Inevitably, our thinking is shaped by the culture we live in. To a great degree, we eat, drink, and breathe the philosophy of the time in which we happen to find ourselves, often unknowingly. But there comes a time when one must make a break with the prevailing world-view and take a stand. Such was the case for William of Ockham.

William of Ockham was born into the world of Classical Philosophy where forms prevailed. Plato had set the stage for a philosophy which would impact the world centuries beyond his time. Plato's world was one in which the forms were the determining pattern and true essence of all the objects we see in the world. Though Plato lived hundreds of years before Christ, his influence pervaded history centuries into the history of the Church. Thomas Aquinas, still thinking somewhat within the paradigm of Plato, held the view that, while there were indeed forms which determined the objects that exist, these forms exist in the mind of God. While this brought philosophy closer to the revelation of Scripture, it did not bring philosophy close enough to Scripture for Ockham. If we say that there are Platonic forms in the mind of God, says Ockham, then it is still those forms which are determinative in the world, not God.

As the "Father of Nominalism," Ockham reacted against the classical notion of forms, especially forms within the mind of God. Ockham's concern was to defend the divine freedom, something that Ockham claimed had been taken away from God by the universal, determinative forms.

In this paper, I shall investigate three areas in which Ockham seeks to defend the divine freedom -- the realm of divine creation, the realm of divine activity in the world, and the realm of divine morality. In response to his views, I shall argue that Ockham rightly defends divine freedom, though at times he takes this "freedom" too far.

Ockham passionately desired to protect God's freedom within the realm of creation. Ockham lived in a world in which it was believed (by those such as Aquinas) that God created according to the forms that were already within his mind. This, however, was not acceptable to Ockham. For God to create according to pre-existing forms within his own mind is not, according to Ockham, to create at all. This amounts merely to the Classical notion of necessary emanation, which is not consistent with a God who freely creates. According to the Classical Philosophy of the day, the forms within the mind of God amounted to an intellectual determinism, thus binding God to necessary action.

Rather than allowing for the notion that the forms within the mind of God bind God to necessary action, Ockham wants to open up the possibility of alternative action for God. To do this, Ockham must come up with some way of showing that God is not bound to act according to certain forms that are within his mind. Ockham does this by asserting that there are not any forms within the mind of God whatsoever. Ockham vehemently opposes the notion of forms as the essence of an object. He wants to say that objects exist individually, not having anything within them that could be called universal. What God does have in his mind, says Ockham, is not forms but ideas. These ideas, however, are not substances as were the forms. They are not substances of God, nor are they substances of the created object. In fact, according to Ockham, they are nothing. That is, they are not things at all, but rather ideals of things that would or could be.

To avoid an intellectual determinism still, Ockham says that God has an infinite number of ideas within his mind. These ideas consist, not only of the ideas of objects that would eventually be created, but of the ideas of objects that could possibly be created as well, as long as the existence of such an object does not entail a contradiction, such as a round square. So, according to Ockham, for every object real or possible, a Divine Idea exists eternally.

Given that these ideas are ideals rather than substances, Ockham can say that God's creation is indeed creation ex nihilo, and not some sort of emanation from something that is already there. Also, Ockham wants to maintain that God has to freedom to choose among these Divine Ideas within his mind. Those he chooses he will create. Those he does not choose will remain possibilities that were never made real. Thus, God's creation is in no way necessary. God creates what he creates because he chooses to create it, not because he has to create whatever is in his mind. Thus, Ockham establishes fiat creationism, while rejecting necessary emanation. This is how Ockham seeks to protect God's freedom in creation. Ockham's credo in reference to God's freedom, far from being that things must be according to the forms, is that things could have been otherwise.

In response to Ockham's view of freedom in the realm of divine creation, I think that Ockham has done a wonderful thing by showing us that God himself is the one who decides who and what he will create. And he does this simply because he wants to, not because he is bound to by something already within his mind. There is perhaps one problem, however. If there are an infinite number of Divine Ideas among which God chooses as he creates, does this not necessarily impinge upon divine omniscience? It seems as though Ockham is saying that there was a time when God considered all of these Divine Ideas within his mind and thought, "Hmm, I wonder which ones I will choose to create." If this is the case, then we cannot really say that God has know everything from all eternity. For if he has known everything from all eternity, then there would never have been a time when he would have to decide what he would create, for he would have already known. Rather than saying that all ideas existed the same within God's mind and then one day he chose certain ones, I think it is better to say that God has always known which ideas he would use to create the world. So, rather than there being one infinite set of Divine Ideas, there would be two -- those that God could make real but won't, and those that God would make real. For surely God knows, and has always known, the difference.

Some perhaps would argue that this takes us right back to the problem of forms and, thus, intellectual determinism. That is, if saying that God creates according to certain forms within his mind is intellectual determinism, why would saying that God creates according to a certain set of Divine Ideas be any different? To answer this objection, we must consider the relationship between the ideas within the mind of God and the mind of God itself. The question is simply this: does the idea determine God, or does God determine the idea? Of course, they both eternally exist, but which is the logical cause of the other? If we were talking about forms within the mind of God, I would have to say that the form determines God; that is, the form somehow causes God to do what he does. This is because, according to my impression, the form is some thing other than God which is determinative. But Divine Ideas, as we have already said, are nothing. That is, they are not things at all, but merely ideals. But further, we must consider the nature of the mind itself. Minds create ideas; that is, they think. That's simply what minds do. So it is with the mind of God. Thus, we can rightly say that God's mind is the logical cause of the Divine Ideas (something we cannot really say about forms). And if it is God himself who causes these Divine Ideas within his own mind, we cannot say that these ideas somehow determine what he will do, for he determined the thoughts to begin with. By modifying Ockham's view here as I have done, we are able, not only to say that God is free from intellectual determinism, but also to maintain his omniscience.

Ockham was concerned to protect God's freedom, not only with respect to the creation of the world, but with respect to his activity within that world as well. Ockham maintained that God's will was the efficient cause of absolutely every object, event and action within the created world. This notion springs from his commitment to the view that reality consists of singulars rather than universals. Thus, there is no real causal connection between various objects.

For example, according to Ockham, fire and heat are two separate, causally unconnected entities. That is, there is no inherent property within the fire itself that would necessarily cause heat to emanate. Ockham grants, of course, that heat generally does emanate from fire. But this is due to the will of God, not some inherent property within the fire itself. What seems to us to be some property within the fire itself is really the ordinary power of God (the way God typically acts), and not something within the fire. While God may cause heat to co-exist with fire one day, he may just as well cause coldness to co-exist with it the next.

Likewise, when I throw a ball up into the air, I see it move. But Ockham denies that there is some inherent property called "inertia." Rather, Ockham claims that God simply wills for that object to be in one place at one moment, in another place at another moment, etc. Of course, God typically wills for these objects to "move" in certain ways (thus the study of physics is possible), but the direct cause of that "movement" moment by moment is the will of God. God could just as well have willed that ball to "move" through the air in a zig-zag pattern, and it would really be no different than the ball "moving" in an arch. Thus, there is really no such thing as "divine intervention," for there are no real inherent principles in which to intervene. Another way to say it is that every event in every place is equally a divine intervention.

Ockham argues as he does, of course, in an attempt to defend the power of alternative action for God, which is what Ockham means by Divine Freedom. While I acknowledge that, if God wanted to, he could create a world in which everything is efficiently caused by his will, I do not agree that this kind of world is necessary for God to maintain his freedom of alternative action. First of all, if God has all ideas within his mind (except those that entail contradictions) and can choose any of those ideas to become real, can God not choose to create a world in which inherent properties exist. Surely Ockham must agree that God could do this, since it is not a contradiction. Further, creating such a world would not impinge upon God's freedom of alternative action within that world. This is what miracles are all about. In a world of fire which actually produces heat because of the inherent properties which God put into it, God would still be able to cause coldness to co-exist with that fire at any given point in time. That is, God is still free to choose something other than that which would result from the inherent properties he has put in place. And this would not have to "violate" those inherent properties (which is the contradiction I suspect Ockham feared). To avoid this violation, all we would have to say is that when God created inherent properties, he created them those properties to be interfered with. That is, the allowance for divine interference would be a part of the inherent property itself. For example, when rocket launches, we do not say that it has violated the Law of Gravity (an inherent property, mind you); rather, we say that the Law of Gravity was overcome, which is perfectly allowable within the Law itself. Thus, a world in which inherent properties exist is not a threat to the Divine Freedom of alternative action.

Finally, Ockham is concerned to protect God's freedom within the realm of morality. As with the realm of creation and the realm of divine activity in the world, here Ockham wants to allow God the power of alternative action. Within the realm of morality, this would mean that God's will is the deciding factor in morality. In response to the classic riddle -- is something wrong because God says it's wrong, or does God say it's wrong because it is wrong -- Ockham would say the former. There is no standard to which God looks to determine what is right and wrong, says Ockham. God himself decides what is right and what is wrong. Just as God is not bound by some form to create a certain way, neither is he bound by some "form of goodness" to say a certain thing is right or wrong. Within our world, God has decided that hating him is wrong. God could just as easily have decided that this action would be right. Likewise, while rape and murder and wrong today, it is possible for God to declare them right tomorrow. In the realm of morality (as with the other areas we have considered), it is God's will which is determinative, not some necessary moral code.

I must agree with Ockham that what God says is right is right indeed, and what God says is wrong is wrong indeed. But can we really say that God is morally free in the way Ockham means him to be free? To address this question, we must ask what it means for someone to be free. To say "I am free" (and nothing more) is meaningless. You must say that you are free to do something.

Bearing this in mind, when we say that God is free, what are we saying that he is free to do? One option is to say that God is free to choose among alternative actions (which is the kind of freedom Ockham says God has). Another option is to say that God is free to do as he wishes. I agree with option one in certain cases. For example, when God put Adam in the garden, he told him not to eat of the fruit of a certain tree. I see no reason why such an action would be inherently wrong. But at the same time, I agree that such an action would indeed be wrong simply because God said not to do it. Further, I agree that God could have said that not eating from that tree was wrong. But to say that God has the kind of freedom mentioned in "option one" in every case does violence to God's nature. While it is true that God could have made the laws of physics differently, he could not choose, for example, to be unjust. This "alternative action" is not open to God. For to choose such an action would be to violate his own nature. For Ockham, it all boils down to the determining factor of God's will. I think it is better to say that it all boils down to the determining factor of God's nature. (Contrary to Ockham, God's will cannot be "freed" from his nature.)

While Ockham wants to maintain that "all things are possible for God, save such as involve a contradiction," I would suggest that all things are possible for God, save such as involve a violation of his nature. Thus, according to my redefinition of Divine Freedom, God has the freedom of alternative action unless it entails a violation of his nature (which he would never want to do anyway). This would be consistent with the second definition of freedom (above). This definition of freedom allows God to be free from being bound (Ockham's concern) while doing justice to his nature (my concern). So, while God's will does determine what is right and wrong, his nature is the structure within which his will is operative.

Despite Ockham's desire to say that everything is determined by God's will, we must say that there is one thing that God could not possibly determine -- his own nature. There was never a time when God decided what his nature would be. God never decided to be just; he simply always has been just. Nor did he decide to be faithful, or compassionate. These are necessary characteristics of God, and they are not of his own choosing. His nature is, if you will, the Ultimate Form. Incidentally, the Law of Non-Contradiction, which (as Ockham continues to remind us) God cannot violate, is not some standard outside of God which God must obey. Rather, it is a part of the very nature of God himself. That is why God cannot violate it: because it is a part of his nature, the one thing he cannot violate. Thus, to Ockham's delight, we can say that God is not bound by anything outside of himself. But he is bound by his own nature, which is inside himself (that is, it is simply who he is). But perhaps "bound" is not a good word when talking about something within. For when we say that someone is bound, we inevitably mean that he is bound by something else. But here we are not referring to something else, but to God's own nature (that is, himself). So, rather than saying that God is bound by his own nature, let us say that he is defined by his own nature. This seems to be the appropriate word for the meaning intended. Thus, while God is bound by nothing, he is defined by his nature.

Ockham was right to react against the classical notion of forms within the mind of God. If God is God, he cannot be bound by anything. He must be free to do as he wishes. With respect to creation, this means that God himself determines what he will and what he will not create, and not some form within his mind. With respect to divine activity in the world, while Ockham claims that God must be the efficient cause of all things in order to have the freedom of alternative action, I maintain that this kind of freedom is still possible in a world of inherent properties. (If God is defined by his nature, it should not be surprising that the world which God made would be defined by its nature as well.) With respect to morality, divine freedom means that God has the right and the power to determine what is right and what is wrong within the framework of his nature.

I am grateful to Ockham for defending the freedom of God. But as a corrective to Ockham, we must never forget who this God is who is free. "Divine Freedom" has two words. It seems as though for Ockham it often only has one -- Freedom. But as we defend the notion of Freedom, we must never sacrifice the nature of the Divine. Then and only then have we truly succeeded in defending the Divine Freedom.

Carre, Meyrick H. Realists and Nominalists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Klocker, Harry. William of Ockham and the Divine Freedom. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1992.

Leff, Gordon. William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975.

New Dictionary of Theology. "William of Ockham," 723-724.

Sontag, Frederick. Divine Perfection: Possible Ideas of God. London: SCM Press, 1962.

The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. "William of Occam," pp. 1462-1463.

The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. "William of Ockham," 1997, pp. 1745-1746.

people have visited this page.