To: atlantis@wetheliving.com
From: rhbass@gmail.com
Date:
Thu, 13 Apr 2000 03:46:37
Subject: Sacrifice
Rand's definition of "sacrifice," as giving up a greater for a lesser value, is, though some Objectivists seem to like it, of little use. In the first place, it is doubtful that it is intelligible at all. If you plug in the Objectivist definition of value, as that which one acts to gain or keep, then presumably a greater value is the one which, when the choice is between it and a lesser value, one would act to gain or keep. But then, giving up a greater for a lesser value isn't possible. It would be acting to gain or keep something while not acting to gain or keep it.
Second, it might be more plausible to understand the meaning of sacrifice as giving up what one should value more highly in favor of what should not be valued as highly. This interpretation has its problems, too. One is that it does not sit well with Rand's own examples, such as that of the woman who "sacrifices" by not buying a hat and feeding her child instead. There, she seems to be tying whether something counts as a sacrifice to what the person actually cares about, not to what she should value (and, incidentally, not to value as she defines it). More fundamentally, even if sacrifice is so construed, in the face of the examples Rand used to illustrate her conception, it would amount -- as was not uncommon for her -- to arguing without an opponent. No moral theory favors giving up what should be valued more highly for something that should not be valued as highly. Any moral theory worth attention at all that speaks favorably of some kind of sacrifice is talking about sacrifice in some different sense than Rand, on either interpretation, is attaching to the word.
In a recent post (which I seem not to have saved), Will correctly claimed that there was nothing in the ordinary understanding of "sacrifice" that implied that there was no compensation or no adequate compensation. Instead, we should understand "sacrifice" just to refer to giving up something of significant value, and as leaving open the question whether compensation is expected. He added that, in teaching, he found it much easier to convey the meaning of egoism to his students by saying that egoism proscribes uncompensated sacrifice rather than that it proscribes sacrifice.
This is a step in the right direction, but it could be usefully refined. One way is to emphasize something already implicit in it, that a sacrifice is giving up something of significant value. Giving up something of little value or marginal significance to you doesn't count as a sacrifice whether or not compensation is expected. Giving a dollar to a street musician is not a sacrifice even if you're tone-deaf and don't expect to be able to enjoy the music. The value involved is not significant enough.
Second, if any compensation is expected, the compensation is not readily commensurable with what is sacrificed. If, say, one gives up money and expects a monetary return, one is not sacrificing but instead investing or, perhaps, gambling. One speaks of sacrifice only when, if compensation is expected, it will be in a different form than what is given up for it -- when, e.g., money is given up to save the life of a loved one or a parent takes an extra job to provide for a child's education.
Third, it is possible for there to be an uncompensated sacrifice that is nonetheless self-interested. This is the best-of-a-bad-deal kind of case. Someone may give up something of significant value without expecting any compensation just because the alternatives are even worse. For example, a few years ago, I sold a car to a backyard mechanic for fifty dollars. The repairs it needed were extensive (engine problems), and the car was not worth what it would cost at auto-shop prices to get the repairs done. The guy I sold it to could do the work himself, and, within a month, had it repaired and sold for several times what he had put into it. I didn't receive anything that would ordinarily be called compensation, but still, selling the car for that price was as good an option as I had.
So, it is a mistake to say that egoism proscribes uncompensated sacrifice. Since uncompensated sacrifice can still be self-interested, it would be better to say that egoism proscribes pointless sacrifice. If that's the claim, however, it is entirely in line with what every other moral theory has said about sacrifice: it is only appropriate when there is some point to it.
The only thing distinctive that egoism has to say about sacrifice is that the point must be self-interested. But that can be said without any reference to sacrifice, for egoism holds that the only thing that justifies any action is its self-interested point. Mentioning sacrifice is neither necessary nor helpful in explicating egoism.
Rob
_____
Rob
Bass
rhbass@gmail.com
http://oocities.com/amosapient
To: atlantis@wetheliving.com
From:
rhbass@gmail.com
Date: Tue,
02 May 2000 13:09:53
Subject: ATL: Re: Sacrifice
Bill wrote:
> [Rob]
> > That's not possible by Rand's
definition. If someone does altruistically
> > give up
something, then since a value is what one acts to gain or
keep,
> > that person values it more highly.
>
>
In one sense of "value", yes -- the sense that one
acts to gain and/or
> keep it. But that's not the sense
that's relevant to the issue of egoism
> versus
self-sacrifice. I think it's important to understand that there
are
> really two senses of "value" at issue here,
which is not at all surprising.
I think you probably need at least three, maybe four, to make sense of what she said on the subject. One is her official definition -- the only definition she actually gives. Two is something like "what should be valued." Three, possibly that can be replaced, for her purposes, with the more concrete "what serves your interests." And four, she needs something to fit her examples of sacrifice, like the woman I already mentioned who sacrifices by feeding her child rather than buying a new hat. That won't fit under any of the others.
Every one of these plays havoc with Rand's own definition of "sacrifice" or with her theories or else with the ordinary usage of the term. The first makes her definition of sacrifice self-contradictory. The second makes sacrifice something that no one has ever advocated. The third implies that there are no self-interested sacrifices, something that Rand herself implicitly admitted, in talking about sacrificing one's arm to save one's life. The fourth would connect sacrifice to something like not doing what you want rather than to values in any plausible meaning of the word.
However you turn it, Rand was confused.
> What do you mean "POINTLESS sacrifice for its own sake"?
You've asked me to
> go back and read her definition of
"sacrifice". I think you should read it!
>
Again, Rand defined "sacrifice" as the surrender of a
greater value for a
> lesser one or for a non-value. There
is always a "point" to the sacrifice
> (the person
doing the sacrifice believes it's his moral duty, obviously),
>
but it still involves giving up that which one (selfishly) values
more for
> the sake of that which one values less.
If there's a point to it, then it is not, in the judgment of the person making or considering the sacrifice, giving up a greater for a lesser value. It may be giving up something of self-interested importance for something that is not, but showing that it is never right to do that is something that neither Rand nor anyone else has ever done.
Rob
_____
Rob
Bass
rhbass@gmail.com