Chapter Two
The Incarnation: The Union of Natures
1. We ought to consider three points about the
incarnate Word, namely, the union of natures, the plenitude of gifts, and the suffering of
the Passion for the redemption of mankind. In regard to the union of natures we should
consider these three points in order to understand the mystery of the Incarnation, namely,
its operation, mode, and time.
In the beginning of this chapter, St. Bonaventure states what he will
examine on the Incarnation in this and later chapters of this section, that is: the union
of natures in a hypostatic, or personal, union; the plenitude of gifts
given to man and creation through the Incarnation; and lastly the suffering of the
Passion for the redemption of mankind. Redemption is a process of restoration wherein
there is a reversal of the effects of the fall. Since the end result of the fall is death
and dissolution, to reverse the process, Christ had to suffer and die as man. He did this
so that He could stop the process of dissolution at its end point, that is at the point of
death, from having an everlasting effect. St. Bonaventure promises to discuss the mystery
of the Incarnation through its operation, mode, and time, that is, the power and
means of the Incarnation, the method of the Incarnation taking place, and St.
Bonaventure's understanding of why the Incarnation took place at a certain time.
2. According to the Christian faith, we should hold
these truths in regard to the operation of the Incarnation: that the Incarnation is the
operation of the Trinity through whom the assumption of flesh by the Deity and union of
the Deity with the flesh occurred in such a way that the assumption involves not only a
sensible flesh but also a rational spirit with its vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual
powers, and also in such a way that there is union not in the union of nature but of
person, not of a human person but a divine person, not of the assumed but of the assuming,
not of any person but the person of the Word alone. Such is the union that whatever is
said of the Son of God, may be said of the Son of man, and conversely, with the exception
of those terms in which the union of the divine and human is expressed or absence [of
human personality] is implied.
The Incarnation is the assumption of human nature by a divine
person. It is a hypostastic union, not a natural union. This means that a person within
the Trinity took upon Himself human nature and joined it to His person, so that the same
person who is eternally God and without change took upon Himself the nature of man and
which is with change. The same person is both God, eternally existent and ever the same,
and man: one person and not two. The person took upon Himself all that a man would have,
that is, an intellect, a soul, and a body. The body is described by St. Bonaventure as sensible
flesh, because it is through our bodies that our senses are active. The senses are
used to examine and interact with material bodies. As a man, the divine person also
assumed a rational spirit (or soul) which has vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual
powers. The vegetative aspect of the soul follows all those activities which are at
the lowest levels of life, that is: nutrition and reproduction. It is called vegetative
because both of these functions are found in the lowest levels of life including that of
vegetation or plants. The sensitive soul is that which all animals possess: the ability to
use senses in order to discriminate and bring about an action, and it is an animal because
it is animated. The intellectual powers of the soul are those which house the reasoning
ability of man, that is, his imaginative and creative side which gives him the ability of
abstraction, speech, and creation. In the Incarnation it must be said that the person who
assumed human nature assumed all that which is normal within a human person, which
includes: a spirit (or intellect), a soul (that which animates), and a body. However these
aspects of human nature which were assumed by the divine person were not aspects of
another person (that is, making the Incarnation two persons), but rather, the
manifestation of the human nature is found within the divine person. Thus, it must be
said, a higher hypostasis can be joined with a lower nature, and give that nature a means
of manifesting itself without the need of a hypostasis of its own order. For example, it
would thus be free to be said that a human person assumes animal nature: the human person
manifests the animal nature which is assumed, and there is no need for an animal
hypostasis to be used to manifest that animal nature, for the human hypostasis is greater
than an animal hypostasis and thus can take the place of the animal hypostasis. Hence, in
one sense, a human person is himself a hypostatic union.
The Incarnation is said to be a union not in the union of nature but
of person, that is, the Incarnation is a union where two natures are joined together
in one person, and it is not where two natures join together to make one nature. Both
natures are left intact within the process of the Incarnation. If it were to be said that
the union was natural instead of hypostatic, it would have to be said that either 1) both
natures were changed into a third composite nature which would be neither one nor the
other, or 2) one of the natures was annihilated in the process of the Incarnation.
However, since the divine nature is without change, there could be no production of a
third nature, and since the Incarnation seeks to free creation through human nature, if
human nature was annihilated in the process of the Incarnation, there would be no
Incarnation which had taken place. For the process of the Incarnation would requires the
assumption of another nature, but if that other nature, when assumed, did not remain,
there would be no nature which was assumed.
Hence, in the Incarnation, there was the joining together of two
natures into one person, not of a human person but a divine person, not of the assumed
but of the assuming, not of any person but the person of the Word alone. That which is
lower can not assume that which is higher than itself, for that which is higher would be
too great for it to assume. A human person would not be able to assume divine nature, for
divine nature is not able to be circumscribed by a human person. However, a divine person
can assume human nature, because a divine person is able to circumscribe human nature,
that is, the divine person is greater than the nature it assumes. Since it was a human
nature which was assumed, it is the divine who is the assumer, and it was not the whole of
the Trinity but rather the person of the Word or Logos. It is an eternal person,
God the Son, who assumed human nature and made it His own. The same person who is "in
the beginning with God" (John 1:1) is the same one which became man. It is the divine
principle of all creation, the Logos, Who took creation upon Himself. The Logos is
the one by which creation is formed, and He put that which He formed, and made it one with
Himself. Since it is the same person who is both God and man, the one who is enfleshed in
humanity is God Himself. He is both Son of God and Son of man. When one discusses this one
person, all that is said of God is said of this person, and all that is said of man, is
also said of this person. Through this, it is easy to see why Mary is called the Mother of
God: for it is one person, God from eternity, who was born of Mary. It is also this same
reason why the image of this person is worshipped, for it is the image which God has made
for Himself which can be seen by man. "In former times God, who is without form or
body, could never be depicted. But now when God is seen in the flesh conversing with men,
I make an image of the God whom I see." (St. John of Damascus, On The Divine
Images: I:16, trans. David Anderson, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980). Thus, St.
Bonaventure wrote, Such is the union that whatever is said of the Son of God, may be
said of the Son of man, and conversely, with the exception of those terms in which the
union of the divine and human is expressed or absence [of human personality] is implied When
one is implying a discussion of the divine nature, it is only there that one can not use
what is said of the human nature for the divine nature, and vice versa: for example, when
the Incarnate one, Jesus Christ, is said to be hungry, it must be said of his human nature
and not his divine nature that is hungry, for the divine does not hunger.
3. The explanation of this is as follows: The operation
of the Incarnation proceeds from the first principle not only in so far as it is effective
but also in so far as it repairs by redeeming, satisfying, and conciliating. Because the
Incarnation, in so far as it bespeaks a certain effect, stems from the first principle,
which accomplishes all things by reason of its highest power and substance, power and
operation are united and completely undivided in the three persons, hence it must be that
the operation of the Incarnation flowed from the whole Trinity.
In the Holy Trinity, there exists one nature, one will, and one energy.
The will is energized by the divine energy and this produces the operation which creates
an effect. Scripture indicates this unity in the Trinity, for example, in John 5:19, where
Jesus said, "Whatever the Father does, the Son does as well." This is said in
relation to ontological union of the Trinity, not within the internal relationship of the
Trinity. We can see an example of this union of operation in the process of creation,
where we see the Father creates all things through the Son by the Holy Spirit. In all
things, the Godhead works together through its one energy to produce an effect. The
operation of the Incarnation restores creation by the work of the Godhead, that is, the
one energy found within the whole Trinity is used to restore creation. The specific person
who is Incarnate is God the Son, but all three work through the one energy of the divinity
in the Incarnation. Thus the Son seeks to bring man to the Father through the unifying
power of the Holy Spirit. The Son works by joining created nature to His person; the Holy
Spirit works through the power of grace which He gives to creation; the Father works by
sending both the Son and the Holy Spirit to work for the redemption and deification of
creation. Hence, St. Bonaventure wrote that the operation of the Incarnation proceeds
from the first principle, that is, through the Godhead, not only in so far as it is
effective but also in so far as it repairs by redeeming, satisfying, and conciliating, that
is, not only in deifying but also in reversing the implications of the fall. The
Incarnation is said to repair the fault in creation by repairing it, accomplishing the
work which it needs to do to pay for its crime, and reconciliating it with God.
Because the effect of the Incarnation stems from the first principle,
from God, the power and operation which is used to do so must be from that first principle
united in its essence, that is, within the Godhead. As the essence of the Godhead is one,
it must be said that the operation and power which stems from this essence (for they are
relation to essences, not persons) must also be one. Hence, as St. Bonaventure wrote, it
must be that the operation of the Incarnation flowed from the whole Trinity, and not
just one person within the Trinity.
4. Because the Incarnation is from the first
principle in so far as it repairs by redeeming and because all mankind has fallen and
sinned in soul and body, the entire nature must be assumed so that all of it may be cured.
And because the carnal part is better known to us and more removed from God, the operation
should not be called an animation but rather an incarnation so that the selection of this
method might be made clearer and a great humiliation shown and a more profound dignity
demonstrated.
Man is both a spiritual and a physical being. All that is a part of
man is good, because God made it. However, in the fall, both the spiritual and the
physical aspects of man have been hindered and hurt, and they need to be healed. Not only
is this true in man, but this is true within creation: both spiritual and physical
elements of creation have fallen. Because man is composed of both spiritual and physical
elements, both spiritual and physical elements can be redeemed through man. Thus it is
said that the Incarnation needs to take upon man's nature, and not just a part of man's
nature, for the Incarnation seeks to save all of man, and all elements of creation which
man shares. Thus, St. Bonaventure points out, the entire nature must be assumed so that
all of it may be cured, that is both the entire nature of man (body and soul), and the
entire nature of creation (which is found within man in microcosm). This is also true, not
only of curing the fallen aspects of creation, but for deifying creation. Man is a good
representation of creation, being both spiritual and physical: although God could taken on
a purely spiritual or physical nature for the deification of the universe, there would not
be as good a symmetrical representation by such as by becoming man, who represents in
himself a microcosm of the cosmos.
Because of the fall, the material side of man predominates his life,
and so the assumption of human nature is called an incarnation, or enfleshment. By calling
it an incarnation, it is seen that even the lowest and yet most known and least important
aspect of man, his flesh, has been assumed by Christ. Since the Godhead is often described
allegorically as spirit, by taking on flesh, God has revealed himself more fully than if
He only took on a spiritual form. Hence, St. Bonaventure points out, the operation
should not be called an animation but rather an incarnation so that the selection of this
method might be made clearer and a great humiliation shown and a more profound dignity
demonstrated. For by putting on lowly flesh, the divine side is both more visible and
more hidden: more visible by assuming that which is sensual, but more hidden, because the
divine side is enfleshed and "humiliated" by the flesh (because matter is
further away from the divinity in ontological status than that of soul and spirit).
5. Again, because the Incarnation is from the first
principle in so far as it repairs by satisfying, and there is no satisfaction except when
made by him who ought to make it can be make it, and no one ought to make it but man and
no one can make it but God, it was fitting that in the satisfaction there be a concourse
of both natures, namely, divine and human. And because it is impossible that divine nature
should coincide with another nature as a part of a third nature and it is impossible that
the divine nature go over into another nature because of the most perfect simplicity and
immutability of the divine nature, divinity and humanity are not united in a unity of
nature or of an accident but in a unity of person and hypostasis. And because the divine
nature cannot exist in any suppositum except in its own hypostasis, this union cannot
exist in the hypostasis or person of man but rather of God. Hence by this union the first
principle in one and of its hypostases makes itself the suppositum of human nature, and
thus there is only one personality and personal unity there, namely, on the part of the
one assuming.
Mankind, humanity-- these are words which reflect both a specific
species and also a specific genus. The genus, man, is that of rational animal, so that any
rational animal would be capable of being said to be man in the most precise sense. It is
through a rational animal that the fall can be reversed through perfect symmetry (for a
rational animal which possesses elements of all aspects of creation: intellect, soul, and
body), and thus, through man that creation can be restored-- but it is also true, that it
is only by the one who produced creation that creation can be restored, that is, the one
who produced creation is the one who can restore that which He produced. Since it was
creation which freely abandoned God, creation needs to give satisfaction for its
wrongdoing. Because it is impossible without God, that is, without being healed by its
creator (for it can not create that which it lost), it is only through God that creation
can be healed. Thus the restoration of creation requires the participation of creation and
of the creator. Therefore it is proper that God becomes a part of creation to restore
creation itself, for then God will be seen as the one who truly restored creation, but
nonetheless, creation itself shall join in the process of restoration, and then fulfil the
requirement that creation gives proper satisfaction. This is what St. Bonaventure meant
when he wrote, it was fitting that in the satisfaction there be a concourse of both
natures, namely, divine and human.
As it already has been said, it is impossible for the divine nature
to change, either to become a part of a third nature, or else, lose something of itself
and still be divine. Therefore, it is said that the Incarnation took place in by a
specific person. However, as the divinity can only be represented by a divine person, this
person must be divine. It is by this reason that one would have to say that the
Incarnation took place in this format: a divine person assumed human nature, thereby
making one person who is both fully God and fully man. If one were to say that the
Incarnation is a human person, it would either be a rejection of a hypostatic union (for
there would be two persons, not one), or else, one would have to say the absurd, which is,
a human person assumed divine nature. However, how can a human person, that is, an
individual representation of human nature, assume a nature which is greater than itself?
The only conclusion is that which St. Bonaventure gives us, that is the first
principle, God, in one and of its hypostases, or persons, makes itself the
suppositum of human nature, not of a human person, and thus there is only one
personality and personal unity there, namely, on the part of the one assuming, that
is, of the divine person of God the Son.
6. Lastly, because the Incarnation is from the first
principle in so far as it repairs by conciliating, and in conciliating it is a mediator,
and mediation properly falls to the Son of God, it follows that this is the case with the
Incarnation. It is the mediator's part to be the medium between man and God, to lead man
back to divine knowledge, conformity, and sonship. No one is more suitable as a medium
than the person who produces and is produced, who is the middle one of the three persons.
No one is more fitting to lead man back to the divine knowledge than the Word (by whom the
Father expresses Himself), which is unitable to flesh, as a word is unitable to the voice.
No one is more fitting to lead many back to divine conformity than He who is the image of
the Father. No one is more fitting to lead man back to his adopted sonship than the
natural Son. Hence no one is more fitting to become the Son of man than the Son of God.
The Incarnation is the mediator between creation and God, or, as
St. Bonaventure discusses, between man and God. This mediation is one where the mediator
shares in qualities of both parties, thereby being a mediary between the two parties. For
the Incarnation is God and man, and thus, is both Creator and creature. In the
relationship of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, it can be said that the relationship of
the Father with the Son and the Son with the Holy Spirit makes the Son to be, in some
respect, a mediator. For the Son is begotten of the Father, but with the Father, the Holy
Spirit proceeds through the Son. Thus, the Holy Spirit relies upon the Father and the Son
relies upon the Father, but the Father relies upon neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit.
For the Father is the source of the Trinity, but the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son
in the relationship of the Trinity, and thus the Son is between the Father and the Holy
Spirit. The Son, in this sense, is said to be both produced (or begotten of the Father),
and to produce (for the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son), while the
Father is alone unoriginate, and the Holy Spirit does not produce within respect to the
relationship of the Holy Trinity. Thus, the Son shares in a relational quality of the
Father in regards to the production of the Holy Spirit, but shares in a relational quality
with the Holy Spirit in regards to having an origin in the Father. Thus, St.
Bonaventure considers the Son the most perfect choice of the divine persons for the
Incarnation, because the Son already possesses a relational quality of mediation, which
neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit posses, so that it is within the role of the Son to
be a mediator, and hence, mediation properly falls to the Son of God.
The one who bridges the gap between the two, that is, between God and
man, must seek to restore man to his original purity. Since man is originally meant to be
a mediator, he is seen to be a son of God, even as the Son of God is the mediator within
the Trinity. As it is the role of the Incarnate Mediator to bring man back to his original
purity, which includes bringing man back to his original intellectual ability, it is once
again proper to see the Son of God, who is the Logos, to be the one who is this
mediator. For indeed, as Logos, the Son of God is the content of all knowledge,
Wisdom, and as Wisdom, He is able to provide Wisdom to that which He assumes. No one is
more fitting to lead man back to the divine knowledge than the Word (by whom the Father
expresses Himself), which is unitable to flesh, for as the Word is the expression and
revelation of the Father, so by being made flesh, does the Word continue to be the
expression of the Father in this way: for He becomes an expression which is not only able
to be apprehended by the intellect, but also seen by the senses. And as the Word is the
image of the Father, it is through this image that creation is able to be called back to
its original unitive purity, to lead back creation to its original divine
conformity.
Thus as the Son is within the framework of the Trinity the mediator
between the Father and the Holy Spirit and as the Son is the image and expression of the
Father, that is the expression which seeks to be apprehended, it is only proper that the
One who most represents creation by being the Logos of creation itself, is the
one who is Incarnate and joined with creation to bring creation back to sonship, divine
conformity, and unity with God.
7. Because the Son of man and of God is in every way
the same by reason of the Incarnation and because 'whatever things for one and the same
reason are the same, are the same among themselves,' (Aristotle, I Elenchi chap 5) it
follows that, unless there is a word available for the purpose, one necessarily has to
communicate by using an idiom, unless there is a word which includes a certain repugnance
to one's idea, as is the case with those words used to express the union of one nature
with another. Such words are: to unite, to be incarnate, to assume and be assumed. Such is
the case with a denial of something whose opposite belongs to the other [nature], as is
the case with words: to begin to be, to be created, and the like in which an allied
meaning exists contrary to the foregoing rule for the foregoing reason.
In discussing the Incarnation, one discusses the work of the
Incarnation idiomatically, that is, with a word which represents the thought which is
trying to be expressed. It must be understood that it is only a relative representation.
As it is impossible to use a word to express the Godhead, it is also impossible to use a
word to describe the person who is Incarnate. However, St. Bonaventure expresses two rules
which we are to use when discussing the Incarnate one: there are some words which are more
proper to use in discussing the Incarnation, for example, words which reflect unity,
incarnation, and assumption. However, just as there are words which are proper, there are
others which in general are not as well to be used, because they give a bad idea to the
divine nature found within the Incarnate person, which include: to begin to be, to be
create, and similar words. Thus, since the person is God, the person is not said to be
created or to have begun to be. Even though it is not proper to refer to the Incarnate one
as being created, one can speak of the person in relation to that which he assumed, so
that, in and only in that sense, it is permissible to discuss a beginning in the Incarnate
one, for in relation to the human nature, the Incarnate one entered time.