"I cannot believe in God when there is so much evil in the world."  This objection is often posed by many when they see the great atrocities within our world.  Though we ought to affirm with them that, yes, there are indeed great evils in the world, we must be careful also to recognize that the conclusion that there must therefore be no God is based more on emotionalism rather than on rationality.  If we look at this statement rationally, we shall see that it's validity is destined to fail.

To consider this objection rationally, it is helpful to put it in a more logical form such as "If evil exists, then God does not exist."  Further, to avoid ambiguities it is necessary to define key terms.  By "evil" I understand the objector to mean "those actions done by persons to other persons that ought not to be done."  By "God" I understand the objector to mean "the good and all-powerful One."

Let us start with our given -- that evil exists.  According to the definition, evil is an action that "ought not to be done."  This definition assumes a standard by which to judge what ought and ought not to be done -- what we would call "good."  And whatever falls short of this good standard (what ought to be done) is evil (what ought not to be done).  This follows from the definition.  Furthermore, this standard of goodness must be a personal one.  Saying that there could be some impersonal principle by which to judge whether some action is evil or not simply will not do.  Remember our definition of evil -- those actions done "by persons to other persons" that ought not to be done.  How can that which is impersonal be used to make a determination about that which is personal?  The two are categories of different kinds.  To make a determination as to whether or not a personal action is evil, one must turn to a personal standard.

All this is to say that, for us to say that evil exists, we must also say that there is a good and personal standard (which we shall call "the Good One") by which to judge that action as evil.  To deny this would be to profess a contradiction, which of course can never be true.  Another way to say it is this: either the Good One exists or evil does not exists, and since we have already said that evil exists, the Good One must exist.  So up to this point, if the objector (who acknowledges the existence of evil) is to be rational, he must also acknowledge the existence of the Good One.

Although the existence of the Good One does indeed necessarily follow from the existence of evil, the existence of God (the good and all-powerful One) does not necessarily follow.  This, however, does not concede the objector's point.  The claim being made here is simply that the existence of evil does not prove that God exists.  This is a far cry from our objector's claim that the existence of evil proves that God does not exist.  Rather than feeling the need to prove that God exists, all that needs to be done here is to prove that God (the good and all-powerful One) could exist.  This alone would reveal the failure of our objector's claim.

We have already shown that, given the existence of evil, the Good One must exist.  We must now show that it is conceivable (that is, it is not contradictory) that this Good One could also be all-powerful.

Even if our objector were to concede that the Good One indeed exists, he would undoubtedly claim that this Good One could not be all-powerful, for if He were good and all-powerful, He would not allow such atrocities (which we often see in the world) to occur.  At this point, we must again consider some definitions.

What does it mean that the Good One would be all-powerful?  Certainly it does not mean that He could do anything.  This quickly leads to absurdities.  The best way to see this is to ask the question "Could the Good One ever commit evil?"  The answer, of course, is "no."  This is because if the Good One is the very standard for what is good, then everything He does is good by definition.  If He were to commit evil, we would have a contradiction (which can never happen).  Therefore, it is not possible for Him to commit evil.

Likewise, we could say (contrary to our objector) that for the Good One to be all-powerful does not necessarily mean that He would be able to prevent evil from coming into the world, given the existence of free moral agents.  For if people are free to commit evil (which our objector would sadly acknowledge), then it would be a contradiction for the Good One to somehow manipulate these free moral agents not to choose evil (for if one is manipulated, he is not free).  So, given that people are free to commit evil (as we clearly see that they are), it is not possible for the Good One to prevent evil from entering the world.

Given that there are clearly certain things that simply cannot be done (as we have just seen), it seems that we must re-evaluate what we mean by "all-powerful."  Rather than saying that for the Good One to be all-powerful He must be able to do anything, it seems better to say that for the Good One to be all-powerful He must have the ability to accomplish that which He has set out to accomplish.  This avoids the complication of contradictions and maintains the general sense of what we mean when we say "all-powerful."

So if, for argument's sake, we were to say that this Good One were all-powerful (that is, that He has the ability to accomplish whatever He sets out to accomplish), how can it be that He (being good) would not set out to prevent evil from coming into the world?  Doesn't this present us with a contradiction (showing that He is not really good at all), thus proving that there cannot be an all-powerful Good One?  To answer this, we must ask again what it means for the Good One to be good.

For one to be good, he must do that which ought to be done (this we discussed earlier in our definitions).  So, for the Good One to be good indeed, He must himself do that which ought to be done.  Notice what we did not say.  We did not say that for the Good One to be good, He must manipulate others to do that which ought to be done, but rather that He must himself do that which ought to be done.  For to do the former is a contradiction and cannot be done (as we saw earlier), but to do the latter is the very definition of what it means to do good.  Thus, for the Good One to be good indeed, it is not required that He somehow manipulate others to do what they ought, but simply that He respond, when those others do indeed choose evil, by doing what He ought.  And our objector knows what the Good One ought to do in response: defeat evil and bring evil-doers to justice.  So, for the Good One to be all-powerful (at least with respect to evil), it is not required that He prevent evil from entering the world, but rather that He defeat that evil and bring evil-doers to justice.

Since it cannot be said that the Good One will not accomplish this task of defeating evil and bringing evil-doers to justice, it cannot be said that the Good One is not all-powerful.  So it is conceivable, though not proven, that the Good One is indeed all-powerful.  And since "the good and all-powerful One" is the very definition of God, it is conceivable that God exists -- even in the face of evil.  Therefore, our objector's claim "If evil exists, then God does not exist" is refuted.

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