



The Experience of the Factory Committees in the Russian
Revolution
Soviets, Parties & Unions
The Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks were fighting for the leadership
of the working class, not to solve workers' problems. The workers
themselves tended to pay little attention to the differences between
the various left-wing groups and parties, differences which mattered
a great deal to the socialists themselves. Rank-and-file Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks had often united in the early days after the February
Revolution anyway: as the moderate socialists discredited themselves,
the Bolsheviks were able to win more support as the uncompromising
party. February had given workers the freedom to combine, and they
were able to force concessions from employers and government on the
eight hour day, better working conditions, social insurance and so
on. When, out of necessity, the move to self-management started, it
was not only something alien to the workers' original demands, but
also to every socialist organisation, and to the trade unions.
By May there were some 2,000 unions with 1.5 million members; by
October, two million members. Some of the unions existed in name
only, with paper membership; others did nothing. The active trade
unions wanted the factory committees to be local branches of the
unions and little else.
For their part, the committees, which had been far quicker to
organise and take up grievances, were in favour of co-operating with
the unions, but certainly not of being subordinate to them.
The unions were dominated politically by the Mensheviks. For them,
the revolution was a bourgeois-democratic one, ushering in a period
of straightforward capitalism: thus the task was to establish trade
unions as in Western Europe to organise and defend workers. They were
for state control over the economy, in which there was to be no room
for factory committees or workers' control. As the Menshevik Dalin
put, it: "The factory committees must see only that production
continues but they should not take production and the factories into
their own hands (...) If the owner discards the enterprise, it must
pass not into the hands of the workers but to the jurisdiction of the
city or central government." [13]
Either the capitalists or the bourgeois state were to run industry,
never the workers.
A directly contrary view was taken by the anarcho-syndicalists,
for whom the factory committees were the beginnings of the future
socialist society. Maksimov and the 'Golos Truda' group called for
"total workers' control" over the process of production itself. Their
critical attitude towards the unions and solid support for the
committees gave the anarcho-syndicalists some influence on workers,
particularly in Vyborg and Kronstadt. However their antipathy to
centralisation left them vague about how the factory committees
should link up across the country.
The Bolsheviks occupied what appeared to be an ambiguous position,
shifting their emphasis from the committees to the unions, from
workers' control to state control. This was partly a reflection of
the differences between the party leadership, which (apart from
Lenin) was unsure as to what it wanted at first, and the
rank-and-file members, who, many of them being workers, were active
in the factory committees. Lenin's April Theses set the tone for his
line of thought: "Not the 'introduction' of socialism as our
immediate task, but immediate transition merely to
control by the Soviet of Workers' Deputies over the social
production and distribution of products." In 'Pravda' on June 4th
Lenin was to repeat that workers' control would be carried out by the
soviets: the factory committees didn't rate a mention. For Lenin,
workers' control was a form of accountancy, and socialism merely
state control of production. Many militants in the party thought a
decisive transformation of society was at stake. Navimov, a Bolshevik
worker on the Central Council of Factory Committees, said at the
first conference of Petrograd factory committees; "Control must be
created from below and not from above, created democratically and not
bureaucratically, and I call upon you to take this mission upon
yourselves. Only we workers can achieve what is necessary for our
future existence." [14]
The Bolsheviks had helped set up the Central Council of Factory
Committees, but were using the committees in the struggle to win
control of the trade unions from the Mensheviks. At the All-Russian
Trade Union Conference in June, Milyutin, the Bolshevik
representative, said that the committees should be union cells, and
workers' control would be exercised by the unions and the soviets. It
has to be said that before February no Bolshevik had given any
thought to workers' control and the problems attached to it: however
their basic political assumptions were already starting to drive them
against the real workers' movement. As the committees themselves were
not always united, and were unclear over their relationships with
other institutions and workers' organisations, the conflict did not
assume a concrete form until after October.
In 1905, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies had risen out of a
general strike. In 1917 this creation was resurrected, but with a
difference: socialists set up a Provisional Executive Committee of
the Soviet both independently of and in advance of the workers. A
leadership established itself that had no workers in it. These first
Soviet leaders were moderate socialists, who hoped in fact to phase
out the soviets as the apparatus of a bourgeois-democratic republic
was created. Some minor soviet elections occurred as early as
February 24th; city-wide elections were held on the 28th in
Petrograd, the day after the Provisional Executive Committee was
formed. These elections allowed for one deputy per thousand voters,
or one per small factory, with one per company of soldiers (usually
250 men). Thus the large factories containing some 87% of workers had
424 delegates, the small factories with the remaining 13% had 422,
and the soldiers had some 2,000, by mid-March. Not only did the
soldiers have an excessive influence in the Soviet, but also the
workers' delegates were frequently not workers, but middle class
radicals of one sort or another.
The Petrograd Provisional Executive Committee started with 42
members: this initially included seven workers and eight soldiers who
were all soon ousted. The Bolshevik Shlyapnikov had successfully
proposed that each socialist party should have two seats
automatically on the Executive. In the event, all parties, large
trade unions and co-operatives were allowed to send two delegates.
Thus Stalin and Kamenev of the Bolsheviks, both well-known Petrograd
workers, got onto the committee unelected. At the first Congress of
Soviets there were 57 executive officers, including just four
workers, one sailor and one soldier. No soldier or worker spoke
throughout the whole proceedings: all speeches were made by party
members, not one of them working class.
The dominating role of the Mensheviks and the Social
Revolutionaries, another moderate socialist party, was reflected in
the way that the Petrograd Soviet urged a return to work in March
before the Provisional Government conceded the eight hour day, or
made any move towards peace and a settlement of the land question. It
was mass action and the threat of a general strike that had gained
workers the shorter working day. The Soviet similarly tried to limit
workers' control by setting up 'Labour Mediation Boards' to settle
disputes. It tried to restrain anti-war demonstrations. The moderate
socialists were after all looking to the bourgeoisie to institute a
western-style capitalism, not to the workers to create socialism.
Despite that, the Provisional Executive Committee found itself under
intense pressure from the workers. It was forced to take over the
State Bank, the Treasury, Mint and Printing Office; post and
telegraph offices, railway stations and other printing works were
also seized. As early as March 6th, meetings of militant workers were
demanding that the Soviet take power. However these early demands for
"all power to the soviets'' were opposed by many workers, most
soldiers and overwhelmingly by the socialist leaders of the Soviet
itself. The Bolsheviks at this stage supported the idea of the Soviet
supporting the Provisional Government.
By June there were 519 soviets, 28 of which were working class
alone, 101 were workers' and soldiers', 305 were workers', soldiers'
and peasants', the rest being all-class. The majority of these
soviets were run by non-working class party activists. Once party
militants got into these higher soviets, they controlled the other
posts. For instance, Anisimov, the chairman of the soviet of district
committees was not elected to any district committee at all -- he had
been selected by his Menshevik colleagues. In the view of these
socialists, clearly some were destined to rule, others to be ruled.
The Bolsheviks too were happy to build up majorities for themselves
by similar methods. For workers though these city soviets tended to
be too slow to help tackle their pressing problems. The local soviets
and factory committees acted on their own account without approval
from above to get things done. Sometimes they merged at this local
district level. Here workers were able to conduct affairs, leaving
the intellectuals to speech-making in the city soviets. The local
soviets took on economic, political and social problems: food,
housing, justice and culture all came within their orbit. They
guarded their local autonomy, but were prepared to unite -- from
below -- and an interdistrict conference was held in Petrograd. This
brought them into conflict with the executive committee of the city
Soviet. Similarly in Moscow, the local soviets were much more radical
than the Menshevik-run city Soviet.




Notes
[13] quoted in Sirianni, p50.
[14] quoted in Sirianni, P55
(from The Russian Revolution and the Factory Committees, Paul Avrich,
pp 69-70).