is privy to only one direct source, the events of his own thinking. These psychical events occur in complete isolation from other observers and consequently remain inaccessible for the purpose of objective verification considered so crucial to the credibility of science. While there is indeed indirect access to the data of other psyches through the use of language, any verbal communication of such information already implies a subjective interpretation. Furthermore, the semantic ambiguities associated with specific words and phrases employed in the description of subjective phenomena are often all but impossible to uncover and clarify. Although the nonaccessibility of psychical data to objective verification would seem to be psychology's most apparent shortcoming (and would seem the only plausible basis for its dethronement by behavioral science)(2), a further examination of scientific procedure reveals certain fallacies in this seemingly warranted and widely accepted notion.
Although science appears to go to great lengths to insure that its conceptions are based upon mutually accessible information, in point of fact, theories only occasionally achieve acceptance as a result or large scale participation in original observations and experiments. More frequently, verification is a consequence of isolated, independent investigations carried on with numerically different instances of data considered to be identical to one another. This is possible because nature is comprised or orderly consistencies which submit to identification and classification.
Fortunately for science, within the majority of such classifications the objects do not merely resemble one another, but rather are often identical and indistinguishable both in form and behavior (e.g. molecules of water, atoms of hydrogen, protons, etc).(3) Because nearly all of nature is comprised or such identicalities,(4) various members of the scientific community making investigations at differing points in space and time can bring about an identical reconfiguration of the relevant circumstances of an original observation or experiment and identically reproduce its results. In such a manner, they can submit their frequently diverse opinions to a consistently uniform and universally accessible authority (in terms of its identical replications of data) independent of the human mind and its subjective influences. Not only does the absolute identicality encountered so predominantly throughout the physical universe greatly facilitate the verification of data, but it also assures the universal validity of the results of such observations with respect to all identical circumstances.
Recognition of the fact that science is by no means dependent upon mutual accesssibility to the same numerical instances of data is of utmost significance to psychology. It implies that its progress is by no means dependent upon direct, objective verification of psychical information, a feat which might conceivably entail a metaphysical impossibility.(5) Instead, it can lay claim to the same expediencies as the other sciences and can therefore rely upon isolated observations, if it can be determined if and when they are of identical data. Furthermore, since it is conceivable that a successful science might arise entirely from isolated observations, the mutual nonaccessibility of psychical data so commonly considered the source of confusion in psychology would seem to provide an insufficient explanation for its slow progress. It is therefore necessary to carry our investigation further to examine yet another characteristic of psychical data (i.e., psychical individualization). This characteristic is of an entirely different nature from that of mutual nonaccessibility, but when considered in conjunction with it can indeed be held accountable.
Unfortunately, at least for the development of psychology, the identicality within classifications of naturally occurring objects is not universally absolute. Rather, it seems to become increasingly subject to individual variations in those classifications wherein the objects have attained a high degree of organized complexity (evolutionary development). This tendency toward intraclassification individualization appears most pronounced in the human species and is apparent not only in the outward form and behavior of individuals, but, more importantly for present considerations, in psychical attributes which the very meaning or such terms as "personality," "individual," "subjective" , etc. have come to convey. It is conceivable that such individualization may have resulted from abstruse evolutionary factors not yet identified. It is more probable, however, that psychical individualization is an inevitable consequence in any species in which reasoning is employed to effect its survival and is itself the cause of other more apparent individualization.(6) In such organisms it is only reasonable to assume that associations would no longer be mere organic photographs of consistent natural sequences (conditioning), but rather the result of the imagination and judgment of the individual, and thus varying greatly from one psychical system to another.
While the emergence of individuality in homo sapiens may be a frequent source of pride to its members and is perhaps regarded as nature's crowning earthly achievement, it is a significant impediment in the psychologist's endeavor to derive theories having universal applicability. As a consequence of the nonaccessibility of psychical data to mutual observation, the necessity for its identical replication is not merely a convenience as in the physical sciences, but an absolute necessity in establishing a common link between the various unalterably isolated observers.
One method of dealing with the apparent "untrustworthiness" of subjective data has been to adopt an empirical methodology (behaviorism). However, this procedure can only be justified if the source of this "untrustworthiness" is coextensive with the entire psychical realm. If, on the other hand, there is reason to presume that psychical individualization is not coextensive with all regions of the psyche, then a science of the mind might indeed be possible. However, this would imply that before psychology can concern itself with the acquisition of relevant uninterpreted psychical observations and the construction of logically valid theories, it must establish a means of identifying subjective data having the equivalent of objective validity --- that is, psychology must identify and restrict itself to those aspects of the psychical realm which maintain their identity irrespective of the particular psyche (and its individualizing influences) in which they occur. In other words, all science is constructed upon the presumption of lateral order, a presumption which, with respect to the classification of systems referred to as *homo sapiens* seems particularly difficult to justify.
Because of the extensiveness of psychical individualization in homo sapiens, bridging the barriers of mutual nonaccessibility through the establishment of interpsychical identicalities may itself seem a remote possibility. However, by recognizing that intraspecies individualization is in all probability a recent evolutionary development and more specifically a consequence of the advent of reasoning, it is possible to infer identicality in reverse. Thus, those psychical attributes most likely to be identical irrespective of the particular psyche in which they occur are precisely those attributes least likely to be the result of recent evolutionary innovations.
To illustrate, the psychical states referred to as fear and anger would seem likely candidates for interpsychical identicality in that; 1) empirical evidence suggests that they are a psychical attribute shared in common with all members of the species and thus the product of a genetic heritage rather than individual imagination; 2) they are inherent in many lower organisms; 3) they are associated with portions of the brain considered the earliest to evolve; and 4) it is possible to conceive of how such functions would be essential to survival prior to and in the absence of more highly evolved cognitive functions. Although, admittedly, the stimuli of and responses to these emotional states may vary from individual to individual (psychical individualization), there is sufficient evidence to assume that the basic emotional states themselves (e.g. increased awareness and urge to behave in a relatively specific manner) are stereo-typed species-specific functions. Thus, fear and anger might be considered orderly consistencies of the psychical domain in much the manner hydrogen and oxygen pervade the physical realm.(7)
Difficulties which might arise from individualization can be circumvented by studying individuated regions in general terms. Thus, while most of the specific associations arising from the employment of individual imagination and judgment cannot constitute a valid basis for scientific investigations (i.e., as data), reasoning as a process is likely to have underlying factors which are identical in all members of the species.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in much the manner living organisms are classified into a biological phylogeny, identified psychical functions must be classified according to their probable evolutionary status. This can be determined both by their apparent complexity and similarity to other psychical functions, and by the evolutionary status of the species of organism in which a type of function can be found. In such a manner, isolated psychical observers can determine the degree of identicality of an observed function simply by its relative position in the phylogeny. Diagram I is a representation of such a phylogeny of psychical functions.(8)
Considerations arising from the discussions of the mutual nonaccessibility factor and the principle of individualization would seem to indicate that the credibility and internal unanimity of behavioral science are the consequence of factors other than its empirical methodology. Furthermore, with the exception of singular events truly dependent upon direct mutual observations for verification (e.g., solar eclipse), or instances which require spatial measurements, it is a conclusion equally applicable to all of the physical sciences. Contrary to widespread opinion, scientific progress has been as much coincidental to an empirical methodology (restricted to data derived through the senses) as resulting from it. Most investigations in the physical realm are of objects sufficiently unevolved to be devoid of significant variations from their classified norm and therefore having universal applicability.
This is not meant to imply that science did not reach a significant turning point in its recognition of the need for a continual correspondence between a theory and its factual origins, but merely that associating this turning point with an exclusive reliance upon sensory data is misleading. As long as such factual origins are uniform and equivalent for all observers, there is no reason for sensory data to enjoy a preferred status. If the collective witnessing of an event were truly the primary criterion for establishing credibility, it would be difficult to account for the ongoing skepticism with regard to certain collectively witnessed but nonreproducible phenomena (e.g., UFO landings, faith healings, etc.). This skepticism would be particularly difficult to justify in light of the almost universal scientific recognition of other observations equally out of context with accepted notions of reality (e.g. Michelson-Morley experiment), and which have frequently been conducted in relative privacy by one or two individuals. Such a disparity can only be accounted for by the realization that data reproducibility (dealing with specific instances of pervasive consistencies) is by far the most significant criterion for establishing credibility.
To summarize, from the undeniable disparity between psychical science and the physical sciences with respect to their relative rates or development, it is apparent that psychology (in the introspective or classical sense) definitely has a problem of some sort or other. And while the credibility of psychology has certainly suffered as a result of the logical-conceptual extravagances of many of its theorists (Freud, Janov, Laing, the various pop pschologies), there is no reason in principle why psychology should be different from any other science in the logical conceptual aspect of its construction (see Fodor, 1975, p.1-9). It is therefore apparent that whatever the problem of psychology, it must have something to do with its data. However, upon examining the ontological and epistemological peculiarities one at a time (e.g., mutual nonaccessibility., nonspatiality, etc.), it is apparent that they can not be held entirely accountable. Since reasoning in general and science in particular are both highly dependent upon the presence of order in that which they seek to "understand", it then becomes reasonable to hypothesize that psychical science may be suffering from an order problem in its data. Combined with mutual nonaccessibility (my term for privacy), it is obvious that this might result in a real can of worms.
Of course, this is not the first time some one has proposed that psychology may have an order problem. But, invariably, this problem is treated from the standpoint of a possible entropy in vertical order (i.e. the indeterminism issue). The result is usually an endless debate while the science itself must come to a standstill. In contrast, I treat psychology's order problem from the standpoint of an entropy in lateral order, that is, between numerically different systems of a class (i.e., *homo sapiens*), and particularly an entropy in lateral order between the kinematic attributes (both thought and behavior) of the systems of a class. And unlike the notion of indeterminism, the notion of individualization is neat and clean. It carries no excess philosophical baggage, and should prove acceptable, not only to science, but to both determinists and indeterminists alike.
The fact that I am proposing that individualization becomes a function, not merely of environmental variables as with conditioned thought and behavior, but of the imagination and judgment of the individual, does not constitute the introduction of anything illegal (homunculi). One can choose to interpret this in any manner he chooses, as imagination and judgment in correlation with physiological individualization in the brain, as variations in imagination and judgment arising simply from more abstruse correlations with environment and genetic endowment, or from the imagination and judgment exercised by an autonomous or semi-autonomous ego. While I regard it rather foolish for a philosopher to become involved in the indeteminism issue, it would be just as foolish to continue to ignore psychology's order problem, since it is in all probability the single most crucial difference between psychical science and the so-called physical sciences. It is not, in fact, a difference between psychical science and physical science, but rather a difference between any science of the kinematics of *homo sapiens* (whether thought or behavior) and a science of less evolved systems (see Diagram II).
The recognition of a possible principle of individualization greatly facilitates this science however. This is because it proposes that not all the kinematic processes of a highly individualized class exhibit individualization to the same degree. It offers a means of delineating the probability of individualization of a kinematic process or attribute. In other words, if one views the construction of a science of highly individualized human minds as somewhat analogous to constructing a house on quicksand, the principle of individualization at least offers some hope for distinguishing which regions of the terrain might provide the most secure footing. From such secure regions, one can set up one's tripod and survey less secure regions. In many areas, one will have to be content with standing knee-deep in the muck (i.e., high degrees of individualization with corresponding need for higher degrees of generalization.)
I realize that it is no longer regarded as necessary to extensively justify the use of mentalese. But the reason most frequently stated for the return to psychical descriptions (e.g. Dennett, 1978), is because it has been discovered that behaviorism simply can't account for many of the important phenomena. However the conclusions presented here suggest that this return to psychology is for the wrong reason. Such a reason readmitts psychology back into the scientific community as a sort of second class citizen, a tainted leper which is allowed back into a society because it can perform services we can not do without. My analysis suggests that psychology should be readmitted as a war hero, or as someone who has been falsely accused, tried and sent to outer Siberia. This is because psychology should have never been banished to begin with. Its problem has never been with its psychicalness, but rather with its orderliness, a problem not of that which is psychical, but of that which is more evolved (see Diagram II), specifically the more evolved thought and behavior which arises from the reasoning process.