The purpose of this work is to briefly survey some of the religious philosophies employed by select thinkers in the twentieth century, and how these men exercised an interdependence on one another that was to profoundly influence the shape of ecclesiastical philosophy during the twentieth century.
The rise of rationalism in the eighteenth century with its subsequent development of new philosophical methods, laid the groundwork for an era of diversification within reformation theology. One school to emerge was that of liberal Protestantism, which, while being somewhat idealistic, sought an ‘anti-dogmatic and humanitarian reconstruction of the Christian faith.’1 This movement was to gain a strong ascendancy throughout much of the Christian church around the end of the nineteenth century, including a dominate presence within many schools of theological education. With that backdrop, I have sought to select four theologians who characterise some of the important theological shifts within the twentieth century; Karl Barth (1886 - 1968), Paul Tillich (1886 - 1965), Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906 - 45), and Hans Küng (1928 - ).
Karl Barth, in his theological move away from Protestant liberalism,
is often credited as being the father of neo-orthodoxy, with its
emphasis on the transcendence of God. This can be contrasted to those philosophies
derived from classical natural theology, with their grounding in the immanence
of God.2 Paul
Tillich was a neo-liberal who sought to revisit the old liberalism
of the nineteenth century armed with modern philosophical methods in order
to stem the perceived over-emphasis on transcendence contained within the
neo-orthodoxy movement as it stood at that time.3
This utilisation of philosophy was to profoundly effect the way in which
all future theologians systematised their thinking, regardless whether
they approved or disapproved of Tillich’s methodology. Just under twenty
years after his death in a Nazi concentration camp, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
gained strong prominence as one of the major inspirations behind the ‘radical
theology’ of the sixties, where the quest for the immanence of God
was revisited. This reaction against neo-orthodoxy sought to find the theistic
reality within the temporal reality of modern life.4
Hans Küng, one of this century’s most prolific and popular theologians,
represents the ‘modernism movement’ within the Roman Catholic Church as
they sought to struggle with many of the same issues as their protestant
counterparts, sometimes to the displeasure of the Church hierarchy.5
Karl Barth - Father of ‘neo-orthodoxy’
After training within the German Liberal Protestant tradition, Karl
Barth made his break from Liberalism after he witnessed the way in which
many of his teachers and peers readily endorsed Nazist ideologies, and
in the process, elevated Hitler to messiah status. Such an acceptance was
for Barth, the logical culmination of natural philosophies in the way in
which the message of Christianity had readily been reduced to a form of
culture Christianity.6 This
event profoundly influenced the direction that Barth’s philosophy was to
develop. He became completely opposed to all forms of natural theology,
and his theology became communal and dialectic in nature.
Küng credits Barth with being the chief initiator of a new postmodern paradigm in theology.7 Recognising the dialectic of the enlightenment, Barth took on an ‘Enlightenment of the Enlightenment.’8 Natural philosophy, with its tendencies towards the ‘cultural-Protestant accommodation to social and civic trends’9 is replaced by a Christological paradigm that stresses the social and political challenge of the Gospel message.10 This is achieved by a dramatic change in theological method. The ‘from below’ nature of philosophical theology with it’s humanistic centre is replaced by a theological method which is ‘from above’, moving theology away from human experience and reason towards divine revelation.11 Revelation thus becomes understood in Christological terms where God actively self reveals as an act of grace, with this revelation being primarily, but not exclusively seen in the life of Jesus. As such, revelation becomes historically inclusive in that the revelation of Jesus defines the terms by which all future divine revelations can be recognised.12
Flowing from this rejection of natural theology is his anti-apologeticism. Barth notes13 that since other sciences seek to understand their object within their own terms, Christianity should not seek to engage in other sciences in order to prove its own being, as it will be apologetically spoken for simply by acting according to the laws of its own being.14 Therefore, the Gospel’s basis in revelation alone yields no common ground for a defence of Christianity by natural reason.15 However, this desire to downplay the role of reason opens Barth’s position up to accusations of fideism.16
Barth became keen to develop a social and public theology. He argued that while the church must remain in the ‘inner circle of the Kingdom of Christ’ (compared to the outer circle of the civil community), it has a responsibility to mould both the shape and reality of the civil community.17 By doing so, the community of the church is to point to a society which is in itself neither individualistic nor collectivist in nature.18 It would seem reasonably clear that this view strongly reflects his absolute disgust at those sections of the church who readily assimilated Nazi ideology into their theological framework.
Further, the resultant tension between the Kingdom and the civil displays Barth's emphasis on the confrontation between God and humanity. Previous models such as those used in orthodox ecclesiastical dogmatics, treated God as a concrete object, while much of the mystical tradition modelled their philosophies using the path of negation, where positive affirmations of God were forbidden in favour of defining God by what he is not.19 In contrast, Barth’s model of dialectical theology involves a move away from a religiosity that satisfies humanity’s religious needs, towards a Christian faith modelled on a God who is the ‘totally other manifest in Christ.’20 Christian truth is thereby discovered in a dialectic apprehension of God which transcends the ‘Yes’ of dogmatics and the ‘No’ of negation.
Herein lies a confrontation between man’s theological and philosophical needs and desires, and a ‘totally other’ God. In Kierkegaard’s terms, religiosity presupposes that truth exists in the individual and that such truth can be extracted in the right environment, while the religion of Jesus understands that humanity is lacking in truth, and that it needs an external saviour figure to bring about the conditions necessary to both reveal and receive truth claims.21
From this, the church holds both the responsibility and the power to influence society towards concepts of truth. In this, the church possesses an inherent degree of freedom. As a creation of the Holy Spirit, it neither possesses nor controls its being in and of itself. Rather, its life is gained through the Spirit of the living Christ. Essentially, this living nature defines the church as an event or moment, rather than being an institutionally based creation.22
Green23 takes
a slightly wider view than others, suggesting that Barth’s overall view
of the Church is grounded simultaneously in Christology, Creationism, and
Trinitarian Doctrine. While not being an organisation set up by Jesus,
a Christological presence within the church is vital. This is because it
is only through Christ that the Kingdom of God is eschatologically realised,
and through election, becomes ‘a provisional representation of the whole
world of humanity.’24
This is made possible by the covenanting nature of God as expressed through
creation, and the way in which community can be seen as part of the essence
of God as structured in the Trinity.25
Paul Tillich’s ‘Method of Correlation’
Paul Tillich was one of the most influential theological thinkers in the twentieth century. The whole of his theological work was directed towards the interpretation of religious symbols so that those within secular society can understand these symbols and be moved by them.26 He was a pioneer in the way in which he strove to correlate modern secular philosophy with Christian theology through his ‘method of correlation.’27 Functionally, this method sought to act as a form of fundamental theology which was to be a substitute for classical natural philosophy.
Tillich insisted that theology should be apologetic in nature, as he presupposes that there is a degree of common ground existing between the Christian message and the contemporary culture which the message finds itself in, thereby emphasising the central role philosophy must play in the theological task.28 This is in direct contrast to Barth, who refutes any apologeticised theology on the basis that apologetics involves working in metaphysical realms that exist outside of his exclusive definition of revelation.
Essentially, Tillich’s method of correlation seeks to explain ‘the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence,’29 by bringing these questions and answers into a critical correlation. In theological terms, such correlation may take on one of three aspects; firstly, the correspondence between religious symbols and that which is symbolised by them; secondly as a logical correlation between those concepts that denote the human and those that denote the divine; and thirdly, the factual correlation between the ultimate concern of humanity, and the object of that concern.30 In this, the method of correlation resolves natural theology into the analysis of existence, and supranatural theology into the answers given to the questions implied in existence.31
This process is achieved when the theologian functions as an existential philosopher as the first theological step. The theologian then draws on the various symbols of divine revelation in order to formulate theological answers to the questions that are implied in human existence which can be discovered by philosophical discourse, but not answered. By doing this, Tillich claimed to be replacing three inadequate methods of enquiry;32 Supernaturalisticism, where Christianity is viewed as ‘a sum of revealed truths, which have fallen into the human situation like strange bodies from a strange world,’33 without allowing for a specific mediation to the human situation; the ‘naturalistic’ or ‘humanistic’ method where the Christian message is drawn from human existence as part of humanity’s progressive religious self realisation; and the ‘dualistic’ method, by which he means traditional natural theology.34
The difference between dualistic methodologies and Tillich’s method of correlation is that he replaces the proofs for the existence of God that can be derived from the metaphysical questions of natural theology with the question of God implied in human existence as analysed by ontology.35 Tillich rejects the arguments of natural theology on the basis that God is ‘being-itself.’ As such, any argument concerning the existence of God is self-contradictory on account of it being a ‘question about that by which its very nature is above existence, and therefore . . . implicitly denies the nature of God.’36 It appears that Tillich goes beyond the general criticism of natural philosophy as trying to argue the infinite on the basis of finite experience, to suggest that the argument is itself an ‘expression of the question of God which is implied in human finitude.’37 This means that the questions, rather than seeking an answer that will deliver a truth statement, in themselves become the expression of ‘their truth’.38
Tillich defines his understanding of philosophy as ‘that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object.’39 Philosophy has then become virtually equivalent to ontology (or as he claims, the original form of metaphysics) which is understood as an ‘analysis of those structures of being which we encounter in every meeting with reality.’40 It appears that Tillich sought to blend the brief of metaphysics into that of ontology in an attempt to remove those supranaturalistic connotations he felt were historically inherent in the term ‘metaphysics’ from the philosophical search.41 By regarding the theological answers provided by natural theology of a ‘higher being existing’ as effectively invalidating each argument, he places a higher value on the act of questioning itself. The act of human thinking he argues, is a participation in being-itself, and as such, naturally presupposes truth.42 Herein we find Tillich drawing on Hegel’s philosophy where ‘human thinking requires the reality of God’.43 The paradox in this seems to be that the reality of God is strongly affirmed, while any intellectual proof for the existence of God is a logical impossibility.
What can be argued is that Tillich eventually understood the subject matters of metaphysics and ontology as being essentially the same. If we then understand Tillich’s reference to ‘supranaturalistic connotations of metaphysics’ as being a reference to non-existentially based metaphysical methods, then the attempt at assigning ontology the role of dealing with universal structures of being, while reserving those issues that are less universal to the metaphysical question of meaning44 fails on two accounts.
Firstly, his definition of universality is deficient, in that man is classified as being non-universal despite the inability to conduct any enquiry without human involvement. The second failing is tied up in Tillich’s ontology.45While his ontology can be seen as being derived from a form of Platonic existentialism,46 his major existential roots can be found in the existentialism of Heidegger, where being (as specifically addressed by ontology) is the philosophical absolute over meaning (as addressed by metaphysics). Despite this strong emphasis, existentialism is not the sole basis of Tillich’s ontology.47 If anything, his ontology could be described as eclectic, as he attempts to combine these modern existentialist ontologies with the more traditional strands of ontology such as those found in Plato and Augustine.48
It can be seen that Tillich’s religious philosophy has been open to
much criticism. One of the major criticisms against him concerns the way
in which ontological concepts are carelessly and inconsistently employed.49
The principles behind the method of correlation are often applauded by
those authors who acknowledge at least some need to interact with issues
of modernity. Often the criticism is more along the lines that Tillich’s
employment of the methodology fail to match his idealised description of
it.50 Hamilton,
writing from a neo-orthodox position, goes further, suggesting that in
the final analysis Tillich does not correlate questions and answers, but
instead interprets the language of the Christian faith so that it conforms
to a preconceived ontological system.51
It should also be noted that his existentialist views tend to run the risk
of reducing theology to an anthropological discussion.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer - The centrality of Christology
The desire for a more radical approach to theology during the sixties brought to light a theologian who had been executed by the Gestapo in 1944 for his alleged involvement in an assassination plot against Hitler. Dietrich Bonhoeffer became an ideal model for a younger generation opposed to the perceived abuse of power by the establishment in modern society.
Bonhoeffer rejected the liberal view of church as a ‘religious community’. He never regarded the formula of ‘Christ existing as community’ as being true in reverse.52 Rather, he argued that the nature of the church cannot rise from a general concept of religion or community, but must be solely derived from God and divine revelation. Such a conclusion is argued on the basis that the revelation in Christ is an ecclesiological reality.53 By doing this, he appears to draw a closer link between Christ and the Church than does Barth, though his definition of revelation is somewhat wider. This viewpoint has been open to some criticism, on the basis that it reduces the difference between Christ and the church almost to the point of identification, and that it eschatologically removes the historicity of the Church.54
Bonhoeffer’s initial theological framework was dominated by an ecclesiology that absorbed Christology. This can be understood as a defence against the metaphysical speculation and transcendental violation of the time.55 He takes God’s transcendence as ‘the Beyond in the midst of the world, the reality of the ultimate that gives meaning to the penultimate,’56 while the church was the place in which God’s revelation would be manifest through the acts of preaching, prayer, and the like.57 Over time, his Christology came to take a primary role within his overall theological framework, demanding that the church not concede to the world the right to determine the place of Christ within the world.58 While there may be an element of reactionism to nineteenth century liberalism in this, Bonhoeffer always made a point of acknowledging his deep gratitude towards his liberal upbringing.59
One of his major themes in the latter part of his Christological search was examining the issue of the ‘non-religious interpretation of Biblical terms in a world come of age’.60 For Bonhoeffer, any relevant Christological search must acknowledge the current stage in the historical development of humanity, though he does not understand such a development as some form of a moral evolutionary pattern where humanity keeps ‘getting better’.61 This ‘world come of age’, or ‘world grown of age’ commences with a movement towards human self-responsibility which manifests itself in an autonomous understanding of human existence. This existentialism is such that it is able to be explained by both theologians and philosophers alike.62 It is a world where ‘people no longer need God as a working hypothesis, whether in science, in human affairs in general or increasingly even in religion.’63 Like Tillich, Bonhoeffer does not condemn the evolution of such secularist world views. Rather, this is seen as a positive move away from the ‘Tutelage of ‘God’.’ It is, in Kantian terms, representative of a post-enlightenment movement away from that self-inflicted immaturity that prohibits the use of one’s intelligence without the assistance of another.64 To come of age ‘leads us to a true recognition of our situation before God . . . we must live as men who manage our lives without him.’65 When we add to this Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the biblical nature of God as one who wins power and space in the world by his weakness and suffering,66 it can be seen that the removal of God as a working hypothesis in society is ultimately what gives God his power.
Following in the steps of Barth and Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer dialectically emphasises the confrontational nature of the relationship between God and humanity. The difference being primarily that unlike these neo-orthodox theologians, Bonhoeffer’s methodology is more a ‘from below’ approach. He advocates that ‘God shouldn’t be smuggled into some last secret place’, neither should we ‘run man down in his worldliness, but confront him with God at his strongest point’67 While the church must facilitate this confrontation with God, to do this in a way that emphasises human weakness is a denial of the maturity of humanity. While this flies in the face of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, Bonhoeffer stressed that this position should not be viewed as a negative or defeatist approach. Rather, this is able to empower the church in it’s Christian witness, for when the church understands ‘the world come of age’ though the Gospel message and the light of Christ, it has understood the world better than it has understood itself.68
It is widely documented how, in his rejection of an apologetic approach, he advocates a ‘religionless Christianity.’ However, it is interesting to note that the attention given to ‘religionless Christianity’ in the English speaking world is not replicated in German speaking countries where the emphasis is on Bonhoeffer’s phrase ‘non-religious interpretation.’69 Bethge suggests that the variety in phrases used to denote the way in which the Gospel message should be transmitted in a non religious fashion suggest distinct elements to the issue,70 though the sheer number different phrases used to denote such an important and wide ranging concept has the capacity to confuse exactly what area of religion is being confronted with each phrase usage, be it the issue of preaching, prayer, or the institutional church.
This concept can be seen as an outgrowth of the philosophy of Barth, whom he viewed as being the first to criticise religion as a concept.71 Like Barth, this concept is rejected on the grounds that it is based on an apologetic that works from the assumption that people are naturally religious, particularly in the arena of speculative metaphysics.72 This is in stark contrast to the philosophies of people like Tillich, who thought he could utilise ‘religious sociology’ to obtain a superior interpretation of the world in a religious sense.73
Given his emphasis on Christology, one can only assume that Bonhoeffer does not include Christological based religion within the concept that he is criticising. While Barth understands religion as that ‘unavoidable characteristic of the believer,’74 Bonhoeffer regards faith and religion as mutually exclusive terms. Religion is viewed as a transitory historical phenomena that exists predominately in the western world. As such, it prevents a true understanding of both Christ and the reality of the present world, seeking to reach the beyond through self justifying human activity.75 However, it appears that this represents one of the weakest points in his argument. I can hardly imagine that the act of ‘postulate(ing) a divinity, to invoke help and protection’76 is limited to the West. It would seem that part of the nature of the world’s ethnic religions77 at least, is a self justification through a mix of religious activity and kinship relationships to achieve particular social ends, such as the maintenance and protection of a separate ethnic identity.
A consequence of this understanding of religion which places the presence of Christ outside of the sphere of religion, is that the church must learn to exist in the same sphere as Christ. The church is called on not to promote an ascetic disengagement with the world, rather to exist ‘in the centre of the village.’78 In doing this it can ‘share in the secular problems of ordinary human social life’, for through the suffering of life, freedom can be gained.79 It is this living out in the world that demands that the Christian be capable of discussing issues, both theological and non-theological, without reverting to ‘religious language.’ Bonhoeffer partially developed a concept of a ‘secret discipline’ as a means of tapping into the power of a transcendent God in order to carry on a sustained non religious witnessing engagement within the world. As such, this would enable the believer to be virtually an agent for God to personally make visible the hidden realities of the Christian faith.80
Unfortunately, Bonhoeffer failed to complete the systematisation of
his ecclesiological philosophy before his death. Despite being highly critical
of the current state of the church, he seemed convinced that the church
would undergo a massive reform directly after the war; particularly in
the areas of finance, training, ministry and confessional structure.81
Hans Küng - a Catholic perspective
The ‘theological excommunication’82 of Hans Küng from the Roman Catholic Church in 1979 was a highly public affair. However, rather than silencing Küng’s views, it bought him and many of the controversial theological issues he was addressing to the attention of mainstream society. It also had the effect of handing Küng complete intellectual freedom from those ecclesiastical restraints he had encountered in the Catholic ministerial education system. As he explained late 1996; “I had to leave the Catholic faculty . . . which was considered a punishment, but which was a liberation.”83 He took full advantage of his new freedom as he further developed his views, drawing on religious quarters that had previously been deemed out of bounds. Catholic theologian Karl Rahner even referred to Küng as a ‘liberal Protestant in Roman Catholic disguise.’84 This charge seemed hard for Küng to shake throughout his career.
Much of Küng’s work is grounded in the concept of paradigm changes, to which he gives credit to Thomas Kuhn.85 It is understood that every community has an ‘entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so forth shared by members of that community,’86 which is then defined as the communities paradigm. The natural sciences are in a constant state of change, and such change, rather than being a constant rational progression, more often occur as a ‘lurch forward through violent shifts in (the) basic frameworks of meaning and interpretation.’87 When this happens, there is a shift in the communities corresponding paradigm. Küng then, assuming that what is true for the natural sciences is true for all sciences, transfers this theory from the sphere of natural science to that of religion and theology. When the faith community experiences a change in the entire constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques such as what happened at the reformation, then a paradigm shift happens within the church.
The early part of Küng’s career was devoted to challenging and reinterpreting Catholic teaching of the nature of the Church, particularly concerning the dogma of Papal infallibility, which he describes as being like ‘a virus that paralyses the body of the Church.’88 In his controversial book Infallable?, he argues that this concept of infallibility is rationally indefensible, particularly when viewed in contrast to the mistakes credited to the church throughout much of history. Küng finds that the truth of scripture means more than that of the any philosophical definition of truth. However, for Küng, the concept of the church’s truth is inseparable to that of the church’s being, so that when the church ceases to be in the truth, it effectively ceases being the church of God. This is resolved by the truth of the church not being dependent on any fixed infallible propositions, rather being in the truth throughout all propositions, including errant ones.89
Underlying this is a strong Barthian influence which emphasises the absolute primacy and otherness of God.
‘The modern doctrine of inerrancy, like the orthodox Protestant doctrine
of inspiration, is a product of the rationalism that sought to make the
divinity of scripture clear . . . which was bound sooner or later to turn
into a domination of reason over Scripture.’90
In his attempt to establish a positive dialogue among secular audiences, Küng sought to correlate dialogue with the use of apologetics. Such an apologetic approach is similar to Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’ in the way that the serious consideration of those relevant philosophies such as secularism and atheism are a prerequisite before the Church is able to communicate the Christian message.91 However, given that biblical and contemporary experiences do not always parallel each other, then any ‘critical correlation’ faces the real possibility of becoming a ‘critical confrontation.’ Küng does not see this in any way as a negative. Rather, this issue is addressed by an acceptance that the life of Jesus ‘acquires a normative meaning’ that constitutes the defining character of post biblical traditions. Consequently, the Church can only share in that normative character in a derivative sense.92
In Theology for third millennium, Küng calls for the church to embrace a new postmodern paradigm for theology, which shows both continuity and discontinuity with previous paradigms.93 This paradigm must preserve the critical power of the Enlightenment, while denying the reductionist tendencies of modernity in a way that both transcends and moves beyond modernity.94 As such the church must be postmodern, comprising an ‘immanent critique of modernity’ and ‘sober, upright movement towards the future’ which leads to a ‘critical ecumenical theology.’95 This in part uses his concept of ‘Aufheburg’; a culture based on the enlightenment, where modernity is transcended without being cancelled out. There is also a desire that those sciences that have a sphere of competence should not be negated, as no science has a monopoly on reality. What is central to the examination of all sciences is the principle of ‘critical rationality.’ This views all epistemological claims as comprising certain presuppositions regarding the rationality of the universe. Such presuppositions, while not always being capable of mathematical proof, can be justified despite the uncertain or ungraspable nature of reality as long as they conform to human experience as a whole.96
Küng draws heavily on Barth in that he describes his style as dialectic.
He always expressed a debt of gratitude towards Barth for the influence
he had had. However, unlike Barth, his starting point is not ‘from above’
but ‘from below’. Ormerod describes this as ‘an upward thrusting dialectic
of critical questioning, particularly of any claims to authority.’97
This ‘ascending’ model is in contrast to the authorities emphasis on a
‘descending’ theology, and would go a long way in explaining why the authorities
were wary of him very early on.
Concluding Remarks.
While this survey has only scratched the surface of the religious philosophies
of these four men, I hope that it has is some way demonstrated the great
interdependence, both positive and negative that these four thinkers have
had on each other as they struggled with issues of modernity in the twentieth
century. Barth was in my mind clearly the most influential, influencing
both Bonhoeffer and Küng, while Tillich strongly opposed his anti
apologetic rejection of philosophy. Meanwhile, the influences of Tillich’s
method of correlation can be seen in Küng’s embracement of secularism
as a positive step towards a productive dialogue. It would have been interesting
to see the influence of a systematic theology from Bonhoeffer would have
had, had he not been executed, given his equally positive reaction to secularism,
and the Barthian rejection of religion as a concept. The intrigue in Küng
is how much he actually draws from Barth’s philosophy, particularly in
his understanding of the nature of God, while at the same embracing some
of the seemingly contradictory liberal views of Tillich.
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1 F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 978.
2 S.J. Grenz and R.E. Olson, Twentieth-century theology: God and the world in a transitional age, InterVarsity Press, Illinois, 1992, pp. 63f.
6 C. Green ‘Introduction: Karl Barth’s Life and Theology’ in K. Barth, Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (ed. Green,Clifford), Fortress Press, Minneapolis, pp. 15f.
7 H. Küng, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View (Heinegg, P., trans.) Anchor Books, New York, 1988, p. 273.
13 K. Barth, Warfield Lectures (1962) cited in J. Howes, Philosophy of Religion: Open to Doubt and Faith (class notes) University of Melbourne, Melbourne, c. 1964, p. 7.
16 N. Ormerod, Introducing Contemporary Theologians: The What and the Who of Theology Today, E.J. Dwyer Ltd, Sydney, 1990, p. 43.
17 Barth, Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom, op. cit., p. 275.
20 Küng, (1988), op. cit., p. 273.
24 Ibid., p. 37 citing Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1, pp. 643.
26 P. Tillich, The Future of Religions (J.C. Brauer, ed.), Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1966, p. 28.
27 P. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Vol. 1.) James Nisbet & Co. Ltd., Digswell Place, 1951, pp. 67 - 73.
29 Tillich (1951), op. cit., p. 68.
32 Tillich (1951), op. cit., pp. 72f.
36 Tillich (1951), op. cit., p. 237.
37 J.M. Russell, ‘Tillich’s Implicit Ontological Argument’ Sophia, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1993, p. 3.
39 Tillich (1951), op. cit., p. 22.
44 A. Thatcher, The Ontology of Paul Tillich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 5.
49 Thatcher, op. cit., p. 159.
52 E. Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian Christian Contemporary (E. Mosbacher et. al., trans.) William Collins Sons & Co., London, 1970, p. 60.
58 D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison: An Abridged Edition (Ed. E. Bethge.) SCM Press, London, 1981, p. 115.
62 Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 128.
65 Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 129.
71 Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 115.
73 Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 115.
77 As defined in K. Young, ‘Introduction’ in A. Sharma (ed.) Women in World Religions State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987.
78 Bonhoeffer, op. cit., p. 100.
80 Grenz, op. cit., pp. 154 - 5.
81 Bethge, op. cit., pp. 790f.
82 While remaining a Catholic Priest, his missio canonica was withdrawn, forbidding him to instruct Catholic ministerial students.
83 Küng as quoted in James Carroll, ‘Breaking the Silence’ Zadok Perspectives, No. 61, Winter 1998, p. 37.
85 H. Küng, Christianity: The religious Situation of Our Time (Bowden, J., trans.), SCM Press, London, 1995, p. 60.
89 H. Küng, Infallible? (E. Mosbacher, trans.) William Collins & Sons, London, 1970, p. 150.
92 Küng, (1988), op. cit., p. 120.