St. Gregory of Nyssa (Nicene/Post Nicene Fathers Series II)
ON "NOT THREE GODS"
TO ABLABIUS
YE that are strong with all might in the inner man ought by rights to
carry on the struggle against the enemies of the truth, and not to shrink
from the task, that we fathers may be gladdened by the noble toil of our
sons; for this is the prompting of the law of nature: but as you turn your
ranks, and send against us the assaults of those darts which are hurled by
the opponents of the truth, and demand that their "hot burning coals"(1) and
their shafts sharpened by knowledge falsely so called should be quenched
with the shield of faith by us old men, we accept your command, and make
ourselves an example of obedience(2), in order that you may yourself give
us the just requital on like commands,Ablabius, noble soldier of Christ, if
we should ever summon you to such a contest.
In truth, the question you propound to us is no small one, nor such that
but small harm will follow if it meets with insufficient treatment. For by
the force of the question, we are at first sight compelled to accept one or
other of two erroneous opinions, and either to say "there are three Gods,"
which is unlawful, or not to acknowledge the Godhead of the Son and the
Holy Spirit, which is impious and absurd.
The argument which you state is something like this:--Peter, James,
and John, being in one human nature, are called three men: and there is no
absurdity in describing those who are united in nature, if they are more
than one, by the plural number of the name derived from their nature. If,
then, in the above case, custom admits this, and no one forbids us to speak
of those who are two as two, or those who are more than two as three, how is
it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, though
confessing the Three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of nature
between them, we are in some sense at variance with our confession, when we
say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is
one, and yet forbid men to say "there are three Gods"? The question is, as I
said, very difficult to deal with: yet, if we should be able to find any-
thing that may give support to the uncertainty of our mind, so that it may
no longer totter and waver in this monstrous dilemma, it would be well: on
the other hand, even if our reasoning be found unequal to the problem, we
must keep for ever, firm and unmoved, the tradition which we received by
succession from the fathers, and seek from the Lord the reason which is the
advocate of our faith: and if this be found by any of those endowed with
grace, we must give thanks to Him who bestowed the grace; but if not, we
shall none the less, on those points which have been determined, hold our
faith unchangeably.
What, then, is the reason that when we count one by one those who are
exhibited to us in one nature, we ordinarily name them in the plural and
speak of "so many men," instead of calling them all one: while in the case
of the Divine nature our doctrinal definition rejects the plurality of Gods,
at once enumerating the Persons, and at the same time not admitting the
plural signification? Perhaps one might seem to touch the point if he were
to say (speaking offhand to straightforward people), that the definition
refused to reckon Gods in any number to avoid any resemblance to the poly-
theism of the heathen, lest, if we too were to enumerate the Deity, not in
the singular, but in the plural, as they are accustomed to do, there might
be supposed to be also some community of doctrine. This answer, I say, if
made to people of a more guileless spirit, might seem to be of some weight:
but in the case of the others who require that one of the alternatives they
propose should be established (either that we should not acknowledge the
Godhead in Three Persons, or that, if we do, we should speak of those who
share in the same Godhead as three), this answer is not such as to furnish
any solution of the difficulty. And hence we must needs make our reply at
greater length, tracing out the truth as best we may; for the question is
no ordinary one.
We say, then, to begin with, that the practice of calling those who are
not divided(3) in nature by the very name of their common nature in the
plural, and saying they are "many men," is a customary abuse of language,
and that it would be much the same thing to say they are "many human natures."
And the truth of this we may see from the following instance. When we
address any one, we do not call him by the name of his nature, in order that
no confusion may result from the community of the name, as would happen if
every one of those who hear it were to think that he himself was the person
addressed, because the call is made not by the proper appellation but by the
common name of their nature: but we separate him from the multitude by using
that name which belongs to him as his own;-- that, I mean, which signifies
the particular subject. Thus there are many who have shared in the nature--
many disciples, say, or apostles, or martyrs--but the man in them all is
one; since, as has been said, the term "man" does not belong to the nature
of the individual as such, but to that which is common. For Luke is a man,
or Stephen is a man; but it does not follow that if any one is a man he is
therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that
separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each
severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number;
yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible
unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction,
but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even
though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with
the individuals who participate in it. And as we speak of a people, or a
mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each
of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more
accurate expression, "man" would be said to be one, even though those who
are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality. Thus it would
be much better to correct our erroneous habit, so as no longer to extend to
a plurality the name of the nature, than by our bondage to habit to
transfer(4) to our statements concerning God the error which exists in the
above case. But since the correction of the habit is impracticable (for how
could you persuade any one not to speak of those who are exhibited in the
same nature as "many men"?--indeed, in every case habit is a thing hard to
change), we are not so far wrong in not going contrary to the prevailing
habit in the case of the lower nature, since no harm results from the mis-
taken use of the name: but in the case of the statement concerning the
Divine nature the various use(5) of terms is no longer so free from danger:
for that which is of small account is in these subjects no longer a small
matter. Therefore we must confess one God, according to the testimony of
Scripture, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord," even though the
name of Godhead extends through the Holy Trinity. This I say according to
the account we have given in the case of human nature, in which we have
learnt that it is improper to extend the name of the nature by the mark of
plurality. We must, however,more carefully examine the name of "Godhead,"
in order to obtain, by means of the significance involved in the word, some
help towards clearing up the question before us.
Most men think that the word "Godhead" is used in a peculiar degree in
respect of nature: and just as the heaven, or the sun, or any other of the
constituent parts of the universe are denoted by proper names which are
significant of the subjects, so they say that in the case of the Supreme
and Divine nature, the word "Godhead" is filly adapted to that which it
represents to us, as a kind of special name. We, on the other hand, follow-
ing the suggestions of Scripture, have learnt that that nature is unnameable
and unspeakable, and we say that every term either invented by the custom(6)
of men, or handed down to us by the Scriptures, is indeed explanatory of our
conceptions of the Divine Nature(7), but does not include the signification
of that nature itself. And it may be shown without much difficulty that this
is the case. For all other terms which are used of the creation may be found,
even without analysis of their origin, to be applied to the subjects acci-
dentally, because we are content to denote the things in any way by the
word applied to them so as to avoid confusion in our knowledge of the things
signified. But all the terms that are employed to lead us to the knowledge
of God have comprehended in them each its own meaning, and you cannot find
any word among the terms especially applied to God which is without a dis-
tinct sense. Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine
nature itself is not signified, but some one of its surroundings is made
known. For we say, it may be, that the Deity is incorruptible, or powerful,
or whatever else we are accustomed to say of Him. But in each of these terms
we find a peculiar sense, fit to be understood or asserted of the Divine
nature, yet not expressing that which that nature is in its essence. For the
subject, whatever it may be, is incorruptible: but our conception of
incorruptibility is this,--that that which is, is not resolved into decay:
so, when we say that He is incorruptible, we declare what His nature does
not suffer, but we do not express what that is which does not suffer cor-
ruption. Thus, again, if we say that He is the Giver of life, though we show
by that appellation what He gives, we do not by that word declare what that
is which gives it. And by the same reasoning we find that all else which
results from the significance involved in the names expressing the Divine
attributes either forbids us to conceive what we ought not to conceive of
the Divine nature, or teaches us that which we ought to conceive of it, but
does not include an explanation of the nature itself. Since, then, as we
perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our
appellations from the several operations that are known to us, and as we
recognize as one of these that operation of surveying and inspection, or, as
one might call it, beholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks
them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His power of contem-
plation into those things which are not visible, we suppose that Godhead, or
qeoths, is so called from qea, or beholding,
and that He who is our qeaths or beholder, by customary use
and by the instruction of the Scriptures, is called qeos, or
God. Now if any one admits that to behold and to discern are the same thing,
and that the God Who superintends all things, both is and is called the su-
perintender of the universe, let him consider this operation, and judge
whether it belongs to one of the Persons whom we believe in the Holy Trinity,
or whether the power extends(8) throughout the Three Persons. For if our
interpretation of the term Godhead, or qeoths, is a true one,
and the things which are seen are said to be beheld, or qeata,
and that which beholds them is called qeos, or God, no one of
the Persons in the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an appel-
lation on the ground of the sense involved in the word. For Scripture attri-
butes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. David says,
"See, O God our defender(9)": and from this we learn that sight is a proper
operation of the idea(1) of God, so far as God is conceived, since he says,
"See, O God." But Jesus also sees the thoughts of those who condemn Him, and
questions why by His own power He pardons the sins of men? for it says,
"Jesus, seeing their thoughts(2)." And of the Holy Spirit also, Peter says
to Ananias, "Why hath Satan filled thine heart, to lie to the Holy Ghost?(3)
" showing that the Holy Spirit was a true witness, aware of what Ananias had
dared to do in secret, and by Whom the manifestation of the secret was made
to Peter. For Ananias became a thief of his own goods, secretly, as he
thought, from all men, and concealing his sin: but the Holy Spirit at the
same moment was in Peter, and detected his intent, dragged down as it was
to avarice, and gave to Peter front Himself(4) the power of seeing the
secret, while it is clear that He could not have done this had He not been
able to behold hidden things.
But some one will say that the proof of our argument does not yet regard
the question. For even if it were granted that the name of "Godhead" is a
common name of the nature, it would not be established that we should not
speak of "Gods": but by these arguments, on the contrary, we are compelled
to speak of "Gods": for we find in the custom of mankind that not only those
who are partakers s in the same nature, but even any who may be of the same
business, are not, when they are many, spoken of in the singular; as we
speak of "many orators," or "surveyors," or "farmers," or "shoemakers," and
so in all other cases. If, indeed, Godhead were an appellation of nature, it
would be more proper, according to the argument laid down, to include the
Three Persons in the singular number, and to speak of "One God," by reason
of the inseparability and indivisibility of the nature: but since it has
been established by what has been said, that the term "Godhead" is signifi-
cant of operation, and not of nature, the argument from what has been
advanced seems to turn to the contrary conclusion, that we ought therefore
all the more to call those "three Gods" who are contemplated in the same
operation, as they say that one would speak of "three philosophers" or
"orators," or any other name derived from a business when those who take
part in the same business are more than one.
I have taken some pains, in setting forth this view, to bring forward
the reasoning on behalf of the adversaries, that our decision may be the
more firmly fixed, being strengthened by the more elaborate contradictions.
Let us now resume our argument.
As we have to a certain extent shown by our statement that the word
"Godhead" is not significant of nature but of operation, perhaps one might
reasonably allege as a cause why, in the case of men, those who share with
one another in the same pursuits are enumerated and spoken of in the plural,
while on the other hand the Deity is spoken of in the singular as one God
and one Godhead, even though the Three Persons are not separated from the
significance expressed by the term "Godhead,"-- one might allege, I say, the
fact that men, even if several are engaged in the same form of action, work
separately each by himself at the task he has undertaken, having no partici-
pation in his individual action with others who are engaged in the same occu-
pation. For instance, supposing the case of several rhetoricians, their pur-
suit, being one, has the same name in the numerous cases: but each of those
who follow it works by himself, this one pleading on his own account, and
that on his own account. Thus, since among men the action of each in the
same pursuits is discriminated, they are properly called many, since each of
them is separated from the others within his own environment, according to
the special character of his operation. But in the case of the Divine nature
we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by Himself in which
the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the Son has any special oper-
ation apart from the Holy Spirit; but every operation which extends from God
to the Creation, and is named according to our variable conceptions of it,
has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfect-
ed in the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation
is not divided with regard to the number of those who fulfil it, because the
action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but what-
ever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His providence for us,
or to the government and constitution of the universe, comes to pass by the
action of the Three, yet what does come to pass is not three things. We may
understand the meaning of this from one single instance. From Him, I say,
Who is the chief source of gifts, all things which have shared in this grace
have obtained their life. When we inquire, then, whence this good gift came
to us, we find by the guidance of the Scriptures that it was from the Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. Yet although we set forth Three Persons and three
names, we do not consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one
from each Person separately but the same life is wrought in us by the Father
and prepared by the Son, and depends on the will of the Holy Spirit.Since
then the Holy Trinity fulfils every operation in a manner similar to that of
which I have spoken, not by separate action according to the number of the
Persons, but so that there is one motion and disposition of the good will
which is communicated from the Father through the Son to the Spirit (for as
we do not call those whose operation gives one life three Givers of life,
neither do we call those who are contemplated in one goodness three Good
beings, nor speak of them in the plural by any of their other attributes);
so neither can we call those who exercise this Divine and superintending
power and operation towards ourselves and all creation, conjointly and
inseparably, by their mutual action, three Gods. For as when we learn con-
cerning the God of the universe, from the words of Scripture, that He judges
all the earth(6), we say that He is the Judge of all things through the Son:
and again, when we hear that the Father judgeth no man(7), we do not think
that the Scripture is at variance with itself,--(for He Who judges all the
earth does this by His Son to Whom He has committed all judgment; and every-
thing which is done by the Only-begotten has its reference to the Father, so
that He Himself is at once the Judge of all things and judges no man, by
reason of His having, as we said, committed all judgment to the Son, while
all the judgment of the Son is conformable to the will of the Father; and
one could not properly say either that They are two judges, or that one of
Them is excluded from the authority and power implied in judgment);--so also.
in the case of the word "Godhead," Christ is the power of God and the wisdom
of God, and that very power of superintendence and beholding which we call
Godhead, the Father exercises through the Only-begotten, while the Son
perfects every power by the Holy Spirit, judging, as Isaiah says, by the
Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning(8), and acting by Him also,
according to the saying in the Gospel which was spoken to the Jews. For He
says, "If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils(9)"; where He includes
every form of doing good m a partial description, by reason of the unity of
action: for the name derived from operation cannot be divided among many
where the result of their mutual operation is one.
Since, then, the character of the superintending and beholding power is
one, in Father,Son, and Holy Spirit, as has been said in our previous argu-
ment, issuing from the Father as from a spring, brought into operation by
the Son, and perfecting its grace by the power of the Spirit; and since no
operation is separated in respect of the Persons, being fulfilled by each
individually apart from that which is joined with Him in our contemplation,
but all providence care, and superintendence of all, alike of things in the
sensible creation and of those of supra-mundane nature, and that power which
preserves the things which are, and corrects those which are amiss, and
instructs those which are ordered aright, is one, and not three, being,
indeed, directed by the Holy Trinity, yet not severed by a threefold di-
vision according to the number of the Persons contemplated in the Faith, so
that each of the acts, contemplated by itself, should be the work of the
Father alone, or of the Son peculiarly, or of the Holy Spirit(1) separately,
but while, as the Apostle says, the one and the selfsame Spirit divides His
good gifts to every man severally(2), the motion of good proceeding from the
Spirit is not without beginning;-- we find that the power which we conceive
as preceding this motion, which is the Only- begotten God, is the maker of
all things; without Him no existent thing attains to the beginning of its
being: and, again, this same source of good issues from the will of the
Father.
If, then, every good thing and every good name, depending on that power
and purpose which is without beginning, is brought to perfection in the
power of the Spirit through the Only-begotten God, without mark of time or
distinction (since there is no delay, existent or conceived, in the motion of
the Divine will from the Father, through the Son, to the Spirit) and if
Godhead also is one of the good names and concepts, it would not be proper
to divide the name into a plurality, since the unity existing in the action
prevents plural enumeration. And as the Saviour of all men, specially of
them that believe(3), is spoken of by the Apostle as one, and no one from
this phrase argues either that the Son does not save them who believe, or
that salvation is given to those who receive it without the intervention of
the Spirit; but God who is over all, is the Saviour of all, while the Son
works salvation by means of the grace of the Spirit, and yet they are not on
this account called in Scripture three Saviours (although salvation is con-
fessed" to proceed from the Holy Trinity): so neither are they called three
Gods, according to the signification assigned to the term "Godhead," even
though the aforesaid appellation attaches to the Holy Trinity.
It does not seem to me absolutely necessary, with a view to the present
proof of our argument, to contend against those who oppose us with the
assertion that we are not to conceive "Godhead" as an operation. For we,
believing the Divine nature to be unlimited and incomprehensible, conceive
no comprehension of it, but declare that the nature is to be conceived in
all respects as infinite: and that which is absolutely infinite is not limit-
ed in one respect while it is left unlimited in another, but
infinity is free from limitation altogether. That therefore which is without
limit is surely not limited even by name. In order then to mark the con-
stancy of our conception of infinity in the case of the Divine nature, we
say that the Deity, is above every name: and "Godhead" is a name. Now it
cannot be that the same thing should at once be a name and be accounted as
above every name.
But if it pleases our adversaries to say that the significance of the
term is not operation, but nature, we shall fall back upon our original
argument, that custom applies the name of a nature to denote multitude erro-
neously: since according to true reasoning neither diminution nor increase
attaches to any nature, when it is contemplated in a larger or smaller
number. For it is only those things which are contemplated in their indi-
vidual Circumscription which are enumerated by way of addition. Now this
circumscription is noted by bodily appearance, and size, and place, and
difference figure and colour, and "that which is contemplated apart from
these conditions is free from the circumscription which is formed by such
categories. That which is not thus circumscribed is not enumerated, and that
which is not enumerated cannot be contemplated in multitude. For we say that
gold, even though it be cut into many figures, is one, and is so spoken of,
but we speak of many coins or many staters, without finding any multiplic-
ation of the nature of gold by the number of staters; and for this reason we
speak of gold, when it is contemplated in greater bulk, either in plate or
in coin, as "much," but we do not speak of it as "many golds" on account of
the multitude of the material,--except when one says there are "many gold
pieces" (Daries, for instance, or staters), in which case it is not the
material, but the pieces of money to which the significance of number
applies: indeed, properly, we should not call them "gold" but "golden."
As, then, the golden staters are many, but the gold is one, so too those
who are exhibited to us severally in the nature of man, as Peter, James, and
John, are many, yet the man in them is one. And although Scripture extends
the word according to the plural significance, where it says "men swear by
the greater(4)," and "sons of men," and in other phrases of the like sort,
we must recognize that in using the custom of the prevailing form of speech,
it does not lay down a law as to the propriety of using the words in one way
or another, nor does it say these things by way of giving us instruction
about phrases, but uses the word according to the prevailing custom, with a
view only to this, that the word may be profitable to those who receive it,
taking no minute care in its manner of speech about points where no harm can
result from the phrases in respect of the way they are understood.
Indeed, it would be a lengthy task to set out in detail from the Scrip-
tures those constructions which are inexactly expressed, in order to prove
the statement I have made; where, however, there is a risk of injury to any
part of the truth, we no longer find in Scriptural phrases any indiscrim-
inate or indifferent use of words. For this reason Scripture admits the
naming of "men" in the plural, because no one is by such a figure of speech
led astray in his conceptions to imagine a multitude of humanities or sup-
poses that many human natures are indicated by the fact that the name ex-
pressive of that nature is used in the plural. But the word "God" it employs
studiously in the singular form only, guarding against introducing the
idea of different natures in the Divine essence by the plural signification
of "Gods." This is the cause why it says, "the Lord our God is one Lord(5),
and also proclaims the Only-begotten God by the name of Godhead, without
dividing the Unity into a dual signification, so as to call the Father and
the Son two Gods, although each is proclaimed by the holy writers as God.
The Father is God: the Son is God: and yet by the same proclamation God is
One, because no difference either of nature or of operation is contemplated
in the Godhead. For if (according to the idea of those who have been led
astray) the nature of the Holy Trinity were diverse, the number would by
consequence be extended to a plurality of Gods, being divided according to
the diversity of essence in the subjects. But since the Divine, single, and
unchanging nature, that it may be one, rejects all diversity in essence, it
does not admit in its own case the signification of multitude; but as it is
called one nature, so it is called in the singular by all its other names,
"God," "Good," "Holy," "Saviour," "Just," "Judge," and every other Divine
name conceivable: whether one says that the names refer to nature or to
operation, we shall not dispute the point.
If, however, any one cavils at our argument, on the ground that by not
admitting the difference of nature it leads to a mixture and confusion of
the Persons, we shall make to such a charge this answer;--that while we
confess the invariable character of the nature, we do not deny the differ-
ence in respect of cause, and that which is caused, by which alone we appre-
hend that one Person is distinguished from another;-by our belief, that is,
that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause; and again in that which
is of the Cause we recognize another distinction. For one is directly from
the first Cause, and another by that which is directly from the first Cause;
so that the attribute of being Only-begotten abides without doubt in the
Son, and the interposition of the Son, while it guards His attribute of
being Only-begotten, does not shut out the Spirit from His relation by way
of nature to the Father.
But in speaking of "cause," and "of the cause," we do not by these words
denote nature (for no one would give the same definition of "cause" and of
"nature"), but we indicate the difference in manner of existence. For when
we say that one is "caused," and that the other is "without cause," we do
not divide the nature by the word "cause(6)", but only indicate the fact
that the Son does not exist without generation, nor the Father by generation:
but we must needs in the first place believe that something exists, and then
scrutinize the manner of existence of the object of our belief: thus the
question of existence is one, and that of the mode of existence is another.
To say that anything exists without generation sets forth the mode of its
existence, but what exists is not indicated by this phrase. If one were
to ask a husbandman about a tree, whether it were planted or had grown of
itself, and he were to answer either that the tree had not been planted or
that it was the result of planting, would he by that answer declare the
nature of the tree? Surely not; but while saying how it exists he would
leave the question of its nature obscure and unexplained. So, in the other
case, when we learn that He is unbegotten, we are taught in what mode He
exists, and how it is fit that we should conceive Him as existing, but what
He is we do not hear in that phrase. When, therefore, we acknowledge such a
distinction in the case of the Holy Trinity, as to believe that one Person
is the Cause, and another is of the Cause, we can no longer be accused of
confounding the definition of the Persons by the community of nature.
Thus, since on the one hand the idea of cause differentiates the Persons
of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another
is of the Cause; and since on the one hand the Divine nature is apprehended
by every conception as unchangeable and undivided, for these reasons we
properly declare the Godhead to be one, and God to be one, and employ in the
singular all other names which express Divine attributes. (
geocities.com/athens/acropolis) (
geocities.com/athens)