This paper seeks to briefly examine the philosophy of Plato and the role of religion within that philosophy, with an emphasis on Plato’s Republic. While the Republic is generally understood as a piece of political idealism, that part of Plato’s philosophy which we could describe as realism is often neglected. I intend to demonstrate that the inspiration behind these two opposing positions can in part be traced back to the different religious influences that shaped Plato’s overall philosophy, and how the embracing of one type of religious understanding has effected the way in which Plato’s philosophy is interpreted. As a somewhat brief work, I have assumed a degree of knowledge about Platonism in parts, in order to see this argument through without writing a thesis.
One of the preliminary issues in any examination of Plato tends to be the question of what constitutes the philosophical teaching of Plato himself, given that he never actually speaks throughout his dialogues. All that Plato specifically gives us of his own views are the titles ascribed to each of his works. His opinions are well hidden within the text. With the number and variety of characters involved, it is often difficult to determine who is expressly verbalising the thoughts of Plato, and who is not. Even the person who seems to express a view that gains the ascendancy from among participants could not be said to carry the full authority of Plato, for frequently a ‘proposition that is held to represent a position can be balanced with another proposition in some other dialogue which is either opposite or its contradictory.’1
It could be that this approach in itself represents a misunderstanding of the dialogues. For it may be that Plato did not even set out to teach a doctrine. He may have perceived his role more as a facilitator of education, as one who sought to facilitate the liberation of humanity from its ignorance.2 Or it could simply be a piece of pure philosophy, removed from all else. This would, in my mind, fit the idealistic picture of the philosopher that he goes on to portray.3 Plato would be doing nothing but writing a piece of philosophy as a philosopher whose sole interest was that of philosophical discourse, far removed from the sensual desires to wield political power or to be a man of affairs.4 This view may be idealistic and/or naive, but I would contend that Plato would have been more than happy to perpetuate such a view.
It is however widely accepted that his work was highly political in nature, both within the topics that are addressed, and by the political act of converting the work into a written format far removed from the traditional patterns of oral discourse. Oral discourse of the type found in the Dialogues are by their very nature political, regardless whether the the subject matter is primarily public or private, because it occurs in the context of public space. Meanwhile, the written text is available to a wider audience and freed from the dual interpretive constraints of space-time for both speaker and listener, and the performance effects that Greek philosophy was seeking to compete against during the fifth century, such as poetry and rhetoric. At the same time, written recording withdraws the work from the public domain and allows for free and unhindered thinking by those who are capable of such activity. In allowing for an openness of thought, it also allows for an openness of consequences, often unforeseen. It appears that this issue remains the source of continual political unrest in those nations where governments wish to discourage unhindered discourse.
Under these conditions, the ultimate purpose of any philosophical writing is to ‘criticise the distorting effects of its rivals and to deny its own effects . . . . (effectively undermining the) politics of speech while denying any politics to philosophical writing.’5 That is, while a piece of philosophical writing is aware of itself as a ‘social practice embedded in politics,’6 it should seek to deny and conceals its own practicality. What makes Plato’s Republic so ingenious is that it creates the possibility for a discourse to occur on the grounds that it is, in the eyes of many, not connected to practicality, thereby making the work immune to its own requirements and constraints. The discourse can only then be translated into a realistic outcome through the presence of that which is portrayed as a paradox, such as the philosopher-king.
One of the interpretive considerations when dealing with Plato is the issue of Socratic irony. Tigerstedt finds that such irony can but impede a proper understanding of the Dialogues, in that it keeps the reader at a distance, ensuring that they are never fully certain about the authors intent.7 Strauss holds a less strict interpretation of this. He suggests that unlike the Aristotle usage of irony where it is used as a vice, Socratic irony can be seen as a ‘noble dissimulation of one’s worth (and) superiority,’8 where one’s worth is ultimately seen in the context of one’s wisdom. Irony then, can both simultaneously portray truth or conceal truth, depending on the kind of person engaging with the material.
A careful reading of the Dialogues will establish that they are not to be understood as simple verbatim accounts of some public discourse. This can be seen in how nothing, no matter how incidental, appears to occur by accident. Each specific event, along with each entry or exit of a particular character with a specific background or attitude, can be seen as part of the logical progression within the theme of the particular dialogue. This principle of ‘logographic necessity’ brings a degree of context to those events which may seem to occur by chance outside of the context of the dialogue.9 In this, the true content of Plato’s works are essentially hidden from those who are not yet ready or fit to absorb their message. The dual usage of logographic necessity and Socratic irony, work together to unlock the meaning within the text to those worthy readers for whom it is intended. Such a reader will be aroused to a higher degree of thinking, while others will merely form opinions.
Further, the dialogues as we have them today, are not a product of Plato
himself. Rather our texts represent interpretations and translations from
various Platonic traditions. It must be remembered that the original form
of Platonism is different to that of Christian Platonism and the various
strands of Neoplatonism as developed by Philo and Plotinus. Feibleman argues
that the religious philosophy of Neoplatonism, while often masquerading
either as a representation of the influence of Plato or sometimes Platonism
itself, is only partly derived from Plato. Further, as a selection and
distortion of Platonism, it contains some important elements that would
not have been accepted by Plato at all.10
The Religious Philosophy of Plato
It can be said from the outset that Plato’s philosophy is not primarily a religious philosophy. This should be of no surprise given the absence of any Greek word that is equivalent to that of our Latin term ‘religion,’ as subsequently defined within philosophy today, though it does not necessarily follow the absence of a word to describe an idea signifies that the idea itself is inoperative.11 However, for any philosophical understanding of the world to be complete, it must examine all activities and institutions within that society, including that of religion, even when loosely defined. Given this, the existence of Gods, sacrifices and concepts such as ‘piety’ within fifth century Greek society indicates the development of a concept of ‘religion’ both on the individual level and on an organisational level.
As such, religion must be treated in the same manner as all other activities within society. This Plato does, though it must be added that Plato’s theology comes across as being highly speculative in nature. Any religious ideas that he does have, he does not hold to as a fixed opinion. Neither does he wish to bind anyone to his ideas with absolute belief.12 That is, while those who advocate a religious position normally seek to convey an underlying certainty to their particular structure of belief, we see no such display by Plato within his Dialogues. What we can say is that his writings are undergirded by the general assumption that gods exist and that they are able to be known.
However, it could be argued that this assumption has been made to generously. The ‘what is’ or ‘who are’ questions concerning the being of God, are not raised. Is it that the suppositions inherent within the religious status quo of the time were regarded as being beyond question by Plato? The Olympic gods are a feature of the Republic, and Plato subscribes to the sacrificial requirements of these indigenous gods. Despite this acceptance, Plato’s religious philosophy is also influenced by the foreign cults that had entered the prevailing Greek culture, particularly that of Orphism. This mystical monotheistic Egyptian cult, with its sun worshipping and understanding of the immortality of the soul, perpetrates the Dialogues both explicitly and implicitly. For example, explicitly in Plato’s reference to the ritual instructions handed down by Orpheus concerning initiation,13 and implicitly in the role played by the sun in the allegory of the cave, and the discussion in book eleven of the Republic on the immortality of the soul.14
It may be that the existence of two different religious forces concurrently
impacting on Plato may account for some of the speculative nature of his
religious philosophy, and his apparent indifference with the issue of god
or gods. What I am going to suggest is that these two separate religious
influences manifest themselves as two distinct and opposing philosophies
within Platonism, that of idealism where intelligible things, be it Ideas
or Forms, are more real than that which can be perceived by the senses,
and the lesser attended philosophy of realism, where that which is sensible
is as are as those intelligible things.
Objective Idealism in Plato
Socrates’ allegory of the cave15 is a good example of Plato’s objective idealism, being dually based on the independent being of the Ideas or the Forms, and on their superior reality. It contrasts image making in nature, and image making undertaken by humans, where that which is false is presented as something real. Earthly type objects, are mere imitations of the Ideas. As such, they are inferior in status to the Idea. However, while being less perfect than the Idea, the fact that they are an imitation or approximation of a model which is by nature perfect, gives them a degree of dignity and value.
The city, which is required due to the needs of men and their lack of self sufficiency,16 is portrayed as a cave, where the inhabitants (who are non-philosophers) are only capable of viewing the shadows of reality due to their constrained ability to see that which is real. That is, for those who are imprisoned in the cave, what appears to be concrete objects of existence are only shadows of the real. That which is being experienced by these prisoners is akin to present human existence, where the experience is that of the falsity that comes when the knowledge of the good is absent. However, the rulers of the city need to have a knowledge of the Good in order to understand their task. In order to achieve this, Plato finds that the main businesses of the state should be the provision of a proper spiritual foundation, and the education of it’s citizens. Taylor finds that this enables the community to be able to realise the divine idea of the Good in both it’s social forms and it’s institutions, while providing a selection procedure for those who are capable of leadership in the city.17
Often such views are given a Neo-Platonist flavour, given the certainty with which such assertions are made, considering Plato’s typically arbitrary views towards the Gods. Plato accepts that the Gods are good. Therefore, being good, they cannot be the cause of all things, just the good ones.18 The problem lies in defining what justice involves, and whether justice is good. This dilemma leads to one of the major concepts in the Republic; that of the Noble Lie par excellence. This concept states that to achieve a sense of order within society, there must be some telling of untruths of a certain kind to both children and even grown up subjects.19 Such a lie will bring about ‘the maximum of caring for the city and for one another on the part of the ruled.’20 Therefore, if it is good and just that the city is to exhibit maximum caring for its subjects, then it can be said that there will exist a fundamental falsehood underlying the governance of the city. Such falsehood can be seen in both civil life and the communities understanding of the divine.21 Socially, it enables the populace to forget both the truth about their education, and the true character of their becoming citizens out of mere human beings. The replacement of a fraternity of humans to a fraternity of citizens is made more possible when the distinctions between nature and art, and between justice and convention are blurred. While such fraternity can be traced to the earth, the inequalities contained within the natural hierarchy are traceable to the gods by their sanctioning of natural differences. Theological education, which is understood as the desirable educational starting point, utilises theology as a model for the untrue stories in education, though Plato appears equally keen not to see the gods being misrepresented.
It is argued that if God is the source of good alone, then inequality is intrinsically good. However, if justice involves lies, then the Gods must also lie as part of their justice, which would tend to pose some problems. This issue is dealt with by Socrates explaining the concept of justice as being a peculiarly ‘human’ concept, in the sense that justice as a concept has been derived due to the innate human nature that lacks self sufficiency and as such is drawn towards the city.22 Strauss suggests that as the gods posses self sufficiency, they are free from this Eros. From this, it can be suggested that their is a strong linkage between justice and Eros, both being uniquely human concepts.23
The quest for truth is portrayed as a hard struggle against abuse and opposition from those who are disturbed by such a revelation.24 The prisoner in the cave who escapes, is representative of the upward struggle from the false opinions of truth by the philosopher. Breaking free from his chains, he slowly ascends towards the source of light, revealing that which is part of the intelligible world, and hence more real. However, upon his return to the cave, he experiences disbelief in those who are still captive as he seeks to explain that what they can see only represents the shadows of the real. This disbelief occurs to the extent that he is virtually classed as being mad and is singled out for execution by those who he seeks to educate.
This allegory is not constructed to be applied in one-one correspondence as in Plato’s preceding analogy of the divided line. Neither is it’s purpose to show how relations within the visible may illustrate relations within the intelligible world.25 Rather, it shows a soul’s rescue or conversion. Such a rescue is not, as may first appear, and advancement beyond that level to which we would normally develop. Instead, it represents a conversion away from a state of wickedness in which we should not be in.26 The Republic gives three possible reasons to why people tend act in this improper or wicked manner. Either there are no gods, the gods are not interested in human affairs, or the gods can be bribed to withhold their wrath.27
This picture has strong implications for the structure of society. Given that people are unable to live without the existence of institutions of some sort, the morality of such institutions will reflect the awareness of those who wield power within those institutions. That is, they will exhibit either a full understanding of the Good, or a falsity that comes when knowledge of the Good is absent. For this reason, half knowledge about limited objects is insufficient. A full knowledge of both the ultimate and absolute reality is not only possible, but necessary for proper government. Such knowledge is available only to the expert.28 As a consequence, while ‘we live through institutions,’29 by their very nature, these institutions in themselves can never be ethically neutral. They will be either ethically corrupt or ethically pure, depending on whether those in charge have a full knowledge of the Good or not.
The philosophers in the city will know that the idea of the Good is the source of every particular good. The guardians of the city will be ignorant of this. Rather, they will be under the belief that whatever is good comes from the gods. Plato does not imply that the guardians are wrong on this count.30 Such a position may paint Plato as being indecisive towards the relationship towards the Ideas and the gods, though there seems to be two possible ways of understanding this paradox. It may simply be that those who use theology to derive their understanding of things are likely to arrive at a doctrine equivalent to that of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas.31 Conversely, it may flow from differing understandings on causation. From Plato’s Laws it could be suggested that the Ideas are the formal cause, while the gods are the efficient cause. As such, the gods would still play a vital role in this scheme. Solmsen emphasises that despite the issue not being discussed in Republic, belief in gods and belief in the Ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive in Plato’s scheme.32
From this allegory, we are able to understand why Plato concludes that the only proper ruler is that of the philosopher-king. Those who have the knowledge should be forced to rule, though they will resist this because it involves them becoming entangled with those who are only capable of understanding shadows of the truth. They are forced to return to that from which they have escaped, to those who are now hostile due to their lack of knowledge. However, it is only the philosopher who can provide a form of government that represents the real will of the many, due to the fact that they, by virtue of their detachment to the sensual life, represent the community at it’s best.33 Having found a true life of communion with the divine, their rule is directed so that the community may find the fullest and most perfect expression.34 The fact that the allegory has led to such a radical conclusion, in it’s construction of government with such transparent authority, leads some to conclude that the cave is neither epistemological, or intended to illustrate the transition from sense to understanding, but is purely political in motive.35
What must be remembered is that the being and nature of the Good as an ultimate foundation for being and knowledge is no more than a hypothesis. What is offered during this dialogue is a promise that such knowledge is possible and worth pursuing.36 This is the same hope as those inside the cave have. It is the uncertain hope of Socrates37 as he attempts to make a distinction between that which is good, and that which seem to good but are only the good’s phantoms.38 Though, for the pursuit of good to be genuine, that which is searched for must maintain a degree of uncertainty. Therefore, within the argument of Plato, it could be said that the Good has somewhat of an invisible presence, only being viewed through the re-presentation of its images. This tension of the Good being crucial while at the same time being invisible, leaves Ophir to define the Good within the Republic as being a ‘key in the discursive space . . . and a lacuna in its semantics.’39 Regardless of this, it represents the first real occasion in western metaphysics where we find the concept of an absolute being ‘the good in itself’ existing as a special entity, where such being operates dually as an ‘epistemological transcendental foundation and the governing force of philosophical discourse.’40
The concept of an absolute being, along with those salvation, sin, and various concepts regarding the immortality of the soul and subsequent rewards and punishments, can be traced back to an Orphic influence. Such themes were to strongly influence the whole of Plato’s Idealism. He accepted much of Orphism’s speculative escatology, which seems somewhat strange given his emphasis on reason. Within this, Plato adopted the notion of rewards and punishments as a divine sanction within the political system to ensure that the non money making classes of society, such as the warriors, were kept in check. It may also be that the Idea is personal in nature. Ritter, in arguing for a personal nature of the Idea suggests that the Idea represents the ‘designation of the objective basis of a conception (where) this objective basis assures validity to the conception and give certitude to it.’41
Despite some evidence that Plato seriously considered Orphism monotheism,
he probably remained polytheistic, though he adopted various Orphic aspects
concerning the nature of God, such as simplicity, constancy, and being
unchanging. Such attributes were as important to Plato as his fundamental
assertion that God is inherently good. This was easily absorbed into the
Greek culture of the time, where simplicity and oneness are of the same
nature as of the good, whereas a manifoldness or the existence of diverse
natures within one being suggested a degree of doubtful moral quality.42
This can also be seen in the Platonic understanding of virtue as a unity.
Thereby, every virtue can be set up as ‘one’ idea.43
Such a multiplicity was regarded as being ‘unsuitable for our state, because
the one man does one job and does not play a multiplicity of roles.’44
Realism within Plato
Another philosophy advocated by Plato that is partly inconsistent with his objective idealism is that of realism. Realism ascribes equal importance to both the reality of the Idea or Form and that of the actual physical world. That is, it builds on idealism’s emphasis on the reality of the Ideas or Forms by ascribing an increased reality to those physical objects.45 This philosophy can be seen in the analogy of sunlight in the Parmenides, with its fragmented version of actuality. While the Republic’s allegory of the cave points strongly towards idealism, it does not necessarily exclude realism. The cave is only an allegory, not a literal description. As such, it is open to interpretation. If we consider that the Ideas are to the mind as the sun is to sight, then the sun is an appearance, and in doing so, actuality is interpreted as being the state where the actual concrete object are as real as the Ideas or Forms, though not as complete or perfect. Appearance now is a real appearance, and that which receives the Forms and converts them into sensible things is as non-transitory as the Forms themselves. The receptacle is ‘actual’ in the same way as the Form is ‘actual.’46
Immediately preceding the cave allegory, it is suggested that the process of formulating opinions begins with the apprehension of reality by means of images.47 This would then mean that sense experience is one method, alongside reason and recollection, that true knowledge can be obtained. Aquinas believes that if we posses reason, then the only use of such virtue would be to strengthen reason itself. Rather than viewing this virtue as being inclination in accord with right reasoning, he purports that inclination and right reasoning must work together in cooperation.48
In Theatetus we find that ‘Knowledge comes from reasoning about sensations, and not directly from thoughts about being,’49 while Socrates guides us to find that it is at the point where two contradictory impressions are received, that reflection is provoked.50 From this we can conclude that sense is useful as a thought provoking exercise, particularly when perception gives a contradictory impression.
The recommended plan for the governance of a just city, with the philosopher-king as ruler, displays the concurrent holding of idealism and realism in the mind of Plato. The ideal possibility of philosopher-king brings together reason and power, discourse and practice51 as against the complete separation of philosophy and politics, where the philosopher keeps to his sole task of philosophy.
The influences behind Plato’s realism can be seen in the indigenous Greek religious paradigm of the time. Greek religion consisted of Olympic gods to whom sacrifices were made, and earth gods who were tended with a degree of ritual avoidance. Both types of god were finite, and maintained a reign over the present world while being separated from humanity. Plato seems to be positive towards this religious view, as can be seen in his attempt to supervise the production of religious stories so to restore a degree of transcendence to these gods.52
Plato’s philosophy of religion in its fully developed form does not include an identification of the gods with the Ideas. In the political and educational scheme of the Republic, religion and the gods occupy a plane below the highest.53 Neither are the Forms or Ideas in the mind of god, nor are they are dependent on, or subordinated to the gods. While the Ideas include that of necessity, which god cannot compel, chance belongs to existence which does, according to Laws, co-operate with god.54 Feibleman finds that god is thus understood as an ‘intermediary with control over the actualisation of the Ideas.’55 That is, god is no more than the cause or the intelligence behind the universe.
Plato’s realism can be seen in his emphasis on the importance of establishing
a good life on this earth. This can be seen in how the Republic’s primary
objective is to design a model for a just and earthly commonwealth, so
that justice may be practised in this world, rather than discuss epistemological
questions regarding the divine and the afterlife. His concern with the
next world is purely personal in nature, while his concern for the functioning
of this world is always social in nature. A full education must not be
content with that of the divine, but must include much that is drawn from
mundane sensual existence so that the necessary reason can be used to practice
justice. If education is understood as the prime role of the state, then
the state must base its education system in realism.
Concluding Comments
Those who were to follow Plato differed in their hermeneutical understanding
of Plato’s works. Aristotle touches on religion in favour of Plato’s Greek
version of religion. However, the Neo-Platonists adopted, then adapted
the Orphic version of religion.56
Augustine subsequently developed this interpretation which was to become
foundational to his philosophy. This can be seen in his acceptance of the
general theory of Forms, but in the line of Neo-Platonists, these Forms
or essences were placed in the mind of God.57
As a result of this interpretation, Plato has become regarded by many as the ‘Father of Christian Mysticism.’58 Such a title, regardless of it’s accuracy or otherwise, clearly demonstrates how deeply the supernaturalistic Orphic religious influence within Plato has been elevated to a prime philosophical position with the interpretive help of the Neo-Platonists. This is especially true given that Christianity, which Plato is considered a father of, was not to be born until five centuries later.
What of its influence today in Protestantism? Some modified versions
of Protestantism took religion away from a mystical outlook towards a version
of the Greek religion. This was achieved by a ‘transfinite and super-natural
God, and the mundane strivings towards Him . . . unmediated by institutions
or by their established and very philosophically-supported theologies.’59
This brings about a realism that places reason not only above, but separate
to emotion. This view is predominate in the Sydney Anglican version of
Evangelicalism. From this, it can be said that some branches of Protestantism
need neither Platonism or Neo-Platonism.
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2 Leo Strauss, The City and Man University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, p. 59.
3 such as Plato (H.D.P. Lee., trans.)The Republic (Penguin Classic Series), Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1955, 6. 500, p. 262f.
4 Christopher Morris, Western Political Thought: Plato to Augustine, Longmans, Oxford, 1967, p. 50.
5 Adi Ophir, Plato’s Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 163.
7
E.N. Tigerstedt, Interpreting Plato, Almqvist & Wiksell International,
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10 Feibleman, op. cit., p. 15.
11 Paul More, The Religion of Plato Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1921, pp. 1 - 3.
12 Feibleman, op. cit., p. 24.
14 Feibleman, op. cit., p. 62f.
15 Republic, book 6, p. 278 - 286.
17 M.E.J. Taylor, Greek Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, London, 1924, p. 109.
22 L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, A History of Political Philosophy University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Third edition, 1987, p. 53.
23 Strauss, 1964,op. cit., p. 99f.
24 H.W.B. Joseph, Knowledge and the good in Plato’s Republic, Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p. 44.
27 Republic, 2, 364f, pp. 95 - 97.
29 The major theme of Robert N. Bellah, et al., The Good Society Vintage Books, New York, 1992.
30 Friedrich Solmsen, Plato’s Theology, Cornell University Press, New York, 1942, p. 73.
31 Strauss, 1987, op. cit., p. 55.
41 Constantin Ritter, (Adam Alles, trans.) The Essence of Plato’s Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1933, p. 375.
42 i.e. Republic, 604 , p. 381.
45 Feibleman, op. cit., p. 29.
48 St Thomas Aquinas, (T. McDermott, trans.) Summa Theologiœ: a Concise Translation , Methuen, London, 1989, p. 237.
49 Theatetus, 186, as cited in Feibleman, op. cit., p 30.
54 Laws 709B, as cited in Feibleman, op. cit., p. 75.
56 Fiebleman, op. cit., p. 18.
57 Ninian Smart, Historical Selections in the Philosophy of Religion, SCM Press, London, 1962, p. 20.
58 F.C. Happold, F.C. Mysticism: A Study and an Anthology Penguin Books, England, 1990, p. 176.
59
Fiebleman, op. cit., p. 213.