Notes on "A Question of Sanction"

by Robert Tracinski

Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1990 23:00:04 CST

From: "Robert W. Tracinski" (rwt1@tank.uchicago.edu)

Subject: Notes on "Sanction".

I would not normally post to this list, but an advanced version of my article, "Notes on 'A Question of Sanction'", was accidentally posted here, and I wish to replace it with the final, fully edited version. If you have the old version, please replace it with this one. This is the final version and is for unlimited public distribution.

This article was originally completed on Jan. 5, 1990, and the subsequent editing is not in any way in response to the content of Kelley's talk in San Francisco or the criticisms, by Eyal Mozes and others, of the first version of the article.

-Robert Tracinski rwt1@tank.uchicago.edu

------------ (Note: This posting is meant for public distribution.)

NOTES ON "A QUESTION OF SANCTION"

This posting is loosely based on a discussion held by a study group which included myself, Robert Garmong, Daniel Drake, David Bombardier and several other Objectivists from the Chicago area. Therefore, I owe some of these points to them. While I am responsible for the writing of this article, they have read it and agree with its content.

Preface:

Before beginning my analysis of "A Question of Sanction", I would like to make a few comments about my approach towards analyzing Kelley's views. I believe that the primary way one ought to approach Kelley's ideas--and to counter them--is the approach that Leonard Peikoff took in "Fact and Value". One ought to identify the essential problem with Kelley's view and address that, rather than entering into a detailed analysis of his arguments. There are several reasons for this.

First, and most important, is the need to think in essentials, to deal with the fundamental issues in "Sanction" first and foremost. It would be concrete bound to enter into a detailed discussion first; it would indicate a failure to grasp the fundamental problems with "Sanction". (It would be similar to a review of The Passion of Ayn Rand which attempts to discredit Barbara Branden by citing concrete factual errors. Such a review misses the fundamental problems with Ms. Branden's book.) Second, anyone who has difficulty with Kelley's arguments and is significantly confused by them is probably confused on that essential issue. Third, entering into a point-by-point analysis of Kelley's arguments affords his position too much respect; it conveys the impression that he has an honestly, subtly mistaken position with many intricate details that require identification and analysis before his position can be judged properly. In actuality, Kelley's position is wrong in a very big way. There is one very wrong idea which underlies most of what Kelley says in "Sanction", and identification, analysis and refutation of that idea is all that is required.

I say all of this in order to make clear why I am entering into just such a detailed, point-by-point analysis. There are two reasons. First, a full analysis serves to make the problems with Kelley's article absolutely clear and "truck-like", and to show how far from Objectivism Kelley really is. Hence, this kind of analysis can be useful as a secondary critique within the context of a broader analysis like "Fact and Value". Second, it provides an interesting and challenging exercise in philosophical detection and in the presentation of ideas. To write this article, I had to figure out what Kelley's philosophy is, then present it in a well-ordered structure.

In this article, I will present the points of Kelley's philosophy and support them with evidence from the text. I am assuming a fairly close familiarity with the text, so a re-reading is suggested. I will give the location of quotes by paragraph number (i.e. P1, P2, etc.). My goal is to present a coherent view of David Kelley's philosophy, as presented in "A Question of Sanction". I will be working both from explicit and unambiguous statements, and from clues in the phrasing of Kelley's points. In investigating the philosophical clues in "Sanction", my main consideration will be to find unifying threads to Kelley's thought--ideas which unite apparently unrelated views and explain apparent conflicts and contradictions in Kelley's statements. I believe that this is where the strength of my analysis lies, since ideas which are not explicitly stated at any one place in "Sanction" can be discerned by observing a pattern, a consistent way of thinking about things, which runs throughout the article.

Part I: Fact vs. Value

The major idea presented in "Sanction" is the separation between fact and value. This split appears in five different manifestations.

1) The seperation between volition and ideas.

Kelley severs the connection between one's choices and one's ideas.

"It is also true that a given person may accept false ideas through evasion, which is morally wrong. But another person might adopt the same idea through honest error. The assumption that libertarians as such are immoral [an assumption which is not made by Objectivists, by the way] is therefore an egregious insult. Some are honest and rational, some are not. The same is true for any other ideological group, including Objectivists. It is a gross non-sequitur to infer that because an idea is false, its adherents are evil for holding it." (P12, emphasis added) [ emphasis is italics ]

Kelley says that one may be honest and rational, yet arrive at any ideological result. One's volitional intentions (honesty) and method of thinking (rationality) have no necessary connection to the ideas that one arrives at. Think of what this means: no matter how honest and scrupulous you are as a thinker, you still might be wrong. There is no approach that can steer you in the right direction.

This is part of the implicit theme of skepticism which runs throughout "A Question of Sanction". Kelley believes that one can be honest and rational, yet still be subject to massive error. Then how can one ever be sure that one's ideas are correct? Kelley's separation of honesty and rationality from their results subjects all cognitive contents as such to doubt. This is the classic formula of skepticism--doubt as a blanket accusation against all knowledge. There is some corroborating evidence of this in the way that Kelley talks about the relationship between tolerance and certainty in P14-15. "Certainty," he says, "is contextual." One's ideas are connected to reality by a long and complex chain, which "pre-supposes an enormous context" (P14). So we must approach others "on an equal footing, a mutual willingness to be persuaded by the facts" (P15).

Think of what it would mean to approach an argument "on an equal footing" and with "a mutual willingness to be persuaded by the facts" when the idea being argued is "existence exists." You would think that this is ridiculous, since the truth of this proposition is so obvious. What possible argument could there be? What facts are there that could persuade you? If you enter into an argument on this subject at all, you do not do it with an "openness" to opposing arguments. Your motive is not to check whether your ideas are right, or to "strengthen the foundations of [your] own beliefs" (P16), but only to see why it is that another person claims to doubt that existence exists, and to show him why any such doubt is absurd. But the same thing applies to other ideas, not just to axioms. (The point is merely clearer with axioms, because they are self-evident.) The key is certainty. To be certain of an idea is to see clearly its connection to reality. That is, you see the truth of the idea (its connection to reality) as clearly as you would see a truck coming down the road at you. This is what Leonard Peikoff calls a "truck-like" understanding of an idea. Doubting such an idea is as absurd as doubting the existence of the truck.

In the case of axioms and trucks, Kelley might agree. But when the ideas involved reach a sufficient degree of complexity, if the chain linking them to reality becomes sufficiently long, if the context required is large enough, Kelley finds truck-like certainty to be impossible. Their connection to reality is never, and can never be, completely clear. One must always leave open the possibility that there is a fact lurking unnoticed that will wipe out one's ideas. What kind of ideas are subject to this kind of doubt? Kelley makes that clear: "[tolerance] is appropriate not only among people who disagree about the application of principles they share, but also among people who disagree on the principles themselves" (P14). Thus philosophical principles (e.g. life as the standard of value, the integration of mind and body, emotions as automatized value-judgements) are subject to this kind of inherent uncertainty.

This gives the lie to Kelley's statement that "tolerance is not a weak-kneed confession of uncertainty" (P14). Kelley states that it is recognition of the fact that "certainty is contextual," but then interprets that to mean that at any moment, what one belives might be wildly wrong. Ayn Rand's statement that "certainty is contextual" was meant to save certainty from its reinterpretation as out-of-context, intrinsicist "certainty." In Rand's usage, "certainty is contextual" means that one cannot be certain of more than the available evidence allows, but it also means that one cannot be certain of less than the evidence demands. Kelley uses the same statement in order to define certainty out of existence--that is, to define it as a form of skepticism. According to Kelley, to be certain of an idea is merely to regard it as true pending its possible falsification by as yet undiscovered facts. The difference between Kelley and Rand is best expressed by paraphrasing a standard formula which Peikoff uses to explain contextual certainty. According to Kelley, with the growth of knowledge, one becomes more certain (and sometimes less). According to Rand, with the growth of knowledge, one becomes certain of more.

Now it is true that everyone is fallible. Note, however, the conclusion which Peikoff draws from this fact.

"That man is fallible means that, on the conceptual level of cognition, he is not automatically right; he is not so built that error is impossible to him; he is not so built that the mere presence of an idea in his mind guarantees its truth. It follows that man cannot accept uncritically whatever ideas occur to him. In order to know an idea's truth, a fallible being must do something; he must form his conclusions by a specific method, a method which will distinguish right from wrong, or reality from unreality. An infallible consciousness could accept with impunity whatever happened to strike it; the responsibility of a fallible consciousness is to validate its conclusions by a specific process.

"The science which defines the proper method of validating conclusions is epistemology. ... If you follow this method, with all of its implications, your conclusions have been validated and you are entitled to claim them as true." (from "Maybe You're Wrong", The Objectivist Forum, April 1981)

Peikoff starts with the premise that man is fallible, and arrives at the conclusion that man must discover and use a method by which he can assure the validity of his ideas. Peikoff's assumption is that to know reality is within our power, but that it requires some specific kind of method. Kelley, on the other hand, interprets fallibility to mean that whether or not we know reality is something that is not under our control, that no such method is possible, that one can be honest and rational and arrive at any ideological result.

It is also true that philosophical ideas are tremendously complex, and an explicit understanding and justification of the correct ideas is very difficult. But an implicit understanding of the basics of philosophy is essentially straightforward. A full explicit understanding of these ideas may be difficult and complex, but an implicit grasp and acceptance of these ideas is not. Hence, an honest and rational person may be wrong on many issues (especially those that involve the full understanding and justification of philosophical ideas) but cannot go very far astray. Grasping reality is something that is within our power; for an honest and rational person, fallibility has limits.

What are these limits? In "Fact and Value", Peikoff gives several examples of inherently dishonest ideas. These are ideas which, by their very nature, undermine any basis on which one could form an honest belief in them. For example: honesty and rationality both depend on the acceptance of and adherence to the evidence of the senses. Hence, it is impossible to honestly and rationally believe in the complete and utter rejection of the senses, as in the case of an advocate of Shirley MacLaine-style "New Age" religion. (I mean these comments to apply in the same context as those set by Leonard Peikoff in his discussion of this issue: a serious belief on the part of adults.)

Kelley's views have some other interesting implications which appear in "Sanction". The first is a method/content dichotomy. Because intention and method (honesty and rationality) do not yield or imply any specific content, "Objectivism" does not designate primarily content, but method. "Ayn Rand left us a magnificent system of ideas. But it is not a closed system. It is a powerful engine of integration. Let us not starve it of fuel by shutting our minds to what is good in other approaches." (P18) Most of the intellectual content of Objectivism (e.g. the concept of "sense of life", the Objectivist theory of free will, the need for government) can be (and regularly is) sacrificed to maintain an "open system", but the "powerful engine of integration" must be maintained. (Similarly, there are those who have attempted to reduce Objectivism to only the Objectivist theory of concept-formation.)

The second is a form of subjectivism. "Above all, let us encourage independent thought among ourselves. Let us welcome dissent..." (P18, emphasis added) Kelley's equation of independent thought with dissent is a subjectivist extension of his skepticism. If rationality can lead to many different ideas and one can never claim certainty, then independent thought will rarely lead to agreement with others, and the demand for agreement will be tyrranical; it will be an attack on "independent thought".

There is one more somewhat tangential but interesting note which I will include before going on. First, I stated that the separation between volition and ideas implies that the choice to focus may still lead one to false ideas. Conversely, this also implies that the choice to evade may lead one to true ideas. This might explain Kelley's support for Barbara Branden's book. In his system, it is plausible that someone can be a cheap, neurotic evader (as Branden portrays Ayn Rand), yet still produce a marvelous system of ideas.

2) The exclusion of cognition from moral evaluation.

"Tolerance is not a virtue where evil is concerned...But it is a virtue in the cognitive realm." (P14) "The concept of evil applies primarily to actions and those who perform them. ... Truth and falsity, not good or evil, are the primary evaluative concepts which apply to ideas..." (P11-P12) Soviet tyrants are not evil because they believe in Marxian collectivism. They are evil because they have murdered millions of people and enslaved hundreds of millions more. An academic Marxist who subscribes to the same ideas as Lenin or Stalin does not have the same moral status. He is guilty of the same intellectual error, but not of their crimes..." (P11)

Morality, says Kelley, applies only to actions. If a man performs an anti-life action, then we can legitimately judge him as evil. (Even this is questionable, according to some of Kelley's supporters. See the articles by Robert Bidinotto and Gregory Johnson, if you can stomach them.) But ideas are not subject to moral valuation, and if a man holds a false idea, then he is simply wrong, but we can in no way conclude that he is evil. The content of a man's mind--and his intellectual associations--in no way reflects upon his character. This is closely connected with both the first and third points.

3) The separation of the mind from life.

"It is true that the horrors of this century were made possible by irrationalist and collectivist ideas. Bad ideas can be dangerous; that's one reason [presumably there are others] we shouldn't endorse them. But they are dangerous because people use them to perpetrate evil. We are not Hegelians; ideas per se are not agents in the world." (P12)

This point is not quite stated explicitly, but key points of phrasing (along with previously quoted passages) show a consistent pattern of thinking on this issue. Let us examine the above quote piece by piece. "...the horrors of this century were made possible by irrationalist and collectivist ideas ... But [these ideas] are dangerous because people use them to perpetrate evil." Notice the view of action which this implies. Evil actions do not result from bad ideas; they are simply made possible by bad ideas. Again, acting on bad ideas is not a source of evil. Bad ideas are simply a means of perpetrating evil. Evil itself has its source elsewhere, and it exists independently of ideas, thought and the "cognitive realm". Kelley sees choice, not as choice in the "cognitive realm"--the choice to focus or evade--but as a choice simply among alternative actions. (See his discussion of choice in "Life, Liberty and Property" for more on this.) Ideas may prepare the way for, or aid the perpetration of evil actions, but they are in no way responsible for producing those actions. The choice of actions is an independent primary. Hence, "bad ideas can be dangerous" and "ideas are not agents in the world". The "can be" is very significant. Contrast this to someone like John Ridpath, who declares emphatically, in that deep, booming voice of his, that "bad ideas kill". The integral connection between thought and action is simply something that Kelley does not see. This becomes clearer in the next point.

4) The separation of values from the rest of philosophy.

"...one's philosophical enemies--i.e., those who hold values fundamentally inimical to one's own..." (Peter Schwartz, "On Sanctioning the Sanctioners") "Schwartz asserts that we should not sanction the Soviets because they are `philosophical enemies.' This is a bizarre interpretation of their sins." (P11)

While Schwartz sees values as an integral part of philosophy and as the connection between ideas and action, Kelley sees values as unconnected to the rest of philosophy. The example of Kelley's honest academic Marxist is very important here. In reality, Marxism is not a set of detached intellectual methods and ideas. Marxism implies and contains a set of values which are integral to it. In order to seriously uphold the ideal of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need", any Marxist, even an academic one, must hold an inveterate hatred for reason, ability, ambition, selfishness, and independence. He must systematically turn against human life, especially considering the widespread knowledge of the destruction and corruption that Marxism has invariably produced whenever and wherever it has been imposed. According to Kelley, however, no set of values is integral to Marxism. An academic Marxist may be honest, rational, and pro-life, yet still uphold his belief in Marxism. For Kelley, a philosophy is a set of ideas out there in the "cognitive realm", with no connection to values or action.

This separation of values from the rest of philosophy goes a long way towards explaining Kelley's view of Libertarianism and the ethical foundations of rights. Because Schwartz recognizes the connection between philosophy and values, he also recognizes that "Libertarians are patently not allies in the ideological battle for capitalism..." ("On Sanctioning the Sanctioners") But Kelley does see them as allies, and he speaks to them as allies. In speaking before them, he assumed that they do indeed hold capitalism as a value, then proposed to teach them the proper philosophical justification for capitalism. This is the very approach which is central to Libertarianism and its "marketplace of ideas". Liberty is taken as a primary, and one shops for a philosophy to fit with that primary, but the value of liberty is seen as independent of philosophy. Kelley also sees values as primaries which are independent of ideas. Hence, "Ayn Rand's ethics is a better foundation for rights than any alternative." (P5, emphasis added)

5) Endorsement vs. sanction.

All of the ideas discussed above are integrated in the way in which Kelley looks at the issue of dealing with Libertarians. He sees two discrete issues: endorsement and sanction.

"A cardinal principle of Objectivist ethics is that one should not give evil the moral sanction it needs to justify itself and disarm its victims. And a principle of resonsible advocacy is that one should not endorse false ideas. These principles are related, but they are not the same." (P10) "An academic Marxist...is guilty of the same intellectual error, but not of their crimes, unless and to the extent that he actively supported them..." (P11)

Kelley sees endorsement as an intellectual matter applying only in the "cognitive realm". One must not signal agreement with ideas with which one disagrees. Sanction, on the other hand, applies only to the realm of values and action. One must not give moral or material support to evil. A man who endorses Marxism is completely different from one who supports the actions of those who put Marxism into practice. For Kelley, the realm of ideas and the realm of values are separate. Thus, endorsement applies in the one realm, and sanction applies in the other. Endorsement concerns only intellectual matters of agreement and disagreement--i.e. of truth or falsehood. Sanction concerns only matters of values and action--i.e. of good or evil.

Kelley does not even hold consistently to his own version of the principle of not sanctioning evil. "I cannot engage my opponents without conferring some benefit on them, in some indirect and attenuated fashion--buying their books, helping them retain their audience, or the like. [Notice that all such benefits are conceived as purely material and practical, not intellectual.] If every such benefit is to be condemned as aiding the enemy, then one cannot participate in the maketplace of ideas. ...In any given case, therefore, I weigh the costs of association against the possible gains." (P2-P3)

Kelley can offer no principle to guide one's dealings with others, and instead offers a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. This is a result of his separation of sanction from the "cognitive realm". In Kelley's system, how could one decide between gaining a cognitive benefit (spreading one's ideas) at the price of conferring material, practical and moral benefits? Since these are separate realms, there is no standard, no common principle according to which one can decide. So, "In weighing these and other matters, I am always looking for long-range strategic gain at minimal cost. That's how you fight a war of ideas." (P3)

Summary of Part I:

According to Kelley, true or false ideas do not result from good or bad choices, but each can result from either choice. Similarly, true and false ideas do not result in good or bad actions. The realm of good and evil--the realm of choice--exists outside of, and independent from, the "cognitive realm". Hence, we must not apply moral evaluation to ideas or those who hold them. We must make sure not to endorse false ideas, and not to sanction evil actions, but these apply to separate realms which must be kept distinct. Philosophy and values, ideas and actions, fact and value, are not connected; they are independent primaries.

Part II: Anti-Principle

The second major point about "Sanction" is epistemological. I am basing this point largely on an article entitled "Reintroducing the Measurements: An Old Fallacy with a New Name" by Bennett Karp, which will soon be published in Objectively Speaking . Since I do not want to steal Mr. Karp's thunder, I will go lightly over this point and refer you to his article for a fuller account.

This point is based on Kelley's "sense of proportion".

"Even if we accept the principle that libertarianism as such is a vice, there would be a vast degree of difference between libertarianism and a regime which has the blood of millions on its hands. When we formulate moral principles, we may abstract from such differences of degree; we omit measurements, as Ayn Rand explained. But when we apply the principles in forming moral judgements about particulars, we must reintroduce the relevant measurements." (P9)

My first reaction after reading this was "so what?" Of what significance is it that there is a difference of degree between Libertarians and the Soviets? They are both still evil and should be treated accordingly. (As I indicated much earlier, Objectivists by no means completely exclude the possibility of an honest Libertarian. However, if we apply this remark to those who represent the core and substance of Libertarianism, then the remark stands.) Kelley's argument appeared as a complete non-sequitur; Libertarianism is a trivial evil, therefore we should not still regard it as an evil?

My second reaction was to question whether there is actually a difference of degree between Libertarians and the Soviets. Surely there are some important differences. The Soviets have put their ideas into practice and their leaders have been responsible for the deaths of millions. It would therefore be moral to try and execute the Soviet leaders for their crimes. Most Libertarians, on the other hand, are not actual criminals. Aside from that, however, the only major differences are that the Libertarians have not yet had a chance to put their ideas into practice, and in a Libertarian society murder and slavery would be decentralized. In addition to that, some of the ideas mouthed by a few of the Libertarians are half-way decent. But the real heart of Libertarianism, which dwells with the nihilists, subjectivists and anarchists, is a hatred of reason and life as profound as anything one could find within the ranks of the Soviets. The nihilism which is the essence of the Libertarian movement is by no means a trivial evil. In this respect, at least, there is no difference of degree.

Finally, however, I read Bennett Karp's article and realized that the real content of this section is not the invalid or inconsistent application of a correct principle, but rather an attack on principles themselves. Notice the strong barrier which Kelley erects between a principle and its application to a particular case. Kelley's emphasis is not on the fact that the principle which applies to the Libertarians and the Soviets is the same, but rather that the particular measurements are different. This is an indication of his separation of concepts from percepts. Specifically, Kelley believes that a large enough difference of degree invalidates a similarity of kind. Soviets and Libertarians may be integrated under the same concept, but when we go down from the conceptual level and take into consideration their specific measurements, we must still treat them as if they are fundamentally different. Kelley's approach is a classic example of the anti-conceptual mentality. He looks at the Soviets and can see that they are evil, but he looks at Libertarians and says, "Oh, well, that's different..." See also Kelley's case-by-case, pragmatic approach towards accepting speaking engagements, as stated in P3. He sees each case as a separate and unique instance, with only a loose set of pragmatic guidelines--but no principles--to guide his decisions. This is only a brief indication, and for the full argument I refer you to Mr. Karp's article.

Part III: Style of Presentation

The third major note about "Sanction" concerns the intellectual honesty of Kelley's observations and style of presentation.

1) Waffling

"Truth and falsity...are the primary evaluative concepts which apply to ideas as such." (P12) "...ideas per se are not agents in the world." (P12)

The phrases "primary", "as such", and "per se" are used by Kelley as means of prevaricating on the important issue of the connection between fact and value. If truth and falsity are the "primary" evaluative concepts which apply to ideas, one would expect there to be secondary evaluative concepts, namely, good and evil; but, Kelley later asserts, this would be "non-intellectual" and "intolerant". If they apply to ideas "as such", then one would expect there to be a broader context in which other evaluative concepts (good and evil) apply; but, says Kelley, that would exhibit "a kind of zealotry". If ideas "per se" are not agents in the world, then one would expect that there is a broader sense in which they are agents in the world; but, says Kelley, this is a "bizarre interpretation".

When words are used as tools of communication, an author who uses "primary", "as such" and "per se" expects the reader to remember "secondary", "in a different sense" and "in another respect" as their (approximate) correlatives. In fact, he is specifically directing the reader's attention to those correlatives and is promising that he will deal with them later. However, Kelley uses these phrases, not as tools of communication, but as tools of obfuscation. His purpose is not to remind the reader that there are secondary evaluative concepts that apply to ideas or that ideas are agents in the world via actions. He certainly wants to conjure up those implications in the reader's mind, but only to obscure his rejection of them. He wants to make unclear the common theme which unites the first and second halves of P12. Hence, the ambiguity produced by the complete non-sequitur from "truth and falsity are the primary evaluative concepts which apply to ideas as such" to "it is a gross non-sequitur to infer that because an idea is false, its adherents are evil for holding it".

The motive should be clear: had Kelley stated his ideas outright, especially in this crucial section of "Sanction", his rejection of Objectivism would have been too blatantly obvious for even him and his supporters to ignore. Kelley is walking a tight-rope, trying desperately to avoid facing his rejection of Objectivism. Accordingly, he uses Objectivist terminology and a badly mangled version of Objectivist ideas to present his attack on Objectivism. He is not straightforward enough to admit to the reader (or to himself, most likely) that what he believes is not Objectivism, that it is opposed to Objectivism. Nevertheless, his real message comes through loud and clear.

2) Self-contradiction

It seems that when Kelley says "We are not Hegelians", he is being a bit too hasty. Note the following unities of opposites.

"...to explain why Ayn Rand's ethics is a better foundation for rights than any alternative." (P4) Then, a mere fourteen lines later... "...my explanation of why individual rights and capitalism cannot be established without reference to certain key principles of Objectivism..." (P6, emphasis added)

Thesis: Objectivism is one of many legitimate foundations for rights. Antithesis: Objectivism is the only foundation for rights. Synthesis: When addressing a Libertarian audience, Kelley can imply that there are many foundations for rights, but when addressing an Objectivist audience, he can imply that Objectivism is the only foundation. Thus, no one is offended and no one gets harangued in a spirit of sectarian hostility.

"Tolerance is not a virtue where evil is concerned...But it is a virtue in the cognitive realm." (P13)

Thesis: Moral evaluation does not apply to the cognitive realm. Antithesis: Moral evaluation does apply to the cognitive realm. Explanation of the Thesis: If tolerance is not a virtue where evil is concerned, and tolerance is a virtue in the cognitive realm, then evil must not apply to the cognitive realm. But if there is no evil in the cognitive realm, then there is no good, and moral evaluation does not apply to the cognitive realm. Explanation of the Antithesis: If tolerance is a virtue in the cognitive realm, then there is such a thing as virtue in the cognitive realm. But virtue is a moral concept, so moral evaluation does apply to the cognitive realm. Synthesis: Anything and everything is permissible in the cognitive realm except "intolerance". Explanation of the Synthesis: The only exception that has been explicitly made to the principle that moral evaluation does not apply to the cognitive realm is that tolerance is a virtue. Hence, the only vice is intolerance. (Thus, according to some of Kelley's supporters, Leonard Peikoff is evil, but Immanuel Kant was not.)

"Tolerance is not a week-kneed confession of uncertainty." (P13) Then, 9 lines later... "We must approach them on an equal footing, a mutual willingness to be persuaded by the facts..." (P14)

Thesis: Tolerance is not based on uncertainty. Antithesis: Tolerance is based on uncertainty. Synthesis: Kelley (and his supporters), while displaying a mutual willingness to be persuaded by Kantians, etc., can speak out with certainty and righteousness against Leonard Peikoff, et al.

"The great minds of the Enlightenment declared war against the entire apparatus of intolerance: the obsession with official or authorized doctrine, ... These are the techniques of irrational philosophies... But they have no place in a philosophy of reason." (P16)

Thesis: There should be no "official" Objectivism. Antithesis: "Tolerance" is an official part of Objectivism. Explanation the Antithesis: To say that there is no place for an idea in a philosophy of reason (by which he means Objectivism) is to say that that idea can officially be said not to be a part of Objectivism; the "open system" is not open to that idea. To that extent, an official doctrine has been established. Synthesis: Anything and everything is compatible with Objectivism, except the view that there are some things which are not compatible with Objectivism.

In any philosophy, a self-contradiction hardly ever stands in a vacuum; it is usually based on a more fundamental contradiction. And so on, in turn, until one reaches an axiomatic contradiction. In Kelley's philosophy, the hierarchy of contradictions is as follows (starting with the axiomatic contradiction and working down the hierarchy).

1. Skepticism: We know that we know nothing. 2. Uncertainty: We are certain that certainty is impossible. 3. Suspension of Judgement: We must be adamant about not being adamant. 4. Militant Tolerationism: We must tolerate everything except intolerance.

Kelley wants to have his cake and eat it, too. He wants to eliminate the claims to certainty of his opponents without undermining his own position. He wants to close Objectivism off from closedness. He wants to claim moral superiority in the cognitive realm for the idea that there can be no moral evaluation in the cognitive realm. He wants to pass moral judgment on others while avoiding moral judgment himself.

3) The twisting of facts

The facts about Libertarianism, Laissez-Faire Books and Laissez-Faire Supper Club (whom he uses as examples of fairness and honesty!), and The Passion of Ayn Rand are so obvious to anyone with a serious knowledge of them and of Objectivism, as to be almost beyond debate. There are, as I have described above, reasons in Kelley's philosophy for his evasion of those facts, but that does not mean that he does not have to evade them. That he does so while claiming Objectivism as his basis is doubly dishonest. That he does so while claiming to be truer to Objectivism than Leonard Peikoff and Peter Schwartz--and Ayn Rand (!)--is triply dishonest.

But the following defines a new order of magnitude of dishonesty: "But if we approach ideas with the question: good or evil?, ... We will substitute condemnation for argument, and adopt a non-intellectual, intolerant attitude toward any disagreement with our views." (P13) "...the obsession with official or authorized doctrine, the concepts of heresy and blasphemy, the party lines and intellectual xenophobia, the militant hostility among rival sects, the constant schisms and breaks, the character assassinations of those who fall from grace." (P17)

Consider to whom these descriptions are meant to apply: Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff, Peter Schwartz, Harry Binswanger, John Ridpath, etc. What kind of mind-bending act of factual distortion would it take to apply such remarks to such people? There is absolutely no objective basis in their actions and statements that could make them liable to even mistaken accusations of this sort. If I may be so bold as to place myself in the same category (though with a "sense of proportion"), I myself take great offense at this slander, both for myself and for those whom I know who are also its targets. And if the shoe fits, I encourage you to wear it. Taking these remarks personally can be a great help in getting the full impact of Kelley's meaning.

Part IV: Conclusion and Evaluation

1) Kelley's view of ideas

David Kelley believes that one holds ideas in the same way as the academic Marxist whom he cites. They are something "out there", a chess game with pieces to be manipulated and complex flanking maneuvers to be performed. But they have no more significance than the pieces of a game. Ideas are not matters of life and death; they have no reflection on one's values, one's character, one's moral status or the way one lives one's life. Values, for Kelley, are a separate, independent realm, a realm which is not derived from or connected to ideas. It is very telling that one of the most frequent charges laid by him and his supporters against those who do morally evaluate ideas is that they are "non-intellectual"; according to Kelley, one can only give moral significance to ideas at the expense of their intellectual significance. How much more complete could the separation between fact and value be? Kelley regards ideas and values as not only separate, but incompatible.

One the most important ideas in "Fact and Value" was Peikoff's observation that, unless a man has integrated his ideas into the context of his own life and values, their connection to reality does not become fully real for him, and he has not actually understood them. That is, the discovery of the value-implications of a fact is absolutely necessary for a real understanding of that fact. This explains how a man like David Kelley (or, to take another example, Nathaniel Branden) can apparently be quite knowledgeable about Objectivism, and even give very insightful lectures on it, yet turn around and act as if he's never heard any of it. To the extent that he ever understood any of it, he understood Objectivism only in a floating and detached way, which means that he did not really understand it. This explanation makes it somewhat less surprising to hear the basic rhetoric of skepticism, relativism and pragmatism (dressed up in pseudo-Objectivist terminology) coming from a former lecturer on Objectivism.

This also integrates the two main intellectual elements of "Sanction", the separation of fact and value and the rejection of principle. The common theme is that the connection between ideas and reality is not fully real for Kelley. Ideas are all well and good, but when it comes down to values, choices and the important issues in life they have no real bearing. Particularly, principles are all well and good, but when it comes down to dealing with specific instances, we must reintroduce the measurements, consider each case separately and "weigh the costs against the possible gains".

2) A moral evaluation

In coming to a moral evaluation of David Kelley, three factors (any one of which alone is sufficient) are relevant.

First, he ought to know better. A man who served as an intellectual supporter of Objectivism, in fact as a spokesman for Objectivism, should have made sure of his own agreement and consistency with Objectivism. Furthermore, his level of knowledge of Objectivism allows no room for such basic and complete rejection of it. It is not honestly possible to have such a close familiarity with Objectivism and nevertheless to reject it.

Second, his views fly in the face of the facts, and often result in massive self-contradictions within the space of a sentence. The number of facts which he must evade (about the nature of the issues, the nature of Objectivism, the nature of his enemies and the nature of his supporters) is too great to be the result of honest error.

Third, his obfuscation and equivocation on key issues, as well as his claim to speak in the name of a philosophy which he is attacking, indicate a dishonest approach, an attempt not to let the reader--or himself--know his real position or motives.

In conclusion, it is clear that, whether Kelley recognizes it or not, "A Question of Sanction" is his declaration of a full and complete break with Objectivism on all levels, both in theory and in practice.

-Robert Tracinski rwt1@tank.uchicago.edu

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