Machiavelli’s Conception of Human Nature

Robert Bass
Department of Philosophy
Coastal Carolina University
Conway, SC 29528
rhbass@gmail.com

Simple versions of Machiavelli’s conception of human nature may readily be elicited from The Prince. It is easy to find textual support for claims that appear to presuppose or be equivalent to some version of psychological egoism. He says, for example, that “men in general … are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain; as long as you benefit them, they are entirely yours,” but their “love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose.” (Prince, xvii, p. 61) Again, speaking of a prince’s counselors, he says “[they] will all think of their own interests …. for men will always be false … unless they are compelled by necessity to be true.” (Prince, xxiii, p. 89)

Beyond specific citations, there is what may be called the atmosphere of the work. Machiavelli constantly assumes that, regardless of what ought to be done, there is no reason to expect that it will be unless it accords with someone’s interests. Objectives which are not secular or this-worldly are only rarely mentioned, and those who concern themselves primarily with such aims are rather summarily dismissed as theorists only for imaginary republics and principalities. (Prince, xv, p. 56) His appeal is always to the prudence of rulers, and he constantly speaks of what is or is not in their interests. It might almost be said that he has no other arguments to offer, no other considerations to bring to bear.

Equally easily, one can find textual support – often in the same texts – for claims that seem to echo the Christian doctrine of Original Sin. Thus, Machiavelli says that “as [men] are bad, and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them.” (Prince, xviii, p. 64) Or “[a] man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good.” (Prince, xv, p. 56)

But there are several reasons for trying to look deeper, for suspecting that Machiavelli may mean something other than what appears on the surface.^[1] First, though he has clearly thought long and deeply about politics, he nowhere tries to give us a systematic account of human nature. His remarks on the subject are remarks – generally in the form of asides intended to reinforce some other point. He is a careful and intelligent observer of the world around him, but there is nothing to suggest that any of his staements on human nature are meant to be self-sufficient and unqualified by what he has to say elsewhere.

Second, he is speaking of a restricted context, the arena of political power and conflict. Nobody, including Machiavelli, thinks that the topics he seeks to address encompass all of human life. Politics may set the terms within which other interests are pursued – but there are other interests and other pursuits. Machiavelli, in short, may no more need a general conception of human nature than the economist needs to ‘believe in’ the existence of Economic Man.  An economist need not believe that all people are rational profit maximizers, only that in certain contexts it is useful so to model them. And, along similar lines, Machiavelli might well be construed as modeling the behavior of ‘Political Man,’ rather than expressing any general conception of human nature.^[2]

Third, Machiavelli has other things to say which seem not to be straightforwardly or obviously compatible with psychological egoism. Pope Julius, for example, “merits the greater praise, as he did everything to increase the power of the church and not of any private person.” (Prince, xi, 43) Additionally, in discussing ministers, he asserts that the prince ought to seek only those who concern themselves more with the prince’s interests than their own – and thereby implies that such ministers can be found. (Prince, xxii, 86)

If, then, Machiavelli is neither clearly a psychological egoist nor an adherent to some extreme version of pessimism about human goodness (or rather its absence), what sort of conception of human nature is reflected in The Prince?

First and most broadly, Machiavelli can be described as endorsing what Gregory Kavka has termed “Predominant Egoism” which “says that self-interested motives tend to take precedence over non-self-interested motives in determining human actions …. [and] non-self-interested motives usually give way to self-interested motives when there is a conflict.” (Kavka, 64)^[3]

Machiavelli, in other words, does not assume that people are always and invariably self-interested or that they never act on other motives or on behalf of other objectives. He assumes only that it is unsafe to count upon their acting otherwise than in their own interests. (And because it is not safe to assume that people will act otherwise than in their own interests, it is wise, insofar as it is in your power to do so, to arrange that it is in their interests or at least not contrary to their interests to act in ways compatible with your own interests.) Second, Machiavelli assumes that people will assess their interests primarily in secular or this-worldly terms. People will pursue or find motivationally most salient such objectives as wealth, power and fame, and will most vigorously seek to protect life, security, loved ones and property. Third, he assumes that desire typically exceeds any available means for its satisfaction. To quote from the Discourses, “nature has created men so that they desire everything, but are unable to attain it … [thus they are] discontent with what they have.” (I.xxxvii, 208) Fourth, he assumes that there is no pre-established harmony among people’s interests. People’s interests, especially political interests in objectives such as power and glory, are constantly liable to give rise to conflict.

The foregoing, I think, is a fair though sketchy presentation of the conception of human nature that finds expression in The Prince. It is the sort of view that emerges when one allows remarks and asides to be remarks and asides which mutually qualify one another rather than taking a favored selection from among them to be a canonical and strictly literal statement of Machiavelli’s total position.

It remains to say something about how well this position accords with what appears in the Discourses and particularly with the claim that, in the words of the title of Book I, Chapter lviii, “The People Are Wiser And More Constant Than Princes.”

Briefly and broadly, I see here neither conflict nor tension. At most, there is some modest need for elaboration. The people, i.e., those who do not concern themselves primarily with getting, keeping and expanding political power, have fewer incentives for behaving “badly” simply because they are less involved in arenas and activities which are inherently conflictual. Additionally, they are less likely to behave badly because the actions which “the people” take (collectively) are more or less complex functions of the actions of the people (distributively) and hence are moderated by the actions and judgments of the best among them in a way that is not available to the prince. Still further, and also due to the fact that the actions of “the people” are a function of the actions of the people’s members, the people cannot act quickly in the face of sudden changes of situation. Thus, though a prince may think that it is in his interests to be suddenly cruel or treacherous, the people, not being as well situated to take advantage of momentary changes of circumstance, are forced to premise their actions upon longer-term considerations.

Beyond these considerations, in the background of Discourses I.lviii, is the assumption that power, in whosever hands it may be, is not self-limiting. “[B]oth [governments of princes and of the people] require to be regulated by laws. For a prince who knows no other control but his own will is like a madman, and a people that can do as it pleases will hardly be wise.” (p. 265) Since, as Machiavelli would surely insist, laws will only have effect insofar as there are people and institutions functioning to enforce and execute them, this means that power is effectively countered or kept within reasonable bounds only by power – a conclusion very much in line with the conception of human nature which underlies The Prince.

Comments? I'd love to hear.

References

Burnham, James. The Machiavellians. Chicago: Gateway, 1943.

Kavka, Gregory S. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Machiavelli, Niccoló. The Prince And The Discourses. Introduction by Max Lerner. New York: Modern Library, 1950.