The Misuse of Language: “Selfishness” and “Altruism”
Rob Bass
One feature of Rand’s rhetoric in
ethics, but not only there, is her idiosyncratic usage of terms –
especially ‘selfishness’ and ‘altruism’. In her hands, they
have non-ordinary meanings. Since these are also terms that have
well-known ordinary uses, she runs the risk of creating confusion.
There is the temptation to substitute her meaning for one more
ordinary or vice versa. Claims that might be respectable if a
single consistent meaning were adhered to are transmogrified through
the mixture of senses. The preposterous comes to look respectable and
the reasonable preposterous.
Perhaps, despite the risk, the
idiosyncrasy is warranted to make points and express distinctions not
adequately marked in ordinary speech. Perhaps.
More
likely, the idiosyncrasy is essential to the conclusions drawn. It
fulfills no cognitive role save to facilitate the drawing of
preposterous conclusions. Her equation of selfishness and
self-interest neither makes any distinction nor marks any commonality
not provided for in ordinary uses; instead, it elides an important
and relevant distinction already embodied in the ordinary usage. Her
treatment of ‘altruism’ is no better: It does not succeed even in
so much as blurring a distinction made in ordinary usage. It simply
invents a doctrine in which virtually no one has ever believed and
affixes to it an entirely misleading label.
But let’s be
more specific:
On selfishness –
Selfishness
does not mean “concern for oneself or what one wants or how one
feels,” as one person sympathetic to Rand put it. Nor does it mean,
as Rand defined it, “concern with one’s own interests.” (She
said it came from a dictionary but gave no reference [VOS,
vii]. For my part, I’ve never seen it defined that way in any
dictionary.) The problem with these “definitions” is that they
leave out an essential element (one that appears in every dictionary
definition I’ve seen and is fairly plainly implicit in ordinary
uses of the term): that selfishness involves excessive concern
with one’s own interests or concern with one’s own interests to
the exclusion or disregard of the interests of others.
You can
confirm that that’s the ordinary meaning by checking standard
dictionaries. (An especially impressive cite on this point comes from
the OED where, in a quote illustrating correct usage, someone
is referred to as concerned with his own interests but not selfish.)
Or ... you can try this test: Outside the insular world of Randians
(who, like many philosophers, will say anything to save a theory),
try asking a few people if they consider it selfish to brush their
teeth. If “selfishness” refers to any kind of action in the
service of one’s interests, they should agree that tooth-brushing
is selfish.
Given the ordinary meaning, the right thing for
Randians to say in order to express their view is not that they are
in favor of selfishness or that selfishness is really a virtue but
rather that there is no such thing as selfishness. There are no
excesses of self-interest; all the alleged excesses, insofar as they
deserve condemnation, are really deficiencies: They involve choices,
actions or attitudes that would have been different on the part of
someone properly attentive to her own interests.
The fact is
that “selfishness” was the wrong word for what Rand had in mind.
There’s a perfectly good term for what she was thinking of, and it
is a term she also used, namely, “self-interest.” She could have
used it exclusively to make her case without throwing up roadblocks
to comprehension by talking about absurdities like “the virtue of
selfishness.” (Her case that all of morality is based on
self-interest was weak in any event, but she could at least have
gotten a more respectful hearing by dropping the red-flag word,
“selfishness.”)
However much Rand would have liked them
to, “selfish” and “unselfish,” as commonly used, don’t
cover all the bases. She simply misused the terms and twisted others
to fit. A selfish action exhibits an excess of self-interest; one
that is unselfish, some noticeable degree of non-self-interested
motivation. Part, though not all, that is omitted when the focus is
only upon what is selfish and what is unselfish is action which is
self-interested but not excessively so. Let’s pursue this by
restricting ourselves, for the moment, to questions about motivation.
In what immediately follows, I will be talking about what the agent
is aiming at or trying to accomplish in an action. Then, we can
usefully partition the field of possibilities into actions that are
self-interested versus those that are not, and into actions that
exhibit due regard for the interests (or something of value, such as
rights) of others versus those that do not. That gives us a four-way
division:
|
Due Regard |
Lack of Due Regard |
Self-interested |
A |
B |
Not Self-interested |
C |
D |
There doesn’t seem to be a
general term for things that fall into box A, but certainly many
kinds of activity and motivation meet these conditions, some, by
having little or no impact on others, such as brushing one’s teeth,
and some, though they may have significant impact on others,
exhibiting as much regard as those others are due (e.g., declining a
marriage proposal).
Items that fall into box B are what are
generally called selfish. This is why phrases like “the virtue of
selfishness” are, on the face of it, absurd. To call something an
instance of selfishness is to say that it ought not to be done,
because it would be refusing to extend to others regard that is due
them; to call the very same thing virtuous is to recommend it, to say
that it is the kind of thing a person of good character would
do.
Under category C, we find the actions most commonly called
altruistic. Their motivation is not self-interested and they exhibit
a due regard for the interests of others. Note, in passing, that “not
self-interested” is not equivalent to “other-interested.”
Devotion to something like a project of scientific inquiry might be
an example. It may be neither self-interested nor altruistic.
A person might engage in it, not because he thinks it serves his
interests (he may have better career opportunities available) or
because he expects it to serve the interests of others, but because
he thinks that knowledge or discovery or research are valuable in
their own right. Still, such a project may show due regard for the
interests of others by not imposing upon them against their wills,
etc.
Under D, we can find various distortions such as malice
and sadism, which are neither self-interested nor exhibit due regard
for the interests of others.
The picture this division gives
needs complication in several ways, however. One of them is that,
though self-interested and non-self-interested motivation logically
exhaust the possibilities, they are not mutually exclusive. One may
have self-interested and other-interested motivation for the same
act. The same act may benefit both yourself and one or more others,
and it might be that if either motivation were absent, the other
would still be sufficient to prompt the action.
Another
complication is that I have been speaking, as I said, of motivations.
The links between motivations and outcomes are, though frequently
robust, considerably less than necessary truths. Motivation may be
self-interested while the actual results of acting on the motivation
may be against one’s interests or may serve the interests of
others. Similarly, altruistic motivation is compatible with action
that in fact does not benefit the intended beneficiaries or that
serves the interests of the altruistic agent.
Still more
complications emerge when we consider the relation between
motivations at a time and over time. You may have some set of
motivations in terms of which the best thing you can do is to take
steps to alter your motivations themselves. This is why it is
possible, as I have argued elsewhere,
to make a case that an egoist might better serve his interests by
ceasing to be an egoist.
On altruism –
Here
are some short quotes from Rand about what she took “altruism” to
mean. (All come from the entry on “altruism” in The Ayn Rand
Lexicon.):
"The basic
principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own
sake, that service to others is the only justification of his
existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue
and value." (Lexicon, p. 4)
"The irreducible
primary of altruism ... is self-sacrifice – ... which means:
the self as a standard of evil, the selfless as a
standard of the good." (Lexicon, p. 5)
"Altruism
declares that any action taken for the benefit of others is
good, and any action taken for one's own benefit is evil. Thus
the beneficiary of an action is the only criterion of
moral value – and so long as that beneficiary is anybody other than
oneself, anything goes." (Lexicon, p. 5, emphasis
on "any," "only" and "anything"
added)
"Altruism holds death as its ultimate goal
and standard of value." (Lexicon, p. 7)
Rand posited this entirely fantastic doctrine as the
alternative to egoism. (Naturally, this makes egoism look good by
contrast.) To be an alternative to egoism, it had of course to be an
ethical theory (which is already a mistake, since the term in fact
labels practices, dispositions or motivations recommended by
different ethical theories as appropriate for certain kinds of
occasions; it is no more an ethical theory than is courage).
Continuing, though, this alleged theory is supposed to hold or imply
a variety of nasty things, some of which are listed above.
Rand’s
conception of altruism, however, was entirely fantastic. It is
a doctrine that has never been held by any important moral thinker
and, in particular, not by any of the thinkers that she castigated as
proponents of altruism – not, e.g., by Kant or Marx, Mill or
Spencer, Dewey or Rawls. Not one of them has maintained that the
interests of the individual are of no importance, that service
to others is the only justification for her existence, or that
anything goes, so long as there is some beneficiary other than
herself.
It is difficult not to suspect a bait-and-switch
argument at work here. The thinkers she criticizes are indeed
exponents of altruism in the ordinary sense of the word – that is,
they believed that the interests of others matter in their own right,
apart from the way they might impact upon one’s own interests, and
therefore, in varying degrees (depending upon the thinker and his
other commitments), that it could be appropriate, desirable or
morally required, to act on some occasions on behalf of others, even
at some cost to one’s own interests. Then, having identified these
thinkers as altruists, in the ordinary or garden-variety sense, she
charges them with being altruists in her entirely different sense.
The bait-and-switch argument might go:
1. Altruism means lots of nasty things (which Rand has detailed).
2. These thinkers believe in altruism.
3. Therefore, these thinkers believe in the nasty things Rand has detailed.
But this argument, such as it is, depends entirely upon equivocation. If the same sense is attached to ‘altruism’ throughout, either the first or the second premise will turn out to be false. In the garden-variety sense, ‘altruism’ does not mean the things Rand has detailed. And in the sense she detailed, Kant, Marx, Mill and the rest did not believe in altruism.