From: Rob Bass <rhbass@gmail.com>
Subject: Deriving 'EE'
Date: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 9:02 PM

Deriving 'Existence Exists'

Can 'existence exists' be derived? If it can be -- that is, if it can be derived without being presupposed, then Rand's claim for its fundamental status goes by the board. On the other hand, if it cannot be derived, there are serious questions as to how it is to be validated. But before trying to derive or otherwise validate it, there is the prior question what 'existence exists' ('EE') means, and therefore what has to be done to give it support.

At least four interpretations are possible. Two of them have some claim to textual support in the Objectivist canon, and there may be some shifting between them, with one or the other being relied upon in different arguments. The other two have less claim to textual support. Before listing them, it is important to note that there are some constraints (most based on explicit statements about the axioms or axiomatic truths in the Objectivist corpus) on what would count as an acceptable interpretation. For an acceptable interpretation, it should turn out that, under that interpretation, 'existence exists'

1.     is true.

2.     is self-evident.

3.     is important.

4.     and what is suggested must be a plausible interpretation of the words, 'Existence exists.'

Each of the interpretations I know fails on one or more of these points (I think they all fail to be self-evident, because nothing is self-evident in any strong, epistemologically interesting sense, so I won't dwell on that):

A.    'EE' could mean that there is a property in some Platonic sense, existence, which itself possesses the property of existence. I don't think there's any warrant in the Objectivist literature for interpreting 'EE' this way, and, even if there is, I think it's either false or non-sensical.

B.    'EE' could mean 'whatever exists, exists.' That is, 'for anything, if it exists, then it exists.' That's a logical truth which can be derived in standard predicate logic from the empty set. Here's a quick proof:

It's more complicated, but can be done just by starting with the denial of 'EE' and deriving a contradiction:

This fails to be important because a) nobody has ever seriously denied it, and b) if it were denied or if something that implied its denial were asserted, it could be derived in the course of any argument for which it was needed -- it would not be needed as a premise.

C.    'EE' could be interpreted along the lines of 'redness exists.' Just as asserting that redness exists can be taken to mean that something or other is red, so, asserting that existence exists can be taken to mean that something or other exists. Then, it just means that something exists. That can be derived either from itself or from some other (any other!) affirmative existential claim, e.g., from 'leprechauns exist.' It can also be derived from any claim attributing any property or any relation to anything, e.g., 'the sun is hot' or 'the sun is hotter than the moon.' But it cannot be derived (from a consistent set of premises) unless some affirmative existential, property-ascribing, or relation-ascribing claim appears in the premises.

This also fails to be important, because everyone, with the possible exception of Gorgias, agrees that something or other exists.

Under both of the interpretations, B and C, 'EE' is true, but in neither case does it appear to meet all of the conditions said to be characteristic of axioms in the Objectivist corpus. In addition, nothing of philosophical importance seems to follow from 'EE' on either of these interpretations. On either, God may exist, the senses may be delusory, the universe may just have popped into existence a moment ago, and so on.

D.   A fourth interpretation takes 'EE' to assert what Objectivists have elsewhere called 'the primacy of existence,' namely, the thesis that any occasion of consciousness or awareness must be awareness of something that is or depends upon the existence of something independent of that very act of awareness.

I think that the primacy of existence is both true and important (not self-evident), but its main failing is that it is not a plausible interpretation of the words, 'existence exists.'

So far as I can tell, there is no interpretation of 'EE' that does all the things Objectivists seem to want of it. It is either false or nonsensical (as is A), true but logically trivial (as is B), true but obvious and uncontroversial (as is C), or true and important, but not a plausible interpretation of the words (as is D). On no interpretation is it self-evident if that is supposed to mean something more than that it appears obvious to someone or other.

Rob
_____
Rob Bass
rhbass@gmail.com
http://oocities.com/amosapient

Comments? I'd love to hear.