| . | 
    Before we can discuss this subject we must form some
    conception as to the kind of effect that we consider a help to mankind. Are mankind helped
    when they become more numerous? Or when they become less like animals? Or when they become
    happier? Or when they learn to enjoy a greater diversity of experiences? Or when they come
    to know more? Or when they become more friendly to one another? I think all these things
    come into our conception of what helps mankind, and I will say a preliminary word about
    them. The
    most indubitable respect in which ideas have helped mankind is numbers. There must have
    been a time when homo sapiens was a very rare species, subsisting precariously in jungles
    and caves, terrified of wild beasts, having difficulty in securing nourishment. At this
    period the biological advantage of his greater intelligence, which was cumulative because
    it could be handed on from generation to generation, had scarcely begun to outweigh the
    disadvantages of his long infancy, his lessened agility as compared with monkeys, and his
    lack of hirsute protection against cold. In those days, the number of men must certainly
    have been very small. The main use to which, throughout the ages, men have put their
    technical skill has been to increase the total population. I do not mean that this was the
    intention, but that it was, in fact, the effect. If this is something to rejoice in, then
    we have occasion to rejoice. 
    We have
    also become, in certain respects, progressively less like animals. I can think in
    particular of two respects: first, that acquired, as opposed to congenital, skills play a
    continually increasing part in human life, and, secondly, that forethought more and more
    dominates impulse. In these respects we have certainly become progressively less like
    animals. 
    As to
    happiness, I am not so sure. Birds, it is true, die of hunger in large numbers during the
    winter, if they are not birds of passage. But during the summer they do not foresee this
    catastrophe, or remember how nearly it befell them in the previous winter. With human
    beings the matter is otherwise. I doubt whether the percentage of birds that will have
    died of hunger during the present winter (1946-7) is as great as the percentage of human
    beings that will have died from this cause in India and central Europe during the same
    period. But every human death by starvation is preceded by a long period of anxiety, and
    surrounded by the corresponding anxiety of neighbors. We suffer not only the evils that
    actually befall us, but all those that our intelligence tells us we have reason to fear.
    The curbing of impulses to which we are led by forethought averts physical disaster at the
    cost of worry, and general lack of joy. I do not think that the learned men of my
    acquaintance, even when they enjoy a secure income, are as happy as the mice that eat the
    crumbs from their tables while the erudite gentlemen snooze. In this respect, therefore, I
    am not convinced that there has been any progress at all. 
    As to
    diversity of enjoyments, however, the matter is otherwise. I remember reading an account
    of some lions who were taken to a movie showing the successful depredations of lions in a
    wild state, but none of them got any pleasure from the spectacle. Not only music, and
    poetry and science, but football and baseball and alcohol, afford no pleasure to animals.
    Our intelligence has, therefore, certainly enabled us to get a much greater variety of
    enjoyment than is open to animals, but we have purchased this advantage at the expense of
    a much greater liability to boredom. 
    But I shall
    be told that it is neither numbers nor multiplicity of pleasures that makes the glory of
    man. It is his intellectual and moral qualities. It is obvious that we know more than
    animals do, and it is common to consider this one of our advantages. Whether it is, in
    fact, an advantage, may be doubted. But at any rate it is something that distinguishes us
    from the brutes. 
     
    Has civilization taught us to be
    more friendly towards one another? The answer is easy. Robins (the English, not the
    American species) peck an elderly robin to death, whereas men (the English, not the
    American species) give an elderly man an oldage pension. Within the herd we are more
    friendly to each other than are many species of animals, but in our attitude towards those
    outside the herd, in spite of all that has been done by moralists and religious teachers,
    our emotions are as ferocious as those of any animal, and our intelligence enables us to
    give them a scope which is denied to even the most savage beast. It may be hoped, though
    not very confidently, that the more humane attitude will in time come to prevail, but so
    far the omens are not very propitious. 
    All these
    different elements must be borne in mind in considering what ideas have done most to help
    mankind. The ideas with which we shall be concerned may be broadly divided into two kinds:
    those that contribute to knowledge and technique, and those that are concerned with morals
    and politics. I will treat first those that have to do with knowledge and technique. 
    The most
    important and difficult steps were taken before the dawn of history. At what stage
    language began is not known, but we may be pretty certain that it began very gradually.
    Without it it would have been very difficult to hand on from generation to generation the
    inventions and discoveries that were gradually made. 
    Another
    great step, which may have come either before or after the beginning of language, was the
    utilization of fire. I suppose that at first fire was chiefly used to keep away wild
    beasts while our ancestors slept, but the warmth must have been found agreeable.
    Presumably on some occasion a child got scolded for throwing the meat into the fire, but
    when it was taken out it was found to be much better, and so the long history of cookery
    began. 
    The taming
    of domestic animals, especially the cow and the sheep, must have made life much pleasanter
    and more secure. Some anthropologists have an attractive theory that the utility of
    domestic animals was not foreseen, but that people attempted to tame whatever animal their
    religion taught them to worship. The tribes that worshiped lions and crocodiles died out,
    while those to whom the cow or the sheep was a sacred animal prospered. I like this
    theory, and in the entire absence of evidence, for or against it, I feel at liberty to
    play with it. 
    Even more
    important than the domestication of animals was the invention of agriculture, which,
    however, introduced bloodthirsty practices into religion that lasted for many centuries.
    Fertility rites tended to involve human sacrifice and cannibalism. Moloch would not help
    the corn to grow unless he was allowed to feast on the blood of children. A similar
    opinion was adopted by the Evangelicals of Manchester in the early days of industrialism,
    when they kept six-year-old children working twelve to fourteen hours a day, in conditions
    that caused most of them to die. It has now been discovered that grain will grow, and
    cotton goods can be manufactured, without being watered by the blood of infants. In the
    case of the grain, the discovery took thousands of years; in the case of the cotton goods
    hardly a century. So perhaps there is some evidence of progress in the world. 
    The last of
    the great pre-historic inventions was the art of writing, which was indeed a pre-requisite
    of history. Writing, like speech, developed gradually, and in the form of pictures
    designed to convey a message it was probably as old as speech, but from pictures to
    syllable writing and thence to the alphabet was a very slow evolution. In China the last
    step was never taken. 
    Coming to
    historic times, we find that the earliest important steps were taken in mathematics and
    astronomy, both of which began in Babylonia some millennia before the beginning of our
    era. Learning in Babylonia seems, however, to have become stereotyped and non-progressive,
    long before the Greeks first came into contact with it. It is to the Greeks that we owe
    ways of thinking and investigating that have ever since been found fruitful. In the
    prosperous Greek commercial cities, rich men living on slave labor were brought by the
    processes of trade into contact with many nations, some quite barbarous, others fairly
    civilized. What the civilized nations - the Babylonians and Egyptians - had to offer the
    Greeks quickly assimilated. They became critical of their own traditional customs, by
    perceiving them to be at once analogous to, and different from, the customs of surrounding
    inferior people, and so by the sixth century BC some of them achieved a degree of
    enlightened rationalism which cannot be surpassed in the present day. Xenophanes observed
    that men make gods in their own image - 'the Ethiopians make their gods black and
    snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair: Yes, and if oxen and
    lions and horses had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produced works of art as
    men do, horses would paint the forms of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen and make
    their bodies in the image of their several kinds.' 
    Some Greeks
    used their emancipation from tradition in the pursuit of mathematics and astronomy, in
    both of which they made the most amazing progress. Mathematics was not used by the Greeks,
    as it is by the moderns, to facilitate industrial processes; it was a 'gentlemanly'
    pursuit, valued for its own sake as giving eternal truth, and a super-sensible standard by
    which the visible world was condemned as second-rate. Only Archimedes foreshadowed the
    modern use of mathematics by inventing engines of war for the defence of Syracuse against
    the Romans. A Roman soldier killed him and the mathematicians retired again into their
    ivory tower. 
    Astronomy,
    which the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries pursued with ardor, largely because of its
    usefulness in navigation, was pursued by the Greeks with no regard for practical utility,
    except when, in later antiquity, it became associated with astrology. At a very early
    stage they discovered the earth to be round and made a fairly accurate estimate of its
    size They discovered ways of calculating the distance of the sun and moon, and Aristarchus
    of Samos even evolved the complete Copernican hypothesis, but his views were rejected by
    all his followers except one, and after the third century BC no very important progress
    was made. At the time of the Renaissance, however, something of what the Greeks had done
    became known, and greatly facilitated the rise of modem science. 
    The Greeks
    had the conception of natural law, and acquired the habit of expressing natural laws in
    mathematical terms. These ideas have provided the key to a very great deal of the
    understanding of the physical world that has been achieved in modern times. But many of
    them, including Aristotle, were misled by a belief that science could make a fruitful use
    of the idea of purpose. Aristotle distinguished four kinds of cause, of which only two
    concern us, the 'efficient' cause and the 'final' cause. The 'efficient' cause is what we
    should call simply the cause. The 'final' cause is the purpose. For instance, if, in the
    course of a tramp in the mountains, you find an inn just when your thirst has become
    unendurable, the efficient cause of the inn is the actions of the bricklayers that built
    it, while its final cause is the satisfaction of your thirst. If someone were to ask 'why
    is there an inn there?' it would be equally appropriate to answer 'because someone had it
    built there' or 'because many thirsty travelers pass that way'. One is an explanation by
    the 'efficient' cause and the other by the 'final' cause. Where human affairs are
    concerned, the explanation by 'final' cause is often appropriate, since human actions have
    purposes. But where inanimate nature is concerned, only 'efficient' causes have been found
    scientifically discoverable, and the attempt to explain phenomena by 'final' causes has
    always led to bad science. There may, for ought we know, be a purpose in natural
    phenomena, but if so it has remained completely undiscovered, and all known scientific
    laws have to do only with 'efficient' causes. In this respect Aristotle led the world
    astray, and it did not recover fully until the time of Galileo. 
    The
    seventeenth century, especially Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, made an advance
    in our understanding of nature more sudden and surprising than any other in history,
    except that of the early Greeks. It is true that some of the concepts used in the
    mathematical physics of that time had not quite the validity that was then ascribed to
    them. It is true also that the more recent advances of physics often reuire new concepts
    quite different from those of the seventeenth century. Their concepts, in fact, were not
    the key to all e secrets of nature, but they were the key to a great many. Modern
    technique in industry and war, with the sole exception of the atomic bomb, is still wholly
    based upon a type of dynamics developed out of the principles of Galileo and Newton. Most
    of astronomy still rests upon these same principles, though there are some problems such
    as 'what keeps the sun hot?' in which the recent discoveries of quantum mechanics are
    essential. The dynamics of Galileo and Newton depended upon two new principles and a new
    technique. 
    The first
    of the new principles was the law of inertia, which stated that any body, left to itself,
    will continue to move as it is moving in the same straight line, and with the same
    velocity. The importance of this principle is only evident when it is contrasted with the
    principles that the scholastics had evolved out of Aristotle. Before Galileo it was held
    that there was a radical difference between regions below the moon and regions from the
    moon upwards. In the regions below the moon, the 'sublunary' sphere, there was change and
    decay; the 'natural' motion of bodies was rectilinear, but any body in motion, if left to
    itself, would gradually slow up and presently stop. From the moon upwards, on the
    contrary, the 'natural' motion of bodies was circular, or compounded of circular motions,
    and in the heavens there was no such thing as change or decay, except the periodic changes
    of the orbits of the heavenly bodies. The movements of the heavenly bodies were not
    spontaneous, but were passed on to them from the primum mobile, which was the outermost of
    the moving spheres, and itself derived its motion from the Unmoved Mover, i.e. God. No one
    thought of making any appeal to observation, for instance, it was taken that a projectile
    would first move horizontally for a while, and then suddenly begin to la vertically,
    although it might have been supposed that anybody watching the fountain could have seen
    the drops move in curves. Comets, since they appear and disappear, had to be supposed to
    be between the earth and the moon, for if they had been above the moon they would have had
    to be indestructible. It is evident that out of such a jumble nothing could be developed.
    Galileo unified the principles governing the earth and the heavens by his single law of
    inertia, according to which a body, once in motion, will not stop of itself, but will move
    with a constant velocity in a straight line whether it is on earth or in one of the
    celestial spheres. This principle made it possible to develop a science of the motions of
    matter, without taking account of any supposed influence of mind or spirit, and thus laid
    the foundations of the purely materialistic physics in which men of science, however
    pious, have ever since believed. 
    From the
    seventeenth century onwards, it has become increasingly evident that if we wish to
    understand natural laws, we must get rid of every kind of ethical and aesthetic bias. We
    must cease to think that noble things have noble causes, that intelligent things have
    intelligent causes, or that order is impossible without a celestial policeman. The Greeks
    admired the sun and moon and planets, and supposed them to be gods Plotinus explains how
    superior they are to human beings in wisdom and virtue. Anaxagoras, who taught otherwise,
    was prosecuted for impiety and compelled to fly from Athens The Greeks also allowed
    themselves to think that since the circle is the most perfect figure, the motions of the
    heavenly bodies must be, or be derived from circular motions. Every bias of this sort had
    to be discarded by seventeenth-century astronomy. The Copernican system showed that the
    earth is not the center of the universe, and suggested to a few bold spirits that perhaps
    man was not the supreme purpose of the Creator. In the main, however, astronomers were
    pious folk, and until the nineteenth century most of them, except in France, believed in
    Genesis. 
    It was
    geology, Darwin, and the doctrine of evolution, that first upset the faith of British men
    of science. If man was evolved by insensible gradations from lower forms of life, a number
    of things became very difficult to understand. At what moment in evolution did our
    ancestors acquire free will? At what stage in the long journey from the amoeba did they
    begin to have immortal souls? When did they first become capable of the kinds of
    wickedness that would justify a benevolent Creator in sending them into eternal torment?
    Most people felt that such punishment would be hard on monkeys, in spite of their
    propensity for throwing coconuts at the heads of Europeans. But how about Pithecanthropus
    Erectus? Was it really he who ate the apple? Or was it Homo Pekiniensis? Or was it perhaps
    the Piltdown man? I went to Piltdown once, but saw no evidence of special depravity in
    that village, nor did I see any signs of its having changed appreciably since pre-historic
    ages. Perhaps then it was the Neanderthal men who first sinned? This seems the more
    likely, as they lived in Germany. But obviously there can be no answer to such questions,
    and those theologians who do not wholly reject evolution have had to make profound
    readjustments. 
    One of the
    'grand' conceptions which have proved scientifically useless is the soul. I do not mean
    that there is positive evidence showing that men have no souls; I only mean that the soul,
    if it exists, plays no part in any discoverable causal law. There are all kinds of
    experimental methods of determining how men and animals behave under various
    circumstances. You can put rats in mazes and men in barbed wire cages, and observe their
    methods of escape. You can administer drugs and observe their effect. You can turn a male
    rat into a female, though so far nothing analogous has been done with human beings, even
    at Buchenwald. It appears that socially undesirable conduct can be dealt with by medical
    means, or by creating a better environment, and the conception of sin has thus come to
    seem quite unscientific, except, of course, as applied to the Nazis. There is real hope
    that, by getting to understand the science of human behavior, governments may be even more
    able than they are at present to turn mankind into rabbles of mutually ferocious lunatics.
    Governments could, of course, do exactly the opposite and cause the human race to
    co-operate willingly and cheerfully in making themselves happy, rather than in making
    others miserable, but only if there is an international government with a monopoly of
    armed force. It is very doubtful whether this will take place. 
    This brings
    me to the second kind of idea that has helped or may in time help mankind; I mean moral as
    opposed to technical ideas. Hitherto I have been considering the in creased command over
    the forces of nature which men hay' derived from scientific knowledge, but this, although
    it is: pre-condition of many forms of progress, does not of itsel ensure anything
    desirable. On the contrary, the present state of the world and the fear of an atomic war
    show that scientific progress without a corresponding moral and political progress may
    only increase the magnitude of the disaster that misdirected skill may bring about. In
    superstitious moments I am tempted to believe in the myth of the Tower of Babel, and to
    suppose that in our own day a similar but greater impiety i about to be visited by a more
    tragic and terrible punishment Perhaps - so I sometimes allow myself to fancy - God does
    not intend us to understand the mechanism by which He regulates the material universe.
    Perhaps the nuclear physicists have come so near to the ultimate secrets that He thinks it
    time to bring their activities to a stop. And what simpler method could He devise than to
    let them carry their ingenuity to the point where they exterminate the human race? If I
    could think that deer and squirrels, nightingales and larks, would survive, I might view
    this catastrophe with some equanimity, since man has not shown himself worthy to be the
    lord of creation. But it is to be feared that the dreadful alchemy of the atomic bomb will
    destroy all forms of life equally, and that the earth will remain for ever a dead clod
    senselessly whirling round a futile sun. I do not know the immediate precipitating cause
    of this interesting occurrence. Perhaps it will be a dispute about Persian oil, perhaps a
    disagreement as to Chinese trade, perhaps a quarrel between Jews and Mohommedans for the
    control of Palestine. Any patriotic person can see that these issues are of such
    importance as to make the extermination of mankind preferable to cowardly conciliation. 
    In case,
    however, there should be some among my readers who would like to see the human race
    survive, it may be worth while considering the stock of moral ideas that great men have
    put into the world and that might, if they were listened to, secure happiness instead of
    misery for the mass of mankind. 
    Man, viewed
    morally, is a strange amalgam of angel and devil. He can feel the splendor of the night,
    the delicate beauty of spring flowers, the tender emotion of parental love, and the
    intoxication of intellectual understanding. In moments of insight visions come to him of
    how life should be lived and how men should order their dealings one with another.
    Universal love is an emotion which many have felt and which many more could feel if the
    world made it less difficult. This is one side of the picture. On the other side are
    cruelty, greed, indifference and over-weening pride. Men, quite ordinary men, will compel
    children to look on while their mothers are raped. In pursuit of political aims men will
    submit their opponents to long years of unspeakable anguish. We know what the Nazis did to
    Jews at Auschwitz. In mass cruelty, the expulsions of Germans ordered by the Russians fall
    not very far short of the atrocities perpetuated by the Nazis. And how about our noble
    selves? We would not do such deeds, oh no! But we enjoy our juicy steaks and our hot rolls
    while German children die of hunger because our governments dare not face our indignation
    if they asked us to forgo some part of our pleasures. If these were a Last Judgment as
    Christians believe, how do you think our excuses would sound before that final tribunal? 
    Moral ideas
    sometimes wait upon political developments, and sometimes outrun them. The brotherhood of
    man is an ideal which owed its first force to political developments. When Alexander
    conquered the East he set to work to obliterate the distinction of Greek and barbarian, no
    doubt because his Greek and Macedonian army was too small to hold down so vast an empire
    by force. He compelled his officers to marry barbarian aristocratic ladies, while he
    himself, to set a doubly excellent example, married two barbarian princesses. As a result
    of this policy Greek pride and exclusiveness were diminished, and Greek culture spread to
    many regions not inhabited by Hellenic stock. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, who was
    probably a boy at the time of Alexander's conquest, was a Phoenician, and few of the
    eminent Stoics were Greeks. It was the Stoics who invented the conception of the
    brotherhood of man. They taught that all men are children of Zeus and that the sage will
    ignore the distinctions of Greek and barbarian, bond and free. When Rome brought the whole
    civilised world under one government, the political environment was favorable to the
    spread of this doctrine. In a new form, more capable of appealing to the emotions of
    ordinary men and women, Christianity taught a similar doctrine. Christ said 'Thou shalt
    love thy neighbor thyself,' and when asked 'who is my neighbor?' went on to the parable of
    the Good Samaritan. If you wish to understand this parable as it was understood by his
    hearers, you should substitute 'German' or 'Japanese' for 'Samaritan', I fear many present
    day Christians would resent such a substitution, because it would compel them to realise
    how far they have departed from the teaching of the Founder of their religion. A similar
    doctrine had been taught much earlier by the Buddhists. According to them, the Buddha
    declared that he could not be happy so long as even one man remained miserable. It might
    seem as if these lofty ethical teachings had little effect upon the world; in India
    Buddhism died out, in Europe Christianity was emptied of most of the elements it derived
    from Christ. But I think this would be a superficial view. Christianity, as soon as it
    conquered the State, put an end to gladiatorial shows, not because they were cruel, but
    because they were idolatrous. The result, however, was to diminish the widespread
    education in cruelty by which the populace of Roman towns were degraded. Christianity also
    did much to soften the lot of slaves. It established charity on a large scale, and
    inaugurated hospitals. Although the great majority of Christians failed lamentably in
    Christian charity, the ideal remained alive and in every age inspired some notable saints.
    In a new form, it passed over into modern Liberalism, and remains the inspiration of much
    that is most hopeful in our sombre world. 
    The
    watchwords of the French Revolution, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, have religious
    origins. Of Fraternity I have already spoken. Equality was a characteristic of the Orphic
    Societies in ancient Greece, from which, indirectly, a great deal of Christian dogma took
    its rise. In these Societies, slaves and women were admitted on equal terms with citizens.
    Plato's advocacy of Votes for Women, which has seemed surprising to some modern readers,
    is derived from Orphic practices. The Orphics believed in transmigration and thought that
    a soul which in one life inhabits the body of a slave, may, in another, inhabit that of a
    king. Viewed from the standpoint of religion, it is therefore foolish to discriminate
    between a slave and a king; both share the dignity belonging to an immortal soul, and
    neither, in religion, can claim anything more. This point of view passed over from Orphism
    into Stoicism, and into Christianity. For a long time its practical effect was small, but
    ultimately, whenever circumstances were favorable, it helped in bringing about the
    diminution of the inequalities in the social system. Read, for instance, John Woolman's
    Journal. John Woolman was a Quaker, one of the first Americans to oppose slavery. No doubt
    the real ground of his opposition was humane feeling, but he was able to fortify this
    feeling and to make it controversially more effective by appeals to Christian doctrines,
    which his neighbors did not dare to repudiate openly. 
    Liberty as
    an ideal has had a very chequered history. In antiquity, Sparta, which was a totalitarian
    State, had as little use for it as the Nazis had. But most of the Greek City States
    allowed a degree of liberty which we should now think excessive, and, in fact, do think
    excessive when it is practiced by their descendants in the same part of the world.
    Politics was a matter of assassination and rival armies, one of them supporting the
    government, and the other composed of refugees. The refugees would often ally themselves
    with their city's enemies and march in in triumph on the heels of foreign conquerors. This
    sort of thing was done by everybody, and, in spite of much fine talk in the works of modem
    historians about Greek loyalty to the City State, nobody seemed to view such conduct as
    particularly nefarious. This was carrying liberty to excess, and led by reaction to
    admiration of Sparta. 
    The word
    'liberty' has had strange meanings at different times. In Rome, in the last days of the
    Republic and the early days of the Empire, it meant the right of powerful Senators to
    plunder Provinces for their private profit. Brutus, whom most English speaking readers
    know as the high-minded hero of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, was, in fact, rather
    different from this. He would lend money to a municipality at 60 percent, and when they
    failed to pay the interest he would hire a private army to besiege them, for which his
    friend Cicero mildly expostulated with him. In our own day, the word 'liberty' bears a
    very similar meaning when used by industrial magnates. Leaving these vagaries on one side,
    there are two serious meanings of the word 'liberty'. On the one hand the freedom of a
    nation from foreign domination, on the other hand, the freedom of the citizen to pursue
    his legitimate avocations. Each of these in a well-ordered world should be subject to
    limitations, but unfortunately the former has been taken in an absolute sense. To this
    point of view I will return presently; it is the liberty of the individual citizen that I
    now wish to speak about. 
    This kind
    of liberty first entered practical politics in the form of religious toleration, a
    doctrine which came to be widely adopted in the seventeenth century through the inability
    of either Protestants or Catholics to exterminate the opposite party. After they had
    fought each other for a hundred years, culminating in the horror of the thirty years' war,
    and after it had appeared that as a result of all this bloodshed the balance of parties at
    the end was almost exactly what it had been at the beginning, certain men of genius,
    mostly Dutchmen, suggested that perhaps all the killing had been unnecessary, and that
    people might be allowed to think what they chose on such matters as consubstantiation
    versus transubstantiation, or whether the Cup should be allowed to the laity. The doctrine
    of religious toleration came to England with the Dutch King William, along with the Bank
    of England and the National Debt. In fact all three were products of the commercial
    mentality. 
     
    The greatest of the theoretical
    advocates of liberty at that period was John Locke, who devoted much thought to the
    problem of reconciling the maximum of liberty with the indispensable minimum of
    government, a problem with which his successors in the Liberal tradition have been
    occupied down to the present day. 
    In addition
    to religious freedom, free press, free speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest came to
    be taken for granted during the nineteenth century, at least among the Western
    democracies. But their hold on men's minds was much more precarious than was at the time
    supposed, and now, over the greater part of the earth's surface, nothing remains of them,
    either in practice or in theory. Stalin could neither understand nor respect the point of
    view which led Churchill to allow himself to be peaceably dispossessed as a result of a
    popular vote. I am a firm believer in democratic representative government as the best
    form for those who have the tolerance and self-restraint that is required to make it
    workable. But its advocates make a mistake if they suppose that it can be at once
    introduced into countries where the average citizen has hitherto lacked all training in
    the give and-take that it requires. In a Balkan country, not so many years ago, a party
    which had been beaten by a narrow margin in a general election retrieved its fortunes by
    shooting a sufficient number of the representatives of the other side to give it a
    majority. People in the West thought this characteristic of the Balkans, forgetting that
    Cromwell and Robespierre had acted likewise. 
    And this
    brings me to the last pair of great political ideas to which mankind owes whatever little
    success in social organization it has achieved. I mean the ideas of law and government. Of
    these, government is the more fundamental. Government can easily exist without law, but
    law cannot exist without government - a fact which was forgotten by those who framed the
    League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact. Government may be defined as a concentration of
    the collective forces of a community in a certain organization which, in virtue of this
    concentration, is able to control individual citizens and to resist pressure from foreign
    States. War has always been the chief promoter of governmental power. The control of
    government over the private citizen is always greater where there is war or imminent
    danger of war than where peace seems secure. But when governments have acquired power with
    a view to resisting foreign aggression, they have naturally used it, if they could, to
    further their private interests at the expense of the citizens. Absolute monarchy was,
    until recently, the grossest form of this abuse of power. But in the modern totalitarian
    State the same evil has been carried much further than had been dreamt of by Xerxes or
    Nero or any of the tyrants of earlier times. 
    Democracy
    was invented as a device for reconciling government with liberty. It is clear that
    government is necessary if anything worthy to be called civilization is to exist, but all
    history shows that any set of men entrusted with power over another set will abuse their
    power if they can do so with impunity. Democracy is intended to make men's tenure of power
    temporary and dependent upon popular approval. In so far as it achieves this it prevents
    the worst abuses of power. The Second Triumvirate in Rome, when they wanted money with a
    view to fighting Brutus and Cassius, made a list of rich men and declared them public
    enemies, cut off their heads, and seized their property. This sort of procedure is not
    possible in America and England at the present day. We owe the fact that it is not
    possible not only to democracy, but also to the doctrine of personal liberty. This
    doctrine, in practice, consists of two parts, on the one hand that a man shall not be
    punished except by due process of law, and on the other hand that there shall be a sphere
    within which a man's actions are not to be subject to governmental control. This sphere
    includes free speech, free press and religious freedom. It used to include freedom of
    economic enterprise. All these doctrines, of course, are held in practice with certain
    limitations. The British formerly did not adhere to them in their dealings with India.
    Freedom of the press is not respected in the case of doctrines which are thought
    dangerously subversive. Free speech would not be held to exonerate public advocacy of
    assassination of an unpopular politician. But in spite of these limitations the doctrine
    of personal liberty has been of great value throughout the English-speaking world, as
    anyone who dives in it will quickly realize when he finds himself in a police State. 
    In the
    history of social evolution it will be found that almost invariably the establishment of
    some sort of government has come first and attempts to make government compatible with
    personal liberty have come later. In international affairs we have not yet reached the
    first stage, although it is now evident that international government is at least as
    important to mankind as national government. I think it may be seriously doubted whether
    the next twenty years would be more disastrous to mankind if all government were abolished
    than they will be if no effective international government is established. I find it often
    urged that an international government would be oppressive, and I do not deny that this
    might be the case, at any rate for a time, but national governments were oppressive when
    they were new and are still oppressive in most countries, and yet hardly anybody would on
    this ground advocate anarchy within a nation. 
    Ordered
    social life of a kind that could seem in any degree desirable rests upon a synthesis and
    balance of certain slowly developed ideas and institutions: government, law, individual
    liberty, and democracy. Individual liberty, of course, existed in the ages before there
    was government, but when it existed without government civilized life was impossible. When
    governments first arose they involved slavery, absolute monarchy, and usually the
    enforcement of superstition by a powerful priesthood. All these were very great evils, and
    one can understand Rousseau's nostalgia for the life of the noble savage. But this was a
    mere romantic idealization, and, in fact, the life of the savage was, as Hobbes said,
    'nasty, brutish, and short'. The history of man reaches occasional great crises. There
    must have been a crisis when the apes lost their tails, and another when our ancestors
    took to walking upright and lost their protective covering of hair. As I remarked before,
    the human population of the globe, which must at one time have been very small, was
    greatly increased by the invention of agriculture, and was increased again in our own time
    by modern industrial and medical technique. But modern technique has brought us to a new
    crisis. In this new crisis we are faced with an alternative: either man must again become
    a rare species as in the days of Homo Pekiniensis, or we must learn to submit to an
    international government. Any such government, whether good, bad or indifferent, will make
    the continuation of the human species possible, and, as in the course of the past 5,000
    years men have climbed gradually from the despotism of the Pharaohs to the glories of the
    American Constitution, so perhaps in the next 5,000 they may climb from a bad
    international government to a good one. But if they do not establish an international
    government of some kind, new progress will have to begin at a lower level, probably at
    that of tribal savagery, and will have to begin after a cataclysmic destruction only to be
    paralleled by the Biblical account of the deluge. When we survey the long development of
    mankind from a rare hunted animal, hiding precariously in caves from the fury of wild
    beasts which he was incapable of killing; subsisting doubtfully on the raw fruits of the
    earth which he did not know how to cultivate; reinforcing real terrors by the imaginary
    terrors of ghosts and evil spirits and malign spells; gradually acquiring the mastery of
    his environment by the invention of fire, writing, weapons, and at last science; building
    up a social organization which curbed private violence and gave a measure of security to
    daily life; using the leisure gained by his skill, not only in idle luxury, but in the
    production of beauty and the unveiling of the secrets of natural law; learning gradually,
    though imperfectly, to view an increasing number of his neighbors as allies in the task of
    production rather than enemies in the attempts at mutual depredation - when we consider
    this long and arduous journey, it becomes intolerable to think that it may all have to be
    made again from the beginning owing to failure to take one step for which past
    developments, rightly viewed, have been a preparation. Social cohesion, which among the
    apes is confined to the family grew in pre-historic times as far as the tribe, and in the
    very beginnings of history reached the level of small kingdoms in upper and lower Egypt
    and in Mesopotamia. From these small kingdoms grew the empires of antiquity. and then
    graduallv the great States of our own day, far larger than even the Roman Empire. Quite
    recent developments have robbed the smaller States of anv real independence, until now
    there remain only two that are wholly capable of independent self direction: I mean, of
    course, the United States and the USSR. All that is necessary to save mankind from
    disaster is the step from two independent States to one - not by war, which would bring
    disaster, but by agreement. 
    If this
    step can be accomplished, all the great achievements of mankind will quickly lead to an
    era of happiness and wellbeing, such as has never before been dreamt of. Our scientific
    skill will make it possible to abolish poverty throughout the world without necessitating
    more than four or five hours a day of productive labor. Disease, which has been very
    rapidly reduced during the last hundred years, will be reduced still further. The leisure
    achieved through organisation and science will no doubt be devoted very largely to pure
    enjoyment, but there will remain a number of people to whom the pursuit of art and science
    will seem important. There will be a new freedom from economic bondage to the mere
    necessities of keeping alive, and the great mass of mankind may enjoy the kind of carefree
    adventurousness that characterizes the rich young Athenians of Plato's Dialogues. All this
    is easily within the bounds of technical possibility. It requires for its realization only
    one thing: that the men who hold power, and the populations that support them, should
    think it more important to keep themselves alive than to cause the death of their enemies.
    No very lofty or difficult ideal, one might think, and yet one which so far has proved
    beyond the scope of human intelligence. 
    The present
    moment is the most important and most crucial that has ever confronted mankind. Upon our
    collective wisdom during the next twenty years depends the question whether mankind shall
    be plunged into unparalleled disaster, or shall achieve a new level of happiness,
    security, well-being, and intelligence. I do not know which mankind will choose. There is
    grave reason for fear, but there is enough possibility of a good solution to make hope not
    irrational. And it is on this hope that we must act.  | 
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