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TEMPO Magazine, No. 02/II/September 18-24, 2001
The Specter of Terrorism in Indonesia
By Ken Conboy
Last week's tragic events in the United States beg the question: Can similar acts of terrorism happen in Indonesia? For purposes of discussion, terrorism is defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets. It can often be inspired by religious ideals, but these often have an underlying political basis. It is usually perpetrated to influence an audience.
Even those without much institutional memory will recognize that such acts—though on a smaller scale—have already taken place in Indonesia. Setting aside the various guerrilla movements that have plagued the archipelago (from the Darul Islam struggle in the 1950s, to the current paramilitary secessionist campaigns in Aceh and Irian Jaya), Indonesia has historically been host to indigenous, and deadly, terrorist groups. One of the most famous took shape after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, when secretive cells of religious warriors on Java conducted a series of armed attacks that culminated in the April 1981 hijacking of a Garuda flight to Bangkok, Thailand. This prompted an Indonesian military raid that resulted in the deaths of the pilot, one commando, and all five terrorists—at least two of whom, apparently healthy, mysteriously died on their way back to Jakarta.
For the next decade, not by coincidence during Indonesia's run of strong economic growth, armed extremism largely went into remission. In the wake of the country's economic and political upheavals, however, radical religious groups returned with a vengeance. With their ranks often filled with rural, underemployed youths from places like Banten and Central Java, the more extreme of these organizations—Laskar Jihad, for example—have shown an ability to sustain paramilitary battles in distant reaches like the Malukus.
Foreign links to these groups are rumored, but often uncorroborated. One radical organization in Central Java, for example, has hinted that its members include veterans from the Afghan war, though solid numbers are elusive. Indonesian security officials have also speculated that last year's unresolved bombing at the Philippines ambassador's residence may have been committed by a mix of Filipino terrorists and local sympathizers.
Much more ominous are reports of compartmentalized cells of foreign terrorists that may be able to perpetrate a major terrorist act on Indonesian soil without assistance from locals. Though details were never publicly released, last month's US travel advisory for Indonesia was linked to compelling evidence gathered in the Middle East about an impending attack against US government facilities in Jakarta. Given the country's rather porous borders and sizeable Arab population of tourists and businessmen, Indonesia must be viewed as a relatively easy target. In light of what happened in New York and Washington, US intelligence officials are no doubt reviewing August's evidence to determine if it was somehow linked, perhaps as a diversion.
Should Indonesia anticipate a major terrorist threat? Not necessarily. The most likely scenario is continued, and sporadic, outbursts by radical domestic groups. Their assaults will probably remain verbal, with perhaps the occasional bombing. There is also a chance of a noisy, though non-violent, backlash against foreigners if the United States stages retaliatory strikes in the Middle East. This may especially be the case if America's counterattacks extend beyond mid-November, which coincides with the onset of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.
While far less likely, a major terrorist attack on Indonesian soil can not be discounted. Were this to happen, the effects could be far more devastating than last year's Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing. With many foreign nationals sensitized in the wake of the US events, even a relatively limited terrorist act would probably result in a large-scale evacuation of expatriate workers, non-essential government representatives, and dependents. Indonesia's economic recovery would be torpedoed as what little remaining foreign investment dries up and the currency plummets. The tourism sector, already hard hit, would be effectively dealt a death blow.
What can Indonesia do? At present, the Indonesian government does not yet have a coherent plan to address real and potential terrorist threats. Such a plan should be prepared and implemented at the soonest. It should include an immediate effort to forge close working relationships between Indonesian and foreign counter-terrorism authorities. It should also include major public statements on terrorism at select international venues (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum), bolstering Indonesia's ability to collect and analyze data about terrorist threats, and streamlining its ability to mount a robust counter-terrorist response (which is currently duplicated in at least four different units).
Even before the attacks in New York and Washington, Hendropriyono, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), had been moving in this direction. In comments to the media on several occasions, he made a strong case as to why BIN should provide oversight and coordination in the war against terrorists.
In the wake of last week's events, Hendropriyono's hand has no doubt been significantly bolstered. With regard to forging cordial working relationships between Indonesia and foreign counter-terrorism authorities, it would appear the groundwork is already being laid. As a first priority, Indonesia's representatives will need to increase cooperation with several of its ASEAN neighbors, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. During meetings with authorities from these nations, Indonesian officials should discuss the possibility of formalizing, or expanding, intelligence exchanges; the focus of such exchanges should be information relating to trans-regional connections between extremists and the regional movement of foreign nationals from suspect states.
Just as important will be close intelligence cooperation with countries outside of the region, especially the United States. For most of the past two decades, intelligence cooperation between Indonesia and the US barely registered. This was largely due to the fact that the Indonesian civilian intelligence agency—now BIN, previously known as BAKIN—was poorly rated in terms of both collection and analysis. Now with the US looking to expand intelligence links across the globe, BIN is a logical potential partner, albeit one in need of a major overhaul.
Cooperation with Australia, too, is vital. Canberra remains correctly concerned about illegal immigration by Middle Eastern and South Asian nationals. Many of these illegal immigrants pass through Indonesian territory on their way toward Australia, which had led to fears that terrorists may be concealed among their numbers. To combat this possibility, Indonesian authorities should increase their current level of cooperation with their Australian counterparts in order to better counter such human smuggling.
The list of other potential partners goes on. Japan, because of its pressing energy requirements, could better support maritime patrolling to both counter piracy in Indonesian waters and monitor illegal arms smuggling to places like Aceh. India, which is extremely sensitive to religious extremism, could offer added insights into radical religious groups operating in Southeast Asia.
The bottom line is that Indonesia needs partners to mount an effective defense. At the same time, the administration of Megawati Sukarnoputri will need to take a hard look inward at the fine line between public expression and religious intolerance.
In the Middle East, many moderate nations are now coming under fire for allowing religious hatred to flow freely in the media, which indirectly adds legitimacy to radical viewpoints. In the same way, by turning a blind eye to things like public solicitation of funds in downtown Jakarta for an armed conflict in the Malukus—a rather common sight near many tollgates—the Indonesian government provides a fertile breeding ground for extremism. While censorship is abhorrent, tolerance must have limits when it impinges upon national security.
All of which must be taken up as a national priority. President Megawati needs to offer her firm support to policies that address terrorist threats. With the full fallout from the US attacks just beginning to be felt, Indonesia can ill afford to be caught behind the curve.
* Ken Conboy is The Indonesia Country Manager for Control Risks Group, an international business risk and security consultancy.
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