© Copyright 1997, Luke Wadel,
The Christian idea of religious authority is not that of power. "You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you; but whoever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever would be first among you must be your slave; even as the Son of man came not to be served but to serve," Jesus said (Mt 20.25-28). (All quotations are from the Revised Standard Version.) Religious authority is a non-powerful one. Paul Halsall begins his Syllabus saying, "One of the main dysfuntions [of the Roman Catholic Church] . . . arises from the centralization . . . of power and authority in the office of the pope . . . ." Similarly, his Syllabus is the first (perhaps primary) component of his grand Radical Catholic site, "Jesus Christ - Liberator!" which opens with the words, "Roman Catholicism is not a religion of hierarchy, oppression, and male power. Both those who attack Catholicism and conservative Catholics seek to demonstrate the opposite: both unite in portraying the Catholic Church as primarily an organized power structure obsessed with controlling its members' bodies." Let it be granted to Prof. Halsall that some popes and not a few priests and bishops have twisted their authority into a base power. But let it be granted also that this is contrary to Catholic doctrine.
And I tell you, you are Peter [which means Rock], and on this rock I will build my church, and the powers of death [also translated "forces of hell," which amounts to the same thing] shall not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.
It is clear, as Halsall says, that final perseverance is promised. For otherwise, one of "the powers of death" will have prevailed. But if this Peter should teach doctrine contrary to Christ's, thus tearing down what Christ has built up, can he still be the base upon which Christ builds his Church? And even if he continues to exist and support the Church, will not one of "the powers of death" have prevailed? There are many kinds of death worse than physical. Further, Jesus tells us, "Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste, and no city or house divided against itself will stand" (Mt 12.25). Could such an end be called final perseverance or be at all compatible with final perseverance?
Now, "binding" and "loosing" are Jewish rabbinical terms denoting the power to command or to allow the Church in matters of religion. The Christian religion, like the Jewish, is concerned only with faith and moral action, not mathematics, not politics, not art appreciation. And since Peter's commands, as Jesus says, conform exactly to the commands given in heaven (by God), what we have here is evidence of a miraculous inerrancy in what is proposed for faith and morals.
Finally, if 'Peter' died with the apostle Simon, again a power of death will have prevailed, and Jesus would have spoken wrongly. But it is a matter of Church history (cf. Tertullian and Irenaeus) that the apostles' missions and authorities were passed on to successors. And we can list the names and dates of successors for 2000 years. Therefore 'Peter' flourishes still in the person of Pope John Paul II.
Paul Halsall does not give us the standard Protestant responses (either rewording Jesus to have address not Simon but his act of faith, "you are Peter," or misapplying the distinction between the Greek Petros and petra, the original Aramaic kepha and kepha being grammatically indeclinable and identical). Rather Halsall lists historical instances in which Peter seems to have erred.
The task of the apologist is fairly base and underhanded according to Paul Halsall and Hans Kung:
For a long time, too, Catholic theologians in their works on apologetics . . . were able to successfully ward off any questioning of infallibility by the use of a basically simple recipe: either it was not an error or - when at last and finally an error could no longer be denied, reinterpreted, rendered innocuous or belittled - it was not an infallible decision.Again the apologist is likened in Halsall's Syllabus to a dishonest supervisor of a company engaged in unethical dealings: "Her goal was neither truth nor fairness but rather to find a way to keep the situation stable just a little longer and not to admit that anything that the company could be sued for had happened." What a charitable picture Prof. Halsall paints of the Catholic defender of the above Scripture! On the contrary, truth and fairness are the goals, and--as far as these allow (no further)--so is the principle of charitable interpretation of Peter's words throughout history.
A Second Aim
Halsall sometimes seems to change the ground of his attack from the doctrine of infallibility ("inerrancy") to the Vatican's authority simply. At least several of his attacks make sense only if the attack is so shifted. So against his secondary conclusion (that non-infallible authorities in Rome or elsewhere are to be disregarded) there is this consideration in the words of Jesus:
[In a dispute over right and wrong] if [your brother] does not listen, take one or two others along with you, that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector."
Mt 18.16-17
This hardly needs to be argued further, but we will. In any school system, even though some teachers blunder, it is foolish for students to deny teachers' authority in general. Now in the Church, the pastors are teachers to the rest. There are some bad pastors just as there are bad teachers, but it is foolish for the Church as "students" to deny their authority. So we proceed to the attacks on infallibility.
Paul Halsall's first instance does not amount to an attack on papal infallibility. For what he complains of here is not that Pope Vigilius taught the Church something wrong on faith and morals, but rather that he condemned certain people, broke some promises regarding these condemnations, and admitted changing his mind in a letter.
It is a fact that Pope Honorius was condemned by later councils and popes. But first of all, Prof. Halsall is no doubt aware that one criteria for an infallible statement is that it must be a public teaching. For Vatican I defines the doctrine of infallibility:
[W]e teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that when the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines a doctrine concerning faith and morals to be held by the whole Church, he possesses . . . infallibility which the divine Redeemer willed His Church to enjoy.
Vatican I, Session 4, ch. 4.
Here we have only Honorius' letters to one Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople. Secondly, it must be a command or an official allowance. For that is what binding and loosing mean. Thirdly, scholars are certainly not in such agreement that the letters were "(b) proposing a new heresy." We read more on the context of the letters in Frs. Rumble's and Carty's Radio Replies:
Sergius favored the Monothelite heresy . . . [and] wrote a very deceptive letter to Pope Honorius begging him not to condemn the doctrine. . . . Honorius wrote to Sergius, praising him for his good intentions, and sanctioning his explanations, though interpreting them in a perfectly orthodox way which Sergius did not accept for a moment. If there is one thing clear, it is that Honorius neither taught heresy in either of his letters to Sergius . . . , and that he gave no dogmatic definition on the subject. . . . Pope Leo . . . said that he had no intention of condemning Honorius for any heretical teaching, but because he was negligent in dealing with the Monothelites, fostering their heresy by his very inactivity.
Radio Replies, Vol. III, 404-405.
Pope John XXII did state false doctrine in his sermon as Prof. Halsall says. It should be quite clear, however, from my deduction of papal infallibility from Scripture above that (again) an infallible statement must be in the form of a command to believe or not believe something (in the realm of faith), or to do or not do something (in the realm of morals), or a statement of allowance. Again, that is what "binding" and "loosing" mean. There is no evidence that Pope John XXII made this doctrine binding. On the other hand, the words of Christ in Matthew 16.18-19, when scrutinized, teach the Catholic doctrine of Papal Infallibility. Click here to review it.
It is almost understandable that Prof. Halsall, the Protestants and other "Radical Catholics" write against Boniface VIII. Indeed the statement with which we are concerned here meets the requirements of an infallible statement, though the whole document needn't. For example, the attribution of a phrase to St. Dionysius is a matter of history and not of faith and morals.
We have several problems today which hinder our understanding and acceptance. First, we are hypersensitive to words and statements proposing any "subjection" or anything "necessary for salvation"; we are immediately turned off. Second, "rules are rules" to us; the letter of the law is obvious and paramount; exceptions and qualifications based upon (what is truly) the spirit of the law are sneakily unlawful at best. Thus in our codes of law everything must be explicit, and all exceptions be accounted for in writing. Thirdly, we tend to imagine subjection always to be an outward and intentional political act.
Enter Boniface VIII with Unam Sanctam, speaking to an age with a different mentality. "[I]t is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff." There are two logical propositions in this statement, which will be examined in turn.
The main component is that all people must be subject to the pope. Must the subjection be outward and intentional? Boniface does not say so, and we cannot assume it just because we usually think of subjection differently in our age. There is an older and broader sense of "subjection," which we employ when we say that the earth is subject to the gravity of the sun, that creation is subject to God, and that a baby is subject to its parents. The subjection in these cases happens to be invisible and unknown to the recipient. Now then, if the pope is the vicar of Christ (and this Catholic belief we observe more calmly) then it follows that a similarly imperceptible, unknown, and absolutely unpolitical relationship exists. Accordingly, the constant insistance by the Church in our age that those outside of the visible Catholic Church (Protestants, Hindus, agnostics, etc.) can be saved, is quite compatible with Boniface VIII. And one might expect Prof. Halsall and any other critic to have picked this up from the context, in which it is clear that Boniface's subject is the essential ontology of the Church, not every person's empirical reaction thereto (the temporal sword discussion being conceptually and textually removed). And if not from the context of the phrase within Unam Sanctam itself, then from the context of the Church's ancient teaching on baptism by desire and baptism by blood.
The second part of the disputed statement is that the first is necessary for salvation. As far as inerrant authority goes, it is necessary for all who must say with St. Paul, "Woe to me if I do not preach the Gospel!" All Catholics must preach the one faith in their actions and in their words, however their walk in life requires. Since it is evident that without papal authority there is infinite recreation of the Gospel, we who must preach need this authority less we preach contrary to Christ. But further, why might it be necessary that there be this invisible, unknown, and mostly unrealized authority of the pope? For one thing it is because papal authority is not only doctrinal; it denotes responsibilities to prayer and fasting, and an eschatological service (according to common Catholic interpretation of Mt 16.19) to use the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The fact that all people are "subject" thus to Peter is therefore a guarantor that all people (not just visibly Catholic persons) have the ability to reach heaven through Christ's body the Church. How far is this charitable and fair interpretation of Boniface from Halsall's sour condemnation!
It was said above that papal infallibility is strictly in the sphere of faith and morals, not in matters of mathematics, politics, or art appreciation. Niether, then, do translation or editing come into the sphere of papal infallibility. Translation of the Bible is certainly related to religious faith, but it is not itself the object of that faith. Translation and editing are only means to the revealed truths. Similarly, Pope Sixtus' poor editorial skills are no argument against Magisterial authority.
This does not touch upon our subject of infallibility; priests and theological commissions are not Peter, and no one imagines them to be infallible.
But for more information on the subject, see where Fr. William Most discusses whether Pius XII initiated a revolution and whether Vatican II initiated a revolution in Scripture studies.
Prof. Halsall is not as clear as he might be on the definition of slavery, though he eventually comes very close with the words "tied servitude." Strictly, slavery is the deprivation of natural freedom and being forced to follow another's commands. As a rule, of course slavery is wrong. As an exception, I suggest that criminals should be deprived of freedom and made to pay off their debt, i.e., be slaves, to the extent and for as long as their crimes merit. This does not counter the teaching of Pope John Paul II or Vatican II, for some rules have legitimate exceptions.
This is not to say that all Catholic religious' slaves were deserving criminals. Probably some were. The Church in our age especially has apologized again and again for the sins of her clergy and laity, and slavery is a big past sin. My point here is, Dr. Halsall has not demonstrated that there has been any papal statement declaring to the Church that it is allowable to take slaves beyond the legitimate punishment of crime.
It is hard to believe that Nicolas forbade slaves baptism or the exercise of their religious duties. At any rate, we recognize from Halsall's history alone that Nicolas V's words were directed only to the King of Portugal, not to the Church. Further, he spoke only of a body of people specific to time and place; this was neither a doctrine nor a general moral principle. As bad as it was--and I have not bothered to check Halsall's description for accuracy--it did not begin to meet the requirements of an infallible statement.
Prof. Halsall seems to confuse the concepts of usury and lending interest, for he uses the terms interchangeably. The first problem then is of distinction in vocabulary. Clearly by itself 'usury' can mean the taking of interest on a loan, simply. But it can also mean any illegitimate taking of interest. Classical Latin's corresponding faeneror (vb) and usura (n) themselves admit of negative connotations often enough to show up in the definitions and examples of Lewis and Short's A Latin Dictionary.
If the Latin equivocation were not enough, Pope Benedict XIV's Vix pervenit is clear. He defines usury not simply as the taking of interest on a loan, but the taking of "more than [the creditor] has given," or (again), "beyond that which he loaned" (3, i). If one stops at the empirical level of analysis, one will not see the distinction, for interest is defined as that which is paid to a creditor beyond what is loaned. But that "beyond what is loaned" (as Benedict says) need not be monetary but valuable in other ways, and that value is given with the loan, so it may be returned in the form of money. That is, the hidden costs of loaning can be repaid in the form of interest. This brings a true equality of what is given and what is to be paid back. Thus it is obviously true that "once the equality has been established, whoever demands more than that violates the terms of the loan" (ibid.).
And if we cannot deduce this from Benedict's words (even as Halsall quotes them), the pope makes it explicit:
We do not deny that at times together with the loan contract certain other titles--which are not at all intrinsic to the contract--may run parallel with it. From these other titles, entirely just and legitimate reasons arise to demand something over and above the amount due on the contract. Nor is it denied that . . . from [other] types of contracts honest gain [meaning "interest"] may be made.
3, iii
These words should be remembered when interpreting the related parts of Benedict's encyclical. Our capitalistic notion that money equals what can be done with it may be taken as partially defining the unseen value of what is loaned in the first place. Likewise, Interest required by the devaluation of currency is compatible with Boniface's analysis. Finally, let it be pointed out against Halsall's attack that when the Church stops speaking about a problem, this does not make for an argument against infallibility. Infallibility cannot apply to nothing said, but rather to something said--indeed "bound" or "loosed," as we determined above.
Paul Halsall admits in his Syllabus (version 1.5) that his argument needs expanding. His gives vague references to Tradition's disallowance of using any natural method, but there is no citation of Papal teaching to that effect. Moreover, there is expressed some disapproval that popes or tradition should speak on this moral issue at all (they "should have had more to do with their lives"). But sex is above all to be an act of love, and love is a moral action. So it is automatically governed by Christian principles.
"Pius was the first pope to allow ANY method of contraception." Contraception is arguably the wrong word here. Pius spoke of naturally avoiding pregnancy, not prohibiting it with anti-creative technology. Besides which, unless past popes have condemned this natural family planning, how can it be said that Pius was the first to allow it?
The verses from Leviticus and Ezekiel that Halsall quotes are inapplicable to Catholic teaching, because they (appear to) form hygienic commands appropriate to the ancient Jews' diseases, medicine and living conditions. Certainly, it is an old fact that the detailed physical expressions of Jewish Law were not incorporated into Christianity, only their spiritual meanings. And the only spiritual meaning of these particular commmands seems to have been that since they were part of God's Law, to disobey was to sin against fidelity.
As for the New Testament, the woman sought healing and got it; this was disease or wound. We cannot deduce that menstruation is evil or that sex during it is illicit for Christians. The Acts 15 interpretation in this section of the Syllabus is likewise irrelevant. To conclude that "the evidence is overwhelming that the Bible condemns as a moral offense . . . sex during menstruation" is misleading at best, outrageous at worst.
As immoral and as politically minded as some popes have been, Prof. Halsall gives us no reason here to believe that false doctrine or wrong general moral principles were made binding upon the Church. The evil of some popes makes infalliblity more the miracle. That is to say (again) that these examples do not relate to our topic of papal infallibility except as falsely understood. But see the note on Halsall's second aim (above).
What is said above applies here too. And why does the non-Ecumenical Council of Gangra come into this discussion?
Again, if Halsall aims to attack the teaching authority of the Church more generally than the "inerrancy" he first mentions, this is treated above.
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